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

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JOHN DAVIS LONG
1906

PAPERS OF JOHN DAVIS LONG

1897-1904

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BY
GARDNER WELD ALLEN

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INTRODUCTION

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GOVERNOR LONG, as he was nearly always called, was born at Buckfield, Maine, October 27, 1838; graduated from Harvard College in 1857; studied law and practised in Boston to the end of his life, though interrupted while holding political offices. He served in the Massachusetts legislature and was governor of the state in 1880, 1881, and 1882; a member of the national House of Representatives from 1883 to 1889; and finally secretary of the navy from March 4, 1897, to May 1, 1902. He became a member of the Massachusetts Historical Society in 1905. He died on August 28, 1915.

In 1929 the late Mrs. Long gave her husband's papers to the Society — a very large collection. For the period of his service in President McKinley's Cabinet the number of papers may be roughly estimated at more than fifteen thousand. While the greater part of the correspondence is of an ordinary sort, there are several hundred letters of decided interest and some of historical importance. Of three hundred and seventy-seven papers selected for publication, twenty-four are letters written by Secretary Long, comprising practically all of his authorship, during this period, in the collection. Nearly all the remainder are letters written to him.

Only a few of the large number of writers will be mentioned here. As might be supposed the letters of naval officers and others concerning naval affairs are numerous and most of them are personal — some of them confidential. Presumably few if any of these have before been published. Captain Mahan wrote to the secretary often and Admiral Sampson was also a constant correspondent. There are a few letters from Admiral Dewey. Captain Chadwick, in later years a member of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Captain Goodrich, and many other officers had much to say to their chief about ships, cruises, and operations in the Spanish War; about the Naval Academy, and the Naval War College. Senator Chandler, a former secretary of the navy, and Senators Hoar and Lodge wrote frequently. Theodore Roosevelt, as assistant secretary of the navy, governor of New York, Vice-President, and President, con-

tributed many characteristic letters to the collection. For permission to include these, thanks are due to the executors of his estate.

Massachusetts affairs and also matters of national and general interest are discussed by Governor Wolcott, Major Higginson, and others. Secretary Long's classmate, Horace N. Fisher, was an authority on Latin America and had a wide knowledge of a variety of subjects which gives his letters a peculiar interest. Of the topics discussed, Cuba and the Philippines had a timely importance. Among the anti-imperialists and pacifists, whose opinions were usually expressed with vehemence, may be noted Governor Boutwell, Gamaliel Bradford, Sr., Moorfield Storey, and the Reverend Charles F. Dole. Supporters of the administration were less emotional, but their arguments may perhaps be generally regarded as the more reasonable.

The secretary himself, while a sincere lover of peace striving to avert war, accepted the situation as it developed and administered his department with energy and sound judgment. His good nature, sense of humor, and tact smoothed the rough places. The vexed question of the policy to be observed towards publicity and newspaper correspondents gave him concern and sometimes called for firmness, of which he was fully capable upon occasion. Governor Long, as every one knew, was a kind-hearted man.[1] Many are the letters in this collection from parents, wives, and others inquiring as to the whereabouts and welfare of various officers and men in the service and acknowledging acts of kindness to husbands, sons, and friends. The governor was president of the Massachusetts Total Abstinence Society, but was not one of the fanatical "drys" we once had with us. He was deluged with letters begging him to abolish the canteen in the Boston Navy Yard, a beneficent institution in those days, keeping the men out of the saloons which infested the neighborhood. After the Spanish War, however, drinking by enlisted men in the navy was prohibited.[2]

The Sampson-Schley controversy was one of the most painful and disagreeable episodes in our history, in which, however, the officers concerned did not themselves take part. After the Battle of Santiago, Admiral Sampson was violently attacked in many newspapers. In reply to these critics Secretary Long sent to the press a

[1] For a very harsh opinion of Secretary Long, see *Letters of Henry Adams*, II (Boston, 1938), 224 and 368. [S.M.]

[2] General Order 508, February 3, 1899.

letter published August 9, 1898, defending the admiral and explaining the situation. This brought to the secretary much commendation but at the same time a torrent of abuse was poured upon him. For the next three years the discussion went on intermittently until the Schley Court of Inquiry in the fall of 1901, when the secretary was subjected to another ordeal of vituperation, mitigated fortunately by many expressions of approval and sympathy.

It was well understood that the governor would have liked to be a United States senator. Probably for many years after his term in the House of Representatives this was his ambition. All hope was finally dashed by a letter from Senator Hoar (January 21, 1901), which may now be seen in the collection, torn in pieces and stuck together again.[3] In 1900 it seems to have been assumed by many politicians that he would be nominated for Vice-President, but the prize, considered of doubtful value at the time, was carried off by his former assistant secretary.[4]

Inasmuch as Governor Long was a New Englander it is only natural that a majority of the writers of these letters, if we except naval officers, should have been men of this community. Many were Harvard men and a considerable number were then, or afterwards became, members of the Massachusetts Historical Society. This gives the correspondence a somewhat local character. It has seemed pertinent to indicate college affiliations in footnotes relating to the writers and persons mentioned. Nearly all naval officers were graduates of Annapolis.

This work was undertaken in 1929 at the suggestion of Mr. Worthington C. Ford, Editor Emeritus of the Society, and within the next two years the letters to be printed were carefully selected and copied. During this period the help and advice given by the Librarian Emeritus, Mr. Julius S. Tuttle, in the search for explanatory material for notes, were of great value. Conditions being then unfavorable, publication was deferred. Within recent months the

[3] Governor Long had, in point of fact, another chance to enter the Senate. When Senator Hoar died suddenly on September 30, 1904, Governor John L. Bates had good reason to see fit to appoint his own predecessor, former Governor Winthrop Murray Crane, to the vacant seat. Senator Crane served out the remainder of Hoar's term, and was reëlected to the Senate in 1907. [S.M.]

[4] Governor Long is said to have doubted the sincerity of Senator Lodge's promise to support his candidacy for the second place on the ticket at the Republican convention in Philadelphia, even though this nomination would have removed Long as a possible competitor for Lodge's seat in the Senate in 1904–1905. See the last letter in this volume. [S.M.]

copied letters have been carefully prepared for the press by Mr. Mitchell.

Secretary Long's book, *The New American Navy*, and Mr. Lawrence S. Mayo's *America of Yesterday, as Reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long*, have been of great assistance. Admiral Chadwick's *Spanish-American War* has also been helpful.

For the frontispiece to this volume the Society is indebted to the kindness and generosity of Mr. Lawrence Shaw Mayo.

G. W. A.

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Papers of John Davis Long

1897

ROBERT M. MORSE TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
March 3, 1897

My dear Long:

I have been delaying to send you my congratulations on your appointment to the cabinet only to get something more definite about it. But I don't want to delay longer and wish you to believe that I heartily congratulate you and wish you all success. You could not return to public life in a more honorable or satisfactory way and I am glad to believe that you will be on hand to prevent at the outset any such deplorable calamity as the jingoists would pull us into as a war with Spain. With my kind regards to Mrs. Long as well as yourself, believe me

Yours truly
Robert M. Morse[1]

CARLETON HUNT TO SECRETARY LONG

Supreme Court
State of Louisiana
New Orleans
March 4, 1897

Dear Governor:

I send you best congratulations, on the occasion of your appointment to be secretary of the navy. This appointment is not without special interest for me, as being held now by you, and as having been filled in the time of President Garfield, by my dear kinsman, William H. Hunt,[1] under whom I grew up as a lawyer.

The subjects of naval architecture and ordnance are truly engrossing. They have developed in the last thirty-five or forty years at such a rate as to form of themselves no unimportant part of modern science, and have, at last, revolutionized naval warfare. Strange to say, the world has yet to judge, by the actual results of naval battle,

[1] Robert McNeil Morse (1837–1920), college classmate of Governor Long and a prominent Boston lawyer.

[1] William Henry Hunt (1824–1884), secretary of the navy 1881–1882.

of the real extent of the mighty forces which have been called into play.

Your life as secretary will, without doubt, be very gratifying, as it brings you in contact with the rights and duties, and with the privileges and honor of the naval profession. This has always been proudly represented in the service of the United States, where the spirit and devotion, and where the talents and accomplishments of our American officers place them on a fair level with the finest naval officers that the history of Great Britain can boast. While, no doubt, considerable credit may be due our mutual friend, Secretary Herbert,[2] it is only part of the truth of history that the party affecting to be the party of the people has, at least until recently, with persistent penuriousness and want of patriotism obstructed the establishment of a suitable navy. I welcome the tardy change. I wish it had been a greater change. I wish we had many times our present number of ships of war. Here, close to Cuba, it is a sign of the times that people are eager for true protection to American citizenship from the navy, a protection, which, while respecting international obligations, will claim for the government of the United States all of the deference which its greatness, and which its peculiar situation and interests justly entitle it to.

If it should happen that actual military and naval service are required by the cause of our country, the men of the South will rush in multitudes, with absolute devotion to its support.

As the duties of your place are to bring you constantly into the councils of the President, for the general welfare, perhaps you will be pleased to have my testimony to the good feeling which is undoubtedly to be found for him here, as he enters upon his great office.

If there is a place where the necessity of keeping inviolate the good faith of the country, by redeeming its financial obligations, in the sense insisted on by him in his campaign addresses is understood, that place is the commercial city of New Orleans. The party of repudiation disappears and will be lost. The best results have attended the expression of the ardent patriotism of the President. Indeed, I can not but believe there is to be a better order of things here, and one, as I hope, that he will be able to direct. If ever there has been a time when the un-American heresy of tariff

[2] Hilary Abner Herbert (1834–1919), secretary of the navy in President Cleveland's second term.

for revenue only was weak and tottering (you and I helped once to overthrow it in a close struggle over the Morrison bill) that time is happily now.[3]

Let me add that it is, at last, deeply felt in Louisiana that the best interests of the state have been sacrificed to the false, delusive and ruinous industrial policy of the Democratic party.

With wishes, my dear governor, for a prosperous and happy official residence for you in Washington, and for the success and honor of the administration of President McKinley, I am,

Very sincerely yours,
CARLETON HUNT[4]

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

FRANCIS D. MILLET TO SECRETARY LONG

Russell House
Broadway
WORCESTERSHIRE
March 4 [1897]

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I see by the *Times* to-day that you are to be or, indeed, already are the secretary of the navy and I can not help sending you a line to say what a satisfaction it is to see this fact recorded. It is a very long time since I have had the pleasure of seeing you but I can not forget the place you held in my father's[1] estimation and the great regard I have always had for your personality and attainments. When you retired from public life it seemed to me a great misfortune for the country and now that you are in active work again I know the interests of the office will be well served and the nation be much richer for your help.

From this remote corner we watch the affairs at home with a keen attention and are, naturally, very jealous of the good name of our government. Therefore we feel it a personal gain to have a

[3] William R. Morrison, of Illinois, chairman of the committee on ways and means, introduced in the House of Representatives, in 1884, a tariff bill, according to which coal, lumber, and salt were to be placed on the free list, and a horizontal reduction of twenty per cent. was to be made on all other dutiable goods. The Democrats were in control of the House, but forty-one of them joined the Republican minority to kill the bill.

[4] Carleton Hunt (1836–1921), Harvard College '56, lawyer and professor of law in New Orleans, M. C. 1883–1885.

[1] Dr. Asa Millet, of East Bridgewater, Massachusetts.

good man put in a good place. And this is why I have ventured to write you, hoping it may not be amiss to hear a note of pleasure from this country corner.

Mr. Gage [2] who is the secretary of the treasury is a good friend of mine and is one of the finest men I ever knew. It was a great pleasure to be with him in Chicago and his influence did more, probably, than any other one man to keep the exhibition up to the high standard it maintained.

Yours faithfully,
F. D. Millet [3]

FRANCIS BARTLETT TO SECRETARY LONG

Washington
March 6, 1897

Dear John:

I am certain you will be surprised, but I trust not disturbed, to find me appearing as an office seeker thus early in your new career. I enclose with this a more formal note, relating to the appointment of Commander William H. Emory,[1] United States Navy, as inspector. My reason for so doing is that Commodore Perkins,[2] of Boston, (whose remarkable services under Farragut [3] at Mobile and New Orleans you may remember) whom I met here yesterday, asked what Commander Emory was doing now, told me that he was "waiting orders," but hoped he might receive the appointment spoken of asking me if I knew you well enough to state the facts of the case, which I trust I was not assuming too much, in saying that I thought I did. I accordingly told Commodore Perkins that I would write you, not asking for the appointment for Commander Emory, which I have no right to do, but to call your attention, as I have done, to the merits of the case, as understood by those whose opinions should, it would seem, have weight.

My interest in Commander Emory comes from meeting him in China in 1896 when he was in command of the *Petrel* and when I formed a most favorable opinion of him both from what I myself discovered, as from the talk of the naval officers of other nations,

[2] Lyman Judson Gage (1836–1927).

[3] Francis Davis Millet (1846–1912), Harvard College '69, lost on the *Titantic*, April, 1912.

[1] William Hemsley Emory (1846–1917).

[2] George Hamilton Perkins (1836–1899).

[3] Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (1801–1870).

who spoke of him in a way that made you feel very proud of our service. I am on my way back from Florida, stopping over here for the inauguration.

You have my heartiest well wishings for your success in your new office, of which I am perfectly assured.

Very faithfully yours,
FRANCIS BARTLETT [4]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[Endorsement]

Refer to Navigation: FRANCIS BARTLETT, 236 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts, writes in behalf of Commander William H. Emory, who seeks detail as an inspector.

COMMANDER GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
Personal NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
March 19, 1897

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I take the liberty of sending you, under separate cover, some of the publications relating to the War College [1] and its aims, begging that you will kindly glance over them and thus get an idea of the college work. The *Abstract of Course* touches upon matters of more special interest to naval officers and is therefore marked confidential. These are sent with a view of preparing you somewhat for the conference I expect to have with you shortly. Through these pamphlets, it can be made to consume as little as possible of your time. I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Yours very truly,
C. F. GOODRICH
President

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[4] Francis Bartlett (1836–1913), Harvard College '57.

[1] The Naval War College had its origin in the report of a board of officers appointed May 3, 1884, by William Eaton Chandler (1835–1917), secretary of the navy. The board consisted of Commodore Stephen Bleecker Luce (1827–1917), Commander William Thomas Sampson (1840–1902), and Lieutenant-Commander Caspar Frederick Goodrich (1847–1925). See John D. Long, *The New American Navy* (New York, 1903), I, 75.

SECRETARY LONG TO S. Z. BOWMAN

March 23, 1897

[S. Z. Bowman]

Your telegrams with regard to Commander Merry [1] are at hand. You know I would do anything to oblige you personally, — but let me tell you how this matter stands. Commander Merry stands next in line for sea service, and has been ordered to the *Katahdin.* If there is any reason why he should not go there, the regulations strictly require that he should apply to the department officially, stating the reasons for his application, and the rule is also clearly to the intent that he should not resort to personal influences to accomplish his purpose.

Commander Merry has made no application to the department, which is certainly very peculiar; but on receiving his orders appeals to personal friends of mine, like yourself,[2] Bailey [3] and Hale,[4] to whom it is almost impossible to refuse a request, and he floods me with telegrams. These, also, state no reason for his not complying with the order which has been issued.

The command of the *Katahdin* is a highly honorable position. As to Commander Merry's desire to go to Asiatic waters, his last cruise at sea was on the Asiatic station, from 1884 to the latter part of 1887. If this was a case that stood out by itself, it would be different. But if his request is granted it will be known throughout the length and breadth of the navy in twenty-four hours, and it will be known that it was done in an irregular way and by his bringing the personal requests of my warm personal friends to bear on me. It is the very thing that the rule is intended to prevent, and not only contrary to the rule but to all propriety of official conduct. If I start in that way, my whole time will be taken up with demands from officers, their wives and friends, to change them from one berth to some other which they prefer a little more, and I should be powerless to refuse, because it would be said that I had done it in a home case. I do not believe that you will ask me to put myself in this position, and yet it is the hardest work in the

[1] John Fairfield Merry (1840–1916).

[2] Probably Selwyn Zadoc Bowman (1840–1928), Harvard College '60, M. C. from Massachusetts 1879–1883.

[3] James Alderson Bailey, Jr. (b. 1867), Harvard College '88.

[4] Edwin Blaisdell Hale (1839–1926), Dartmouth '64. Secretary Long had received telegrams from these three.

world for me not to instantly comply with the slighest wish of my friends. I can not bear that they should think me disobliging or ungracious. I have explained the matter to McCall,[5] who has telegraphed me. I shall also explain it to Barrett,[6] who sees the difficulty. I wish you would show this letter to Hale, who also telegraphed me from Boston, and to Bailey, who [you?] say is interested in the matter.

Very truly yours,
[JOHN D. LONG]

SENATOR PROCTOR TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 23, 1897

TO THE PRESIDENT:

I like Theodore Roosevelt. His honesty and energy and courage sometimes trouble those who are easily alarmed at any exhibition of these qualities, but I honor and respect him for them, and believe that if he was appointed assistant secretary of the navy he would do credit to himself and to your administration, and am glad to heartily endorse him for that appointment.

Very respectfully
REDFIELD PROCTOR [1]

WILLIAM L. STRONG TO SENATOR LODGE

CITY OF NEW YORK
Office of the Mayor
March 30, 1897

MY DEAR MR. LODGE:

Police Commissioner Roosevelt is somewhat desirous of being assistant secretary of the navy, and after a long conversation with him yesterday I am quite well satisfied that I shall have to relinquish my claim on him to retain his present position until the first of January, 1898, not because I want to, but because I am quite sure it will be to his interest to take the position of assistant secretary, if the secretary would like to have him. I had hoped

[5] Samuel Walker McCall (1851–1923), Dartmouth '74, M. C. from Massachusetts 1893–1913, and governor 1916–1918.

[6] William Emerson Barrett (1858–1906), Dartmouth '80, M. C. from Massachusetts 1895–1899.

[1] Redfield Proctor (1831–1908), Dartmouth '51, U. S. senator from Vermont.

that he would remain in his present position until the fight was over here, but I can not ask him to do that, against a prospective position that would be more to his taste, and one I am very sure he can fill with signal ability, as he has the position of police commissioner.

I can not tell you, Mr. Lodge, how much I shall regret this change, even for nine months, but he is bold, courageous, vigorous and full of integrity, and to me just an ideal man for any municipal or governmental position, and I can not say too much in his favor, and in justice to him I must wish him success in getting this appointment, but I shall part with him with sincere regret.

I have the honor to remain

Very sincerely yours,
W. L. Strong[1]

Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
United States Senate Chamber
Washington, D. C.

NATHAN APPLETON TO SECRETARY LONG

66 Beacon Street
Boston
31 March, 1897

My dear Sir:

I hope, in the midst of your numerous occupations, you have not forgotten the Panama Canal, the annexation of Hawaii, the cable across the Pacific Ocean, and the development of Pearl Harbor, near Honolulu. As regards the first I would say that a commission of engineers should be sent to the isthmus to see just what the situation at Panama is, and what work is being done there. For the Hawaiian Islands also a commission should be sent to remain there several months, and show our people what folly it would be for us by the *vis inertiae* to allow Japan or England to have possession of the only harbor in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator.

Personally I would say, that, while you know very well I have been a public spirited and patriotic citizen of our country for more than thirty years, the best work I could do, and the one most fitted to my knowledge of the situation, would be to have some sort of credentials from our government to go to France any time [during] the next three months to find out at what price the old and new Panama Canal companies would be willing to sell out all they have

[1] William Lafayette Strong (1827–1900), mayor of New York City.

either to our government, or to a joint stock American company. That done, in my opinion, the canal can easily be finished.

Yours very truly
NATHAN APPLETON [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

FRANCIS BARTLETT TO SECRETARY LONG

Monument Club
BOURNE, MASSACHUSETTS
April 1, 1897

MY DEAR JOHN:

I enclose a note received to-day from Mr. Hamilton Perkins,[1] a son-in-law of Mr. William Bliss,[2] president of the Boston & Albany Railroad formerly of the navy and brother of Commodore George Perkins. In regard to Captain Gridley [3] I can only say that of course I am too much of a layman to pass upon his professional capacity for any position, but I was his guest last spring upon an inspection trip upon his visit to the light-houses on Lake Ontario, and I can imagine no one with whom I should be better pleased to have daily relations than with him, and should be greatly pleased to think that any word of mine would have weight in procuring for him any position for which he was fitted.

It can but seem strange to me as it must you that I am again in the position of asking a favor of you in your new position, but in both cases so far as my opinion is of weight, I am certain you will be willing to consider it.

Yours very truly,
FRANCIS BARTLETT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[1] Nathan Appleton (1843–1906), Harvard College '63, captain U. S. V., in the Civil War, authority on the subject of isthmian canals.

[1] Lieutenant Hamilton Perkins resigned from the navy in 1888.
[2] William Bliss (1834–1907).
[3] Charles Vernon Gridley (1845–1898).

BENJAMIN F. TRACY TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

35 Wall Street
New York
April 5, 1897

My dear Mr. Secretary:

As I understand that Captain Schley [1] is shortly to be ordered to duty as a member of the lighthouse board, I venture to take the liberty of writing to you in reference to his selection as chairman of the board.

I suppose it is hardly necessary for me to say much about Captain Schley's reputation and position as an officer. His admirable services in command of the relief expedition for the rescue of Greely [2] are well known to every one, and he subsequently made an excellent record as chief of the bureau of equipment. While I was in the navy department, he was the efficient commanding-officer of the *Baltimore*, and he was subsequently detailed for lighthouse duty in charge of the principal depot at Tompkinsville [3] of the lighthouse establishment.

As you doubtless know, the chairman of the board is elected by the board. The naval members as a rule vote for the senior naval officer, the army members for the senior army officer, and the civil members have the casting vote, including the secretary of the treasury, who is ex-officio a member of the board. I always regarded the lighthouse establishment, though under the treasury department, as being primarily a nautical bureau, and this opinion was shared by the secretaries of the treasury [4] while I was in the Cabinet. The lighthouses exist for the benefit of navigation and it has always seemed to me that the executive head of the establishment should be a sea-faring man. They have no connection whatever with the army and the only reason why the army should take part in their administration is in order that the services of the army engineers may be made available in their construction. The relation even of these engineers to the establishment has always seemed to me to be entirely subsidiary.

Knowing as I do the natural conflict of interests which seems

[1] Winfield Scott Schley (1839–1911).

[2] Lieutenant Adolphus Washington Greely (1844–1935), in command of the Arctic expedition, 1881–1884.

[3] Staten Island.

[4] William Windom (1827–1891) and Charles Foster (1828–1904).

always to exist in Washington between the two services and that the chairmanship of the lighthouse board is one of the points of conflict, I have ventured to write you on the subject, as my personal interest in the navy did not cease at the time of my leaving the department. If I had the pleasure of knowing Secretary Gage personally, I should feel disposed to write also to him, but perhaps if you show him my letter it will serve the same purpose. I would add that my personal knowledge of the worth and ability of Captain Schley and my personal regard for him have a strong influence with me in writing to you on the subject.

Very truly yours,
B. F. TRACY [5]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILLIAM R. GRACE TO SECRETARY LONG

1–2 Hanover Square
Personal NEW YORK
7 April, 1897

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I had the pleasure of calling on you the other day, to renew our acquaintance of some years ago. I was glad to see you looking so well, and I hope that you are enjoying your new post as secretary. It is a great office, one that grows more and more important, and attracts more and more attention throughout the country from year to year, and I have no doubt you will be able to discharge your duties to the satisfaction of the people and with great credit to yourself.

I want to congratulate you upon the appointment of Theodore Roosevelt as assistant secretary. I have known him since he made his first appearance in public life, and was much impressed by his way of accomplishing things in the assembly of this state. No one man has ever accomplished more in that body in the interests of reform in the city of New York than Mr. Roosevelt, and his public record since then is well known to us all. I have not the slightest doubt that his ability, studiousness and energy will make themselves felt to his own credit and your advantage. I hope some day to have the pleasure of voting for him as mayor of New York

[5] Benjamin Franklin Tracy (1830–1915), secretary of the navy in President Harrison's administration; New York lawyer.

City, or governor of the state, although he does not belong to my party. With best wishes, I am,

Yours very truly,
W. R. GRACE[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL SELFRIDGE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *San Francisco*
Personal SMYRNA, ASIA MINOR
April 8, 1897

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

As the oldest Massachusetts officer on the active list, and with mutual friends in Boston, I take the liberty to send my congratulations that our native state has been honored in your selection as secretary of the navy; and that my profession is to reap the benefit of the presence of a gentleman who has been so eminent in both public and state affairs.

It is coupled with regret however that it will be my privilege to serve under you but for a short period (as I retire in less than a year); for in my long service of forty years, it is the first time that the secretary of the navy has been appointed from my native state.

As a Massachusetts officer and native of Boston, the neglect of the Boston Navy Yard has been a blow to my pride. The closing of this important navy yard has not been the result of any legal act, but due to stronger local prejudices on the part of your predecessors in office. To be sure the plea has been made that two navy yards are cheaper to run than three, but I know it to be a fact that the gathering of too many vessels at New York and Norfolk, have so obstructed the water front, as to compel ships to lie in tiers of two or three, and thus greatly increase the cost of repairs.

When commandant of the Boston Navy Yard, from 1890 to 1893, with the slender means at my command, I put the Boston yard in a position to make repairs, but I could not succeed in overcoming the local prejudices that I mentioned. There is a report in the navy department by a board of officers, of which Admiral Luce[1] was president, on the resources of the different navy yards, and it would be worth your while to send for it. Chief Constructor Hichborn[2]

[1] William Russell Grace (1832–1904), mayor of New York City 1881–1886.

[1] Rear-Admiral S. B. Luce.

[2] Philip Hichborn (1839–1910), chief of bureau of construction and repair.

could get it for you. In this report you will find ample justification if you desire to reopen the Boston Navy Yard, which only requires an order from you to send one or more ships there to be repaired. The facilities for doing so are already at hand.

In 1890 I formulated plans for the permanent improvement of the Boston Navy Yard on business principles, but for obvious reasons I could not obtain a sanction for them, as they required a money appropriation. When I retire from this cruise, I shall be pleased to lay them before you if you desire.

I have just returned from a cruise along the Syrian and Asia Minor coast, and the situation is more encouraging than I could have hoped. Our missionaries in the interior reached from Alexandretta and Mersina do not write with any apprehension of future disturbances, and their schools are all in operation. I conversed with several of the Turkish governor[s] and they all assured me that it was their desire to maintain tranquillity. There is much suffering among the Armenians and many widows and orphans, the result of the awful massacres of last year.

The Turk, unless his religious fanaticism is aroused, is lethargic, and easy to govern. But still there is a rabble in all the towns whose appetite for plunder has been whetted, and it will be some time before apprehensions from outbreaks from them will entirely disappear. I am satisfied it is entirely within the power of the local authorities to control the turbulent, and they will do so if upheld by the Sultan. The latter is the unknown quantity.

Yours truly

THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, JR.[3]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG,
Secretary of the Navy.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMANDER GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
United States Naval Station
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
April 10, 1897

SIR:

I am sorry to have to report that Senator Lodge will be so busy with work in connection with the tariff as to be unable to deliver

[3] Thomas Oliver Selfridge (1836–1924). Admiral Selfridge's father, Rear-Admiral T. O. Selfridge, Sr., who entered the navy in 1818, was still living at this time.

an address at the opening of the college. I have hopes that perhaps at some other time he may be able to come.

2. I shall be very glad and the college would be greatly honored if you would yourself take Senator Lodge's place. You may remember that I asked you originally to open the college. If you can not come perhaps Mr. Roosevelt will do so. He has already expressed to me his readiness to accept the invitation extended in your name to lecture at the college at a date as yet undetermined. In this way Mr. Roosevelt might open the college and Mr. Lodge address it at his convenience during the summer.

3. Begging the favor of an intimation of your wishes in this matter I am,

Very respectfully,
C. F. GOODRICH
President

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GENERAL WILSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

Stockford
WILMINGTON, DELAWARE
April 13, 1897

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have been trying for several days to congratulate you on the appointment of ROOSEVELT as your assistant secretary. It is in my judgment a capital stroke of business for both the government and for yourself.

I have had a great deal of experience in handling young and ambitious men and it is to me an immense satisfaction to have such as Roosevelt about. You will find it a constant delight to have his cooperation. His perfect honesty, fearlessness and enthusiasm for work – his untiring industry, and his intense Americanism will make him invaluable to you and to the service. And he will be as loyal and obedient as the stupidest man you could find!

I look upon your department as under ideal control, and I bespeak for you increased honor and usefulness in the service of the great republic!

Yours sincerely,
JAMES H. WILSON [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department

[1] James Harrison Wilson (1837–1925), major-general U. S. V., in the Civil War, and U. S. A. (bvt.)

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
Boston
April 21, 1897

My dear Sir:

My attention has been called to the fact that September 30, 1897, is the one-hundredth anniversary of the launching of the *Constitution* from Constitution Wharf in this city, and that there is a feeling among certain members of the legislature that it would be a proper and fitting thing to have this day publicly observed by the presence of the *Constitution* in this harbor and by such exercises as might be later determined upon. The wish is very strongly expressed that the President and Cabinet might find it possible to be present and take part in this proposed commemoration of the most famous ship that ever belonged to the navy of the United States.

I have been asked to communicate with you informally in regard to it in order to ascertain your views as to whether the above plan meets your approval and seems to you to be feasible, and especially whether in your opinion we could probably hope to secure the presence of the President and other members of the Cabinet on the occasion. In case your reply is a favorable one I think it is proposed that the legislature shall adopt some resolve providing for the carrying out of the plan.

Believe me with much respect

Very truly yours,
Roger Wolcott[1]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
Boston
May 3, 1897

My dear Sir:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your favors of April 30 and May 1 relative to the proposed celebration by this commonwealth of the one-hundredth anniversary of the launching of the frigate

[1] Roger Wolcott (1847–1900), Harvard College '70, governor of Massachusetts.

Constitution and enclosing a letter addressed to you by Senator Chandler,[1] a communication addressed to him by the New Hampshire Society of the Sons of the American Revolution, and a letter addressed to you by Mr. Henry Bainbridge of Brooklyn, New York.

I am glad that the proposed celebration appears to you proper and feasible, and as soon as any definite action is taken by the legislature regarding it I will promptly communicate it to you.

Thanking you for the interest you have taken in the matter, I am, with much respect,

Very truly yours,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN COOPER TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

United States Naval Academy
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
May 11, 1897

SIR:

With reference to the subject of your unofficial letter of May 10, 1897, I have to state that it must be acknowledged that the law can not discriminate against colored boys, if members of Congress will recommend them for appointment. If therefore the government entrusts the Naval Academy authorities with the responsibility of educating and protecting the boy who is to report for examination in September I hope that there will be no doubt in the mind of the secretary that the duty will be faithfully discharged.

I can not think that it is desirable to make any special point with the cadets that the law must be observed in this case. Their entire training is preparing them for any event that may arise and there is not in my opinion the least fear to be apprehended after the young man enters the academy, if perchance he qualifies. He will have the same examination and the same opportunities as the other candidates; he will not be discriminated against, nor will he be especially guarded. The trouble to be apprehended will be that before he becomes a cadet he may have rough treatment from outsiders, but that is a matter for the civil authorities to handle.

[1] William E. Chandler, of New Hampshire, former secretary of the navy.

I can foresee the life he will lead at the academy in part. He will not of course be *persona grata* with other cadets; he will lead a solitary and forlorn existence in social relations; in official matters he will be as the others are and have the countenance of the authorities. Within the walls of the academy he will have no associates of his color, for he can not look to the servants and messengers for companionship and if he can stand four years of such a life he will be rewarded with a certificate of proficiency.

The newspaper reports you have referred to have not been inspired at the Naval Academy and I trust that you will be able to answer your anxious correspondents that you are confident that the officers and cadets will give the young colored man every chance to make his record upon his merits.

Very respectfully,
P. H. Cooper[1]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

COMMANDER GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
May 15, 1897

My dear Mr. Secretary:

As a result of my conferences in Washington I beg to say that Senator Lodge is so deeply engaged this coming summer as to be unable to address the class at the War College, but he holds out some hope of favoring us next year. He begged me to express to you his appreciation of the compliment paid him. He suggested Senator Frye[1] rather than Senator Elkins[2] inasmuch as the latter has taken up the subject of mercantile marine with practically a sole purpose of advocating subsidies, while the former, as chairman of the committee on commerce, has made the whole subject his own and can therefore speak with a greater authority. Shall I in your name invite Senator Frye?

[1] Captain Philip Henry Cooper (1844–1912), superintendent of the Naval Academy.

[1] William Pierce Frye (1831–1911), Bowdoin '50, U. S. senator from Maine.
[2] Stephen Benton Elkins (1841–1911), U. S. senator from West Virginia.

Mr. Justice Brewer [3] was unable to give me a definite answer but he thinks he may possibly be able to address the class here on the proposed subject, namely: "Venezuela and the Monroe Doctrine." He was much impressed by the courtesy of your invitation and begged me to convey to you his thanks.

Senator Hale [4] was most grateful for your kind invitation. He asked me to thank you for your consideration and to say that for this year at least it would be impossible for him to come to Newport for the purpose mentioned, much as he would like to do so.

Mr. Foster [5] thought he would be able to come later in the session and for that reason he gave no positive answer. If he can come at all it will probably be in the month of September.

Mr. Charles H. Cramp [6] is very much pleased by the honor you have conferred upon him in asking him to be one of the lecturers and he will come. I think that from him we shall hear something which will be well worth listening to.

I am awaiting replies to letters addressed to the other distinguished gentlemen whom you named. From some at least I look for favorable replies.

With much respect, sir, I am

Yours very truly,
C. F. Goodrich

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

SECRETARY DAY TO SECRETARY LONG

June 12, 1897

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy:

A note just received from the Spanish minister [1] reports information that a carload of arms left Jacksonville yesterday morning by Florida East Coast Railroad and passed New Smyrna last evening south-bound, that a second carload of rifles and dynamite left

[3] David Josiah Brewer (1837–1910), Yale '56, associate justice, U. S. Supreme Court.

[4] Eugene Hale (1836–1918), U. S. senator from Maine.

[5] John Watson Foster (1836–1917), diplomatist and former secretary of state.

[6] Charles Henry Cramp (1828–1913), shipbuilder, of Philadelphia.

[1] Don Enrique Dupuy de Lôme.

Jacksonville yesterday morning on the regular freight train for the probable purpose of being transferred to some vessel on the east coast probably the yacht *Valusia* which has been engaged to transfer these munitions from the railway to the vessels destined for Cuba. He asks renewed vigilance on the south-east coast of Florida adding that it is probable that the vessel which will receive these arms will not come close to shore.

Respectfully yours,
WILLIAM R. DAY [2]
Acting Secretary

COMMODORE O'NEIL TO SECRETARY LONG

Department of the Navy
Bureau of Ordnance
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 12, 1897

Memorandum for the
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

The high explosive shell invention of the Messrs. Hanson would appear, from their description, which is herewith returned, to probably consist in loading the shell with materials which when separate are inert, but which when mixed together by some means on firing the shell, become violently explosive. This idea is one which for years has been periodically proposed to the bureau. It is considered entirely impracticable.

It might be, of course, that this particular invention is a valuable one, but it is extremely unlikely, and when the number of persons writing to the department and requesting the test of their inventions, which they always think of very great value and importance, is considered, it seems evident that it would be unwise to agree to the conditions which Messrs. Hanson propose.

The bureau thinks that it is not advisable to agree to test at government expense any invention at all, until a knowledge of all its details has enabled a judgment to be formed as to its probable value.

CHARLES O'NEIL [1]

[2] William Rufus Day (1849–1923), University of Michigan '70, assistant secretary, later secretary of state, and afterwards associate justice of the U. S. Supreme Court.

[1] Captain Charles O'Neil (1842–1927), chief of bureau with the rank of commodore.

NATHAN APPLETON TO SECRETARY LONG

66 Beacon Street
Boston
5 August, 1897

My dear Sir:

I take pleasure in enclosing a short article of mine on the Panama Canal, with six views of the work now going on there, which give a good idea of the progress of the great enterprise.

I wrote the President about ten days ago a letter asking to be appointed one of the three commissioners to examine and report upon a deep waterway from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Ocean, and have received a reply from Secretary Porter[1] saying that my communication had been referred for the consideration of the secretary of war.[2] I informed the President of my knowledge of canals from the time I was the delegate of the Boston board of trade at the opening of the Suez Canal in November, 1869, down to the present time. I can now tell you that I consider myself thoroughly competent to do my part as one member of the commission, and also that I believe in such a commission it is advantageous for many reasons to have one of the three commissioners a person of general knowledge on the subject, but not a professional engineer.

I watch with great interest all that is transpiring in the Hawaiian Islands, and would say that I shall not feel at ease until our flag is hoisted in Pearl Harbor, which I believe we have a right to do from the present treaty. Professor Alexander,[3] an old American engineer, who has lived there for years and whom I met during my sojourn nearly a year ago, could easily attend to the small amount of dredging needed to enter the harbor.

Believe me, dear Mr. Secretary

Yours very truly
Nathan Appleton

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

[1] John Addison Porter (1856–1900), Yale '78, secretary to President McKinley.
[2] General Russell Alexander Alger (1836–1907).
[3] Edward Porter Alexander (1835–1910).

REAR-ADMIRAL SICARD TO SECRETARY LONG

Flagship *New York*, First Rate
Personal YORKTOWN, VIRGINIA
September 29, 1897

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have your letter of the twenty-sixth instant and in reply would say that I have been intending to go to Boston with the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Maine* and *Texas*.

It is probable that, on account of the ferries, the harbor proper can only accommodate three of the ships safely, and I had selected the *New York*, *Massachusetts* and *Maine* to anchor there, the other ships to anchor in President Roads.

It has been my intention to reach Boston about October 13, but yesterday I was in receipt of a letter from the department enquiring whether the squadron would be at Hampton Roads on the fourteenth of October, with a view to receiving a visit from the New York Life Insurance Association, which expects to be there at that time.

Yesterday I wrote to the department, discussing certain matters involved in the trip to Boston, which seemed to militate against the reception of the association above mentioned, at Hampton Roads on the fourteenth. As there has not yet been time to receive an answer to this letter, I am just now somewhat in doubt about the precise date of sailing from this neighborhood and consequent arrival at Boston, and I shall be obliged to await information from the department before I can fix a date for reaching Boston. Will you therefore please inform me by telegraph whether I am to be at Hampton Roads on the fourteenth of October, as in such case I can not, unless I use high speed, enter the port of Boston before October 17, and more probably the eighteenth, whereas the seventeenth would be the latest date on which we should arrive if the convenience of the tide is to be considered, which I think is necessary.

If we leave the drill ground on the ninth, we could reach Boston on the twelfth or thirteenth, probably.

My letter of the twenty-eighth explains about the tides at Boston.

Very truly yours,
MONTGOMERY SICARD [1]

[1] Montgomery Sicard (1836–1900), commanding the North Atlantic Squadron.

COMMODORE HOWISON TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts
October 2, 1897

My dear Sir:

Your two personal letters, relating to the centennial celebration of the launching of the *Constitution*, reached me last evening.

I shall, as instructed, communicate with Mr. Haskins[1] in regard to exhibiting the relics in his possession.

I doubt very much the advisability of having such a valuable collection of relics on board the old frigate at this time, as it is expected that there will be a vast number of visitors, and such valuable articles are difficult to properly care for in densely crowded places.

Referring to the matter of invitations, I have called on Governor Wolcott, who informed me that he intended giving the names of persons to be invited and that the list would include the names of some six or seven hundred persons, some of whom would probably not accept; estimating that some four or five hundred would come with, and present the tickets admitting them to the deck of the vessel at the time of the proposed ceremonies.

The spar deck of the old frigate offers standing room for about four or five hundred. After the ceremonies on October 21 the general public are to be admitted, using all care possible to avoid crowding and endangering the lives of the persons going on board. The old ship is now open to visitors from 10 A.M. to 4 P.M., daily except Sundays and Wednesdays. Wednesdays are reserved to give the vessel one day in each week for cleaning.

I have declined to reserve any days for societies or other bodies to commence the celebration of the launching, until after the governor has completed the ceremonies which are to take place on the twenty-first instant.

I understand this is a celebration by the state and city here, and as the governor is arranging for the invitations, and is to say to whom they are to be sent, would it not be well to refer all such requests to him?

I am, Sir,
Faithfully yours,
H. L. Howison[2]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[1] David Greene Haskins, Jr. (1845–1926), Harvard College '66.

[2] Henry Lycurgus Howison (1837–1914), commandant of the Boston Navy Yard.

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

NAHANT, MASSACHUSETTS
October 6, 1897

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

The Boston Fruit Company,[1] which has been built up by our people here in Massachusetts until now it is a very strong concern, and doing a large business in the West Indies, are anxious to put on four American built steamers to run between here and Jamaica. Their competitors are a subsidized English line and they can not do it unless they receive a mail subsidy, as provided in the act of ninety-one.[2] I have written to the postmaster general[3] in regard to it, and I hope you will do all you can to assist them. We are pledged to the encouragement of American shipping, and I do not know a case where aid could be better bestowed. It will encourage our ship building and help our commerce in the West Indies.

With kindest regards,

Very sincerely yours,
H. C. LODGE

SECRETARY LONG TO ALFRED NOON

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
October 11, 1897

Personal

SIR:

I am in receipt of your letter of October 8.

Evidently there is some misapprehension as to the post tradership at the Charlestown Navy Yard. When I came here the system which had been adopted was to permit some man to establish a post tradership or canteen, as it is sometimes called, in the various yards. There has been such a one at Charlestown for many years. It has been, more or less, under the supervision of marine officers. I suppose the purpose of its establishment was to prevent enlisted men from going outside the yard and patronizing liquor saloons, which exist, as you know, in every city in close proximity to such yards. It seemed to me that I could improve even upon this. I found that the army had successfully tried the experiment of abolishing these canteens, which inured entirely to the profit of the person who

[1] Later the United Fruit Company.
[2] Act of March 3, 1891.
[3] James Albert Gary (1833–1920).

happened to have the privilege of running them. The army plan substituted a system by which the immediate management is under the direction of officers who keep strict account, so that every dollar of profit instead of going to the liquor seller goes back to the men, and is expended in the improvement to their food and for the purchase of books, periodicals, gymnastic appliances, better food and other means of improving their moral and physical condition. This new system, also, as you see, tends to eliminate the element of greed on the part of the liquor seller who, under the old system is constantly under temptation to sell as much beer as possible, in order to enlarge his profits. The overwhelming testimony is that it has proved a great success in the army, as I am informed, both in the way of improving the habits of drinking on the part of the men, and in securing for them additional comforts.

The assistant secretary of the navy, Mr. Roosevelt, who has charge of matters relating to the marine corps, has therefore established this new system in several places, including Charlestown. I need not assure you that the only purpose is to make an improvement. From the nature of your letter I infer that you are not familiar with the facts.

As the navy yard at Charlestown is a part of the United States reservations, I suppose the state liquor laws including the requirement of municipal licenses, do not apply to it.

In 1890 Congress enacted in the army appropriation bill, that no alcoholic liquors, beer or wine should be sold to any enlisted man at any military post in any state in which the sale of such beverages is prohibited by law. The law officer of the department informs me that no such act of Congress has been passed with regard to enlisted men in the navy at naval stations, and that the only statute against the sale of alcoholic liquors, beer or wine is the above statute as to *army stations*, in those states only in which such sale is prohibited by state law.

The new system changes the responsibility of the officers charged with its management, rather in degree than in kind. Under the former system it was under the supervision of the commanding officer of the marines; and a council of administration, composed of marine officers, controlled the accounts at stated times, so that it was their duty to keep things straight and in order. Under the new system, the charge of the accounts and the management of the saloon are under their control and immediate direction, as, of

course, they ought to be. Do you not think this is a better system? If your friend, who is a naval officer, is a true man, he will be glad of the opportunity to do something to improve and control this business. I am told that in the army the officers were very unwilling to undertake the system when it was introduced; they objected, I suppose, to the additional care it put upon them, and it is possible there may have been a feeling that the post traders, who had been making a living out of the old system were subjected to the loss of what had been an income to them. But, as I have said above, the experiment has proved so successful that I do not believe the army would think of abandoning it.

If Congress should prohibit all sales at such a yard, of course the enlisted men would purchase outside and be subjected to all the demoralizing influences of the regular liquor traffic. Prohibition would be of little value if limited to a few acres of land on the edge of a great city and surrounded by a cordon of rum shops.

You will bear in mind, also, that these places, which under the old system, were called post traderships or canteens, and under the new are called post exchanges, are not merely for the sale of beer, but are a sort of coöperative store, furnishing enlisted men, at reasonable prices, with articles of ordinary use, wear and consumption which are not supplied by the government. I enclose a copy of the army regulations, which are practically those now adopted for the navy post exchanges.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG

Reverend ALFRED NOON [1]
36 Bromfield Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

COMMANDER LYON TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

U. S. S. *Dolphin,* Third Rate
Off BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT
October 25, 1897

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I write in type to save you time in reading.

This was our day to be in New York, and although I have made my best efforts to get there, the weather has been, for the first time this season, really bad.

[1] Alfred Noon (b. 1845), secretary of the Massachusetts Total Abstinence Society, of which Secretary Long was president.

We left Boston at seven o'clock A.M. on the twenty-second, steaming down the harbor in [the] rear of the fleet; but, once past the light, hoisted the despatch flag and passed by the vessels rapidly. There was a heavy sea from the northeast, — so much so that the great *Brooklyn*, after every dip into it, rose and showed not only her ram, but seventy or eighty feet of fore-foot. The *Massachusetts* would not have made the agreeable promenade she did in Boston Harbor, for every sea swept up and over her forward deck.

As the weather became more threatening, I ran into Provincetown for shelter, and extended the "glad hand" to the residents. In a couple of hours the *Fern* came in; but the fleet went out past the cape, and then stood along to go outside the shoals.

The next day I started out during a deceptive lull, proceeding towards the Pollock Rip entrance to Nantucket Sound, but I found the sea still heavy outside, and knew that it was breaking almost across the passage. For this reason I kept on to the entrance called Great Round Shoal, where there is plenty of water, and the sea does not break or threaten destruction to vessels of this draught.

That evening at sundown we charged up Narragansett Bay like a race horse, having five-sixth boiler power on, with wind and tide favoring. Off the naval station a boat took the household effects of Mrs. Kautz, and the starboard cabin door was again put in commission. Commodore Kautz [1] had come down with me as stevedore and supercargo, and was a most entertaining and agreeable guest.

Sunday forenoon did not hold out any temptation to go out, my desire being to pass to the southward of Block and Long islands, and to anchor at Tompkinsville.[2] However, at one o'clock it seemed practical to go on by way of the sound, and so I started. Thick weather closed in, and I was glad to run into New London for shelter. This takes me up to last night. This morning was not good, but at nine o'clock I thought it was good enough for my purposes in the closed waters of the sound, being encouraged by a treacherous sheet published in New London, and rejoicing in the name of the *Morning Telegraph*. It stated that the hurricane, predicted for the night before, had gone off the coast. Before long the weather became thick, with much rain, and we had a very poor time of it. I had hoped to make Hempstead Bay, which is within striking distance of New York, but had to anchor, after passing Stratford

[1] Albert Kautz (1839–1907).
[2] Staten Island.

Shoal Light, and here I am now, wishing for the day like St. Paul, — or "like sixty," perhaps.

We were most courteously treated in Boston by the state and by the clubs, and made to have a very enjoyable visit. The procession was a great success. I had the pleasure of dining in the ward-room with Mr. Hemenway and Mr. Barnes,[3] and of taking Mr. Wheeler [4] and his family around the *Massachusetts* and *New York* the evening of the illumination. Southerland [5] and I do not think either of those vessels was as complete and perfect in the details of illumination as was our little ship.

Mrs. Lyon has been at my father's since her return from Pennsylvania, where she left Harry at school, and we are getting the very best reports from him as well as from his teachers.

All the officers join me in kindest regards to you and to your family.

Very sincerely yours,
H. W. Lyon [6]

The Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

CAPTAIN COOPER TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Academy
Personal Annapolis, Maryland
October 28, 1897

My dear Sir:

It was due entirely to your intelligent comprehension of the view that we ought to educate our young officers at home, and not abroad, that we have been enabled to establish a post-graduate course in naval construction at the academy. Having gained the foot-hold it has been my ambition to so firmly establish this one branch that there can be no shadow of turning from it, nor adverse criticism of the results.

Great things can not be accomplished without adequate means and in this matter I can not believe that too much has been requested towards the initial steps. And I am frank in my belief that the Naval Academy in equipment and outfit has never received the

[3] Alfred Hemenway (1839–1927), Yale '61, and Charles Benjamin Barnes (b. 1868), Harvard College '90, Secretary Long's law partners in Boston.

[4] Probably Jesse Franklin Wheeler (1845–1912), Harvard College '68.

[5] Lieutenant William Henry Hudson Southerland (1852–1933).

[6] Commander Henry Ware Lyon (1845–1929).

consideration commensurate with its status as a great national school. Attention has been called to this fact repeatedly without avail and I marvel at the excellence of the output when contrasted with the circumstances. It is not for me to judge wherein, or with whom, lies the blame, but I do know that a most perfect system of training is carried on with imperfect instruments and in uncongenial surroundings.

The first obstacle to be met when we realized that the post-graduate school was an accomplished fact was within what walls, in what building, should the students perform their daily task. Not a square foot of space was available in any building existing for academic work, for we are marching our cadets to and fro to seek places for daily recitations, and having to exercise much ingenuity to supply the necessities of this service, owing to the entire lack of unity in the establishment.

Finally, it was decided that a building formerly used as a photographer's studio, then converted into a paint and repair shop, was absolutely the only building within the grounds approaching suitability. Painters and carpenters were turned out, and work commenced to fit up this building in such a manner as to supply the needs until that future day when Congress will uplift this academy from its present condition.

A floor plan of the little building is enclosed to exhibit to you what we intend to do, and every article on the requisition for outfit, which is in the department, is necessary to success. Once having this outfit there will be no occasion to call upon the appropriation for "pay miscellaneous" for such articles until in due course of time these are worn out and useless.

The second requisition for supplies covers much that is expended from day to day, and can not be avoided. But if my recommendation receives favorable action from you that the Naval Academy appropriation for "special course" be increased from three thousand to five thousand dollars, at which amount it formerly stood, there will be no reason to ask for assistance from the department on that line.

I beg leave to state that Mr. Hobson [1] must not be held responsible for the requests which have been submitted for your approval; I assume the entire responsibility. I will state also that in my opinion Mr. Hobson is a zealous and accomplished officer; that he is heartily

[1] Richmond Pearson Hobson (1870–1937), assistant naval constructor.

with me in my desire to make this course a success. I earnestly deprecate any effort to organize a board to take this matter into consideration; it appears to me that this question can be better settled by one man, and if bounds of prudence and propriety are overstepped that man can be held responsible; that man can be no other than myself, and I am willing to be held to responsibility.

If it is your desire to have Mr. Taylor[2] confer with me it will be entirely agreeable to me to meet him, or it will be agreeable for me to go to Washington to explain to you in person. In the meantime I can not refrain from stating that our work is being delayed from lack of outfit and that much is being done with borrowed material such as typewriter and paper.

You have done me the honor to state that you will be glad to hear from me and this statement is frankly made from my standpoint of interest, zeal and responsibility.

Very respectfully,
PHILIP H. COOPER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILLIAM ENDICOTT, JR., TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
November 8, 1897

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I felt greatly relieved on seeing in this morning's paper what appeared to be an authorized statement from you that there was really no ground for the war scare that has so generally prevailed here during the last week. It has been very general and has caused much anxiety. Of course all chance of improvement in business is at once knocked in the head by it, if it continue.

As war is almost the greatest calamity that can afflict a nation, the evil effects continuing to generations yet unborn, I sincerely hope that the administration will not be tempted by the jingo talk of impulsive and hot-headed persons to allow our country to drift into one in which we have little interest other than sentimental.

I should regard the acquisition of Cuba as a great misfortune. It is contrary to our theory of government for this country to have

[2] David Watson Taylor (b. 1864), naval constructor.

subject populations, and there is mighty little material there of which to make intelligent citizens. Our problem is sufficiently difficult now, without complicating it by the infusion into our body politic of a lot of ignorant semi-barbarians.

With high regard, I remain,

Yours very truly,
WILLIAM ENDICOTT, JR.[1]

NATHAN APPLETON TO SECRETARY LONG

66 Beacon Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
9 November, 1897

MY DEAR SIR:

I was rather surprised to see the enclosed in the *Boston Journal*,[1] for I would have supposed it was ever the intention of the executive to have a fair and impartial survey of the Nicaragua route for a canal on its merits. This, I do not hesitate to say, can not well be done if Mr. Menocal[2] is a member of the commission to go there. I have known him since we were both delegates to the canal congress, called together by Ferdinand de Lesseps[3] at Paris in May, 1879, and he has been, and still is, so prejudiced in favor of Nicaragua that I have never thought that he was in a condition to give fair attention to any other route. You might say the same of me in relation to Panama, and so I dare say I should not be the right person to be one member of a commission to go there, to report on its merits. I have been connected with the old Panama Canal Company, and I believe Mr. Menocal has had a position in the Nicaragua Canal Company of Honorable Warner Miller.[4]

[1] William Endicott (1826–1914), Boston merchant.

[1] NEW YORK, November 2. – Chief Civil Engineer A. G. Menocal has received leave of absence from the navy yard and been ordered on duty in connection with the Nicaraguan Canal Commission, of which Rear Admiral Walker [John Grimes Walker (1835–1907)] is at the head. Mr. Menocal expects to leave the yard on November 17 and will be away about six weeks. Mr. Menocal has been chief engineer of the canal from its inception, and it is on the plans made by him between 1872 and 1891 that the present commission is to report.

[2] Anecito Garcia Menocal (1836–1908), civil engineer, U. S. N.

[3] Ferdinand de Lesseps (1805–1894).

[4] Warner Miller (1838–1918), Union College '60, a leader in the manufacture of paper, was elected to the House in 1878 and sat in the Senate for New York from 1881 to 1887. Miller was one of the two new senators chosen to replace Conkling and Platt. In 1888 he was defeated for governor of New York by David Bennett Hill.

At any rate, when this new commission goes to the isthmus, I would ask you to see that they look carefully over the Panama route, and have proper official letters of introduction to the director general of the new Panama Canal Company, and other officers at Colón and Panama. I want them to see the ten to fifteen miles of canal at the Atlantic end, also the excavating at Emperador, Culebra, *etc.*, with some American machines at work, and then the work at the Pacific terminus, where the railroad will go to a wharf and, with a channel dredged, ships can come to the end of the railroad, soon to be the Pacific beginning of the canal. This trip can be made by the commission with little time and trouble.

Believe me,
Yours very truly,
NATHAN APPLETON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[Enclosure]

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

FRANKFURT, [GERMANY]
18 November, 1897

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I beg to thank you for the excellent command [1] with which you have honored me, and which gives me the greatest pleasure.

I must express, too, my obligation that it was found possible to allow my delaying here a few days, until Mrs. Chadwick could be enabled to leave. We are here, on account of heart weakness with which she has been troubled for some time, to meet a Dr. Schott who is the head of what is known as the Nauheim system of treatment, and who has effected some remarkable cures, one of the most remarkable being that of a friend of our own. I am thus hoping as good results in Mrs. Chadwick's case. It was of such importance that she should be here at least ten days, that I felt justified in asking a little delay, in case circumstances at home would allow it. As the methods can, after a time, be pursued elsewhere, she can accompany me home without difficulty on the twenty-seventh, in the *St. Paul* from Southampton.

We have had a very pleasant and interesting journey here, and I was particularly interested in seeing something of Spain under present conditions.

[1] Command of the armored cruiser *New York*.

We both unite in kindest regards to Mrs. and Miss Long and yourself, and believe me,

Sincerely yours,
F. E. CHADWICK [2]

REAR-ADMIRAL SELFRIDGE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *San Francisco*
Personal SMYRNA, ASIA MINOR
November 19, 1897

MY DEAR SIR:

About to sever my active connection with the navy, and actuated only for the good of the service, I take the liberty of writing you on the subject of "navy personnel." [1]

Yearly before the meeting of Congress the newspapers abound in allusions and statements regarding the quarrel between the line and staff. It is in the line of sensational journalism so much in vogue at the present, calculated to give an erroneous and alarming idea of the condition in the navy, totally at variance with the truth.

There is no quarrel between the line and staff. If there were, it should be found on naval ships where all officers are thrown into the closest relations. That there are serious differences between the two branches which are active in Washington is not to be denied. These differences stripped of all side questions lie wholly in the desire of the staff to appropriate to themselves the titles of the line; for which the latter, always on the defensive, assert that there is no reason for such claim, nor does the good of the service demand it.

Take any ship of war, the *San Francisco* for example, all officers are in friendly associations.

The chief engineer has sole charge of his department. His orders to his subordinates are as implicitly obeyed, as are those of the line officer on deck. The same can be said of the surgeon and paymaster, each supreme in his own department; no one does or can give orders to these officers, except their commanding officer.

When at sea, the motive power is under the chief engineer, receiving orders direct from the captain regarding revolutions of the engines, expenditure of coal, *etc.* Only in an emergency, such as "a man overboard," or sudden dangers would the officer of the deck

[2] Captain French Ensor Chadwick (1844–1919).

[1] For the passage of the personnel bill, which attempted to settle the line and staff controversy, see the letter of Professor Hollis, January 19, 1899, note.

give orders regarding the speed, to stop, back, or go ahead, and then only as the representative of the captain who can not be always on deck. The assertion widely spread, that engineer officers are placed under the command of junior line officers has no foundation in fact.

You will find harmony in the ward room and junior officers' messes throughout the service afloat. Officers of all corps mingle together aboard and ashore, as members of a common profession should do, and the social standing of a staff officer is just as good as a line officer, for such depends upon the individual himself. As to military honors or the etiquette of the service, the line and staff share such equally.

This whole question of line and staff was gone over, and settled by the law of March 3, 1871, which in itself was a compromise to reconcile the views of the different interests. By this law staff officers were given the distinctive titles of director and inspector ranking with captains and commanders with all the honors accruing to such grades. In addition, officers of the rank of director were relieved from sea duty, and the staff were given six years preference over the line of corresponding dates of entry in the service.

This law was supposed to have settled this question for all time. That it has not done so is owing to no action of the line, but to the craving on the part of certain portions of the staff, not all, to the titles of the line, and which is sought to obtain under the specious demand for positive rank, claiming that without positive rank they can not properly command in their own departments. That this is not the case, an inquiry into the actual condition of affairs on our naval vessels will quickly show.

The proposition to mix the line and engineer corps by an interchange of duties would be fraught with great injury to the service. The line officer not only must be a seaman, which can only be acquired by experience on deck, but he must have a knowledge of ordnance, gun mounts, projectiles, torpedoes, and how to use them, electricity, navigation and international law. To be proficient in such is as much as any man can acquire without requiring him to become an engineer. A knowledge of machinery afloat sufficient to command his ship he already has, more than this is not necessary.

The engineer officer must not only have a practical knowledge of the motive power which can only be acquired by experience in the engine room, but he must be able to design and build engines,

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duties quite sufficient to employ all his time, without compelling him to take up the duties of a line officer, possibly spoiling a good engineer and making an indifferent line officer.

Upon our naval engineer corps lies the responsibility of designing and constructing the motive power of our ships of war, duties requiring talent and education of the highest order. The management and care of the motive power afloat is mechanical and does not require the technical education of the constructing engineer.

If I am permitted to make a suggestion that concerns the good of another corps than my own, I would dignify the present engineer corps by no longer requiring them to stand watch in the engine room. These duties should be performed by warrant engineers, whose status would be similar to our present warrant officers, and filled by engineers from the merchant marine, and machinists of the first class, who had performed one cruise as such satisfactorily. These would be under an officer of the constructing engineer corps, of which there would be but one on ships below first rates and flagships, and two on the latter.

In regard to the personnel of the line, the right to retire after thirty years' service would be a privilege that all grades ask for. Commanding officers should not be over forty and commanders of squadrons not over fifty-five upon first being detailed for such positions. This could be only accomplished by some kind of selection, a discussion of which is not permitted in this letter, already too long.

I have written my views solely for your information, my dear Sir, and I would request when this letter has served this purpose you would destroy it.

Very respectfully,

[THOMAS O. SELFRIDGE, JR.]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMANDER LYON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Dolphin*, Third Rate
Navy Yard
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
November 19, 1897

Personal

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am very much gratified to learn from Mr. Snowden[1] of your kind inquiries for us all, and of your continued interest in your

[1] Lieutenant Thomas Snowden (1857–1930).

"flag-ship." [2] It is a very sad looking vessel at present, but with the coming of spring weather and lengthening days, I hope to present her to you in Washington a thing of beauty and comfort.

I am much pleased with my orders, and think, personal feelings apart, that it is best for me to be here during the repairs. Mr. Bowles [3] heartily agrees with me in this.

I have, as you may have noticed, always refrained from offering advice or asking favors for the very many officers who have written me to do so, for the reason that your bureau chiefs have been detailed as your advisors on naval affairs, while my detail is to simply command the *Dolphin*. My only safe-guard is to have and maintain a cast-iron rule in this respect. You can not imagine the number of importunities that assail one who is "near to the secretary."

I do not think I am breaking this rule of mine in the request I am about to make in regard to Lieutenant Snowden, for he has served with me, and is to serve with me again after a brief interim. This fact causes me to have the almost paternal feeling that an officer ought to have for those serving under him, and, it seems to me, that it is a case where I am not opposing the bureau of navigation, but merely doing my manifest duty in striving to look after, as far as possible, the interests of a faithful and capable subordinate.

If possible, will you have him given duty in Washington? I understand that there is no particular limit to the number of officers that can be ordered to the yard as "under instruction in ordnance" or to the office of naval intelligence; but to whatever department he is ordered he is sure to be in evidence from his zeal and faithfulness, to say nothing of his high professional abilities. This requested duty in Washington will keep him with his family, as Mrs. Snowden opened her house in Washington under the impression, well founded at the time, that the ship was not to go out of commission. After all, it was not Snowden's fault that she did.

Mrs. Lyon is visiting cousins in New Jersey, and I had a "pleasant call" from her last Monday. It is the last luncheon on board for a long time. During the work of going out of commission, we thought it best for her not to be too near, but after we have spent Thanksgiving with Harry at his school, she will come to Brooklyn to the St. George Hotel, where we have engaged rooms.

[2] The *Dolphin* was used by secretaries of the navy on their official trips and was known as the secretary's yacht.

[3] Francis Tiffany Bowles (1858–1927), naval constructor, U. S. N. See the memoir in *Proceedings*, Massachusetts Historical Society, LXIV, 415–421.

I had an acute attack of malaria last week, but am "pretty fit," as the English say, now; but it was a reminder of a case of break-bone fever contracted in the gulf many years ago.

With kindest regards to Mrs. Long and the young ladies, in which the officers join me,

Faithfully yours,
H. W. Lyon

The Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island
November 20, 1897

Personal

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Commander Stockton[1] has just reached San Francisco in the *Yorktown* after a creditable cruise of two years. When his ship is inspected, *etc.*, he will, in the natural sequence of events, be detached, sent home and granted two months leave. Doubtless the orders have already been issued.

Stockton has been identified with the college, off and on, for many years, his special branch being international law. On the death of the late lamented Professor Freeman Snow[2] of Harvard, Stockton was directed by the navy department to edit his lectures.[3] How well he did his work the constant requests for copies from all parts of the world and the universal encomiums of disinterested jurists attest.

You may not, and probably do not, remember my expression of regret that the course in international law last summer was not more detailed and systematic. I feel that our captains and admirals can not be too well grounded in the principles of this science, that they may decide promptly and correctly the many questions with which they have to deal. There is no person in the navy, and precious few outside, better fitted to treat of this branch than Stockton who is conservative in opinion, mild of tongue and manner, and scholarly in every spoken or written word. Were he not so good and proved

[1] Charles Herbert Stockton (1845–1923).

[2] Freeman Snow (1841–1894), Harvard College '73.

[3] International law. Lectures delivered at the Naval War College by Freeman Snow, Ph.D., LL.B., late instructor in international law in Harvard University. Prepared and arranged for publication by direction of the Honorable H. A. Herbert, secretary of the navy, by Commander Charles H. Stockton, U. S. N., in 1895.

a naval officer I should say nature had cut him out for a university professor.

After this long preamble you will not be surprised when I confide to you my hope that you will, if the suggestion meets with your approval, direct that Stockton be ordered to "Proceed to your home and report to the commandant of the naval station, Newport, Rhode Island, for special duty in connection with preparing a course of lectures to be delivered at the Naval War College." This is substantially the form employed when Mahan [4] was ordered to write lectures on strategy and when I was similarly given the subject of coast defense.

Stockton lives in Newport. His family are here. His eldest daughter, a sweet girl, is wretchedly ill, and has been so for several months. I am certain that nothing you could do would give Stockton so blessed a sense of comfort as the receipt of orders which would take him home, keep him there and relieve his mind of all apprehension of being sent away from Newport to perform duty which might indeed be welcomed by many but which would be uncongenial to his quiet and reflective temperament. It will be no hardship for him to take up immediately the work outlined above. For a commander with wife and children to support, the hardship lies rather in going off duty and losing pay at the rate of twelve hundred dollars a year.

Of course, Stockton has agreed to this arrangement – but being the most modest of men, he prefers that I do the asking. As he would not tell you how valuable his services have been in the past and, I hope, will be in the future, to the college, it is perhaps well that I should speak for him and in saying one word for him say two for myself.

This detail does not put him into the college staff nor involve quarters. It is only an accident that he happens to live in Newport. Mahan lived in New York and I in Pomfret while on like duty, and Stockton may, if he wishes, move to Boston or Kalamazoo.

Very respectfully,
C. F. Goodrich

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

[4] Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–1914). President of the Naval War College, 1886–1893.

1898

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1898

SIR:

I have for some time been much interested in the development of our gun practice. It looks very much as if we were behind the age in this all-important branch of naval work – the very branch in which we possessed the decisive superiority that mainly contributed to our victories in 1812. I have a number of reports from our naval attachés abroad. I finally got together Captain O'Neil, Captain Crowninshield,[1] Captain Clover,[2] and Mr. Dashiell,[3] and we had a long consultation on the subject which resulted in Captain Clover furnishing to the bureaus of navigation and ordnance copies of what he had learned regarding foreign practice, and in my issuing directions to Admiral Sicard for special practice to test the capacity of the best trained crews with the four, five, six and eight-inch guns in his squadron this winter. When Mr. Dashiell comes back from his trip in England, in which he will try to get all the information he can about the gun practice there, I should like to send a board of inspection, composed, say, of Captain O'Neil, Mr. Dashiell, and Lieutenant Fletcher,[4] to visit, not only our gunnery training ship, but two or three of the vessels of Admiral Sicard's squadron when they return to northern waters. I am certain that a board of experts who know something of what foreign navies can achieve in gun practice, as well as from practical experience what our people can do, could from personal inspection of our training ships and our cruisers, not merely give valuable hints in the way of improving the gun practice, but also get information that would be of great assistance to us.

I enclose a letter from the American minister to Venezuela.[5] If one of the light cruisers could be sent as he requests it seems to me it would be a good thing. At any rate, I commend the letter to

[1] Arent Schuyler Crowninshield (1843–1908), chief of bureau of navigation.
[2] Richardson Clover (1846–1919), chief intelligence officer.
[3] Paul Joseph Dashiell (b. 1867), Johns Hopkins '87, professor of physics at the Naval Academy.
[4] Frank Friday Fletcher (1855–1928), ordnance expert.
[5] Francis Butler Loomis (b. 1861).

you for your personal attention. Judge Day asked me to do whatever could be done for Mr. Loomis.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
January 22, 1898

SIR:

I beg to call your attention to the three enclosed memoranda. The first is a copy given me by Captain Bradford [1] of a report on the desirability of the Dry Tortugas as a naval station for the fleet. I have submitted it to the chief of the bureau of naval intelligence,[2] who practically endorses it. Key West would be the best place, in my opinion, if there were a good harbor for our big battleships there, but there is no such harbor, and this leaves the Dry Tortugas the only desirable place south of the Chesapeake. I think it would be well worth while for the navy department to carefully examine into the situation at the Dry Tortugas, and to take steps so far as might be to make it the proper base for possible operations in the Caribbean Sea.

I also call your attention to the memorandum from the chief intelligence officer on the subject of torpedoes. I would suggest this being put before the chief of the bureau of ordnance.[3] We should have an ample supply of torpedoes both on the Atlantic and Pacific.

Finally I call your special attention to the report from the naval attaché [4] at Rome that the Italian government has made arrangements to sell to the Spaniards the two very powerful armored cruisers now building at Leghorn and Genoa. These two cruisers are superior in force to the *New York*. When they are finished and can be turned over to Spain, their existence would probably

[1] Royal Bird Bradford (1844–1914), chief of bureau of equipment.
[2] Commander Clover.
[3] Captain O'Neil.
[4] Lieutenant Albert Parker Niblack (1859–1929).

make it a serious question whether it would be safe to send the Flying Squadron [5] over there, as outlined in the plan I have laid before you.

I would also respectfully call your attention to the steady way in which the Spanish force grows relatively to our own. If we had had war with Spain a year ago they would have had but three ironclads to put against us. Now they can probably put seven. Six or eight months hence they will probably be able to put nine or ten. During all this time our own force has remained and will remain at seven battleships and armored cruisers. Even when they get all these ironclads our force will be superior, thanks to the quality of our men, but instead of the superiority being overwhelming, as it was a year ago, it will be small, so far as the Atlantic Ocean is concerned. The naval situation has steadily turned a little to our disadvantage, and is continuing so to turn.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 8, 1898

SIR:

In reference to the memoranda made for the chief clerk [1] by F. H. Stickney [2] and M. L. Croxall on February 7, I have to report as follows:

According to this memorandum it appears that my office has used thirty-one dollars' worth of stamps since March 4, 1897, (Mr. Stickney says in one place thirty dollars and in the other thirty-one dollars) these stamps being used for official business. Mr. Stickney further says that my private secretary during that time has paid for one hundred two-cent stamps; Mr. Croxall saying that the private secretary has paid for none.

Of the stamps charged to this office, twenty five-cent and two

[5] A squadron to be assembled at Hampton Roads and held ready to move at short notice; later put under the command of Commodore Schley. See Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 148, 207, 209, and 212.

[1] Benjamin F. Peters. [2] Disbursing clerk.

hundred two-cent stamps were bought prior to April 19, the date on which I took office. This leaves one thousand two-cent and one hundred twenty five-cent stamps which have been used since I took office, some of which are now on hand; this being an average of about four stamps a day. A small number of these stamps have been used by Lieutenants Sharp[3] and Gibbons,[4] but too small a number to be counted. The others have been put on my letters, either by Mr. Howell[5] or Mr. Hinman, or occasionally by the messenger William Wilkes; my directions being that in case of doubt, the doubt should always be construed in favor of the government — that is, against the letters being considered of an official or semi-official nature. The five-cent stamps I find have largely been used in sending abroad such publications as the personnel bill, the lecture to the War College, and the digest of the opinions of the presidents. These would generally go as first-class mail, because a short letter would accompany them. For this foreign mail the frank is not generally available, so that both official and semi-official letters have to be stamped. Sometimes the two-cent stamps were used for sending foreign mail as second-class matter. This leaves an average of about three two-cent stamps a day on the home mail of a semi-official type. During the past two or three days I find by my letter book that I have sent as semi-official letters the following:

A letter to the Reverend Sylvester Malone,[6] answering certain inquiries of his as to the possibility of getting a given man back into the navy yard, and then replying to some remarks of his about the Republican organization in New York. (It was because of the last that the letter was not franked, but of course it was written primarily with reference to the laborer who wanted a government position.)

A letter to the late consul at Turin, Mr. Mantius,[7] answering an inquiry about the personnel bill, and in addition, certain remarks about the way to deal with our merchant marine.

A letter to Captain Goodrich,[8] answering a request that I try to procure him an audience with you, and also thanking him for some personal expressions of regard.

[3] Alexander Sharp, Jr. (1885–1910), naval aid.
[4] John Henry Gibbons (b. 1859), in charge of naval militia.
[5] William Howell, private secretary to the assistant secretary.
[6] Not identified.
[7] William E. Mantius.
[8] C. F. Goodrich.

A letter to Captain Davis [9] promising to speak to you about that man whom he wished to have discharged from the observatory.

A letter to Captain Cooper [10] asking for some information about the case of a cadet in whom Colonel John McCook,[11] of New York, was interested; and so on and so forth.

It is possible that Messrs. Howell and Hinman have not been quite as strict as they should be in seeing that all cases of doubt were construed in favor of the government, but they both assure me that there will be no trouble of this kind hereafter; and if there has been any laxity of the sort (which I doubt) it is I find because until I took this position it had been the invariable custom for all of the mail sent through the assistant secretary's office to be either franked or stamped at the government expense. You may remember that last June, or thereabouts, when this custom was brought to my attention, I at once had it changed and directed that all stamps be purchased for my own account when they were to be used on my private letters.

I find that during the period of my incumbency I have given to Messrs. Howell and Hinman $66.78 for sundries. They submitted to me monthly statements of how this was expended, but these statements have not been kept. Mr. Howell says he thinks about one-half of this money went for stamps; Mr. Hinman thinks about three-fourths did. At any rate, the amount was in the neighborhood of thirty-five or forty dollars. In the majority of cases these stamps were purchased outside of the building. Indeed all of the stamps purchased by Mr. Howell and Mr. Hinman were purchased outside of the building. But most of the purchases of stamps were made by the messenger, William Wilkes, whom you know, and who is a particularly honest and trustworthy man. Frequently, probably in the majority of cases, he also has purchased the stamps outside of the building, it being discovered when the mail was made up after office hours that we were short of stamps, and he then being given one or two dollars to purchase them. In addition to this, however, I find that he has purchased stamps on at least half a dozen occasions, from Mr. Stickney and Mr. Croxall, for my account, and on a number of other occasions has purchased small amounts from them for Lieutenant Sharp. Messrs. Stickney and Croxall would of course

[9] Charles Henry Davis (1845–1921).
[10] P. H. Cooper.
[11] John James McCook (1845–1911).

have been ignorant that he was purchasing for Mr. Sharp, and would have supposed that he was purchasing for my office. Mr. Stickney, in his memorandum, which I herewith return, states that my private secretary paid for one hundred two-cent stamps since March 4; and Mr. Croxall says that while he was in the office my private secretary paid for none. As above explained my private secretary personally never purchased any stamps at all from Mr. Stickney. The purchases were made through William Wilkes. The two dollars which Mr. Stickney admits was paid was in the form of a check which was passed last Saturday. William states positively that on at least half a dozen other occasions he purchased one or two dollars' worth of stamps from both Mr. Stickney and Mr. Croxall. I myself saw him on one occasion go out with a two dollar bill, without his hat, to get the stamps from Mr. Stickney's office, and saw him return within a few minutes with the stamps. Mr. Sharp and Mr. Legaré have both been eye-witnesses of similar incidents. Mr. Stickney and Mr. Croxall both stated to me that they did not recollect any such incidents, but admitted that they had never kept an account of cash purchases of stamps, and that they could not say that such purchases had not taken place. They at first stated that they had no recollection even of William purchasing from them small amounts of stamps, which, as before stated, he procured for Mr. Sharp himself. I consider it very extraordinary that they should have forgotten these purchases by William, of which, as I have said, Mr. Sharp, Mr. Legaré and myself have been, at times, eye-witnesses. Their statements are certainly erroneous.

I have directed Messrs. Howell and Hinman hereafter to keep an accurate account of the number of stamps purchased for me and ordered for this office, whether from outside the building or from within, and have repeated with even greater emphasis that in mailing the letters they are to construe every doubt in favor of the government. It is of course an impossibility for me to look at every letter when the stamp is on, as I usually sign the mail about four, and it is press-copied, stamped and posted after I leave the office.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

CAPTAIN HIGGINSON TO THEODORE ROOSEVELT

U. S. S. *Massachusetts*, First Rate
Dry Tortugas, Florida
February 11, 1898

My dear Mr. Roosevelt:

Were you ever pursued by the odium of an act which you *never committed?* If so you may realize my feelings when I read in the *Army and Navy Journal* the fact that the *Massachusetts* had been *on shore*. Now whether at fault or not there is a certain discredit attached to a vessel that goes ashore and her reputation becomes in a measure spotted so I am naturally indignant to see the misfortunes of the *Iowa* and *Texas* ruthlessly and recklessly fastened upon the innocent *Massachusetts*.

Do you suppose it is possible that the editor [1] of the *Army and Navy Journal* could have taken the statement from the public press and republished it without verification? It seems impossible. Officers expect misrepresentation and even slander from the public press because some journals are animated only by self-interest guided by ignorance and malice or both. But officers look to a service journal to correct the misrepresentation of the press, to act as censor and to publish only what is true.

I am curious to see when the official report of the accident is given out if Mr. Church will make a correction. I suppose editors never apologize except by an order from a court, as that would be a blow to their infallibility.

We all felt very blue the day of the accidents and it seemed as if it was not only raining but pouring. It created too a nervous distrust of the whole place and even now we are all shy of discolored water whether shoal or sunshine. We are taking no chances.

Not a particle of blame can be attached to either Sampson [2] or Philip.[3] They are both able seamen and skillful navigators, (above the average) and according to the chart were piloting their vessels in perfectly safe and clear water.

The channels we were using were improperly surveyed and improperly buoyed. This has now been done in the southeast channel and we can enter and depart through it with safety—*I think.* (After what has happened I must make a mental reservation to any

[1] William Conant Church (1836–1917).
[2] Captain William T. Sampson, of the *Iowa*.
[3] Captain John Woodward Philip (1840–1900), of the *Texas*.

statement about this place). We only know, or think we know, this one channel (southeast) but "there are others" — No one in the navy is much surprised at anything the *Texas* may do, even if she struck bottom in one hundred fathoms of water, because that is her history and reputation, but to have our pride and delight the *Iowa* come to grief was disheartening. I think it was these accidents and the anxiety about more to come every time he moved his fleet which broke Sicard down. Or rather it was his conscience which worried him so about his duty as never to give him any rest. You've got to take chances in this life and no man can afford to sit up all night trying to circumvent fate. We are very sorry for Admiral Sicard as he is much respected and is gentle and moderate in his intercourse with his subordinates.

The *Texas* and *Iowa* will I think last until there is a chance to go north and repair.

I sincerely hope that while these vessels are in dock under repair that no foreign complications will arise. Can not you stay the hand of war until we are prepared? The fleet is in good health. Both the men and officers are getting good experience. No gun practice yet but some highly interesting and instructive manœuvres.

Fortunately Dry Tortugas is a rough water anchorage and the boating is good practice for the men. Just now we are all hands coaling ship out of Bradford's coal fleet which all arrived here on time.

Very truly yours,
FRANCIS J. HIGGINSON [4]

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
February 11, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

Thanks for your kind letter of the eighth instant which I fully appreciate. Had I known that a resumption of our conversation of Monday would have been agreeable to you, I should have stayed a day longer in Washington. Doubtless we should have reached a mutually satisfactory conclusion. I thank you for the unexpected

[4] Captain Francis John Higginson (1843–1931), of the *Massachusetts*. See the letter of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt dated February 17, 1898.

honor of a presentation to the President. I have never been so near the throne before!

Referring to the first subject in your letter; like all libraries of reference, that of the college does not show the extent of its use. The number of officers who resort to it constantly is small – comprising only those stationed in Newport and outsiders, like Mahan and Stockton, who are working for the college. During the summer their number is of course greatly increased. On the other hand, the topics touched upon range far and wide. As you well know, the variety of these topics largely determines the size of a library. Eventually I hope that no legitimate question asked the college library can remain unanswered. Such is not the case now. Only last week, one of the college staff, in making a study of the battle of Actium, was obliged to buy, out of his own pocket, a copy of Plutarch's *Lives,* in order to get the best account extant, the library not possessing the book. This appears to be a fitting occasion to say that the college is quite as busy during the winter as during the summer, as the enclosed schedules of exercises will show. The mornings are devoted to special and individual work, and the routine business of the college, the making of plans of campaigns, *etc.*

As to the principal subject of your kind favor, I seem to have failed to make myself clear. I hold one of the most important and honorable places in the gift of the navy department, with two years longer occupancy, according to the custom of the service and the precedents of the case. I have ventured to express what I hope is a praiseworthy ambition, *viz.* to command a battleship, even at the sacrifice of a portion of my present duty, but I have asked for and I desire nothing else. Until you can give me that, let me continue where I am to the end of my regular term, when I shall accept cheerfully whatever disposition you please to make of me and my services.

Not being available, in the usual sense, for sea duty, but only seeking sea duty on board a battleship from a desire to better fit myself for the highest employment to which I am bound – *Deo volente* – to arrive, you can understand that the *Boston,* however desirable she may be, is not what I wish. In other words I asked for one definite thing. What I am offered is something very different.

As to the justice of which you speak, I can say nothing. Any captain is eligible to the command of any ship of and above a certain tonnage. The gift of the command lies entirely with yourself.

There is absolutely no other rule. If you think proper to give a junior captain a good ship you can do so. You did so, for example, when you appointed Chadwick,[1] the junior captain, to the *New York*. Cook [2] was promised the *Brooklyn* before he was promoted. Evans [3] had the *New York* as junior captain and he was still one of the junior captains when given the *Indiana*, our first big battleship. Gridley [4] was near the bottom of the list when assigned to the *Olympia*, and Sigsbee,[5] that admirable fellow, got the *Maine* within three weeks of promotion. Except as to Cook and Evans these things have all happened under your own administration and their wisdom, not questioned at the time, is justified by the event.

In short, my dear Mr. Long, I am *not* the junior captain on the list, and am *not* due to go to sea, unless on my own application or by your wish – so that I do not fit the conditions you imply.

If the best ship in the navy were in need of a captain and half a dozen captains were ready to go to sea – I say frankly – seniority should only be considered in selecting her captain, *cœteris paribus*. I should rather say (I hope you will pardon my frankness) that it is advisable to so dispose of that command that the service and the country get the best return from the experience that goes with it. To give that experience to a man whom you would not, in war time, be glad to see on board your best ship, or who, through age or other reason, is unlikely to profit by the experience in subsequent command of a fleet is to waste a great educational opportunity. Of these we have few. Their disposal entails quite a responsibility.

As to the personal equation upon which you touch, I there can make myself plain. When I was asked to accept, as a commander, the presidency of the college, I felt that in justice to my prestige, I could not refuse a position which is generally conceded to be one of the most important in the whole service. Since I have been here, I have received abundant proof that, with a few exceptions, all the officers in the navy are of this opinion and that they regard it as second to hardly any one open even to a captain. Under these circumstances, you can hardly blame me for believing that the chair of president here would suffer in public estimation and my good name be harmed if for no fault of mine I were removed be-

[1] F. E. Chadwick.
[2] Francis Augustus Cook (1843–1916).
[3] Robley Dunglison Evans (1846–1912).
[4] Charles V. Gridley.
[5] Charles Dwight Sigsbee (1845–1923).

fore the end of my three years' term unless it were to advance me to a position of even greater professional honor and responsibility. It will be an all-sufficient answer to any captain to say that when asked if I wished to go to the *Boston* I replied that I preferred to finish my tour of duty as president of the War College.

While writing the above, I received the enclosed letter from the secretary of the Naval Institute.[6] I thought you might care to congratulate me.

I am, my dear Mr. Long,

Very sincerely yours,
C. F. Goodrich

[Schedules enclosed]

[Naval War College]

PROGRAMME

Actions to be described

January 12	Captain Goodrich	Salamis
January 19	Lieutenant Murdock[1]	Syracuse; the overthrow of the Athenian fleet
January 26	Ensign Willard[2]	Actium
February 2	Ensign McCormick[3]	Constantinople; victory of the Genoese under Doria over the Venetians
February 9	Commander Merrell[4]	Naupaktus
February 16	Captain Goodrich	Lepanto
February 23	Commander Merrell	Portland
March 2	Lieutenant Murdock	Texel
March 9	Ensign Willard	Hereclea of Minos
March 16	Ensign McCormick	La Hogue
March 23	Lieutenant Blish*[5]	Off Isle of Wight

* Was promised me by the bureau of navigation but was sent to the *Michigan*[6] instead – much against his will. His duties must be performed by some other person.

[6] Lieutenant Herman G. Dresel (d. 1898).

[1] Joseph Ballard Murdock (1851–1931).
[2] Arthur Lee Willard (1870–1935).
[3] Benjamin Bernard McCormick (b. 1873).
[4] John Porter Merrell (1846–1916).
[5] John Blish (1860–1921).
[6] An old wooden cruiser stationed on the Great Lakes.

March 30	Captain Goodrich	Capture of Havana
April 6	Commander Merrell	Tricomalee
April 13	Lieutenant Murdock	Granada, 1779
April 20	Lieutenant Blish	Prince Rupert Bay, 1782
April 27	Ensign Willard	Camperdown
May 4	Ensign McCormick	Basque Roads
May 11	Lieutenant Blish	Beachy Head

Schedule of staff work for the winter and spring of 1898

Monday: —	
At 2.00 P.M.	Fleet Game
Tuesday: —	
At 2.00 P.M.	Von Moltke
	Single Ship Game
Wednesday: —	
At 2.00 P.M.	Description of Actions
Thursday: —	
At 2.00 P.M.	Fleet Game
Friday: —	
At 2.00 P.M.	Von Moltke
	Single Ship Game
Saturday: —	
At 9.30. A.M.	Strategic Game
	(Every two weeks)

REAR-ADMIRAL SICARD TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Fern*
Personal KEY WEST, FLORIDA
February 12, 1898

DEAR SIR:

I beg to inform you that, pursuant to the permission contained in your very kind telegram of the ninth instant, I left the squadron in charge of Captain Sampson on the tenth instant, and took the *Fern* into Key West, when finding that I could not then make the arrangements that I regarded as essential to getting proper benefit from my sick leave, and also feeling immediately somewhat benefitted by change, I determined to return to the squadron, and delay my leave, indefinitely if I proved well enough, otherwise to some time when the necessity for it should again press.

I shall accordingly rejoin the part of the squadron at Tortugas Harbor on the morning of Monday the fourteenth instant and I have so officially telegraphed the department.

Again with many thanks for your kindness, I am,

Very truly yours,
MONTGOMERY SICARD

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

BOSTON
February 14, 1898

DEAR LONG:

In reply to your note of [the] eleventh I may say that Von Holst's [1] address, — apparently intended to annihilate Hawaiian annexation by combined action of its opponents in the East and West (largely mugwumps), speaking through the author of the *Constitutional History of the United States*, also professor of history at [the] University of Chicago, — is an argument *a priori* and capable of conclusive answer. My memorandum, criticising this address and exposing its shallowness and fallacies, is completed and will be mailed to you as soon as copied. To make sure that my reply appeals to the calm judgment of thinking men, I have submitted it to several friends: our friend M. P. Kennard [2] summed up his opinion in one word — "comminution," a sort of pulverizing process whereby solids become dust and disappear. But Kennard is sometimes too enthusiastic, you know. Yet, upon re-reading, I am satisfied that Professor Von Holst's address is much in the condition of Humpty-Dumpty who had a fall from a wall with such fatal results that

"All the King's horses and all the King's men
Can't put Humpty Dumpty together again."

Yours very truly
HORACE N. FISHER [3]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Hermann Eduard von Holst (1841–1904).

[2] Martin Parry Kennard (b. 1818).

[3] Horace Newton Fisher (1836–1916), Boston lawyer, college classmate of Governor Long, authority on Latin-American affairs, and Chilean consul at Boston. During the Civil War he was lieutenant-colonel, U. S. V., and inspector-general of the Army of the Cumberland.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 16, 1898

SIR:

In view of the accident to the *Maine*, I venture respectfully, but most urgently, to advise that the monitors,[1] instead of being laid up, be put in commission forthwith. If we had gone to war with Spain a year ago we should have had seven armored ships against three; and there would be no chance of any serious loss to the American navy. Month by month the Spanish navy has been put into a better condition to meet us. A week ago it would have been seven sea-going armored ships against seven. To-day it would be six against seven. When the *Numancia*[2] is ready, as she soon will be, it will be six against eight. By adding the three monitors and the ram *Katahdin* we can make it ten to eight. We have lost in peace one of our battleships, a loss which I do not believe we would have encountered in war.

I would not intrude on you with any suggestion or advice did I not feel, Sir, the greatest regard and respect for you personally, no less than a desire to safeguard the honor of the navy. It may be impossible to ever settle definitely whether or not the *Maine* was destroyed through some treachery upon the part of the Spaniards. The coincidence of her destruction with her being anchored off Havana by an accident such as has never before happened, is unpleasant enough to seriously increase the many existing difficulties between ourselves and Spain. It is of course not my province to in any way touch on the foreign policy of this country; but the navy department represents the arm of the government which will have to carry out any policy upon which the administration may finally determine, and as events of which we have not the slightest control may, at any moment, force the administration's hand, it seems to me, Sir, that it would be well to take all possible precautions. If over some such incident as the De Lôme affair,[3] or this destruction

[1] The *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Terror* were in commission at this time. By July 1 fourteen monitors were in commission, eight of them being old Civil War vessels used for harbor defence.

[2] An obsolete Spanish ironclad.

[3] The Spanish minister at Washington, Don Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, had "some time ago" in a private letter, afterwards published, made offensive references to President McKinley, which forced his retirement. See Lawrence Shaw Mayo, *America of Yesterday* (Boston, 1923), 161.

of the *Maine*, war should suddenly arise, the navy department would have to bear the full brunt of the displeasure of Congress and the country if it were not ready. It would in all probability take two or three weeks to get ready vessels laid up in reserve, and these two or three weeks would represent the golden time for striking a paralyzing blow at the outset of the war.

I would also suggest that the Merritt Wrecking Company, or else some other as good, be directed at once to make preparations to get the *Maine* up.

I note Captain Sigsbee and Consul-General Lee [4] advise against a warship going to Havana at present. It seems to me they would not thus advise unless they felt that there was at least grave suspicion as to the cause of the disaster. In any event I hope that no battleship will be again sent there. In point of force it is either too great or too small. The moral effect is gained as much by the presence of any cruiser flying the American flag, a cruiser such as the *Marblehead*, for instance. If there is need for a battleship at all there will be need for every battleship we possess; and the loss of a cruiser is small compared to the loss of a battleship.

I venture again to point out how these events emphasize the need that we should have an ample navy. Secretary Tracy,[5] in his address at Boston the other day, was able to show that he had no responsibility for our present inadequate navy; that he had given advice which, if followed by Congress, would have insured us at the present moment, a navy which would have forbid [*sic*] any danger of trouble with either Spain or Japan. The question of economy is very important; but it is wholly secondary when compared with the question of national honor and national defense. An unsuccessful war would cost many times over more than the cost of the most extravagant appropriations that could be imagined. Congress may, or may not, adopt your recommendations, if you recommend, in view of what has happened, the increase of the navy to the size which we should have; but at any rate the skirts of the department will then be cleared; and it is certain that until the department takes the lead, Congress will not only refuse to grant ships, but will hold itself justified in its refusal. For a year and a half now we have been explaining to Spain that we might, and very probably would, in certain contingencies interfere in Cuba. We have therefore been

[4] Fitzhugh Lee (1835–1905), major-general, C. S. A., in the Civil War.
[5] Secretary of the navy 1889–1893.

giving her ample notice, of which she has taken advantage, to get ready all the fleet she could, until the margin of difference between our force and hers has become so small that by the sinking of the *Maine* it has been turned in her favor so far as the units represented by the sea-going armorclads on the Atlantic are concerned. It is of course true that the department will be blamed for extravagance if it recommends that the navy be increased, as it should be increased, and as the interests of the nation demand; but this blame will be baseless, and we can well afford to stand it, whereas it may be held against us for all time to come, not merely by the men of to-day, but by those who read history in the future, if we fail to point out what the naval needs of the nation are, and how they should be met.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 17, 1898

SIR:

Although the enclosed letter of Captain Higginson is in form private, it really relates to a public matter, and I therefore send it to you, for it calls attention to the fact of the extreme defectiveness of the surveys of the Dry Tortugas. It ought not to be necessary to employ battleships to make surveys. It seems to me that it would be well to have an immediate and full report as to why the coast survey did not have these channels thoroughly charted, so that the blame, if any there be, may be placed where it belongs.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

[Enclosure. See Captain Higginson's letter of February 11, 1898.]

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 17, 1898

SIR:

The *Journal* the other day, and the *World* to-day, have pictures of the *Vizcaya*[1] shelling and destroying New York, and interviews of men who say that under such circumstances they would destroy her. I wish it were possible in some way to point out the criminal character of such articles. Until the sinking of the *Maine* they amounted to mere hysterics, compounded in part of sensationalism, and in part of physical cowardice. Now they are more serious, and represent incitement to murder. It almost seems to me that an authoritative statement from you to this effect might do good.

In any event it seems to me that the situation is serious enough to warrant extra precautions being taken by us to secure the safety of the *Vizcaya*. Undoubtedly whatever the facts may be, a very considerable number of our people will believe that the *Maine* was destroyed by a torpedo in some such way as the *Journal* depicts this morning; and the *Journal* and the *World* may be relied upon to do their scoundrelly best to inflame any weak-minded and vicious person to the point of making an attempt upon the *Vizcaya*. Of course it is unlikely that such an attempt will be made, or that it would succeed, but I think your department should take every precaution against it; and I should suggest that you have special boat patrols kept around the *Vizcaya* by day, and especially by night, throughout her stay in the harbor, and that you consult with the chief of the bureau of navigation to see what other steps can be taken to insure the safety of the Spanish ship while she is our guest.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

[1] Spanish armored cruiser in New York Harbor.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 19, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

In reference to our conversation of yesterday, and to a brief conversation which I had with Judge Day this morning before you came, let me again earnestly urge that you advise the President against our conducting any examination in conjunction with the Spaniards as to the *Maine's* disaster. I myself doubt whether it will be possible to tell definitely how the disaster occurred by an investigation; still it may be possible, and it may be that we could do it as well in conjunction with the Spaniards as alone. But I am sure we never could convince the people-at-large of this fact. There is of course a very large body of public opinion to the effect that we sometime ago reached the limit of forbearance in our conduct toward the Spaniards, and this public opinion is already very restless, and might easily be persuaded to turn hostile to the administration. The outrageous attacks of Senators Allen [1] and Mason [2] yesterday, which were so well answered by Lodge and Wolcott,[3] show that even in our own party, as well as among our foes, there is already a disposition to look with suspicion upon our attitude about Cuba. I feel that for our own sakes the administration should scrupulously refrain from doing anything which would give a color of right to our critics, and they would undoubtedly seize upon a joint investigation as an excuse for denouncing us, and for asserting that we were afraid to find out the exact facts. Of course such an accusation would be absurd; but it might be damaging nevertheless; and it would at present have weight with a great many decent people who would not normally pay any heed to it, but who think that we should intervene on behalf of Cuba.

There is another subject of which I spoke to you yesterday, and about which I venture to remind you. This is in reference to additional warships. I was informed that both Speaker Reed [4] and Senator Hale [5] had stated that we must cease building any more

[1] William Vincent Allen (1847–1924), U. S. senator from Nebraska.
[2] William Ernest Mason (1850–1921), U. S. senator from Illinois.
[3] Edward Oliver Wolcott (1848–1905), U. S. senator from Colorado.
[4] Thomas Brackett Reed (1839–1902), Bowdoin '60, of Maine, Speaker of the House of Representatives.
[5] Eugene Hale, of Maine, chairman of the senate naval committee.

battleships, in view of the disaster to the *Maine*. I can not believe that the statement is true, for of course such an attitude, if supported by the people, would mean that we had reached the last pitch of national cowardice and baseness. Nevertheless, while I can not believe that any of our own party leaders would adopt such an attitude, there is no question that it is one which appeals to people who are timid and foolish; and furthermore, it will appeal even to persons who are neither timid nor foolish, but who are ignorant of the subject, and who believe that we should have more monitors and torpedo boats instead of battleships. I shall not repeat what I said in my letter of yesterday about torpedo boats and battleships; but I earnestly wish you could see your way clear now, without waiting a day, to send in a special message, stating that in view of the disaster to the *Maine* (and perhaps in view of the possible needs of this country) instead of recommending one battleship, you ask that two, or better still, four battleships be authorized immediately by Congress. If such action were taken promptly I believe it would not only be of great service to the country, but of great service to the administration; for I believe it would be an admirable thing politically, and would do much to set at ease many good men who have felt that our policy in reference to the navy, and on foreign affairs, was not strong enough. If only Congress could be persuaded to act upon such a suggestion at once, and authorize the battleships immediately, it would do more for the national tone than could be done in any other way.

Very respectfully,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SENATOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.
February 19, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY LONG:

Thank you for your very kind note of this morning. I only voiced feebly the sentiment of pride our whole country feels in the American navy: a sentiment that has been strengthened by the dignity and wisdom with which its present chief is guiding its policy in these critical times.

Higginson[1] in one of his essays tells us that the average age of the captains who sailed out of Salem and Marblehead in the War of 1812, and who brought such glory to the flag, was under twenty-two! Their descendants still adorn the service, and their example still kindles the patriotism of the officers of our navy.

With best wishes,
Yours sincerely,
EDWARD O. WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

A. MAURICE LOW TO SECRETARY LONG

HAVANA
February 26, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

This is the first opportunity I have had to send you a few words as it is not advisable to send anything but ordinary communications through regular mails.

Belief grows stronger every day among the American correspondents here – careful men and not the sensationalists – that a mine caused the explosion. I came here without any preconceived theories, I have been trying to convince myself that the disaster was an accident, and yet conclusion is forcing itself upon me that [the] mine theory is correct. Your recent order all the officers – unfortunately for us – are obeying literally. Not a word do they tell us. Perhaps you don't realize how hard our task is. Captain Sigsbee desires me to convey his regards and say how much he appreciated your kind message. It was very cheering to him to know his course had met with your approval. He is a magnificent fellow and an honor to the country and the service. If he would only talk!

Outwardly Havana is quiet; under the surface there is a seething volcano. Will it break out?

I must close as General Lee has the pouch ready. With regards,

Faithfully yours,
A. MAURICE LOW[1]

[1] Colonel Thomas Wentworth Higginson (1823–1911), Harvard College '41. See his *Life and Times of Stephen Higginson* (Boston and New York, 1907), 39–42.

[1] Alfred Maurice Low (1860–1929), newspaper correspondent.

WILLIAM C. WHITNEY TO SECRETARY LONG

Joye Cottage, Easey Street
AIKEN, SOUTH CAROLINA
March 1, 1898

Confidential

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I imagine all the suggestions in this note have already been considered by the President. If war comes the only point is *damage to be done to us by an enemy's ships of war*. Cuba would be overrun and Spain be on the defensive there [on] short notice. But nothing but an overpowering superiority on the ocean would prevent a panic, war risks in all directions and general commercial disaster no matter how the war ended. Q. How can this be prevented? Only by purchasing vessels of war. This can only be done by paying twice what they are worth. But Spain has no money and we have. If we had a dozen more first class fighting ships there could be no war. This purchasing can only be done by confidential, quiet advances being made in a variety of directions, without Spain knowing of it, and without publicity. The avenues through which such advances can be made will readily occur to you and the President and will suggest themselves – diplomatic of course.

Pardon this repetition of what you have already considered. But we should not go to war unless we can end it at once. A *long* fight with such a country as Spain would be humiliating. But the South with no ports and no navy, with one privateer the *Alabama* inflicted hundreds of millions of damage (directly and indirectly, war premiums, *etc.*) upon this country.

If there is nothing new in this letter tear it up. It does not require an answer.

Yours sincerely,
W. C. WHITNEY[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

SECRETARY LONG TO MILTON EAMES

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
March 2, 1898

MASTER MILTON EAMES:

I am in receipt of your letter of the twenty-seventh ultimatum, enclosing ten cents.

[1] William Collins Whitney (1841–1904), Yale '63, secretary of the navy in President Cleveland's first administration.

As no subscription is being received for the building of a battleship, I have turned the money over to the ladies having in charge the raising of a fund for the relief of the *Maine* sufferers.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

Master MILTON EAMES
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WARD

Department of the Navy
Bureau of Navigation
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 2, 1898

The data furnished in the *Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation* for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, is made up from a careful count of the men who were actually on board of the vessels of the navy and at the different navy yards and stations on the thirtieth of June. The number of men in the general service was 8,685, number of apprentices 1,642, total 10,327. Number of men in special service, including fish commission and coast survey, 1,018; grand total, 11,345.

Of the number of men in the general service, 2,845 are petty officers; of this number, over forty-eight per cent. are native born, and eighty-three per cent. are actual citizens of the United States. Of the 5,840 men in the general service, holding other ratings, fifty-eight per cent. are native born, and seventy per cent. are actual citizens. Of the number of men in the special service 351 are petty officers, eighty-six per cent. native born and ninety-one per cent. citizens of the United States. Of the 667 men in special service under other ratings, forty-eight per cent. are native born and over sixty-eight per cent. are citizens.

Of the whole number of men in the service, over fifty-four per cent. are native born, and seventy-four per cent. are actual citizens. Of the remaining twenty-six per cent., over twelve per cent. have declared their intentions of becoming citizens. Of the apprentices in the service, over eighty-six per cent. are native born.

[JOHN D. LONG]

JOHN W. CANDLER TO SECRETARY LONG

66 State Street
Boston
March 2, 1898

My dear Secretary Long:

A friend of mine has given me from time [to time] very interesting accounts of the "Holland Sub Marine Boat,"[1] it seemed from what has been said to me it is valuable. They write me that Mr. William H. Tagues, the president of the company, is to be in Washington to arrange for a trial, or something of that kind. If it meets the approval of the department, I take pleasure in recommending Lieutenant Commander W. W. Kimball[2] to be detailed to be present. I believe him to be a very reliable and capable officer.

I have no personal interest whatever in the invention, but as an old Cuban merchant I am tired of the cruelty and tyranny of the Spaniards in Cuba, which I have been familiar with for about forty years, and hope new inventions will aid in destroying them if necessary to drive them from rule on this side of the Atlantic.

Sincerely yours,
John W. Candler[3]

Honorable John D. Long

WALTER L. BOUVÉ TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Senate Chamber
Boston
March 2, 1898

Dear Mr. Long:

I have hesitated to bother you by writing during a period that I knew must be very trying and wearying and which, quite possibly, was overworking you. Moreover it has been a time for deliberation on the part of every one, and I for one, did not wish to let feeling carry me off my feet, especially in any endeavor to give you my impression of public sentiment; — which perhaps you will not be sorry to learn, — as it appears to me. Last year, in the House, I made a very vigorous fight against the passage of resolutions intended as advice to Congress, — although entirely sympathising with

[1] Invented by John Philip Holland (1840–1914).
[2] William Wirt Kimball (1848–1930).
[3] John Wilson Candler (1828–1903), M. C. from Massachusetts 1881–1883.

their spirit, – and finally voted with *only ten others* against their passage, while they passed by a vote of *one hundred and twenty-one*. A like conservative course has influenced me this year on at least two occasions. So I think you will give me credit for endeavoring to speak impartially.

To me personally, the loss of the *Maine*, – due to any *probable* cause, – does not appear to be a justifiable reason for war. If Spain connived at or brought about the calamity, of course I should think directly the opposite. Whether a refusal of indemnity if caused by her citizens would be a proper reason, is to me doubtful. So the *Maine* disaster is to *me* a sad and unfortunate incident. But the people at large, – and thoughtful and high minded portions, at least, – feel much more strongly. The views of those who agree with my opinion are expressed perhaps better by saying that, as a whole, the *Maine's* loss should be made a pretext for an interference in Cuba by our government, which ought really to be undertaken on other grounds.

There can be no doubt that there is great restraint being exercised all round and that the least apparent yielding of proper claim against Spain would lead to the greatest and bitterest outburst since 1861. The people here have great confidence in you and in the President, and it is this confidence which has resulted in the quiet thus far apparent. But if you and the rest of the Cabinet – and especially Congress – could hear the denunciation of Boutelle [1] of Maine and of Speaker Reed, both in and out of the legislature, you would realize how near we are to a popular explosion, even after these two weeks.

Really all hands had accepted the certainty of war, and, excepting those for peace at any price, and those who were troubled about its effect on their pockets, there was an almost universal feeling of satisfaction that the misery and cruelty in Cuba was to be stopped. For my own part I should prefer that the United States act honestly, and interfere openly; first in the cause of humanity, and second because I believe it to be for our national interest to do so. I think the real desire for action by our government is based on the same reasons, but that almost all are willing to make a pretext of the *Maine* disaster – as said before. However that may be, I have never seen such a general quiet acquiescence in, and desire for, the extremest measures. There is universal denunciation of Congress for

[1] Charles Addison Boutelle (1839–1901), M. C. from Maine.

its real or supposed failure to back up your wishes and vote men and money, for men, guns and ships, and especially for dry docks.

I have been with two committees of the Senate and House within a few days where most radical talk was the result of hesitation or inaction, — and Mr. Reed received unstinted denunciation. I wish you could see all that the papers have printed and hear all that has been said about you. It could but please you. There is universal confidence in your dignified course. It is felt that if you were secretary of state it would be "none too good for you."

I think there is less satisfaction with Mr. McKinley from the fear that he will not only seek peace honorably but be disposed to yield everything for its sake. Still almost every one believes in the administration and thinks it will do the wise thing. If peace can be maintained without sacrifice, the people desire it, but they are not in a mood to yield much; and there is a general desire to have action taken to free Cuba.

I am delighted at the immense and deserved gain you have made in popular esteem. I hope you are not being overburdened.

If the most serious thing should happen, Massachusetts is admirably prepared to do her part efficiently.

Very truly yours
WALTER L. BOUVÉ [2]

Don't trouble yourself to write. I know you have enough to trouble you.

CAPTAIN SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Iowa*, First Rate
KEY WEST, FLORIDA
March 4, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

It may appear out of place to write you about a personal matter at this time, when my whole thought should be, and really is, occupied by the court of inquiry. We are about to start for Havana, where I shall be more fully occupied than here.

I had for some time past supposed that the way was clear for my promotion to the grade of rear admiral, because of the retirement of Captain Robeson.[1] I now learn by a few lines in the paper

[2] Walter Lincoln Bouvé (b. 1849), lawyer, state senator, militiaman.

[1] Henry Bellows Robeson (1842–1914).

that he is likely to receive his promotion. For his sake I am glad that it is to be so; and I am ashamed that for [a] personal reason I should take any other view of it.

My situation is a peculiar one. There are six officers above me who are younger than I am; consequently I can never reach the grade of rear admiral, as there seems to be no chance for our reorganization measure. It has occurred to me that if Robeson would voluntarily retire, on condition that he were reported favorably by the medical board, he would secure all he expects, and would not block my promotion. Evidently he would subsequently pass for promotion to admiral, for no reason would exist against it which does not hold good now. This is the reason why I find the outlook so hopeless. Of course, if he were ordered to command a squadron, he would ask to be retired; but in these times no secretary would take such a responsibility, for he might accept the command.

You will wonder, my dear Mr. Secretary, why I should write you on this subject. Principally for two reasons: I can do nothing for myself; and because you might start the train which would lead Robeson to ask for his retirement. This only on condition you think it entirely proper.

I confess I am greatly in doubt whether I should ask this.

Yours sincerely,
W. T. Sampson

The Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

GAMALIEL BRADFORD TO SECRETARY LONG

502 Beacon Street
Boston
March 4, 1898

Dear Mr. Long:

Of the many rumors floating about one is to the effect that the administration is trying to negotiate with Spain and Cuba for the independence of Cuba against an indemnity of one hundred (or two hundred) millions of dollars to be raised by a loan guaranteed by the United States. This report has moved me so deeply that I can not help trespassing upon your time and patience.

If Mr. McKinley wishes to make his name second only to those of Washington and Lincoln in the history of the country, and to

make his reëlection in 1900 absolutely certain; if he wishes to raise the United States higher in the eyes of the world than they have ever stood before; if he wishes to give the Republican party a new lease of power, now is his opportunity.

While — thanks largely to your attitude — I have not much fear from the *Maine* incident, I have very great fear that intervention can not be long averted. Any attempt to buy the island for ourselves would be peremptorily refused by Spain, and even its acceptance would involve annexation which I regard as the last of evils, and I believe that feeling is shared by the country. The alternative, war, with its train of endless evils, could hardly bring any greater than the annexation which would be one of its results.

But the separate independence of Cuba would avoid all these evils. Having so large a mortgage on it, we could take it if it ever seemed desirable, while we should have an interval to decide calmly whether it was so or not. That this great democracy could do so magnanimous and wise an act — I do not say unselfish because it would be the very perfection of enlightened self-interest — would fill Europe with astonishment and raise it enormously in their estimation. As to the cost, if we never got back a cent it would be less than that of six months of war and hardly more than one year's pension list; while the interest at three per cent., six millions, would scarcely exceed the cost of one ironclad. The difference both present and future in the moral effect upon the country of the maintenance of peace as compared with war would be cheaply purchased at the capital sum.

Of course the condition would be included that slavery should never again be permitted in the island.

Spain would not accept? Then having made the proposal would justify anything we might afterwards be compelled to do. And our position in making it would be entirely different from that of trying for ourselves. We could use every possible conciliatory expression; pain and regret that such a noble nation should be compelled to give up her ancient dependency; total disclaimer of any selfish purpose beyond that of securing peace on our border; readiness to do anything to make the settlement honorable to both sides; but that it would be impossible much longer to restrain our people who are becoming more and more excited; while with our seventy millions of population and their enormous wealth, the result in the long run could not be doubtful and the end, after unspeakable

disaster to both nations, could not fail to be worse, much worse than that proposed.

It seems to me that except the first Revolution and the Civil War, there has never been a time when the government of this country held its future welfare and that of untold generations in its hands more completely than the present.

If there is anything which I can do either by word or deed to promote the result I am ready at a moment's notice, and meantime I will ask you to pardon this irrepressible outburst of feeling.

Believe me,

Very truly yours,
GAMALIEL BRADFORD [1]

WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
March 4, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

While the scandalous portion of the press is maligning you, I am sure you are conscious that the best people are grateful for your admirable bearing in a troublous time. The thinking people of Massachusetts feel that you have added renown to the commonwealth, and rejoice that you are in a position to do such great public service.

Among the men whose good opinion you value, whether of your party or not, there is but one expression of approval. They feel also that the President has acted with conscience and discretion. I enclose [an] editorial from [the] *New York Journal of Commerce* which [is] a deserved and fitting tribute.

Very sincerely yours,
WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON [1]

ROBERT M. MORSE TO SECRETARY LONG

Burroughs Street
JAMAICA PLAIN, [MASSACHUSETTS]
March 6, 1898

DEAR LONG:

I wish it understood that I join in the chorus of approval and gratitude which goes up from intelligent people all over the country

[1] Gamaliel Bradford (1831–1911), Harvard College '49.

[1] William Lloyd Garrison, Jr. (1838–1909).

to the President and yourself for your conduct over the *Maine* disaster. Nothing in our experience has been so vile as the course which has been taken by a large part of the press in manufacturing lies and in trying to stir up a war feeling. To make an accident like this, occurring in a friendly port where our ship had been received with every courtesy and where, upon the happening of the accident, both authorities and people have hastened to show their horror at the act and their sympathy with us, the occasion for precipitating us into a causeless war, is too wicked for adequate description in words. I believe that to-day our greatest danger as a people is in the existence of this braggart and jingo spirit which is ready to insult other governments and nations and to threaten war and perhaps go to war. All the more we are proud and thankful that the national administration is calm and just and that it will not permit such a blot on civilization as a war with Spain would be. With kind regards, believe me,

Very truly yours,
ROBERT M. MORSE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

SENATOR CHANDLER TO SECRETARY LONG

Senate Chamber
WASHINGTON
March 10, 1898

Private and personal

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Shouldn't our Asiatic squadron be strengthened by adding a battleship, if the squadron is to remain there? With a battleship it could take Manila; without it, it can do little and might as well come home. But I should not favor its return. Our Pacific Coast hasn't many harbors like the Atlantic; and besides, a Spanish fleet is not likely to appear there. Therefore I hope you will send over a battleship, which will stop *en route* at Hawaii. It is a long journey and ought to begin at once. Excuse me for writing to you. I am unable to reach the department this morning to see you. I congratulate you upon the creditable action of the department so far. Thank God Cuba is to be free; and we are to take at least a little part therein. The birth of a new American republic is a great event, my friend, although its beginnings may be feeble!

Sincerely your friend,
W. E. CHANDLER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

SENATOR HALE TO SECRETARY LONG

1001 Sixteenth Street
[WASHINGTON, D. C.]
10 March, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am off for Maine to get a whiff of winter as there are four feet of snow there on the average.

You are surrounded by men who are eager for war and I am glad I am not in your shoes. But I thank the Lord you are just where you are. The President will not apportion the money except as it is really needed, and I am sure he will stand by you in resisting the hungry crowd who want to get hold of it.

Yours most sincerely,
EUGENE HALE[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

THOMAS H. TALBOT TO SECRETARY LONG

23 Court Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
March 10, 1898

DEAR GOVERNOR AND SECRETARY:

You fellows in charge of the nation's affairs will not, I believe, do much that I shall not approve, either to avoid, or to prepare for, war.

Probably it will soon be apparent that practically, Cuba can not be well governed save by the United States. But I hope that the island will come under our government without war.

Yet, it did me good to see the other day that we had warships in waters of the East Indies: for, in the event of war made upon us by Spain, I hope to see even her Philippines seized and strongly held by our forces, until we see fit to give them up.

Further, it is a pleasant rumor to me, which comes this morning, of sympathy and an approach to a good understanding between the United States and Great Britain, as to affairs in the extreme East. I do not know a great deal about the issues out there, now becoming acute. But it would be difficult to make me believe, that we had no interest in those issues. In preventing the closing of portions of China to the world's free commerce, I think we should

[1] U. S. senator from Maine and chairman of the naval committee.

have a substantial interest, even, if we were now, what we once were, a nation with only an Atlantic seaboard.

Now, however, we have a long stretch of Pacific Coast, fronting eastern Asia; and I do not think we can too carefully provide for the great future of these Pacific interests of ours.

It was my opinion of the foreign policy which our nation ought now to adopt, which chiefly deter[mined] my choice of candidates for President in 1896. What I knew of Cleaveland's [*sic*] views thereon would have prevented my repeating my votes for him, had he been a candidate. And yet, if Olney,[1] the other day, at Cambridge, spoke for Cleaveland, as well as for himself; then Cleaveland's so far are not so objectionable to me, as I had regarded them. As, indeed, for some years I have considered the doctrine of Washington's "Farewell Address" as not good gospel for to-day. I think of it as a "back number," ever since we were able by warlike force to restore the integrity of the Union. Our new powers, of which we then became conscious, impose upon us altogether new duties; and we can not shirk them, if we would.

Nor are we always to be a mere continental, land-bound people. The sea and foreign parts have a loud call for some of our people; and we must try to find them fit opportunity on the ocean and abroad.

Yours truly,
THOMAS H. TALBOT[2]

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER MILLER TO SECRETARY LONG

Hôtel du Bazar Slave rue Nicolskaïa
Moscou
March 12, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

After the occupation of Mobile in the early spring of 1865 I was engaged in dragging for torpedoes and saw several of our vessels destroyed by them — was within fifty feet of the *Milwaukee* — she had but two or three feet of water under her — the *Osage*, a gunboat, a "tin clad" and two tug boats with my own boat — the

[1] Richard Olney (1835–1917), Brown '56, secretary of state in President Cleveland's second administration.

[2] Thomas Hammond Talbot (1823–1907), Bowdoin '46, Boston lawyer, assistant attorney-general in President Grant's administration; brevet brigadier-general, U. S. V., Civil War.

launch of the *Cincinnati* were all destroyed by torpedoes.[1] In no case was any internal explosion caused by the external explosion of the torpedoes. Conditions differed of course. The torpedoes were made of beer kegs anchored by "mushrooms" filled with gunpowder and ignited by means of nipples filled with fulminate of mercury. While you have nearer and more valuable sources of information I consider it my duty to lay this before you.

Very respectfully
FREDERICK A. MILLER[2]

To the
Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NATHAN APPLETON TO SECRETARY LONG

66 Beacon Street
Personal BOSTON
14 March, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I enclose a short article of mine which appeared in the *Boston Herald* of to-day. As regards that part of it which refers to the Panama Canal I would say that the director general of the present Panama Canal Company has quite recently started for the isthmus, and is expected to return to New York, *en route* for Paris, about the middle of April. You will remember our conversation in relation to the canal last summer at Washington, and I wish as much now as I did then that, should I meet Mr. Hutin on his return from Panama, I could give him some encouragement as to our coöperation in the great work which is quietly going on. Believe me,

Yours very truly,
NATHAN APPLETON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Iowa*, First Rate
KEY WEST, FLORIDA
March 16, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have been very much impressed during the past few weeks by what the papers have had to say concerning the coming of the

[1] The *Milwaukee*, *Osage*, and *Cincinnati* were ironclads.
[2] Frederick Augustus Miller (d. 1907).

Spanish torpedo boats. This has been asserted and contradicted several times. On my arrival here from Havana, I see that it is finally stated that they are to come at once. I therefore venture to write you my opinion, and to advise in the most positive manner that Spain should be informed that it will be considered a hostile act if they are sent here. Such vessels can only be used against us, and under the present conditions, in the most effective manner. This North Atlantic Squadron is now very open to an attack by such boats; they might approach us under a friendly guise and destroy a battleship without our power to resist. Not so in the case of big ships. Their approach to our coast would in itself be a suspicious circumstance; we would not mind if she did attack us, and got in the first blow. We are always ready, and probably would make short work of her; but a torpedo boat, from her invisibility, may need but one shot to sink a ship. If such a boat approached us to-day, I would not know whether to treat her as a friend or a foe.

I think the government should warn Spain that if those torpedo boats are sent over here, that we will destroy them at once. Self preservation demands such a course. If we are not to follow this course, the ships should be withdrawn to a position where, if a torpedo boat comes, it will plainly indicate that she is on hostilities bent.

Upon another point I venture to express my opinion, my dear Mr. Secretary, without knowing your views, and again having my information only from the papers. Briefly, I would not purchase any foreign built warship. Let us make the best of what we have. We should have more, but we can win without more. I do not think that England will sell to us under the present conditions, and it would probably be humiliating to have her refuse; though that is not of much importance.

The spirit of the international rule against supplying war material during war would be violated, if not the *letter*. War may come at any moment, and England will be careful not to put herself in the position she was when the *Alabama* cost her so much. Spain will secure no appreciable advantage by such purchases. She is dead broke.

Warn England, and any other country having ships for sale, not to sell to Spain at the risk of our subsequent action, and then keep our own ships clear by not attempting to purchase ourselves; it will give great strength to our claims against any nation who does

sell ships to Spain. Let us proceed at once to build our own ships, — such as we want.

Yours sincerely,
W. T. SAMPSON

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILLIAM H. LINCOLN TO SECRETARY LONG

114 State Street
BOSTON
March 22, 1898

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I have refrained from writing you, because I did not wish to trespass upon your time, realizing what demands are now made upon you.

You will always be Governor Long to your old friends whatever position you may fill. I want to say that your calm, deliberate course of action has increased the admiration of all classes in this community for you and the grand old commonwealth has reason to be proud of her worthy son and representative. I have always remembered what you once said to me, many years ago, that the height of your ambition was to be in the Senate of the United States. It seems now, that in the good providence of God you have been called to a much more responsible and prominent position, and next to the President, the eyes of the whole people are turned toward you. We have confidence in your ability — your judgment and your sense of justice. I fervently trust and pray that the demon of war may not be let loose upon this country — and I have faith that somehow peace may be maintained and with national honor.

But my object in writing is to offer you my tribute of praise and to endeavor to strengthen your hands if need be by assuring that the people of this state believe in you — and in your wisdom and your sense of responsibility.

The export trade of this country was never in a more flourishing condition, and the country was entering upon a period of unprecedented prosperity.

The mission of commerce is to proclaim peace and good will to men, — to bring the nations into closer relations with each other. May peace be established.

With kind regards and high esteem —

Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM H. LINCOLN [1]

[1] William Henry Lincoln (1835–1925), Boston merchant.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
March 23, 1898

DEAR LONG:

My letter of twenty-first instant suggested the importance of forestalling the Spanish crafty scheme of arbitrating the *Maine* disaster, whereby Spain would probably get European support to some extent, with a view of forcing a modification of our Monroe Doctrine. Therefore I suggested the recognition of Cuba's independence, which as a proper act of sovereignty can not be subject to arbitration.

Moreover such recognition does not *necessarily* involve war; yet it would carry with it belligerent rights, assure Cuba's demand for rights by the laws of war and thereby render offenders outlaws and personally responsible.

This recognition of Cuba's independence would really be a peace measure, because it would probably be followed by similar recognition by other Spanish American governments and not unlikely by the British government; whereas giving precedence to the "*Maine* disaster" is really an opportunity for dilatory tactics on the part of Spain and a continuance of the starvation condition of the reconcentrados, for which we would thus make ourselves jointly responsible.

There is another reason for holding this to be a peace measure; Spain, — now practically having lost Cuba and therefore not loser in anything but prestige by confessing it, — would be under bonds to us not to consider our recognition of Cuba's independence as an act of war. Those bonds would be Porto Rico and the Philippines, which Spain would be likely to lose if she declared war on us; to say nothing of other grave inconveniences, such as financial ruin, crippling of commerce and industry of the peninsula and possibly civil war at home. For which reasons I think that recognition of Cuba's independence decidedly less liable to cause war than to cause pacification of the island of Cuba.

Of course if war should result, we would become allies of the Cubans after their recognition as an independent power. Spain must realize that our alliance would immediately follow Spain's declaration of war, and commercial intercourse would cease between the two countries. Whereas, a graceful acceptance by Spain

of our recognition of Cuba's independence, would not interfere with commerce between Spain and the United States; and moreover might be conditioned upon our guarantee of a certain amount to be paid to Spain by Cuba and thus help the Spanish treasury.

These points, tactfully communicated to Spain, would not be without influence with so wise a statesman as Sagasta.[1]

Yours truly,

HORACE N. FISHER

P.S. You are too busy, my dear classmate, for me or any one to expect an answer to letters from friends. Everybody is nobly upholding the hands of the President and his advisers in this most critical time. That is my only excuse for writing you.

Yesterday I sent to Senator Hoar a duplicate of my letter of [the] twenty-first instant to you, for his consideration: for, as the poet says,

"Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes,"

I am awfully afraid of European arbitration, for reasons stated in my letter. H. N. F.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

NEW YORK
March 24, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

I am making good progress with the scheme of a proposed coast signal service,[1] have secured through my friend Mr. Hudson,[2] president of the Bell Telephone Company, offers of most hearty cooperation and from Mr. Eckert[3] of the Western Union Telegraph Company, through influential friends here, equally pleasant assurances.

I think, *entre nous*, that I shall be able to save the department the expenditure of many thousands of dollars and to secure efficiency with economy. So far I have spent nothing except for unavoidable travel.

I hope to bring my work to a conclusion inside of three weeks.

[1] Praxedes Mateo Sagasta (1827–1903), prime minister of Spain.

[1] See Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 161.
[2] John Elbridge Hudson (1839–1900), Harvard College '62.
[3] Thomas Thompson Eckert (1825–1910).

If you should need my services in a more active way before then I have "an understudy" ready to take the burden.

I am distressed by the clouds that *will* gather on the political horizon but ready to do what I ought to do when the call comes. The bureau of navigation has my address always.

Sincerely yours,
C. F. Goodrich

CARLETON HUNT TO SECRETARY LONG

New Orleans
March 24, 1898

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In his letter which came to-day, Lieutenant Ridgely Hunt[1] expresses his gratitude for your appointment of him to be naval expert in the branch hydrographic office, New York, in order that I, too, may write and thank you. I do so. I speak for him, and for myself also, with all my heart, because I am not without some hope, that with your usually gracious disposition, your thoughts, as you acted, may have turned towards me as well as Ridgely.

As you will perhaps remember, I have from the beginning of President McKinley's administration considered that the Cuban troubles would have to be seriously dealt with. I welcomed your appointment as sure to be useful, and as one in which distinguished public service would be rendered by you. Observation, as practised as is yours in public life, does not fail, I am very certain, to perceive all the perplexities of the present time in this part of our great and common country. It is difficult to imagine anything more deplorable than the effort being made in the name of what is called democracy, to defraud the fifteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. If only the attempt could be wisely met and overthrown, how happy the conclusion would be!

The war with Spain will, as all war must, bring its measure of calamity to the people of this state. It will, however, be, as I believe, not without good results. It will fire their patriotism. It will show them full of courage. It will prove them devoted to the cause of the country. The first gun that is fired will unite our countrymen everywhere North and South, and bring them gloriously to the support of the wise and firm course of the President. Please God,

[1] Ridgely Hunt (1854–1916).

the triumphs that are to follow by land and sea will tend to the suppression of Bryanism and repudiation!

Wishing you every success, and highest honors in your great place, I am, with every sympathy, personally and as a citizen in this public crisis,

Yours faithfully,
CARLETON HUNT

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON

JAMES DE NORMANDIE TO SECRETARY LONG

First Church, Roxbury
BOSTON
March 24, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

You have not time, I fear, to read commendations for yourself — and yet you must be helped in these critical moments, by knowing of the highest praises in every one's mouth. It seems to me I never heard such a consenting voice — and for the President also. It is surely the great desire of the vast majority hereabout, that you may be able to go on for some time in your present course. We are surely too great to mind any taunts of being afraid to go to war — but when we do go, let us all be sure the moment has come, and we are ready to demand our own terms. So many of us feel that if you could spend a hundred millions more in preparation, it would be as nothing to the expenses of war, and might be one of the means of preventing it. In any event we are all putting great confidence in you, and a strong assurance that you will meet any emergency in the right spirit and with success.

May every good help be on your side.

Most truly yours,
JAMES DE NORMANDIE [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[1] Reverend James De Normandie (1836–1924), Antioch '58. Abstract of Secretary Long's reply, written in short-hand on the back of this letter: "I thank you for your letter and sympathize with your views. The difficulties are very thick, but the sun will shine through. The President is exercising the utmost discretion and is exhausting every means of peaceful settlement. If the sword is raised it will be for the purpose of extending succor."

REPRESENTATIVE MOODY TO SECRETARY LONG

House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 28, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I am somewhat embarrassed about the naming of a ship *Gloucester*. I understand, doubtless without sufficient foundation, that when we talked over the question some little time ago you told me the first opportunity which offered would be taken to give that name to some war vessel, first because it was a resonant name, and second because of the peculiar relations of Gloucester to the sea. When I was in Gloucester at the meeting of the Master Mariners' Association a week or so ago, I stated that fact in my speech with the result of great applause.

I appreciate the difficulties in the way but hope they may be overcome. I should call on you but I realize the tremendous pressure under which you are acting at this time.

Yours very truly,
W. H. MOODY [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GEORGE S. BOUTWELL TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
March 29, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

It is always a question of doubt with me whether a letter from an outsider can be of any value to those who are entrusted with the management of affairs, but there are indications in the newspapers that the public opinion of this section of the country in regard to the difficulties with Spain may be misunderstood at Washington. I have been in contact daily for the month preceding with many persons in varying conditions in life, and I have not met one who is in favor of hostilities with Spain upon any of the grounds that are supposed to exist. There is, as you might expect, a very general concurrence in the opinion that, if unhappily, we should be brought into a condition of war, the government must be sus-

[1] William Henry Moody (1853–1917), Harvard College '76, M. C. from Massachusetts and Governor Long's successor as secretary of the navy; later associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.

tained in its prosecution until an honorable peace can be secured. I think it is safe to assume that any arrangement by which peace shall be secured will be acceptable to the people of Massachusetts, and I think it will be acceptable to the people of this part of the country.

As to forcible intervention in the affairs of Cuba for the purpose of securing peace, it is safe to say that there are no advocates of such a policy. For myself, I may say from my experience of four years during the former war, and from my knowledge of Spanish character acquired then and since, that Spain will never yield her hold upon Cuba except through war with the United States. Should such a war occur, the administration will find support in Massachusetts, but few or no advocates of the policy which may have led to such a war. It may be practicable, and on this point you can judge much better than I, — but it may be practicable to effect an arrangement by which as much freedom in government shall be secured to the inhabitants of Cuba as is now enjoyed by the inhabitants of Canada. If such an arrangement can be made, it will be accepted and approved very generally in this part of the country. If in Congress and out there should be wordy declamation against such a policy, its effect will be temporary and its influence limited to a very few persons. In one phrase I am of opinion, in which I think there is very general concurrence here, that forcible intervention in the affairs of Cuba should not be thought of, and that it would be wholly indefensible upon moral grounds, as well as a proceeding hostile to the best interests of the country.

Very truly yours,
GEORGE S. BOUTWELL [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EDWIN D. MEAD TO SECRETARY LONG

20 Beacon Street
BOSTON
March 31, [1898]

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I hope you receive enough letters from the serious and earnest men of Massachusetts to make you quite sure that a lot of the newspapers, always anxious to put into the soup all the pepper and salt

[1] George Sewall Boutwell (1818–1905), former governor of Massachusetts.

there is on the table, do not at all represent the best in the general Massachusetts sentiment. I speak confidently, for I touch many circles. The President's temper and words, and yours, are what give satisfaction and confidence here in Boston, and are what we bank on. If Mr. Lodge went back to Washington and reported a "war feeling" in Boston, it was because he hunted for it and wanted to find it. Such explosions as Mason's[1] in the Senate day before yesterday, and all those war resolutions at this critical time, are most solemnly condemned by *your* Massachusetts and mine. Thurston's[2] and Gallinger's[3] melodramas are without effect here. Senator Proctor's speech moved everybody profoundly – the speech of a man not loving war, but loving peace, but loving truth and duty more than peace. Our obligations of neighborhood and humanity forbid our allowing this suffering and wickedness to go on; but we want it stopped by men who are not playing to the galleries, but facing the judgment seat of God, and whose patience can last much longer than from one Thursday to another, where the great interests of peace and order and international reason are concerned – the interests which it has been the pride and glory of Sumner's Massachusetts and of this great republic to stand for. I hope you know that Massachusetts feels that, with you in the cabinet at this critical time, her true self and true influence are there.

Yours truly,

EDWIN D. MEAD[4]

JOSEPH R. LEESON TO SECRETARY LONG

226 Devonshire Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
March 31, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

Before leaving Boston for New York last week, I was so much impressed by the grave aspect of national affairs, as well as with a lively sense of appreciation of the wisdom with which the President has guided and largely controlled events, that I caused a meeting to be called by the Boston Chamber of Commerce, to strengthen the President's hands by a public expression of this feeling, which is general in this community. Having requested that Mr. William

[1] Senator Mason of Illinois.
[2] John Mellen Thurston (1847–1916), U. S. senator from Nebraska.
[3] Jacob Harold Gallinger (1837–1918), U. S. senator from New Hampshire.
[4] Edwin Doak Mead (1849–1936).

H. Lincoln prepare a set of resolutions, I subsequently conferred with him on the form of the resolutions which were afterwards passed, with an amendment, however, which had I been able to attend the meeting, I should have vigorously opposed, – my own conception of the needs of the hour is so widely at variance with the false view held, mostly by irresponsible persons, that the existing difficulties between our country and Spain need for adjustment violence and bloodshed. As a method of dealing with international differences, wholesale slaughter is out of date, and is surely abhorrent to all of those higher interests of humanity toward which our civilization is tending. Future historians will record for the admiration of succeeding generations, the splendid self-control and exalted courage which have enabled the President to withstand the clamour of the press and of politicians, a courage of far more elevated character than any which is needed amid the excitement of battle. It is fitting that one who has shown himself capable of the exacting requirements involved in physical encounter, should exhibit the rare statesmanship which President McKinley has brought to the nation's service in this terrible crisis. He may be quite sure that he has not only earned the lasting gratitude of unborn millions of his countrymen, but that he has the confidence and support of a vast majority of those now living, who, in case the extremists prevail, will pay the larger proportion of the fearful cost which would be involved. I gather through my daily intercourse here, in New York and elsewhere, this great majority, noiseless but potent, is placing its main reliance upon the President's wisdom, endurance and fortitude.

That this commonwealth, rightly regarded as a leader in most elevating movements of our day, should have placed at the President's side one who will use all his efforts in support of this, the better and stronger side of Massachusetts, as doubtless of the entire country, is a source of deep gratification. Be assured that the high service which you are aiding the President to render at this time is not lightly regarded by those whose good will you most highly value.

With my best remembrances, I am,

Yours faithfully,
J. R. LEESON [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Joseph Robert Leeson (1844–1930), president of the Boston Chamber of Commerce.

SECRETARY LONG TO HENRY L. NELSON

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 2, 1898

SIR:

Replying to your letter of the thirty-first ultimo, requesting to be permitted to have a correspondent on board one of the warships in the event of hostilities between this country and Spain, I have to inform you that the chief of the bureau of navigation, to whom your letter was referred recommends that your request be not granted, as it would be seriously detrimental to the service. In view of this recommendation of the chief of [the] bureau of navigation, the department would not feel warranted in complying with your request.

Very respectfully
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

MR. H. L. NELSON[1]
Harper's Weekly
NEW YORK CITY

LIEUTENANT SOUTHERLAND TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Eagle*
Navy Yard
NEW YORK
April 2, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I want to thank you for the proudest day of my naval service.

The *Eagle*[1] was commissioned this afternoon, Yeoman Hall running up the ensign and old man Haines mastheading my first command pennant, as the *Dolphin's* bugler sounded four ruffles to the flag. I wish you could have seen it.

The little craft is a beauty and I believe she will really prove of service. To say that I am thoroughly pleased and very proud is putting it very mildly. She is not as large nor quite so fast as either the *Sovereign* or the *Josephine*, but she is handy, a good sea boat, and will get away before either one of them.[2]

[1] Henry Loomis Nelson (1846–1908).

[1] The yacht *Eagle's* former name was *Almy*.

[2] The yachts *Sovereign* and *Josephine* were taken into the navy and renamed *Scorpion* and *Vixen*.

I am actually at a loss for words to express to you how grateful I am, but will try to show it by doing my duty while in command.

I was sorry to leave the *Dolphin* on which I had passed two happy years, but feel that I am honored by the more responsible position, and in addition, am sure this little craft will be better protected and almost as well armed.

I see a great deal of Mr. Bowles, whose work is never ending. To-night he took me on a trip to the dry dock and through his several shops, an experience which I wish you could have during night operations. He hopes to have the work on the dock and caisson completed this coming week. He has done wonderfully well and deserves great credit. In addition to his dock work he has made improvements in the shops which can not be appreciated without being seen.

Please give my kindest regards to Mrs. Long and to Misses Margaret and Helen, and tell them that if all turns out well with me in the future, I will hope to again be afloat with them.

And with all hearty good wishes for you sir, believe me,

Very sincerely,

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND

WILLIAM CLAFLIN TO SECRETARY LONG

63 Mount Vernon Street
BOSTON,
April 3, 1898

MY DEAR SECRETARY:

You have no time for ordinary letters and I have no others, except to say that as far as I can see everybody is for the President's policy, and nobody really wants war. Many are mad about the loss of the *Maine*, and express their feeling earnestly, but most are quite as angry with Congress for trying to force the President.

The country believes in him, will follow him in all his efforts for peace. All the jingoes will be left high and dry, by and by, and will have about the same name as the Hartford conventionists, in the great hereafter.

You have the profound confidence and love of everybody.

Truly yours,

WILLIAM CLAFLIN [1]

[1] William Claflin (1818–1905), former governor of Massachusetts.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 4, 1898

SIR:

The war board[1] has been considering the disposition of the ram *Katahdin*, and has decided to place her at Provincetown, where in less than a day she can be sent to any point in Maine, or any point on the Massachusetts coast that is menaced, or to the east pass of Long Island Sound. She has too little coal to justify her in cruising with the fleet, and she is of course of no use against fortifications.

Yours truly,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

COMMANDER BROWNSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Embassy of the United States
ROME
4 April, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I regret more than I can tell you that the *Garibaldi* has gotten away from us. The consul-general[1] and I myself were told yesterday by Mr. Bombrini, the head of Ansaldos, in the anteroom of the minister of marine, that at no time during the past seven months would it have been possible for us to have secured the ship. I do not think this is entirely true, for I am of the impression that they would have been glad to have found an excuse for breaking with S[pain] so that they could sell to us at an advanced price, but the excuse for breaking never has existed. I have suggested that we might make another offer but they, the Ansaldos, would not listen to it. Looking after the *Garibaldi* delayed my investigation of [the] *Baschio* and torpedo boats. At first I did not understand the *Baschio*, as I had always heard her spoken of as the "Morocco" boat, and

[1] The naval war board, or strategy board, consisted at first of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, Captains Crowninshield and Barker, and Commander Clover; and, as finally made up, of Admiral Sicard and Captains Mahan and Crowninshield. See Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 162, and Mayo, *America of Yesterday*, 184, 191, and 194; also Captain Mahan's letter of May 10, 1898.

[1] Hector de Castro.

had really paid little attention to her on account of her small size and age. As I telegraphed and wrote you I do not advise her purchase.

The two torpedo boats of Odero you can have, but I assume the question of time, four months, will throw them out. There is another boat, Ansaldo, Genoa, builders, 154 feet long, 136 tons, which can be had in [the] same time, 3 to 4 months. I am waiting for her radius of action and your decision regarding the other boats before reporting. The speed is greater, twenty-six knots, and the price excessive, 750,000 francs gold, $150,000. This includes, however, torpedo tubes (two) and two thirty-seven millimeter guns (Hotchkiss, I assume), without the guns the price would be 710,000 francs gold.

The *Baschio* you can have — ready in ten days after purchase. The price is large, but includes everything practically except coal and provisions. The ammunition is included. Guns are of Armstrong, old type, which I suppose were regarded quite good enough for the Sultan of Morocco. The builders claim sixteen knots, others say she can only steam fourteen, under forced draft. Some few changes would have to be made to give more room to the men. I do not think you want her. I have been working on the government to get the *Carlo Alberto* and some torpedo boats ready for sea. This has to be done very quietly, and mainly through the opposition. The papers representing that party having already advocated the selling of ships, in order to build others, better ones, and to keep their yards busy. The minister of marine is in favor [of] selling but dares to make no move. I saw him again yesterday informally, and think he is very friendly to us. Should the move to sell come from the opposition I think the government would accept it, but they can't make the proposition themselves. The trouble is Parliament does not meet until the fourteenth of April, and before that nothing can be done except to pave the way. The price of the ships from the government would probably be reasonable, their cost, which is not low as they were built in government yards, and I have promised a commission of one per cent. to the one who will bring it about, on any large ships we may get, and possibly a larger one on torpedo boats. This commission goes to an attorney not connected in any way with the government. I have not much hopes of success but think it worth working, as it is being done very quietly. The ambassador [2] and consul-general are both doing what

[2] William Franklin Draper (1842–1910).

they can in the matter. I write this to go in the pouch as I would not trust it to the mails.

While waiting for the result of these plans I may go to Germany, to Stettin, after hearing regarding the *Baschio* and torpedo boats.

I am naturally anxious about condition [of] affairs at home, and trust that you will keep the *New York* for me if I do not succeed in getting anything here. I regret that the conditions have permitted me to do so little. My only satisfaction is, in looking backwards, I do not see how I could have done more.

Assuring you of my desire to carry out your instructions to your satisfaction, I am,

Very respectfully,
WILLARD H. BROWNSON [3]

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Spain's responsibility for war, if it comes to pass

BOSTON
April 5, 1898

DEAR LONG:

To-morrow, when you receive this letter, will be the anniversary of the battle of Shiloh, – the first of those great battles in the West which cut the southern confederacy in two and settled the fate of the rebellion.

If we may judge from the news bulletins today, it seems that to-morrow will become to our children what April 6 and 7, 1862, means to us, – a historic anniversary of the expulsion of Spain from the New World. Whether the beginning or the conclusion of that expulsion, remains to be seen; if war is declared, the beginning; if Spain unconditionally surrenders, the end of a dominion founded in cruelty and crime and perpetuated in open disregard of every one of the ten commandments.

Knowing what war means, I have hoped that the efforts of the President and his advisers, to secure the objects of war by diplomatic methods, might be crowned with success; and, as far as lay in my opportunities, have done what was in my power to do. But I confess that, at no time, have I been sanguine in the belief that Spain would abandon Cuba without war with us. My reason for this belief was that, to my mind, the key of the position, of the controlling causes, was not at Washington nor at Havana, but at

[3] Commander Willard Herbert Brownson (1845–1935).

Madrid; that the internal condition of Spain is such that the loss of Cuba would probably overthrow the Liberal party and not improbably the present dynasty, leading to civil war.

Indeed the Queen Regent has not overstated the difficulties of her position. As constitutional queen she has only the "moderator" power; the executive power is vested in a ministry responsible to the Cortes and representing the dominant majority. In a thoroughly consolidated dynasty like that of Queen Victoria, the crown can safely direct in a measure the course of affairs: but so great is the difference of temperament and fitness for self-government of the Spanish from the English, that really the Queen Regent is practically helpless in great emergencies. As trustee for the little King, she feels a profound personal responsibility in addition to her constitutional obligations, and might well question how far she should go in consenting to greater freedom for Cuba. By the Constitution she was prohibited from alienating or ceding any part of the national territory; yet by international law, as I pointed out in my letter of April 1 to you, she was authorized to act in violation of all prohibitions of the Constitution, provided she was brought face to face with "an imperative necessity which of itself vests in the executive all powers indispensable for the safety of the state." This doctrine is distinctly recognized by the standard Spanish authority on international law: and for this reason I expounded it in my letter to you of April 1; "in the interests of peace"; so as to indicate how Spain could lawfully yield to our demand without bringing on war.

While I have no pity for Spain, now brought to judgment for deliberate crimes not less infamous than Alva's butcheries and Philip II's hypocrisy and personal vice, I really do pity the Queen Regent who is the first Queen of Spain since Isabella of Castile and Leon to whom can be honestly given unqualified personal respect. No Queen ever had a more difficult rôle to play; with her son's throne tottering, her kingdom bankrupt, her people – the common people – bigoted, ignorant and conceited though not without sterling manhood, her upper classes and officials corrupt and contemptible, – still she must struggle to preserve the throne for her son in the approaching political earthquake; though probably horrified at the condition into which Cuba has been plunged by those acting in her name, though really her masters.

There has seemed to me but one way of saving the throne, the Constitutionalist-Liberal party and the country from civil war

which is bound to follow the overthrow of the present dynasty; that way was to lose Cuba as the result of a foreign war, to yield up her West Indies to a power so manifestly superior in force as to make the loss of territory but still retain Spain's prestige; while to surrender Cuba to the Cubans might well be held fatal to Spain's prestige.

Under these circumstances it has seemed to me that our President could not possibly avert war with Spain, despite his unwearying patience and Christian forbearance; that the Spanish government, in their despair, were bound to force the United States into war; and that the Spanish government was privy to the De Lôme letter,[1] which failed to excite the indignation expected; nor do I think that the *Maine's* destruction took place without the full knowledge and consent – perhaps even the orders of some high officials of the government, who calculated upon that to assure war.

Therefore I write thus fully to you my opinion that the President and his advisers have done everything possible to avert war; but that Spain has deliberately forced war upon us, all the time seeking to pose as a victim to our land-hunger. Our conscience is free from responsibility and God will show the right.

Faithfully yours,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETARY LONG TO B. F. LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 8, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I am in receipt of your letter of the sixth instant, and am glad to know the feeling of patriotism which you say exists in North Carolina. It is gratifying also to know that the efforts of the administration to maintain peace have the approval of so many of the citizens of your state.

Please accept my thanks for your kind words in regard to myself, and believe me,

Very truly yours,
J. D. LONG

B. F. LONG, *Esq.*
STATESVILLE, N. C.

[1] See letter of Theodore Roosevelt, February 16, 1898, note.

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
April 10, 1898

My dear Sir:

Commander J. Giles Eaton [1] informs me that he expects to go to Washington tomorrow and will call upon you.

Although I should regret to have him removed from the command of the training ship *Enterprise*,[2] his faithful and most efficient services to the commonwealth in that command entitle him to my best wishes in any duty to which he may be assigned.

I have the honor to be,

With much respect,
Very truly yours,
Roger Wolcott

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
April 10, 1898

Dear Long:

Thanks for your letters of [the] sixth and eighth instant: though highly appreciated, you should not take time to write me when under such pressure as you must be at this time.

The points in my published communication in the *Transcript* ("Insolence of the Junta") indicate the drift of my opinion: — that intervention will devolve on us the responsibility of restoring order and keeping down lawlessness and cruelty by the strong hand, whether the offenders claim to be Spanish volunteers or Cuban patriots. As, by our Monroe Doctrine, we can not allow European nations to intervene, it devolves upon the United States to stop these notorious and enormous crimes and restore order in Cuba. Neglect to do so would make us responsible for their continuance, now that we have exhausted every peaceful resource to attain that object. This duty will be inseparable from our intervention in the interest of humanity. Therefore the only fact which needs to be established

[1] Joseph Giles Eaton (1847–1913).

[2] A naval vessel loaned by the navy department to the state for the use of the Massachusetts Nautical Training School.

to warrant our action is that of lawlessness and cruelty by whomsoever committed.

When the present intolerable disorder is suppressed, a new duty will devolve upon us: – that of deciding how the island shall be governed, – to whom and under what supervision the task of government shall be entrusted by us.

This decision will depend upon facts *not yet fully established*, such as the following: –

(1) Have the Cuban insurgents in actual operation a responsible civil government, *calculated in our opinion* to assure to the Cubans their lives and property and the varied rights for the protection of which governments are organized?

(2) Is the so-called Cuban republic such a *de facto* organized government and are the majority of the inhabitants of Cuba desirous of being governed by it?

(3) Are the purposes of that government fair and honorable in regard to those who have not taken arms against Spain?

These questions are vital to the full performance of the duties assumed by the United States in compelling the removal of the Spanish military and civil power from Cuba; for thereby we shall make ourselves responsible for the establishment of a peaceable and orderly government in Cuba.

No greater stain upon our national honor could come than that the government we may establish in power should proceed to proscribe, confiscate and murder their political opponents, or the "Spanish tories" left in Cuba.

Therefore the satisfactory answers to the above questions will constitute the facts upon which we must decide whether to recognize the independence of Cuba – of the Cuban republic – at present.

Hence *intervention is based on fact now known* to us, to wit: the intolerable disorder and Spanish cruelties. But *recognition depends upon facts yet to be established*, as to the character and purposes of the insurgent government and its acceptableness to the majority of the inhabitants of Cuba. These are therefore distinct questions and, from their very difference of base, are practically impossible of being united as a single issue.

The wisdom of treating intervention for the sake of humanity as a question distinct from the recognition of Cuban independence, seems quite as clear as treating intervention as distinct issue from the responsibility for the destruction of the *Maine*.

If the course of events should necessitate the consideration of the reconstruction of the Cuban government, my studies of such question for another part of Spanish America may be useful in Cuba.

Yours truly

HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 11, 1898

SIR:

The strategy board [1] has the honor to report as follows:

If it seems unlikely that hostilities will occur for some weeks, then all the vessels possible, and especially the *Texas* and *Massachusetts*, should be docked. The board would much like to have exact information as to when the New York and Port Royal docks will be ready to receive battleships. If there is any doubt about the New York dock being fit, then it would seem to be worth while to do everything possible to put the Port Royal dock in trim.

The four ships [2] that have just been made auxiliary cruisers will be armed with ten instead of eight big rapid-fire guns. The board has come to the conclusion that these vessels should form part of the deep-sea patrol for the protection of the coast trade, and undefended seaboard at once, from Cape Hatteras to Eastport. With this end in view they must be given a formidable battery, so as to enable them to out-fight any privateer or unarmored vessel likely to be brought against them. As there must be six of these patrols the board recommends that the *Nictheroy*,[3] if purchased, be fitted with one eight-inch and six five-inch modern rifles; and that another cruiser to carry eight, and if possible ten, rapid-fire five-inch guns be purchased. The *St. Louis* and *St. Paul* [4] should be used primarily as dispatch boats and huge colliers, and only need two or three four-inch guns apiece.

The board has telegraphed to Admiral Sampson to find out what

[1] The naval war board.

[2] The *Prairie*, *Yankee*, *Dixie*, and *Yosemite*, formerly ships of the Morgan Line.

[3] Auxiliary cruiser, formerly a ship of the Morgan Line, purchased in 1894 by the Brazilian government, and in 1898 sold to the United States. Her name was changed to *Buffalo*.

[4] These large ocean liners had been chartered for the navy.

vessels are needed for blockaders if the coast of Cuba is to be blockaded, and also as to what kinds of vessels. For this blockade service the board is inclined to think that smaller vessels, carrying but two or three rapid-fire guns apiece, will be sufficient.

Two colliers and a dispatch boat should be sent to the flying squadron at once, and this squadron, or at any rate the *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*, should be exercised off the coast so as to get into good trim.

If possible confidential men should be obtained at the Cape Verdes and Port au Prince, who will telegraph us all possible information. The bureau of steam engineering already have one such man at the Cape Verdes.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

GAMALIEL BRADFORD TO SECRETARY LONG

502 Beacon Street
BOSTON
April 11, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

You can hardly imagine the faint and trembling eagerness with which I seized the President's message and the infinite relief and gratitude which followed from reading it. It is all that could possibly be expected. Of course it leaves in his hands the power to use force, but the knowledge of what he has done puts away all doubt that it will be used with wisdom and discretion.

There is one thing more I should like to ask and that is that you will use your influence to procure the suppression of demonstrations in the galleries, whether in the House or Senate. It is disgraceful and dangerous to the last degree and certainly can not be claimed as a popular right.

Now for the " dogs of war " in Congress but I have great confidence that the Republicans will fall into line. There seems to be no limit to the folly and wickedness of the Democrats.

With the deepest gratitude to the President and yourself as his coadjutor,

I remain cordially yours,
GAMALIEL BRADFORD

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 12, 1898

SIR:

The secretary of war[1] asked me to present to you the fact that effort should be made to prevent the Spaniards from getting coal from the United States. They are getting ammunition and food also. Of course the delay is all in their favor, but I don't see how the navy department can act in the matter.

The board recommends that [some of?] the Mosquito Fleet[2] be stationed at Port Eads in the event of war; and that if possible two old monitors be spared for the defense of the mouth of the Mississippi, but that the deep-sea patrol of the Gulf Coast must be left to the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic Squadron. He will probably close the passes to the south as well as to the north of Cuba.

The board earnestly recommends that the Flying Squadron be sent to sea for two or more days for exercise and drill. It is important that these ships should be drilled together, as the *Minneapolis* and *Columbia* will be of little use unless they are given such sea drill, three-fourths of their crews being new.

I enclose herewith a list of the vessels we have already purchased, and a list of those we are meditating purchasing.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 15, 1898

SIR:

On behalf of the war board I have to report as follows:

The five deep-sea patrol vessels[1] for the North Atlantic Coast

[1] General R. A. Alger.

[2] For coast defense, consisting of old monitors, yachts, *etc.*, eventually forty-one vessels.

[1] These were the four ships named in note to Roosevelt's letter of April 11, and the *Badger*.

which have already been purchased have been assigned to the New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maryland and New Jersey naval militia by the chief of the bureau of navigation. The *Nictheroy*, if she comes up in time, or whatever the sixth patrol vessel may be, will probably be given to the second battalion of New York militia. The Connecticut and Rhode Island militia are also efficient. The Pennsylvania naval militia are much less efficient. Disturbances have broken out in the Georgia militia, with the result that their best division has disbanded. All of this emphasizes the wisdom of the department in enlisting the naval militia individually, and in preventing the recognition by the department of all the different naval militia organizations as being on the same plane. It is the purpose of the department to keep the naval militia together in their battalion and division organizations, and it will be very unwise to act otherwise; but the widest difference obtains between the different organizations. The five chosen to man the deep-sea patrol vessels are those for which we have the best reports from the regular officers during the past year. They are all five thoroughly efficient organizations. From these we range down to organizations such as one in the southern states which made its appearance aboard ship with the officers rowing the men, as they were the only ones who knew how to row. Of course we can only take tentative steps about the naval militia, assigning them to their vessels, and giving them the information that they have thus been assigned. Until they are called out and we are able to pay them, they can not be brought on.

The *Topeka* will come instantly to this side of the water. The *Somers*[2] will then come if she can. The board believes that we should close with the offer to deliver here for $12,000.

In reference to the letter from Mr. Emery[3] the board has to say that of course it can not scatter cruisers around South American ports, and that it will probably be impossible to scatter some of them around the equator at the point mentioned by Mr. Emery to protect the trade. We have not a sufficiently large navy.

In the event of war Congress should at once pass a law permitting our ships to be transferred to foreign flags with power to again be put back under the American flag at the close of the war if desired.

[2] The *Topeka* (*Diogenes*) was purchased in England, the *Somers* (a torpedo boat) in Germany. The latter did not arrive in time for the war.

[3] Probably Daniel Sullivan Emery (1833?–1908), Boston ship broker.

In connection with the accompanying report of Captain Clover the board recommends that the small cable vessel therein mentioned be immediately hired and put under Captain Sampson's control. The *Buccaneer* is the vessel recommended.

Commodore Dewey will be directed to operate against Manila. Probably it will not be advisable for him to blockade, but he should certainly pick up the Spanish vessels, and probably he should take the forts defending Manila. The objection[s] to trying ships against forts until the Spanish vessels are destroyed which obtain on the North Atlantic Coast do not obtain on the Asiatic Coast.

The board transmits herewith the offer from Mr. Flint [4] about the three torpedo cruisers now in Brazil. If these boats can be delivered at some naval station north of Hatteras within 30 days, it is our opinion that any price up to $1,000,000 apiece should be paid for them. We are paying very large prices for steamships, yachts and tugs which relatively are not nearly as valuable as these vessels.

The *Nictheroy* should start at once. For some reason the report about her seems to hang fire. Minister Bryan [5] should be telegraphed to that we need an immediate report.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 16, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I wish you would lay this before the President. I hear from Captain Sampson corroborating what I hear from many other sources, that the Spaniards are now laying in three months' provisions in Havana for their army. A considerable quantity has been sent; more is on the way. Coal is also on the way. I again urge as strongly as I know how that we declare an embargo. If we had declared the embargo a fortnight ago, Havana would have been in shape to fall at once. General Lee informed us that at that time it could not have

[4] Charles Ranlett Flint (b. 1850), agent of the U. S. government in negotiating for the purchase of war vessels.

[5] Charles Page Bryan (1856–1918), U. S. minister to Brazil.

held out for two weeks. Now it will hold out a month. If the provisions and coal are allowed to go it may be able to hold out for three months. Again I wish most respectfully, but most urgently, to point out the great disadvantage that comes to us from not striking quickly. Every consideration from a military point of view bids us to strike at once if we are to strike at all. Week by week, as well as month by month, the situation has steadily changed to our disadvantage since last December, and notably since February. If Havana is to be provisioned, the difficulty of reducing the city will be immensely increased, and it may mean an appalling death rate among the troops sent down there to besiege it who will have to be kept through the sickly season. What would otherwise be done in days may require weeks. It must be remembered that every week's delay so far has undoubtedly meant to our army and navy serious loss of life in the event of war, and this is what delay in the future will mean. I earnestly beseech you to lay this matter immediately before the President.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

P.S. I am writing on behalf of the war board.

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

44 State Street
BOSTON
April 16, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

At the risk of troubling you once more, I suggest again the purchase of Cuba for the benefit of the Cubans, they of course to pay the cost, we to take a mortgage for whatever you choose on the island. Somebody suggested awhile ago that we should take a ground lease of the island. There are ways enough to do it, if it is feasible. Mr. E. A. Kelly,[1] a member of the Suffolk bar, asks me to write you in his name and my own. Mr. C. A. Coffin,[2] of the General Electric Company, also likes this or any other plan which

[1] Edward Albert Kelly (1831–1907).
[2] Charles Albert Coffin (1844–1926), president of the General Electric Company.

will avert a two-billion-dollar war and a hundred thousand lives thrown away for nothing.

We all have sympathized with and greatly admired the course of the administration, more especially that of the President and yourself, in this whole matter, and we all feel confident that if the Senate will do as well as the House has done and leave the matter in your hands, we shall escape this great scourge, if it can be avoided.

It is remarkable to see the unanimity of feeling among all the men whom you would know here – your classmates, your friends all about, whether in trade or in the professions – and also remarkable to see how the laboring men feel in the matter. They fear the loss of home, of life, of work, and the feeling is intense, but this escape from war which has been considered may possibly be used now at the last moment. Nobody within my acquaintance wants Cuba. It is only to stop the trouble.

If these views are of any use, you will know what to do with them and, in any case, do not give yourself the trouble to reply.

Mr. Henry Lee [3] would sign this letter, as Mr. Kelly does in effect, and plenty more men of all kinds.

Yours very truly,
HENRY L. HIGGINSON [4]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 17, 1898

SIR:

The war board does not wish to needlessly bore you by repeating advice, and of course it is ignorant of the larger policies and purposes of the administration; but with the light we have we would again respectfully state that in our opinion the construction of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers should be begun at once, and that all the battleships, and especially the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky*, should be hastened to completion, working night and day. Surely the *Kearsarge* and *Kentucky* could be gotten ready by next fall if necessary. The board has agreed upon the armament for the four

[3] Colonel Henry Lee (1817–1898), Harvard College '36.
[4] Major Henry Lee Higginson (1834–1919), Harvard College '55.

American liners,[1] following in this respect the suggestion of Captain O'Neil. We have also substantially adopted his suggestion with regard to the armament for the remaining cruisers.

Some of the yachts we have taken have been overloaded with armor, so that their speed has been greatly reduced. The board thinks that it would be well to take the *Corsair* and put very light guns aboard her, so as to use her merely for a dispatch vessel. She is the best yacht, barring the *Mayflower* and possibly the *Sovereign*,[2] that we have had up.

The *Newark* is already being pushed to completion as rapidly as possible, and will soon be ready. I think the *Chicago* and *Atlanta*[3] should be likewise pushed.

Very respectfully,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT
Assistant Secretary

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

REAR-ADMIRAL ERBEN TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE

NEW YORK
April 18, 1898

SIR:

In February, 1865, at Matagorda, Texas, I broke up a Confederate torpedo station, capturing one of the boats with all her fittings, and also a torpedo. A sense of duty dictates to me that I should bring to the notice of the Senate committee, having in charge the *Maine* disaster, this fact, as showing the possible and very probable manner by which the *Maine* was blown up. The outfit consisted only of three boats, one reel, with about three hundred feet of small cotton line on it, and a cigar-shaped torpedo, to hold about one hundred and fifty pounds of powder and also an anchor. The torpedo was to have been dropped down, under the bows of my vessel, the *Panola*, from the boat with a reel and paying-out line, which boat was to have been anchored ahead of the *Panola*. This was a good sized one, the other two being only small affairs to be used as guide boats, to see that the floating torpedo came in contact with the ship, at which instant the torpedo was to have been exploded. Such a torpedo as

[1] *St. Louis, St. Paul, New York,* and *Paris.*

[2] These three yachts were added to the navy. The *Corsair* and *Sovereign* were renamed *Gloucester* and *Scorpion;* the name *Mayflower* was not changed.

[3] The *Chicago* and *Atlanta* were out of commission, undergoing repairs.

this would have destroyed any vessel. The capture was considered of great importance. My report of February 19, 1865, to Commodore Emmons,[1] commanding the division of Farragut's fleet off Texas, was forwarded to the admiral who wrote a letter, thanking the crew of the *Panola's* cutter who made up the cutting-out party, capturing this torpedo. This broke up the torpedo station. It was the intention of the torpedo corps to operate along the coast as far as and including Galveston, in destroying the vessels doing blockade duty. There were several of these larger boats at the torpedo wharf in the Matagorda harbor. We did not realize in capturing the large boat what an important thing we had done, as the object of the expedition was the capture of the armed schooner *Annie Dale.*

I enclose herewith a diagram showing the boats, the torpedo and the *Panola.*

I will add that such torpedo practice as this could have been done to great advantage in a harbor like Havana, full of passing boats, which would have detracted from the boats operating the torpedo.

I am,
Very respectfully,
HENRY ERBEN[2]

TO THE CHAIRMAN
COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION

COMMODORE HOWISON TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Navy Yard
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
April 18, 1898

SIR:

In reply to your letter of the sixteenth instant, relating to Boston newspapers' representatives applying to the navy department for access to the navy yard here:

I have the honor to state that while the order excluding visitors except on business is enforced, the correspondents and agents of newspapers are considered as having business with the authorities here, and are admitted daily, provided they state to the guard that they are on business. I have heard no complaints, and have never known many of them to be too modest to state their business. I see

[1] George Foster Emmons (1811–1884).

[2] Henry Erben (1832–1909), in charge of the coast defense system, April 28, 1898.

many of them in my office, representing the Boston papers, every day in the week. If any of these representatives have any difficulty in passing the guards, I can issue to such a general pass on application to this office.

Very respectfully,
H. L. Howison
Commandant

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
April 18, 1898

Dear Long:

I am very glad to see that the House to-day has concurred in the Senate resolution, *except* as to the recognition of the Cuban Republic. That part of the resolution was unconstitutional, as well as contrary to the practice of our government. I trust the Senate will adopt the resolution as modified.

As to its unconstitutionality, I wrote Senator Hoar[1] quite freely last Saturday (sixteenth) and may now add the following authority in point:

"The question of recognition of foreign revolutionary or reactionary governments is one exclusively for the executive, and can not be determined internationally by congressional action." (Secretary Seward to Minister Dayton – I Wharton 551).[2]

Indeed the framers of the Constitution took every precaution to divest Congress of its former executive functions, especially in our foreign relations; but while transferring executive power to the President, a similar case was taken to limit his powers far within those of a constitutional monarch.

This explains why the royal prerogative to make treaties, appoint ambassadors, declare war and raise armies was transferred to Congress, as of either original or concurrent jurisdiction. Yet in most matters of executive power, Congress was rigidly excluded from interference in our foreign relations.

[1] George Frisbie Hoar (1826–1904), Harvard College '46, U. S. senator from Massachusetts.

[2] *Digest of the International Law of the United States*, Francis Wharton, Editor, (Washington, 1906).

Thus Congress could neither recognize a foreign government by receiving its ambassadors nor by any other form of direct communication. All foreign intercourse and negotiation was conducted by the executive exclusively; hence recognition of the independence of a revolutionary government is part of the executive prerogative, which is indivisible and supreme.

One of the established usages of our government, in strict accord with international law, is that recognition of independence for a revolutionary colony is not permissible until the contest is won; another form of this principle is the rule laid down by Mr. Canning [3] in the case of the Spanish-American republics: "While a doubtful and bona fide struggle for supremacy is still maintained by the sovereign power, the insurgents *jam flagrante bello* can not be said to have established a *de facto* independence."

As to the qualification of a revolutionary civil government for recognition, Secretary Seward in his instructions to Minister Culver [4] (Venezuela) lays down the correct rule as follows:

"A revolutionary government is not to be recognized, until it is established by the great body of the population of the state it claims to govern. . . . This government has and must insist on, the right to determine for itself when new authorities, established in a foreign state, can claim recognition as an established power." (I Wharton 542)

It is not, as a rule, within the power of other governments to declare which party is right in a civil war. Hence recognition of either contestant depends upon the *fact* of its being the established government, not upon its *right* to be such government. This may be considered an established principle, so long as considerations of policy affecting the relations of the two countries do not arise. This latter point is clearly stated by Secretary Evarts in his instructions to [the] United States minister [5] to Venezuela [in] 1870:

"The United States regard their international compacts and obligations as entered into with *nations*, rather than with their *political governments:* it behooves this government to be watchful lest their course towards the government should affect our relations with the nation" (I Wharton 548).

From these principles we are led to the consideration whether the

[3] George Canning (1790–1827).
[4] Erastus Dean Culver (1803–1889), University of Vermont '26.
[5] James Rudolph Partridge (1823–1884), Harvard College '41.

so-called Cuban Republic can properly claim recognition as the *de facto* government, at this time, of the island of Cuba. If not, then the President can not recognize such government as the free and independent government of Cuba; nor can he shift from his shoulders the responsibility for recognizing the Cuban Republic by any resolution of Congress ordering him to do so.

There are cases which call for the world's sympathy for the oppressed — such as the barbarities of the Turks against the Greeks, which led to the emancipation of Greece; as early as 1822 resolutions in favor of Greek independence were introduced in the United States Congress. Finally the British, French and Russian governments intervened by force and Greece became a sovereign state.

The grounds for this intervention were

1st the request of the oppressed Greeks,

2nd on the ground of humanity to stop cruelty and bloodshed,

3rd to put a permanent stop to anarchy.

Sir William Vernon Harcourt [6] declares that " the emancipation of Greece was a high act of policy, above and beyond the domain of law. As an act of policy it may have been, and it was, justifiable; but it was not less a hostile act which Turkey might properly have resented by war."

A parallel case is now presented. We are to intervene in Cuba on the ground of humanity to stop cruelty and bloodshed; and to put down anarchy and intolerable disorder. This is, equally with the case of Greece, a high act of policy above and beyond the domain of law. It is as unquestionably justifiable as to interfere by all force necessary to compel a savage to stop scalping defenceless women and children: we ask no law, but we have the warrant of that unwritten law of nature, which rises superior to all statutory enactments, to overthrow the savage tyrant who seeks to cruelly and wrongfully murder our neighbor, — the law of God-given instincts which raises man from the level of the brute, which makes man possible of rising above selfish gratification and become a benefactor of the world.

Yours truly
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[6] Sir William George Granville Venables Vernon Harcourt (1827–1904).

W. S. BIGELOW TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Beacon Street
Personal [Boston]
April 19, 1898

My dear Sir:

May I venture to express the hope that you will use your authority, or if necessary induce the President to use his, to forbid Mr. Roosevelt to leave his present post for the front.

I have tried my best, as have others of his friends, to dissuade him, but wholly without success.

The news of his proposed departure is received by the press – as it was obviously fated to be – very unfavorably, and the worst motives are of course ascribed to him – truculence – instability of character and so on. His own notion that he ought to go because he has talked war, and therefore is now bound to vindicate his personal courage, is much like his saying that he should wear no clothes in the street to prove that he is not a negro.

I have the honor to remain, with great respect,

Very truly yours
W. Sturgis Bigelow[1]

I need not add that it would be worse than useless to show Mr. Roosevelt this letter.

Honorable John D. Long

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

44 State Street
Boston
April 20, 1898

My dear Mr. Long:

Thank you for your letter.

As regards a means of handling Cuba, – could we take it on a ground lease of say one hundred years, for the benefit of the Cubans, giving our bonds for it, either at once or in the future, and securing ourselves by taking a promise from the Cubans, with a mortgage of the whole island and a mortgage also of its revenues, duties or taxes in some fashion? This leaves the title in Spain, which may save her mortification. It transfers to us the responsibility for the price of the lease and we must collect from the Cubans as well as

[1] William Sturgis Bigelow, M. D. (1850–1926), Harvard College '71.

we can. As far as we are concerned it is much cheaper than a war and it may save the Spanish pride, at the same time freeing her from a very weighty encumbrance. I can not conceive that this expedient has not occurred to you and send it with much diffidence, but you know how gladly any of us would do anything decent to avoid this war or to help you. How we can under any circumstances get anything but discredit out of a war, no one within my knowledge can tell.

As a matter not directly your concern, Congress should give Mr. Gage power to borrow money at a rate not to exceed four per cent. on such terms as he can. The country can save a great many millions of dollars by making the loan a gold one, for the whole world wants such. I am with great respect,

Yours truly,
HENRY L. HIGGINSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
BOSTON
April 22, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I have not heretofore troubled you with communications relative to the present disturbed condition of our foreign relations preferring to await information or instructions from yourself or from the secretary of war. In the absence of such definite information I venture to call your attention to the following suggestions which are now under consideration by me.

In Colonel Mansfield's[1] absence I have been informed by Lieutenant Sewell,[2] of the United States corps of engineers, now in charge of the coast defenses of this commonwealth, that while the port of Boston and perhaps other strategic points on our coast line are now or will soon be placed in a condition of adequate defense, there are other important and exposed positions which are not likely to be so protected by the national government. The ports of Gloucester, Marblehead, Salem, New Bedford, Provincetown, Plymouth and others fall within the latter description. Lieutenant

[1] Samuel Mather Mansfield (1839–1928).
[2] John Stephen Sewell (b. 1869).

Sewell suggests that if the commonwealth should undertake the throwing up of earthworks at these points, which in his opinion need not be very elaborate, guns and ammunition could probably be furnished promptly for their defense and could be put in position and handled by the militia of this commonwealth.

It seems to me important in order that there may be no duplication of preparation or conflict of orders that I should receive definite instructions as to what will be expected from the militia of this state.

I beg to suggest that under existing law the entire militia can be ordered into state camps on the coast or elsewhere at the expense of the commonwealth for a period of eight days, the same being regarded as the equivalent of their annual tours of duty in camp, and that if I should be advised to issue orders to this effect at once, the organizations could be subsequently called into the United States service at the expiration of the eight days encampment.

In the absence of definite instructions or advice I am much embarrassed to know what orders to issue. I may add that from the citizens of these several ports requests for protection are already being received.

Very truly yours,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL CROSBY TO SECRETARY LONG

Metropolitan Club
WASHINGTON
April 22, 1898

MR. SECRETARY:

I was informed by a lady this evening that a Spanish officer who was recently here as an attaché to the Spanish legation and now in command of one of the Spanish men-[of]-war on the Havana coast told her that they the Spaniards would surprise us – where we least expected it – that they would attack places on our coast, and spoke of Cape Ann on Massachusetts coast where the telegraph cable is landed as one of the places they would destroy – she also said that this officer had been three years in this country as an attaché to the legation and that he had maps and plans of all our coasts – where forts are located, *etc.* – that he boasted of the damage the Spaniards would do on our coast and where they would be the least expected. The lady I refer to is the wife of a Spanish gentleman and in this

way her house was visited by the Spaniard but she is an American and thoroughly loyal to her country the United States – she was anxious to communicate to you this information – but being a stranger came to me.

She does not wish to have her name known and all she has told me is confidential – but if you would like to see her she is perfectly willing to see you and tell all that she has told me. The husband of this lady was at one time a minister to this country.

As this information may be of importance I have decided to give it to you. With great respect I remain your humble servant,

PEIRCE CROSBY[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
BOSTON
April 25, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of April 23, and thank you for the information it contains. You are doubtless already informed that I have made application upon the secretary of war[1] for guns, equipment, and ammunition to be used in earthworks at exposed points by the militia of this state. We are still in a lamentable condition of ignorance of definite demands that may be made upon us by the national government. No authority has yet been received to place the first regiment of heavy artillery at Fort Warren, which it seems to me should be done instantly. War exists, and the coast of Massachusetts is exposed and liable to attack. Definite instructions are hourly expected but do not come. I would not willingly add anything to the great pressure of responsibility which must now rest upon you, and which you are bearing with so much honor to yourself, and with so great advantage to the nation.

With much respect, I am

Yours very truly,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Peirce Crosby (1824–1899).

[1] Secretary Alger.

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *St. Louis*
Personal Tompkinsville, Staten Island
April 27, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am here in my ship — quite ready — and only awaiting orders to go. Where? I have no idea.

I trust I shall give a good account of myself and justify your appointment of me to this magnificent command. She can't fight battleships but she *can* be useful.

I enclose a letter from the ablest man in the British Army — Colonel Sir George S. Clarke,[1] R. E. K. C. M. G. *etc. etc.* — a very dear friend of mine — a deep thinker and a warm friend of America. It is well worth the trouble of deciphering its hasty script — for it gives an inkling of that better class of feeling which rules or ought to rule international sentiment.

As I telegraphed you this morning — of course I understood the situation. I could not leave without assuring you on this point. I only sought to make your road easier — and if our points of view as to the *manner* differed — it was only to be expected from our different training. That I am always ready to do what you wish and in the way you wish I am confident you know as well as I.

I am sure I take your good wishes with me, and so good bye. May your administration have the success it so eminently deserves.

Very sincerely,
C. F. Goodrich

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

44 State Street
Boston
April 28, 1898

Dear Mr. Long:

A petition to the President that "seizures upon the seas of private properties of Spaniards be prohibited" is brought to me for circulation. I shall not sign it unless you like to have it signed; otherwise, if you like to have it signed, I can get plenty of signatures of the best kind. You have been kind enough to listen to various things said by us about this war. I merely want you to understand that almost everybody whom I see recognizes that, war being declared,

[1] George Sydenham Clarke (b. 1848).

it is our bounden duty and pleasure to help the government in every possible way. Our only hope is that the government will appoint only educated and seasoned officers to high commands – for volunteer regiments, ships, *etc.* Dozens of men whom you know, and who have been in the service, would like to help as they can, though they are all too old to go in the field.

This letter needs no reply. If you do not tell me to circulate that petition, I shall not do it, though it comes from very good people.

Yours truly,

HENRY L. HIGGINSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
Off HAVANA
April 30, 1898

Personal

DEAR MR. LONG:

We have heard of the resignation of Mr. Roosevelt, and our hopes were raised high by the rumor that Admiral Walker [1] had been appointed assistant secretary, but they have been dampened by, today, hearing it was probable that there was too much opposition. I hope you will allow me a word on the subject.

There is no possible question from a military point of view (which is the only view to take at the moment) that the person nearest you should be a military man of ability and force, and one having the complete confidence of the service. It is no time to add to the machinery of our administration untried and unformed men whose minds must be by the very nature of things (*viz.* ignorance of the machine they assist in directing) made up for them by perhaps irresponsible influences. Do not let us court disaster by failure to employ the best instruments possible. It is no time for political jealousies of naval influence which instigated the amendment (Mr. Chandler's) prohibiting the employment of a naval officer on the active list from being assistant secretary. If naval men are not competent, and supremely competent for such duties, what other class of men are [*sic*]?

Only military men can successfully conduct or direct military operations. We are face to face with a most serious problem, and nothing should stand in the way of a successful solution. If the law

[1] J. G. Walker, rear admiral, U. S. N., retired.

does this then let us abrogate the law, which I should think it very possible to do on a representation from the President. It is in any case, it seems to me, an improper, and in its tenor an unconstitutional law.

I request that what I say be not construed as against a civil head to the department. I think it is quite right that this should be so, but the civilian headship should end there; the second in direction should by every law of experience elsewhere, of reason and of justice to the service, be a naval officer of rank and proved capacity for command.

Walker is one of the ablest military minds in the navy, and the service has had no abler officer in my opinion in this generation, and to have him associated with you at this juncture closely, as he would be, as assistant secretary, would add enormously to the satisfaction and confidence of the service.

From all we read or hear here the country is undergoing a panic of invasion. Let us strike the enemy instead of fearing he will strike us. The *Minneapolis* and *Columbia* on the coast of Spain would be a far better defense than where I hear they are; on the coast of Maine. These two ships with their great coal endurance and great speed would in themselves keep the greater part of the Spanish fleet at home. "The best defense is a vigorous attack," and in my humble opinion we should by this time be in possession of Puerto Rico, and Spain's base be thus three thousand miles further off. With the coal and machine shops at San Juan (Puerto Rico) destroyed and the place rendered untenable there would be no fear of any Spanish fleet on this side; Cuba would then be an easy question.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours,
F. E. Chadwick

AMBASSADOR DRAPER TO SECRETARY LONG

Embassy of the United States
Rome
May 3, 1898

Confidential

My dear Friend:

As Captain Scriven[1] is coming home I can safely send you a note that will not be seen by other parties, and there is a little matter that I wish to write you about.

[1] George Percival Scriven (b. 1854), U. S. military attaché at Rome.

First, let me congratulate you on the glorious victory at Manila, under your administration. Admiral Dewey is a man whom I know intimately, and his success has justified my former opinion of him.

The particular reason for my letter is that certain matters seem to reach the press from the various departments in Washington that it seems to me should not be given to the public.

The example that I have in mind is that Captain Mahan, who was here in Rome, was ordered home, and came to this embassy asking that various communications should be made for him in regard to his passage, *etc.*, in cipher. All this was being conducted with the greatest secrecy on our part, when suddenly the papers here, having received news from America, published more of Captain Mahan's mission than either he or I knew. One correspondent at least, of a New York paper, received instructions to interview Captain Mahan before he left Rome. Probably no great harm was done by this, but it might have resulted in Captain Mahan's being intercepted.

The communications of all American diplomats abroad are restricted by the fear that what they write may reach the press, and that of course limits the efficiency of the service.

Mrs. Draper joins me in kindest regards to yourself and daughter.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM F. DRAPER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
May 3, 1898

DEAR LONG:

The enclosed letter of yesterday's date explains my wish to have a hand in the great movement in which we now are involved, — the new departure which I have, as you know, for the past year looked upon as an inevitable development of our country's influence. That letter was more formal than my letters to you usually are, because you may have occasion to use it with others who do not know me personally. I think that my rather unusual experience and training may find a useful field of action; and I therefore ask your help.

The victory of Admiral Dewey, glorious as it unquestionably

has proved, opens a new page for our government. It seems inevitable that we must hold the Philippines for a while; that we can not honorably surrender the inhabitants unreservedly to Spain at the close of the war, to be again enslaved and plundered. On this point the country will back the President and Congress in holding the Spanish East Indies. And the same may be said of other Spanish colonies which may be occupied by us during this war.

Whether for temporary or permanent necessity it seems inevitable that we must establish some kind of government in the interest of humanity, peace and order in such occupied possessions.

Now you see the use of my published paper on colonial systems, in the *Transcript* of July 31, 1897. For more than a year it has seemed inevitable that we must meet this problem at an early day; that we could not escape the responsibility of governing outlying possessions wherein were people of different races from our own; that we must distinguish between such incongruous elements and our own homogeneous territories; that we were bound to have *foreign* colonies as an inevitable incident of our national development. For this reason, a colonial system seemed the only practical remedy; the basis of which was to grant each colony the maximum of self government which the people could safely use, measuring out autonomy according to the particular status in each case.

As to the Latin American colonies, I have made a very close study of the character and genius of the race and have a clear idea of how they can be developed on lines parallel with our own. Those lines, strange to say, were those under which Spain's colonial glory was originally acquired, but which Philip II displaced for his centralized system which resulted in Spain's degradation. Those lines trace back to the same Gothic source as our own New England system, which permeates this entire country of ours.

Yrarrázaval [1] and I have studied these two lines together: he came here to study our Anglo-Saxon line with me in 1875–1876 and I went to Chile in 1879–1880 to study the Castilian-Gothic line with him. Our conclusions were in perfect accord, that by restoring the old Castilian-Gothic system in Spanish America we could then by regular and natural evolution bring about a harmonious development of Spanish American countries in accord with our own institutions. We hoped to initiate this in Chile and for that reason I wished to go there as United States minister; but my dear friend Yrarrázaval

[1] Don Manuel J. Yrarrázaval.

has gone to his reward and now, perchance, it may remain for me to apply the result of our years of patient study to Cuba and Porto Rico; the regeneration of Spanish America, if begun in Cuba as an incident of this war, would be a blessing and a glory far exceeding any glory to be won by armies and navies.

My note books, patiently filled from year to year, enable me to speak with confidence that our régime in Cuba will give results in the way of beneficent statesmanship second to none in this century.

The paper I sent you on Hawaii – "Some public questions raised by the proposed annexation of Hawaii" – discussed some of these questions; it was a natural outgrowth of my last summer's paper in [the] *Transcript* on colonial systems. If you or Secretary Day wish a proof of that published paper, I will send it.

Renewing my congratulations over Dewey's naval triumph and hoping to soon see it supplemented by as decisive a victory by Admiral Sampson, I am as ever,

Yours sincerely,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CHARLES H. ALLEN TO SECRETARY LONG

Rolfe Street
LOWELL, MASSACHUSETTS
May 5, 1898

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Last Thursday, – a week ago to-day, – an Associated Press report was sent out from Washington, to the effect that the President had decided to appoint me assistant secretary of the navy, vice Roosevelt.

The first I knew of it, I was called upon the telephone by a Boston newspaper and asked if I would "accept." The newspapers generally assumed the report to be true, and many commented on it, editorially. The report has gone all over the country, and I began to receive letters and telegrams of congratulation. Of course the whole thing was a surprise to me and I hardly knew what to say as I kept thinking I should have some word from you, perhaps, which would help me in answering enquiries. As none came, I was obliged to say what was true, that I knew nothing about the matter other than the information in the newspaper despatches. And I'm

no better off yet, in the way of information, and I wish you would wire me if there is anything to it.

It would be purely an affectation on my part, if I were to pretend to be indifferent. I am not. Indeed I do care very much about it, and hope it is true, for I know I can be a lot of help to you, in taking detail, and it seems as if my twenty-five or more years of fairly successful business experience would be useful in such a place. At the same time I have had the greatest hesitancy in writing even this letter, for I wouldn't like you to think I wanted to force myself on you at this time. But it would be a personal *relief* if I could know about it.

With kindest regards for both you and Mrs. Long,

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES H. ALLEN[1]

P.S. Since writing the above I have had two letters returned to me from Washington, directed there to me as "assistant secretary of the navy," — so you see how very embarrassing this is, — and how much I would like to be able to affirm or deny the report.

C. H. A.

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

44 State Street
BOSTON
May 5, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

Louis Adams Frothingham,[1] a graduate of Harvard College in 1893, and three years later of the law school, has been promised, as I think, a commission as lieutenant of marines by Mr. Roosevelt. As that gentleman may be gone, I venture to name the thing to you. He is an unusually fine chap and will do all that he says — and more — and is the kind of which excellent junior officers are made. I am writing without his knowledge. You will find he is vouched for by Honorable William C. Lovering[2] and perhaps some other gentlemen. Should it meet your views in all ways, will you kindly designate him for a commission, if not in that place, in some other? I

[1] Charles Herbert Allen (1848–1934), Amherst '69, was soon appointed assistant secretary of the navy.

[1] Louis Adams Frothingham (1871–1928), lieutenant-governor of Massachusetts 1909–1911, M. C. 1921–1928.

[2] William Croad Lovering (1835–1910), M. C. from Massachusetts.

know the pressure on your time and beg that you will not reply to this letter. Be sure that I would not name him to you if I did not feel sure of the lad, and be sure also that if he is not appointed, he and I will both be content.

Yours truly,
H. L. Higginson

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

PAUL L. FORD TO SECRETARY LONG

97 Clark Street
Brooklyn
May 5, 1898

Dear Sir:

I feel apologetic, after your letter of May 2, in troubling you further in reference to my application for permission to sail on the Flying Squadron; the more that I fully realize the difficulties you mention. If I were merely a correspondent, I should not urge further, but my interest is historical, and if it will simplify the matter, I will agree not to represent any paper, or will represent a syndicate, whichever will be preferable. I know that rules are necessary, but if an exception was made for Mr. Davis,[1] I think I am entitled to equal favor.

But if you still think no exception in my favor can be made, may not the matter be arranged by my being appointed pay clerk to the paymaster, or to some such civilian position? I know Paymaster Livingston Hunt,[2] of the *New Orleans*, and think he would be willing to give me any help, if it were permitted.

I am sorry to seem so insistent, but I know that in these matters there is always a certain amount of elasticity, and naturally one always thinks that if there is favor to be shown, it should always extend to one's self. I am sure that if the department would give its consent, that I could arrange matters with the officers of the ship I might be assigned to, so that there should be no objection to my sailing on her.

Yours very truly,
Paul Leicester Ford

Honorable John D. Long

[1] Richard Harding Davis (1864–1916). See below, Davis's letter of May 14.
[2] Livingston Hunt (b. 1859), Harvard College '81, paymaster, U. S. N.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I enclose herewith my letter to the President.

Let me add one word personally. I don't suppose I shall ever again have a chief under whom I shall enjoy serving as I have enjoyed serving under you, nor one toward whom I shall feel the same affectionate regard. It is a good thing for a man to have, as I have had in you, a chief whose whole conduct in office, as seen by those most intimately connected with him, has been guided solely by resolute disinterestedness and single-minded devotion to the public interest. I hate to leave you more than I can say. I deeply appreciate, and am deeply touched by, the confidence you have put in me, and the more than generous and kindly spirit you have always shown toward me. I have grown not merely to respect you as my superior officer, but to value your friendship very highly; and I trust I have profited by association with one of the most high-minded and upright public servants it has ever been my good fortune to meet.

Permit me to sign myself, with great affection and respect,

Always faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

CAPTAIN COOPER TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Academy
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
May 7, 1898

Personal

MY DEAR SIR:

As the academic year is drawing to an end it may not be out of place for me to call myself to your attention in the most unobtrusive manner, which is by note and not in person.

You may recall a conversation we had some weeks ago regarding my future, and at the time the *Chicago* was mentioned as the ship apparently most available for me to command. From a reliable source I now understand that she will be ready about July 15 and I hope you will assign me to her.

Our academic year closes June 4; the cadets will be embarked June 6 and all plans for the summer arranged.

On July 1 the appropriation for reconstruction of the buildings becomes available; you are authorized to contract to the extent of one million dollars, and your agent here, the superintendent, should be associated with the work from the initiative and I will be ready to step aside for him.

I trust you will be disposed to give favorable consideration to my request.

Very sincerely,
P. H. COOPER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Forecast of Possible Results from Dewey's Victory at Manila, May 1, 1898

BOSTON
May 9, 1898

DEAR LONG:

In my last letter (May 3) I congratulated you briefly upon Dewey's naval victory and said "The victory of Admiral Dewey, glorious as it unquestionably is, opens a new page for our government. It seems inevitable that we must hold the Philippines for a while; that we can not honorably surrender the inhabitants unreservedly to Spain at the close of the war, to be again enslaved and plundered. On this point the country will back the President and Congress in holding the Spanish East Indies."

In view of the fact that we then had no details of the battle, that we did not know how seriously our fleet had suffered nor what its effective capacity then was, it seemed "too previous" to discuss any policy to be adopted for the Philippines beyond the general thesis that it seemed an unavoidable necessity that we must hold them for a while and to establish some adequate government there "in the interest of humanity, peace and order in such occupied possessions."

Now, however, we do know enough of the details to warrant active measures; according to the published news, the President has decided to send a strong land force to hold the islands (at least, Manila), as well as fleet-supplies. That is wise and unavoidable; the

President could not do otherwise. As to the force to be sent, it seems that five thousand men is too small a force in view of the facts, unless to be bottled up there; twenty-five to thirty thousand would not be too many, I think. We must remember that the Philippines and dependencies have an area about equal to that of either the Japanese Empire (excluding Formosa), or Great Britain and Ireland, — say one hundred and thirty thousand square miles — with a population of some ten millions. Fortunately the climate is one of the most healthy in the tropics; yellow fever, cholera, plague and famine are alike unknown. In productiveness, the Philippines may be accounted the garden of the East Indies and under a strong and just government may become a second Japan within a single generation of good government. In 1888, the exports and imports of the Philippines aggregated $47,566,000; against $130,307,000 for Japan's foreign trade in 1888. But thirty years ago, when Japan commenced its career as a civilized government, it may well be questioned whether it had anything like fifty million dollars of foreign trade; in fact, in 1884 Japan's foreign trade amounted to only $61,837,000! But so vast were the gains in peace and order and civilization that, in four years from that time Japan's foreign trade doubled. May we not expect a similar change in the Philippines when, in the stead of Spanish oppression and licenced plunder of Spanish officials, those fertile regions may enjoy peace and order and just government under the strong hand of the United States!

These problems are great, but by the providence of God we seem the nation chosen to perform this work. Then let us accept the duty and boldly and bravely push forward to the end. Above all, let us not make two bites of a cherry, — but send forces to Cuba and the Philippines large enough to ensure prompt and complete victory, whether the number be fifty thousand and twenty-five thousand, respectively.

Whether I am right or wrong, these are my views in regard to the Philippines and I think that the results indicated will be warranted in the end.

I. Dewey's victory marks an event of the first magnitude in the history of the Far East. Indeed it seems likely to prove of a far-reaching importance hardly inferior to Clive's victory at Plassy, from which dates the British Indian Empire.

II. At first sight, this extraordinary victory will be likely to arouse the greatest interest on the part of the great powers who are

intent upon the partition of China; yet, upon more serious reflection, I think they will realize that their respective interests will be better subserved by the United States in possession of the Philippines, than to have them fall to either one of the great European powers or to Japan; that they will recognize that Spain's power is hopelessly broken and that unless *we* take the control, Japan will be very likely to annex this "Cuba of the Orient" to her empire, which will thus form a long archipelago extending from the Arctic Circle almost to the equator, facing Asia's east coast only two days' steaming from the Chinese ports. Such an expansion of Japan's power would more seriously disturb the "balance of power" in the Far East than to have the United States hold the Philippines and take the responsibility for the maintenance there of peace and order and the observance of the international duties of civilized governments. Hence the apprehensions of the European concert's jealousy at our occupation of the Philippines seems uncalled for.

III. As to the United States: —a great foreign market for our surplus manufactures is a necessity, constantly increasing in pressure. The constantly gaining increase of our manufacturing productions over our agricultural productions has been enormous by each succeeding census for forty years: at present we produce four times as much manufactured products as agricultural. Even now, our domestic consumption can not take more than seventy-five per cent. of our manufactured products, based upon capacity of the latter's annual output at full time. Hence the necessity of great foreign markets for such surplus, with the alternative of curtailment of production or of wages. This latter has already produced labor agitation and strikes, the tendency being to array labor against capital, the logical effect of which would be more dangerous to our system of government than would be involved in any colonial expansion.

IV. This victory of Dewey is a Godsend, for opening a great foreign market for us and under our strong and just oversight we may reasonably expect to bring the Philippines in a single generation to be fitly compared with Japan.

V. We have indeed come to the parting of the ways and must abandon our international isolation; that we have no foreign interests and responsibilities outside of the American continent can no longer be seriously maintained; we must extend our influence to other countries "for their benefit and our own and for the

future generations of our posterity," as John Quincy Adams said of the "Monroe Doctrine."

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILLIAM C. WHITNEY TO SECRETARY LONG

871 Fifth Avenue
NEW YORK
May 10, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

You will doubtless know officially and without personal recommendation Captain Paget,[1] the naval attaché accredited to this country by Great Britain.

What I want to do is to ask for Captain Paget your friendly offices to enable him to execute his mission as intelligently as consistent with his position among us. You can give him facilities for doing so — and I bespeak for Captain Paget your friendly offices in every way. Captain Paget's brother married my daughter, and I am therefore personally interested, but he is a most distinguished officer of the English Navy and it would I think be in line with the grateful courtesies being exchanged by the two governments and which we so highly appreciate at this time, if you should give to Captain Paget your favor and friendship.

Yours most truly,
W. C. WHITNEY

To the Honorable
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
Office of Naval War Board
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 10, 1898

SIR:

I respectfully recommend that the "board of war"[1] be abolished, and that in place of it, to perform the functions with which it is now entrusted, there be appointed a single officer, to be known by such title as may seem convenient to designate his duties.

[1] Alfred Wyndham Paget (b. 1852).

[1] For the naval war board, see Roosevelt's letter of April 4, 1898, note.

2. To this officer there would be appointed such assistants as shall be expedient, with whom he can consult at his pleasure, individually or collectively, directing their special study of the general situation, or of particular features, and inviting suggestions; but, in the end, the opinions officially submitted will be his own, for which he alone will be responsible, and for whose success he alone would receive credit.

3. The change suggested is from a council of war, which the board virtually is, with corporate responsibility and without individual responsibility, to the single, individual responsibility, which alone achieves results in war.

4. I do not forget that the secretary himself exercises such single responsibility. But, with the varied and onerous duties resting upon him, it is inevitable that, in such highly technical matters as the conduct of war, he must depend largely upon the technical familiarity with the subject that only seamen, and military seamen, can possess. Professional opinion should come to him, not as the result of a majority vote, but with the far weightier sanction of a single competent man, acting under the high sense of high personal responsibility.

5. I offer the suggestion at once, before any difference with my colleagues has arisen, or could arise. Resting, as my opinion does, upon a wide study of military history, it is not liable to change, and at present it has the advantage of absolute impersonality.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,
A. T. MAHAN

To the Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

[Endorsed]
Navy department, naval war board, May 10, 1898. Respectfully forwarded, M. SICARD, *Rear Admiral, President of Board*

HENRY LEE TO SECRETARY LONG

BROOKLINE
May 10, 1898

MY DEAR OVERWORKED SECRETARY:

I am begged to forward to you the record of — Ensign W. A. Moffett[1] — written by an officer commanding one of the United

[1] William Adger Moffett (1869–1933), rear-admiral and chief of the bureau of aeronautics (1931). Admiral Moffett lost his life in the wreck of the U. S. naval airship *Akron*, April 4, 1933.

States ships, and with it the young ensign's supplication for immediate active service, as he feels that as he is on board the United States Ship *Mohican*, Honolulu, he is shut off from perhaps the one chance of his life to do something in his profession, and he implores to be ordered to some ship that is to be given real work to do against the Spaniards.

This record is creditable and so is his aspiration, so I feel forced to do what little I possibly can by presenting his petition to you, sure that it will be duly considered.

Nothing but the fear of adding one more minute's task has stopped me from expressing to you frequently my full appreciation of your labors and responsibilities, you have my hearty sympathy.

Yours with respect,

HENRY LEE

[Enclosure]

Ensign W. A. Moffett: Appointed to Naval Academy from South Carolina on September 6, 1886, and commissioned an ensign on July 1, 1892.

Served with zeal, credit and distinction on board the flagship *Chicago* under command of Captain Mahan. Upon the return of this vessel to the United States, early in 1895, Mr. Moffett was ordered to the monitor *Amphitrite* where he did most creditable service and from which vessel in acknowledgment of his satisfactory work he was ordered to the *Enterprise* and intrusted with the important duties of instructor of mathematics to the cadets of that vessel.

Ensign Moffett has been almost constantly afloat since being graduated and has had about six years and a half sea service.

RICHARD H. DAVIS TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Army Headquarters
Tampa Bay Hotel, FLORIDA
May 14, 1898

DEAR SIR:

Mr. Neilson[1] of *Harper's Weekly* has at your suggestion forwarded me your letter to him. It states your views of my case and your reasons for putting me off the flagship. They are several; in the first place I was represented to you as the correspondent of an English paper, the *Times*, it is a daily paper the most important paper in England. It is not an illustrated paper, as you suggest by

[1] Probably H. L. Nelson. See Secretary Long's letter of April 2, 1898.

referring to me as "the artist of a foreign newspaper, the *London Times*." I am not an artist but a correspondent, and novelist and a writer of books of travel. In accrediting me to a foreign paper Mr. Neilson was correct, but he did not go quite far enough. I also represent the *New York Herald*, in which paper my letters from the flagship appeared daily, and through the *Herald*, I also represent a syndicate of fourteen American papers among them the *Boston Herald* one of those you mentioned as complaining about my presence on the *New York*. These papers are the first papers in the first fourteen cities of this country. I also represent *Scribner's Magazine*, and am writing a series of articles for them on the war and a book which is to be a history of the war. On the whole — I represent more papers, more important papers, in more important cities than any other correspondent, with the exception of the Associated Press, now following this war. And I also am in a modest way an historian of the war through my connection with one of the three greatest magazines. When you put me off the ship, a young man came over the side representing an unknown western syndicate of papers of no value. He himself was a Cuban doctor. For him you sent me ashore, or as you say in your letter because "if you showed favor to one paper you would expire in hot water."

I beg to suggest that you are taking a wrong and an extremely personal view of this matter. Some men are trained to fight and some to write. I have been ten years learning to write, and it is possible that I can describe events more correctly than others or that I have learned how to place them on paper. I claim that trained writers are just as important to this war as trained fighters. I do not call all of the two hundred accredited correspondents trained or trustworthy writers but there are some that can be trusted and who should be trusted and who should, other things being equal, be allowed on the fleet, no matter whether the yellow journals get you in "hot water" or not. From the letters I have received from strangers and the comments in the newspapers I judge that in putting me off the flagship you succeeded in pleasing a few where you antagonized many. There is still ample time for you to recognize reputable journalism and journalists, not as a favor to them in any way, but because their value is deserving of recognition. Mr. Zogbaum, Mr. Remington, Mr. Bonsal, Mr. Stephen Crane [2] all of whom

[2] Rufus Fairchild Zogbaum (1849–1925), Frederick Remington (1861–1909), Stephen Bonsal (b. 1865), Stephen Crane (1871–1900).

you ordered off the fleet are writers of as much consequence as this country can produce. I, myself, am of consequence only because I represent fourteen decent papers and a great magazine and the one English paper that is pledged to the Anglo-American alliance.

I beg you to consider these things and to reverse your order concerning myself and allow me to return to the flagship, or to any vessel of the fleet where her commander will receive me.

When you do this you can answer any question that may be raised by other papers, that I represent not one but fifteen papers, that besides furnishing news I am acting as a historian of the war and that if they get up a syndicate as strong and as reputable as the one I represent they can have a representative also. I feel sure that you will see the justice of this and furnish me with an order giving me the opportunity to relate the victories of our fleet at first hand.

I am, Sir, yours,

RICHARD HARDING DAVIS

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

JESSE H. JONES TO SECRETARY LONG

HALIFAX, MASSACHUSETTS
May 14, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

If you can find time to read my editorials enclosed they will be better than any letter. Please account them a personal letter to yourself.

Because I was opposed to making war, it does not follow that I would not make the war effective. The way of war having been chosen, it is our duty to make it as effective as we can, and get out of it all that we can. Hence not a Spanish flag must be allowed to get back across the ocean.

Hence under no conditions may the Philippines be given up. We have taken them by our might; we can not give them up except in utter weakness and we will not recover from the despite of it in a century. And besides we will be false to our duty to that people and to the whole human race to lead the way of freedom and progress, hope and prosperity.

Spain must get off this hemisphere. She would not consent to be outgrown; she would have violence. Now she must go. That is the only recompense for the *Maine*.

As to the government of the Philippine Islands, if I supposed the President would read it, I would prepare a thoroughly thought-out plan: but my time is worth too much to expend it on uncertainties.

I have three fundamentals.

I. No peace with Spain that lets her have a foot of land that we have taken or can take.

II. No interference by any European power.

III. Line right up with England into an Anglo-Saxon league, to be for ever.

These three set forth our imperial destiny, just now set before us.

I doubt if I ever did any work better than my editorial "The Signs of the Times."

Cordially yours,
JESSE H. JONES[1]

NOTE. The editorials referred to in this letter appeared in the *Standard*, of Rockland, Massachusetts, and the *Public*, of North Abington, Massachusetts, both of May 13, 1898. The battle of Manila Bay is rated, as to its decisive results, among the great events of history. The Philippines must not be given up.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

HENRY LEE TO SECRETARY LONG

BROOKLINE
May 16, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

To-day I have received a second letter from you informing me that young Ensign Moffett has had his longing gratified, and since you can find time to attend to petitions and to write pleasant friendly notes calling up the past you must have time to listen to our grateful thanks only withheld lest they should intrude, for no other reason. Some of us, quaking with anxiety, did approach the President more than once through you to beseech him to resist the jingo clamors of Congress and preserve us from the present anxieties and the dire future responsibilities and entanglements of war, and now we are sick at heart over these calamities wantonly piled upon us and the threatening future. Rightly or wrongly we have trusted to you and to the President to accept Sagasta's cessation of hostilities and refer-

[1] Reverend Jesse Henry Jones (1836–1904), Harvard College '56.

ence of the *Maine* to an impartial tribunal, and how our two senators can reconcile to their consciences; one, his unceasing endeavors, open and hidden, to stir up war and imperialism, the other his false conclusions from fair premises, most of us, especially those who can still turn pale over the anxieties, the losses, the haggard years of one great war, can not conceive. If I were to begin to ask you how are we to solve this or that problem in view, it would take time not to be spared, but I must assure you of the pride and gratitude of us all over your fulfilment of one of the beatitudes.

You allude to that ground dear to all of us, the college, and no one, I fancy, has partaken of the pleasures of our festivals more often and more heartily than I, – but – for two years I have been broken down by bronchitis and heart trouble, am now in care of nurse and doctor, have been unable to go to commencement, save for an hour or so, can not get up to Hollis 11 to see John Ropes [1] and the rest, give up Phi Betas, have resigned the presidencies of Tavern and Union clubs, am just trying to quit the presidency of the Provident Institution for Savings, have quitted Lee Higginson and Company and am "only waiting" like my old crony and classmate S. G. Ward [2] of Washington. It is hard and sometimes sad, now I resign [*sic*] my place on the board of overseers where I have sat (with one year ineligible) from 1867. I can not go, this last attack was brought on by fatigue and excitement going in to a meeting in the easiest way.

I have the privilege of pleasant country life and driving all the year, and family and a good many friends and friendly acquaintances. Foresight and hindsight are wonderfully different, my life is like a watch in the night. Good-bye, governor, let me ask you one question, have you anything to do but to listen to the yarns of an old fellow.

Yours gratefully,
Henry Lee

I think Sowdon [3] will eventually become an archbishop.

[1] John Codman Ropes (1836–1899), Harvard College '57.
[2] Samuel Gray Ward (1817–1907), Harvard College '36.
[3] Apparently refers to Arthur John Clark Sowdon (1835–1911), Harvard College '57, a Boston lawyer, and very prominent in the Episcopal church.

SENATOR CHANDLER TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
Personal WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 19, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am anxious about the Manila situation. I know the influences which are at work to prevent a military landing there. Concerning those I will not worry you; and doubtless you will not have to bear any of the President's responsibility which will be heavy enough for not occupying the Philippines.

But you will be blamed for any naval mishap; like the defeat of Dewey or his enforced withdrawal. I have not criticized the naval management in any way and am proud of the record of the secretary and his officers and men. I have only suggested one specific thing; long ago the sending of the *Oregon* to Dewey. I wish she was with him now. If there is a big battle in Cuban waters and the *Oregon* participates perhaps I shall be rejoiced that she didn't go to Manila!

But still Dewey may be imperilled. He has no armored ship. Send him the *Monterey;* and your duty is done whether soldiers go or not. The *Monterey* in Manila's harbor mouth can stand off the Spanish fleet.

Twenty days have gone by and no ship has been sent to him; no supplies, no ammunition, no men, nothing. You know whether he has asked for anything. If he has, do send.

The *Charleston* has not yet gone. Please don't wait for the army, but reënforce the navy.

Truly yours,
WILLIAM E. CHANDLER

SECRETARY LONG

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *St. Louis*
Personal WINDWARD PASSAGE
May 19, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

My friends, in congratulating me upon the command of so beautiful a ship as this, invariably added that "she can run away from

anything." How much comfort this assurance is likely to give a person of my mental temperament you can better imagine than I describe.

Within the past twenty-four hours, as I write, the *St. Louis* has been *twice* in serious action!

Yesterday I grappled one of the two cables between Jamaica and Cuba right under the forts of Santiago — *and in this ship* — and I was actively engaged for forty-one minutes. That the ship and her little consort, the *Wompatuck*, were untouched is due to a kind Providence rather than the good will of the Spaniards. Lieutenant Jungen [1] with his one *three* pounder and I with my *broadside* of two six pounders silenced the gun in the Morro and one, a very small one in a new battery to westward of the harbor, but we could not reach a mortar battery inside that put shot after shot close alongside — some not one hundred feet outside the ship. It was very nasty! But I held on to the cable and gradually worked out of range. If you like — I can send you a sample of the wire that might very easily have cost us dearly. As I probably ruined the other cable at the same time, I shan't go back for it until I know the necessity.

To-day, thanks to our having such tiny guns, I had to abandon an attempt to cut the French cable in Guantanamo. A very plucky little Spanish gunboat with two bigger pieces (four or five-inch probably) came out and drove us off. I argued that, Admiral Sampson having sent me to cut cables, fighting was secondary. We had a very pretty scrimmage for half an hour or more — but the Spaniard wouldn't scare a bit so I — *ran*. Very humiliating, but I had too much to lose and too little to gain — for this cable can be cut elsewhere — not so the Jamaica cable.

I mention these things to you because when the time comes to serve out the rewards, I think my conduct off Santiago de Cuba entitles me to at least this — that no man should be promoted over my head. More I do not ask. Am I not reasonable? If one of my juniors merits advancement which would put him above me, then I ought to go up enough to keep him astern. Had you been with me on the bridge of the *St. Louis* yesterday and heard the shells whistling over and around us, I am sure you would agree with me. It's one thing to meet your enemy in full panoply yourself, but to have

[1] Carl William Jungen, commanding the naval tug *Wompatuck*.

neither armor nor good weapons and yet to stand fast till your work is done is not unworthy of remembrance in old age and of telling to your children.

We are having "a beautiful time" as the girls say. Everything on board is smooth and harmonious and we are indeed a happy family in every way. I expect to go north shortly for coal and stores – but I shall not, I fear, have the pleasure of seeing you then.

Very sincerely yours,
C. F. Goodrich

SAMUEL HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

Concord
May 30, 1898

[Dear Sir:]

I am surprised and mortified that a fugitive remark of mine, intended to be rather of a playful nature, should have been deemed by any hearer [to be] worthy of the dignity of repetition, where it might either wound or offend. And this the more when a social club was the place where the saying and the hearing took place. The fact of the remark itself had gone so completely from my mind that I was at a loss on the receipt of your letter of the twenty-sixth instant to know or recall the occasion. But it has come back to me that the whole thing was based on a talk about the newspaper jibes or criticisms on the direction given by the so-called strategy board to affairs which should much better be left to the high officers in charge on the spot. I then said in a spirit of banter that I had for some time thought of getting up a petition for its abolition. That this has caused you, with your engrossing and important duties, to be at the trouble of writing me is distressing because it has turned from what it was intended to be to something apparently serious.

I feel now as if your informant was a person always to be avoided and also as if the club might be full of such. My own constant and untiring support of the government, my admiring recognition of the superiority of the navy department in this crisis, which has already made us able to command the high respect of mankind, ought to have been enough to have given this auditor pause before he repeated me in so unfriendly a spirit and of all others to you.

As it is, I never will speak disrespectfully even of the equator

(to use the figure of Sidney Smith) except in the strictest privacy and to those listeners alone who are sworn to secrecy.

After saying what I have it perhaps is unnecessary for me to categorically answer your six questions, but yet to be precise, I will say

First. I knew who composed the board.

Second. I understood generally that it was the staff of the secretary of the navy.

Third. My information or misinformation as to its specific action was derived from the daily press, and I can not now recall what, at any time, it was.

Fourth. The only amendment I would humbly suggest to its order sent to Commodore Dewey is that he should sail for home as soon as he has destroyed the Spanish fleet and fortifications.

Fifth. I applaud all I know of its action respecting the *Oregon.*

Sixth. I am gratified to learn the facts stated by you in your sixth question.

In conclusion I beg to assure you of my great anxiety about this war and its administration, of my high faith in the President and in the conscientious and able work of his secretary of the navy, which so far as in me lies, I am upholding and shall continue to uphold.

Respectfully yours,
SAMUEL HOAR [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WILLIAM ENDICOTT, JR., TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
May 30, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

Mr. Henry MacFarland [1] in a recent letter to the *Boston Herald* says that the President is " desirous to know the opinion of the sober-minded men of the country upon the subject of colonial expansion."

I can give him the opinion of one at the present time *very* sober-

[1] Samuel Hoar (1845–1904), Harvard College '67.

[1] Henry Brown Floyd MacFarland (1861–1921), president of the board of commissioners of the District of Columbia, 1900–1910.

minded person and it is not alone my opinion but that of every one with whom my business associations bring me in contact. We have jingo newspapers trying to emulate the *New York Journal*, and jingo politicians always ready to whoop up any thing that they think will take with the ignorant and unthinking, but the sober sense of this state is all in opposition to any such departure from the traditional policy of the country as is involved in colonial extension.

National honor forbids. The President, in the most solemn manner, called the world to witness that the sole purpose of this government in making war upon Spain was to relieve Cuba from misgovernment and to establish self-government there, and that under no circumstances would annexation be thought of. The congressional resolution echoed this sentiment. To say that this referred to Cuba only and left us at liberty to grab any other Spanish territory that we might conquer is to say that President and Congress were guilty of a piece of hypocrisy too base to be conceived. The purpose evidently was to place our action upon the high moral plane of undertaking the enormous sacrifices of war with no selfish purpose of territorial aggrandizement, but solely from motives of humanity. This purpose was to make it, as Senator Hoar declared, "the most holy war in all history." I can see nothing especially holy in passing over Cuba, for the annexation of which propinquity offers strong temptation, asking the world to admire such an act of self-abnegation, and prowling the world over to annex the Philippine Islands, the Carolina Islands, the Canary Islands, or anything else that the fortune of war may enable us to wrest from Spain. Our holy mission will be accomplished when we have set up in Cuba a well-ordered and successful government of the Cuban people and retired without having our pockets filled with swag. The whole world thought when these declarations were made, and doubtless still thinks, that we were lying. Let us take heed that we do not prove that they were correct.

Colonial expansion will involve an entire change in our form of government. This government of ours, of which we are accustomed to claim that it is the best in the world, is founded upon the declaration that all "government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed" and is organized upon the theory of equal rights to all its citizens who exercise their rights of sovereignty through co-equal states. To annex a territory, ten thousand miles away,

with a population of eight to fifteen millions of savages to be ruled as subjects having no rights other than it may please the conqueror to accord, will announce to the world that this is no longer a republic, but an oligarchy, and an oligarchy without the redeeming feature of a highly intelligent and educated class to give direction to public interests.

To govern this mass of ignorant subjects, who can not possibly become citizens, would require an army of civil servants, many of whom would be out there "on the make," and would surely breed corruption in the public service. To protect such distant dependencies would require an enormous increase of the navy and army, withdrawing hundreds of thousands from the peaceful pursuits of industry and imposing a burden upon the nation such as is crushing the industrial classes of so many of the nations of Europe.

These large armaments will inevitably lead us to be taking a hand in international squabbles from which, by our isolated position, we are now happily exempt. The Constitution requires that all taxes, duties and imports shall be uniform throughout the country. The introduction of our tariff system into the Philippines would be so great a departure from ordinary trade conditions there as would be likely to invite unfriendly interference from other powers. And for what purpose are we asked to incur all these dangers? It is not necessary for purposes of trade for we can buy their hemp and sugar without governing them, and we can sell anything which we can offer in competition with other nations. The purpose is clearly to cultivate the spirit of jingoism that a nation to be great must be a big, swaggering bully, chip on shoulder, ready to fight all creation, and constantly wasting life and treasure in unnecessary war. It is not in this way that we have hitherto prospered. We have shown that a nation may become great and prosperous by cultivating peaceful ways. We are in no danger from any quarter if we keep out of European squabbles and attend to our own affairs.

There is great danger to republican institutions in great military and naval armaments as is shown by the dominance of the army in France at the present time, to say nothing of the teachings of history. If we become a great military power, ambitious spirits, always ready to pander to the prejudices of the ignorant, will be likely to be attracted to military life to serve their selfish ends.

The president of one of the three largest financial institutions of

New York City said to me in conversation a short time since, "I do not dare to look forward fifty years and think what may be the future of this country. It makes me tremble."

It makes me tremble also. In my humble opinion the perils now confronting the republic are greater than at any time in its history, save only during the Civil War. It will be the part of a wise statesmanship to escape these dangers by returning to the traditions of the fathers. It may be old fogyism but I think George Washington a safer counsellor to tie to than Senators Mason, Foraker [2] and Lodge.

With sincere regard, I remain,

Yours very truly,
WILLIAM ENDICOTT, JR.

COMMODORE CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

Department of the Navy
Bureau of Navigation
WASHINGTON, D. C.
June 1, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I was very sorry to learn from Mr. Allen of your suffering from a sudden attack of lameness. I sincerely hope it is only temporary and that you will soon be able to return to office.

The reports that there has been some fighting at Santiago seem to be confirmed by press reports from Port au Prince, which Mr. Hood [1] has just shown me. The squadron under Schley made an attack upon the fortifications and also fired on one or two of the Spanish vessels that were in sight. We have received, so far, nothing official in regard to it. Admiral Sampson must have arrived there before this, and is now in charge, as a telegram from him, sent into the mole, probably while he was passing through the Windward Passage and dated one A.M., was received this morning.

I am quite desirous of being in New York on Friday, if you think I can be spared for one day, as there will be an important meeting of the Nicaragua Canal Company on Friday, which I wish to attend unless there is some important news or operation which requires me to be here on that day. I should like to leave by the four

[2] Joseph Benson Foraker (1846–1917), U. S. senator from Ohio.

[1] Edwin M. Hood, representative of the Associated Press.

o'clock train tomorrow afternoon. Incidentally I could visit one or two of the ships fitting out there, and in which I am interested; at the same time have a change of scene.

Very respectfully,
A. S. CROWNINSHIELD [2]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREELY TO SECRETARY LONG

War Department
Signal Office
WASHINGTON
June 4, 1898

Confidential
12.45 P.M.

SIR:

I have pleasure in confirming my verbal report to your confidential secretary, that press dispatches just received from off Santiago-de-Cuba bring information that all the cables on the south coast of Cuba have been severed, and that the island is completely isolated except through the Key West cables under our control. While this information is unofficial, yet it is confirmed by prior dispatches already sent you stating that the French line from Hayti to South America was interrupted at 6.30 P.M. Friday afternoon.

Very respectfully,
A. W. GREELY

To the Honorable
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA
June 6, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have received, of course, your order regarding Mr. Scovel,[1] the *World* correspondent; I would say, however, that there are circumstances of great mitigation, and in fact I do not think it is too much to say, so far as I understand the matter, the circumstances redound to Mr. Scovel's credit.

I can not enter into a full explanation of what has come to me wholly privately, but Mr. Scovel has been so daring, and has done

[2] Chief of the bureau of navigation, with the rank of commodore.

[1] Sylvester Scovel (1869–1905).

such exceedingly good work amongst the insurgents, and given us so much valuable information at very great risk to himself, that I should feel obliged if you would enable me to act at my discretion in the matter of his being allowed to visit the ships. Some time later I hope I shall be able to make known to you personally the grounds of this request, but I believe they are amply sufficient to warrant my making it.

Yours very truly,
W. T. Sampson [2]

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*, First Rate
Personal Off Santiago de Cuba
June 10, 1898

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I do not know how many private letters you may have from people down our way, but I shall write this in the hope that you will not object to having a personal opinion of how things look from this point of view.

We are now anxiously and not patiently-mindedly awaiting the army.[1] We have done a great deal here; we have silenced the batteries, have established a vigorous blockade, our ships lying in at two miles distance and illuminating at night the harbor entrance, and a good landing force would complete the rest in a very short time. Were the entrance to Santiago of a different character: *i.e.* with low-lying land, we could easily force our way in, but it is extraordinarily narrow commanded by bluffs two hundred feet in height, and these bluffs occupied by an active enemy would render our action in this narrow inlet, but three hundred and fifty feet broad, planted with mines, very difficult and disaster there would be irretrievable. If we were sure to be left alone, we should of course try it at whatever risk; with the hope of the arrival of an army we of course wait.

Our blockade thus far has undoubtedly been effective; nothing has gone in or out since our arrival. The batteries looked formidable,

[2] Captain Sampson was in command of the North Atlantic Squadron, with the rank of rear-admiral.

[1] The army sailed from Tampa on June 14 and landed under cover of the navy, a part at Daiquirí, June 22, the rest at Siboney, June 23 – respectively 16 and 10 miles from Santiago. See Captain Clover's letter of October 17, 1898.

but we silenced them most effectually the other day, lying off finally at our leisure and firing at short range until we thought it wise not to expend any more ammunition.

We were ranged round the entrance thus:



I see much stress is laid upon the convoy of troops. The Spanish naval force on the north side is of the most trivial character. It is wholly, except two torpedo destroyers at Havana, of little gunboats used in the shallow waters of the keys extending some two hundred miles eastward of Cárdenas. We have been in the habit of paying them no attention whatever, and that our army movements should be made to depend on any regard being shown them, shows an entirely false appreciation of circumstances.

This leads to another thing! the somewhat – or I should say the wholly real – absurdity of scaring ourselves with idle fears of what will never happen. We have expended too much of our energies and thought in fighting spectral enemies. Our people north seem to have seen in every wave crest or cloud shadow a swift destroyer of some sort pointed at our doorsteps. Instead of wielding what bludgeons we have with all our vigor at the really visible heads, we have been looking for the invisible. The country, or at least the press, and some of our officials, have gone into spasms over torpedo boats running up and down the New England coast in the rough weather of early spring. Any one with the slightest experience of these craft would know the absolute impossibility of this, the ordinary torpedo boat must be nursed like a baby, and the torpedo-boat destroyer is not much better. They have not thought of the coal she must have and her very limited radius. The only result of

all our anxious patrolling north has been to knock a hole in the *Columbia.*[2]

The way to keep the enemy from your door is to go for him so actively that he can not afford to do anything but defend himself. Napoleon complained that his marshals would always make too many pictures to themselves of what might happen. This habit has worried our whole coast into semi-hysterics, prevented vigorous action where vigor was most needed, and has been most detrimental to the successful conduct of the war. To-day as I write comes a report from the *Eagle* that she saw a Spanish armored cruiser, a protected cruiser and two torpedo boats on the north side – and the effect is a suspension of a movement of paramount importance. Even were the report true, it should not to my mind for a moment change our plans. But I have no faith in it whatever. How did Lieutenant Southerland [3] know the vessels were Spanish? I don't believe he could tell their number even.

To my mind it is one of those groundless, or at the best semi-groundless fears of which we seem to be so much the victim, and which surely are not to our credit as a bold, vigorous and fearless people. In fact these panics are most discreditable. To show how easily people may err in such things I will instance an occurrence of last night. The *Yankee* left Môle St. Nicholas about eight; on arrival here at five-thirty this morning they reported having seen and been in the midst of a squadron of eight or ten ships, one of which was thought a battleship, which used a search-light; the battleship looked somewhat like the *Indiana;* they could not tell what they were, and hastened on to inform us. Later came in the *Panther*, *Yosemite*, *Armeria*, *Scorpion* and *Supply*, five instead of eight or ten, and on inquiry it turned out that the *Scorpion*, which has one mast (*à la* battleship) was the user of the search-light; that they had sighted the *Yankee*, had taken her for a torpedo boat and the *Scorpion* had opened fire upon her, though the *Yankee* was so far away she did not hear the shots and took them for the working of the search-light as a signal. It is an excellent instance of how even an experienced officer may be mistaken. The fact is that there is no sense of perspective at night; a torpedo boat may look as big as a battleship or vice versa.

[2] On the night of May 28, the *Columbia*, cruising in a dense fog, collided with a British ship and was rather badly injured; the other ship was sunk.

[3] W. H. H. Southerland, commanding the *Eagle*, a converted yacht.

I have regretted more than I can say this dreadful tendency to panic, which seems so unworthy of us in every way; which makes us ridiculous abroad and should make us ashamed at home. If I can be allowed to say anything, it is that we should go on and do our work without paying any attention whatever to rumors and loose talk – let us strike energetically, decisively, quickly and we need fear nothing in the way of possible raids or phantom squadrons. The one absolutely fatal thing in war is over-caution.

I can not understand why the *Columbia*, *Minneapolis* and *St. Paul* should not be sent to show themselves on the Spanish coast. If they did nothing more than make themselves known at one or two points and then disappear below the horizon for the United States or elsewhere, we should hear nothing more of Spanish ships crossing the Atlantic. It is certainly true strategy to scare the other fellow rather than to let him scare us, and I repeat that our failure to do this is beyond my comprehension.

The navy has done its work well. As I look back I can see that beyond any reasonable doubt we could have demolished the batteries at Havana the morning we left Key West the twenty-second of April. But I do not say it was not perfectly sound judgment from the point of view of the time not to attempt it – though we were all prepared for it, and as far as I know, all anxious for it.

We could have taken Puerto Rico easily enough, but the doubt as to what to do with it with no landing force to hold it, an exasperatingly slow squadron (on account of the monitors), a Spanish squadron to look after and the Flying Squadron at Hampton Roads, weighed heavily on the admiral's mind, and he thought best not to hamper his movements. As it turned out, in the light of later events, we could have spared the time both to take and to hold with our own ships, but so far as we could see we were left to hold alone a line the important points of which were a thousand miles apart. Had we had the Flying Squadron with us it would have been plain sailing. I have held from the beginning that our very first objective was San Juan, and no better use for the Flying Squadron could have been found than to use it April 22 for the occupancy of that place, but our own action did not go for nought, as it is clear (and it is also shown in the light of Lieutenant Carranza's [4]

[4] Ramón de Carranza, late naval attaché of the Spanish legation at Washington. He wrote a letter to Don José Inay, Spanish minister of marine, dated May 26, 1898, at Montreal, where he had been organizing a spy service. It was intercepted by United States secret agents and published in the papers of June 6.

letter) that the operations of this squadron on the coast of Puerto Rico forced Cervera into Santiago, where I think he is surely ours.

Yours very truly,
F. E. CHADWICK

P. S. June 11

It occurred to us last evening that the vessels seen by the *Eagle* were the same which arrived here yesterday. This morning we brought the *Scorpion* up from the westward and examined her log. The result is that there can be no doubt that what she saw were our own ships.

REAR-ADMIRAL SICARD TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
Office of Naval War Board
WASHINGTON, D. C.
June 16, 1898

SIR:

From telegrams received from the United States consul [1] at Kingston, Jamaica, and laid before this board, it appears that the island of Jamaica begins to bear the relation to the present war in Cuba, that the port of Nassau did to the Confederate States, during our Civil War — that is, it tends to become a half-way depot for stores needed by the Spanish army, where such stores can be easily, because innocently, accumulated, and whence the voyage to Cuba is a short run.

The wants of the Spanish army fall under two great heads — munitions of war and food. The former, being distinctly contraband, are more easily arrested en route, and coming as much from Europe as from the United States, are out of our power for particular action.

The case is different as regards food supplies. Those will come principally from the United States, as the nearest source of supply, as has ever been the case for the West Indies; and with the tendency of the business world to enter into speculations of this character, we may expect to see this traffic increase apace.

Three methods of prevention are open to the United States:

1. To prohibit exports of food from our ports to Jamaica, beyond the annual amount heretofore customary.

2. To declare food supplies going to Cuba contraband of war —

[1] Louis Addison Dent (b. 1863).

a step frequently taken by nations in the past, when the question of supporting an enemy's armed force was involved, as is notoriously the case now in Cuba.

3. To extend the blockade of the south coast of Cuba, to include – besides Cienfuegos – the ports of Batabano, Trinidad, Manzanillo, and others, to be specified by name.

The first course will strike most efficiently at the root of the evil, but might be considered unfriendly by the British government. A similar action, however, has already been taken as regards coal shipments.

The second possesses the advantage of allowing a vessel carrying food to be stopped, without reference to her port of destination being blockaded.

The third alternative would be less objectionable to foreign states than the other two; but it will seriously tax the resources of the navy, already strained by the necessity of convoying the army at the same time that it has to maintain the blockades already proclaimed.

Very respectfully,
M. Sicard
President

The Secretary of the Navy

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
Thursday morning,
June 16, 1898

My dear Long:

My enclosed letter of [the] fourteenth instant has been delayed by my being unexpectedly called away Tuesday noon, not returning to [my] office until this morning. In the meantime Gamaliel Bradford, Moorfield Storey[1] and I think a brace of lesser mugwumps have held their threatened meeting at Faneuil Hall and tooted on their pharisaical rams-horns, hoping to control Congress to do their bidding, to wit: *not* to annex Hawaii, *not* to acquire Spanish pos[ses]sions beyond the sea, *not* to ask territorial or money indemnity from Spain, *et cetera similia.*

But at that very hour yesterday, without even hearing the wailing jeremiads from Faneuil Hall, the House of Representatives passed

[1] Moorfield Storey (1845–1929), Harvard College '66.

the Hawaiian annexation resolution by more than a two-thirds vote. The inspired mugwump papers have teemed with lamentation-editorials and letters over the backsliding of Massachusetts Representatives Gillet[2] and Barrows,[3] who have actually come to the conclusion that the dead hand of past generations can not for ever stay the development of nations.

Under these circumstances Carlyle's words (quoted in my letter) have a more pungent force: — "If the laws and judgements are verily those of God, there can be no clearer merit than that of pushing them forward — regardless of the barkings of gaze[t]teers and wayside dogs."

But Carlyle is not alone in believing that God governs in the affairs of nations; that His judgments against chronic misgovernment and cruelty of nations are inevitable and must be executed by other nations, "with written law or without."

When our second Continental Congress met, Franklin offered a resolution that the daily sessions should be opened by a prayer for divine guidance and said, "I have lived a long time; and the longer I have lived the more convinced am I that God governs in the affairs of men; and, if a sparrow can not fall to the ground without our Father's knowledge, how shall a nation rise unless God blesses its labors?"[4]

Apparently our pharisee friends belong to some antediluvian race and can not rise to the emergencies of the present. Because, forsooth, their grandfathers of sacred memory used smooth-bore flintlock muskets and swore by the Westminster catechism and drove to church in a one-horse shay, — it does not seem to the American nation of to-day a sufficient reason to ignore the progress of the past century and repudiate rifle guns, a more liberal Christianity, and steam and electric cars.

It undoubtedly was wise (to use Washington's words, inserted by Hamilton in the "Farewell Address"), "[in extending our commercial relations],[5] to have with them [foreign nations] as little *political* connection as possible." But, as stated in my letter of [the] fourteenth enclosed: "Political relations have an entirely distinct character (*i.e.* from commercial relations and the customary law

[2] Frederick Huntington Gillet (1851–1935), Amherst '74, M. C., later United States senator from Massachusetts, 1925–1931.

[3] Samuel June Barrows (1845–1909), M. C.

[4] This resolution was offered in the convention of 1787.

[5] These brackets appear in the original address.

of nations): The policy – domestic or foreign – of a nation depends on the particular condition of the country at different times; and consequently is not based upon precedent. Hence it is above and beyond the domain of law." – And, it may be added, above and beyond the sophisms and *non-sequiturs* like those proclaimed yesterday at Faneuil Hall – *e.g.* "We have solemnly disclaimed any intention to annex Cuba. What right therefore have we to annex Porto Rico or the Philippines? "

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN BARKER TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Newark*
Personal HAMPTON ROADS
June 17, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am delighted that you sent a letter of commendation to Commander Symonds [1] of the *Marietta* who is one of the most intelligent and best "all-round" officers we have in the service. I know that he will appreciate your letter very much — as will every one on board.

Symonds told me once that long before the nomination of Mr. McKinley – his brother who is a leading Republican in one of the cities in New York – introduced Mr. McKinley to his audience – as "the next President of the United States" – and that it was the *first* introduction of that kind. Of course he was pleased that it should prove true.

Symonds gave me a very interesting account of his trip from the Pacific to the Atlantic. He said that as the *Marietta* was so much slower than the *Oregon* – he suggested to Captain Clark [2] that he be left to make the best of his way to the United States.

I expect the *Newark* will be off in a short time. We are now awaiting orders, but I never realized before as I do now how much more efficient a ship is after she has been in commission six months than when newly commissioned with a green crew. For this reason I do not believe we have much to fear from the "Cadiz" fleet. Those vessels would not dare meet those of our squadrons in the West Indies.

[1] Frederick Martin Symonds (1846–1926).
[2] Charles Edgar Clark (1843–1922), commanding the battleship *Oregon.*

I note with pleasure that the *Vesuvius* has vindicated your judgment in keeping her as she was originally intended to be used. It requires *nerve* to work her battery, but Pillsbury [3] who is a cousin of Cushing [4] has got it — and a good lot of brains to direct it. I am glad he has had a chance to test his guns in action.

One thing more — I am impressed every day with the truth of Colonel Wagner's [5] remarks about an army of invasion, *etc.* It seems to me that everything he said is coming true, but I suppose we needed the experience. Let us hope that the yellow fever will not break out among the troops. Hoping that you have fully recovered from your lameness and with kindest regards to the ladies — I am

Yours sincerely,
A. S. Barker [6]

P. S. Please tell Mr. Snyder [7] that I have not heard from him since I sent him a letter a week or so ago.

A. S. B.

HORACE B. SARGENT TO SECRETARY LONG

Santa Monica, California
21 June, 1898

Dear Governor:

Your considerate kindness in giving my dear daughter's husband, Commander B. H. McCalla,[1] command of the cruiser *Marblehead*, with which, and with his splendid officers and crew, he is delighted, has never been forgotten by me. I am very glad that he has justified your confidence, and proved the value of services which — but for you — might have been sacrificed to a mistake of *trop de zèle* in discipline on one occasion for which he has patiently, for years, suffered a bitter degradation.

Now, in war, should we not remember the facts on which peace passed judgment? *Tempora mutantur — nos mutamur — in illis* (?)

[3] Commander John Elliott Pillsbury (1846–1919), commanding the dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius*.

[4] Lieutenant-Commander William Barker Cushing (1843–1874). He destroyed the Confederate ram *Albemarle* in the Civil War.

[5] Arthur Lockwood Wagner (1853–1905), on General Miles's staff.

[6] Captain Albert Smith Barker (1843–1916).

[7] Harold C. Snyder, Secretary Long's confidential clerk.

[1] Bowman Hendry McCalla (1844–1910).

First. With evidence of a conspiring purpose, he was insulted by the most opprobrious term in the English tongue; and, after repeated warning to the offender (an iron mutineer) gave him a cut, "two inches long," on the scalp, which, by some strange concert among hostile illustrated newspapers, was depicted with a headline, "THE DECKS DELUGED WITH BLOOD"!

Secondly. A distinguished member of the court martial that sentenced McCalla, was *un*challenged by him, in spite of the advice of counsel to challenge him for a previous bitter denunciation and expressed opinion of his guilt; and all, but one, of the court recommended McCalla to the clemency of President Harrison. One opposed.

Thirdly. The highest officers in the United States Navy supported this saving recommendation on the ground of B. H. McCalla's general ability, high character, and *previous exemplary national service* under delicate and difficult conditions.

Fourthly. President Harrison did ultimately remit "all the unexpired portion of the sentence"; and the extent of the effect of this remission, as to lost numbers during suspension, turns on the delicate question — whether, in the statute of 1878 touching change of rank, without the consent of the Senate (as an appointing, rather than as an ordinarily legislating, power) the word "*and*" should be construed "*or*"; while, in spite of the general rule of construction, "*and*" can not be construed "*or*" in the constitutional prohibitions in regard to "gold *and* silver" as legal tender. "*Inter arma*" *res adjudicata* may be silent?

Fifthly. The recognition of McCalla's equitable claim to restoration to normal rank, and of his ability to serve in his normal grade is evidenced by the gallant consent of juniors, whom his loss of numbers has advanced above him, to waive their privilege of "number."

Now, dear Governor, I would ask you, under all these circumstances, if his unflinching, untiring, brave, exemplary, daily service, as a commander of men, in labors that expose him to death every hour with the badge of degradation and "penalty" still shoulder-strapped to him, in spite of "remission," does not justify my own old-soldier prayer — that *now* — NOW — *before* he dies a hero's death in a lower grade than belongs to his yeoman-service in this war

where we feel the need of naval discipline, he may be totally relieved from dishonor under a penalty "remitted"?

Very truly and respectfully,
HORACE BINNEY SARGENT [2]

To Honorable
JOHN D. LONG, LL.D.
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETARY LONG TO FRANCIS D. MILLET

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
June 25, 1898

MY DEAR MR. MILLET:

I am in receipt of your letter of the twenty-third, advising me that you have accepted the position of special correspondent of the *London Times* and are on your way to Manila. Your kind offer to place your services at the disposal of the government is much appreciated, but there does not occur to me at this time any way in which you can be of use. I will be glad to bear your offer in mind, however, and should an opportunity arise where the department can make use of your services, I will be glad to call upon you.

Thanking you for your courtesy, and trusting that you may have a very interesting and successful trip, I am,

Very truly yours, with pleasant memories of old days,
JOHN D. LONG

MR. F. D. MILLET
Correspondent *London Times*
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

CAPTAIN WEEKS TO GOVERNOR WOLCOTT

Headquarters, Massachusetts Naval Brigade
Massachusetts Volunteer Militia
U. S. S. *Minnesota* [1]
BOSTON
June 25, 1898

SIR:

I am informed that Lieutenant Robert G. Peck, United States Navy,[2] at present commanding the U. S. S. *Lehigh*,[3] has been

[2] Horace Binney Sargent (1821–1908), Harvard College '43.

[1] An old steam frigate loaned to the state for the use of the naval militia.

[2] Robert Grosvenor Peck (b. 1849).

[3] A Civil War monitor stationed in Massachusetts Bay for harbor defence.

ordered to Washington to take his examination for promotion. The *Lehigh* is officered and manned by members of the Massachusetts naval brigade and Lieutenant Peck's success as a commander of these men has been so marked, that I believe it due him that the attention of the navy department be called to it. Lieutenant Peck was ordered to this command early in April, at which time the *Lehigh* was entirely without equipment and in a state of unpreparedness which would usually indicate a summer's work to overcome. The officers and men detailed to her, while of most excellent material and of more than ordinary intelligence, had had very little sea service or continued service on a man-of-war. In two months' time the monitor has been thoroughly equipped and put in condition for service and the officers and men so systematically shaken into their places, that I believe the ship and crew will compare favorably with ships of the navy manned by experienced men-of-warsmen. This could not have been accomplished without great industry, tact and judgment on the part of her commanding officer and it is of special interest to Massachusetts, as the excellent work done by Lieutenant Peck, who is a Massachusetts man himself, enables the founders and builders-up of the Massachusetts naval brigade to realize their ideal of the possibility of making a body of citizen sailors into trained men of great service to our navy in time of war within a reasonably short time. With less tact and judgment, this result might have been entirely different and I therefore feel that Lieutenant Peck has done the state and navy a distinct service, most creditable to himself, adding to his already high reputation as a versatile and accomplished officer.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JOHN W. WEEKS[4]
Captain Commanding

To His Excellency ROGER WOLCOTT
Governor of Massachusetts

[4] John Wingate Weeks (1860–1926), later U. S. senator from Massachusetts, and secretary of war in the administrations of Presidents Harding and Coolidge.

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
Boston
June 27, 1898

My dear Sir:

I beg to hand you enclosed and to commend to your favorable consideration a letter addressed to me by John W. Weeks,[1] captain commanding Massachusetts naval brigade, regarding the faithful and valuable service rendered to the commonwealth and to the United States government by Lieutenant Robert G. Peck, at present commanding the U. S. S. *Lehigh*. I am assured that in the difficult duty assigned him Lieutenant Peck has shown in a remarkable degree the qualities of devoted service and intelligence and tact, which would appear to qualify him for the promotion he seeks.

I have the honor to be with much respect,

Very truly yours,
Roger Wolcott

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

SECRETARY LONG TO B. J. KING

Navy Department
Washington
June 27, 1898

My dear Sir:

I am in receipt of your letter of the twenty-fourth instant, calling my attention to Mr. A. Perry Bliven, of Brooklyn, New York, who you state is a marine architect of unusual ability, and suggesting that the department might find his services of great value in connection with the designs for the battleships and torpedo boats recently authorized by Congress.

I have with pleasure forwarded your letter to the chief constructor of the navy for his consideration.

Thanking you for bringing the matter to my attention, I am,

Very truly yours,
John D. Long

Mr. B. J. King
New York City

[1] See preceding letter.

GOVERNOR WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
Boston
July 1, 1898

My dear Sir:

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of June 29, which will receive my careful consideration.

I wish that you might have been connected by telephone with Memorial Hall at about 4 p.m. on commencement day and have heard the great shout of hearty approval that went up from the great body of the alumni at the mention of the name of our present secretary of the navy. The sound, I am sure, would have been a cheering and bracing one.

With much respect, I am,

Very truly yours,
Roger Wolcott

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

SENATOR HALE TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
July 4, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have talked the matter of Hobson's promotion over with Senator Morgan,[1] and he agrees with me that your suggestion of putting him through the grade of ensign and through the grade of lieutenant junior grade, and fifty numbers in the lieutenant grade will be a very handsome recognition of his services.[2]

Mr. Morgan is very reasonable about it and suggests that if the thing should be over-done it would render Hobson's position uncomfortable in the line. He thinks also that Hobson has more of the

[1] John Tyler Morgan (1824–1907), U. S. senator from Alabama.

[2] Hobson was eventually made a captain in the construction corps, his commission being dated back to June 23, 1898. On the morning of June 3, Hobson had sunk the collier *Merrimac* in the entrance of Santiago Harbor with the purpose of blocking the channel.

constructive ability than any thing else, and that it is unfortunate that he must be taken from his peculiar field.

I think that if the President sends in the promotion to the extent you have indicated there will be no trouble about it except that some may take it as too much.

Yours very truly,
EUGENE HALE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

COLONEL HEYWOOD TO SECRETARY LONG

Headquarters United States Marine Corps
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 5, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Referring to your letter of the second instant, and our conversation of this morning, I respectfully request that, owing to the present demand upon the marine corps, ten more second lieutenants be appointed for service during the war, exclusive of those to be appointed from worthy noncommissioned officers of the corps. The following is a list of the six applicants who have passed the required examination, and I beg to call particular attention to Messrs. Faunt Le Roy and McGill as well qualified to perform the duties which will be required of them:

R. P. Faunt Le Roy [1]
Beverly C. Mosby [2]
J. F. McGill [3]
F. H. Delano [4]
C. A. Taussig [5]
J. C. Breckinridge [6]

With respect to the appointments to be made from noncommissioned officers, I have requested the commander-in-chief of the North Atlantic station to convene a board for the examination of the men who have applied. As soon as the report of the board is

[1] Robert P. Faunt Le Roy (d. 1904).
[2] Honorably discharged in 1898.
[3] John Fauntleroy McGill (1874–1929).
[4] Frederic Henry Delano (b. 1876).
[5] Charles A. Taussig, honorably discharged in 1899.
[6] James Carson Breckinridge (b. 1877).

received, I will forward the names of the men found qualified to the department, with the recommendation that they be appointed.

Very truly yours,
CHARLES HEYWOOD [7]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THOMAS W. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

No importance (except to the writer)
No naval business
No reply needed!

Glimpsewood
DUBLIN, NEW HAMPSHIRE
July 5, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

It was an act of friendliness beyond my deserts that you should turn from your vast cares to remember me and my academical degree! [1] Better than the degree itself have been the congratulations it has called forth, beginning with the roar of applause among the students.

In my speech at the dinner I did not say (as reported) that you could not manage a cat-boat, but that the nation called you to administer the navy without knowing whether you *could* do that thing. I cited it as an illustration of what the Tory Bodley [2] has just admitted in his book about France, that under a republic we see men called on to administer affairs for which they had no special antecedent training, and yet doing it well.

I also quoted what Sydney Smith said of Earl Russell that he would at any moment take charge of the channel fleet if called upon; but I added that you had taken charge of one which would need only half an hour to dispose of the whole channel fleet of those days.

Most cordially,
T. W. HIGGINSON

[7] Charles Heywood (1839–1915), colonel commandant, United States Marine Corps.

[1] LL.D., Western Reserve University.

[2] John Edward Courtney Bodley (b. 1853).

CAPTAIN COOPER TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Academy
Personal July 6, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

The order detaching me from duty at the academy has been received. I thank you very much for the kindly note in your hand writing on the face of the order. It will be possible for me to leave on the fifteenth [of] July and earlier if you desire.

If it will be agreeable to you I should like to be ordered to report for duty in connection with the *Chicago* upon leaving here. I could at least feel in touch with active duty, in some remote manner connected with the war from which the navy is gleaning a harvest of glory.

I hope McNair[1] will be in sympathy with the reconstruction plan, which is the result of several years' careful study, so that there may be no material changes.

Yours very sincerely,
P. H. COOPER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GREELY TO SECRETARY LONG

War Department
Confidential Office of Chief Signal Officer
WASHINGTON
July 6, 1898

SIR:

A dispatch from Captain Sawyer,[1] signal officer at Key West, received this morning contains the information that yesterday the Spanish steamer *Alfonso XII* was totally destroyed while attempting to run the blockade near Mariel. Also that the *Iroquois*[2] has arrived at Key West with three hundred wounded from the first day's fight.

Very respectfully,
A. W. GREELY

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

[1] Rear-Admiral Frederick Vallette McNair (1839–1900), Captain Cooper's successor as superintendent of the Naval Academy.

[1] Not identified.

[2] Chartered army transport.

JUDGE BARKER TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
July 6, 1898

MY DEAR FRIEND:

I write to ask you to use your influence to ensure the appointment, if there shall be a call for more men, of Morris Schaff [1] to a brigadier-generalship. He is eating his heart out with the desire to be back in his old profession, and reflection, thought, reading, and study have made him a stronger man than when he came back to civil life. He has conquered the respect of the men who meet him in his present official work and altogether he is a man to whom the President and the country can safely entrust the leadership and management of men as well as the honor of us all.

I write earnestly because I believe that true policy will require the putting under arms of vastly more of our men, before our relations with the rest of the world are again stable, and the placing over those men of our best officers.

Yours very sincerely,
JAMES M. BARKER [2]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

NATHAN APPLETON TO SECRETARY LONG

66 Beacon Street
Personal BOSTON
July 7, 1898

DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

I can not tell you how greatly I rejoice at the good news of the vote for Hawaii, for I was much afraid that it would be postponed until next session. Now we have our good little Yankee colony in the Pacific, and the splendid harbor that is there. Hurrah, I say, for the stars and stripes soon to be floating there! The enclosed article written a fortnight ago comes in now quite *à propos*.

Yours very truly,
NATHAN APPLETON

[1] Morris Schaff (1840–1929), retired officer of the regular army.
[2] James Madison Barker (1839–1905), Williams '62, associate justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court.

JAMES DE NORMANDIE TO SECRETARY LONG

First Church, Roxbury
Boston
July 8, 1898

Dear Secretary Long:

With a word of heartfelt congratulations to you for the splendid successes crowning your plans and your associates, let me add a word about peace. I know how you strove to preserve it and I know how you must desire to establish it — but I earnestly trust that for an enduring peace, and for the cause of humanity, the continued power of Spain to rule so cruelly her colonies, will be all taken away. It is the old struggle of Israel against the cruel tribes around — and if we are to be a peculiar people, let us do well the work, from which we shrank — but which we seem providentially forced to undertake. "The goodness and the severity of God."

I know what questions of tremendous importance must be thrust upon us afterwards — but I have confidence we shall have wisdom to meet them.

Mrs. Stedman tells me as an old acquaintance she has written you about sending her son to the Naval Academy — but I think you can not look after this — and I will do what I can for her. May strength and health, and guidance be yours.

Ever most truly yours,
James De Normandie

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *St. Louis*
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
July 10, 1898

Personal

My dear Mr. Long:

By careful husbanding of our fuel I have been able to make a cruise of six weeks from the day of leaving New York until my arrival here. During that time the ship has been very useful, as Admiral Sampson was good enough to say to me. What with cutting cables, blockading off Cape Cruz, taking prizes, landing the army and bringing home the captives, she has certainly not been idle. It is pleasant to think that she has been able to cut no less than three foreign cables leading to Cuba — while the army boat *Adria*,[1] a steamer completely equipped for the purpose, only cut

[1] A Danish cable-vessel chartered by the army.

the one which I had already cut three weeks before. The newspapers give the credit to General Greely [2] and his "able assistants in Cuban waters" but as a matter of fact the *St. Louis* did the work. For instance, in one night she found and cut a second Jamaica cable which the *Adria* had grappled for in vain for days.

I am a bit apprehensive that totally unnecessary changes are contemplated in this ship which will be costly in the first instance and much more costly when she comes to be refitted for the transatlantic trade. As things are, the *St. Louis* could be handed back to her owners on a Monday – be coaled and provisioned Tuesday and sail on her regular trip Wednesday. A few hundred dollars would pay for the damage done to the upper rail where it was removed to make way for her battery; and a few hundred more for overhauling and repairing her boats which suffered somewhat in landing the army – a couple of hundred more for miscellaneous items and there you have practically the whole bill. Yet no one can say that the *St. Louis* has not done well.

With a couple of larger guns and no more men I am ready to join the fleet going abroad – or return to Sampson. I can do the work on board. For this there is no necessity of sending the *St. Louis* to Cramp's or indeed any navy yard. The war is drawing to a close, and I am anxious to see the end from the deck of my ship while cruising – and not at a dockyard undergoing alterations.

If it must be, give me at most, four six-inch guns: one forward, one aft and one on each side, with twenty more marines to man them and please send me not *another soul*. We are all as happy as clams on board and we only ask to be let alone. I have never commanded a more harmonious ship. I hear we are to have a paymaster. Please countermand his orders; I have no need of him at all. The officers' accounts are taken up at some office or other on shore and those of the marines can be similarly dealt with. The business of the ship and her crew is done by the American Line purser in a business way. A paymaster is superfluous; were one sent to replace the purser dire confusion would result.

It is but right to commission the officers (yet unexamined by the way), but it would be a great mistake, in my judgment, to enlist the crew. They are content with their present status and compensation. Why alter an arrangement which has served its purpose well?

I have diligently sought these four things, harmony, efficiency,

[2] A. W. Greely, chief signal officer, U. S. A.

usefulness, and economy. I am happy to be able to think I have succeeded in all. When the *St. Louis* goes back to the American Line, her crew and her staff will be justly proud of the part she played in the war.

Admiral Sampson told me that, in recognition of my services, he had purposed giving me command of the *Cristobal Colon* – the least injured of the vessels of Cervera's [3] fleet – but she proved to be too badly aground to get off speedily. I can't express my disappointment. I hope you will see your way clear to giving me an armored ship now – one that is to go to Spain. The heroes of the third of July can well afford to give others a chance. Some of them need a change of air although they won't say so – Evans [4] among the number; he would flay me alive if he heard me say so, but it's true. But any *fighting* ship that is to take part in the last act of the drama will do. I have worked faithfully and well – as Sampson will tell you – with the *tools* at hand – now put a *weapon* into them, I pray you.

I wish the army appreciated the excellent work done for it by the navy, but our sister branch of the service is a spoiled child and takes every exertion on our part as a matter of course. From its point of view the navy is but a handmaid to the army. Some of the things done lately have not been calculated to soothe the nautical temper. Especially is it hard for us to put up with an irritating assumption of superiority. Of its only maritime enterprise – the moving of the troops from Tampa to Daiquirí [5] – it is well not to speak. Some day a grave scandal will probably be unearthed. After getting the troops there the army was as helpless as a babe until the navy stepped in and landed them. Had the army frankly said, "This is a matter appertaining to ships – let the navy manage it" the case would have been different – but it assumed the task gaily. The coming accountability will be heavy. Then too, with lots of heavy transports lying idle off Siboney and Daiquirí – it must needs call on the navy for its big liners to bring more troops from home. I hear that even this noble vessel was to have had its share of this disagreeable, dirty, and thankless task. I can't tell you how glad I am to have escaped it. Had it been a real national exigency no

[3] Admiral Pascual de Cervera y Topeto (1833–1909), whose fleet was defeated and driven ashore in the naval battle of Santiago, July 3, 1898.

[4] Captain R. D. Evans, of the *Iowa*.

[5] See Captain Chadwick's letter of June 10, note.

one would have responded to the call more promptly or cheerfully than I, but knowing, as I did, the army's wealth in transports that are doing nothing but burn up their coal in port it was impossible to take interest or pleasure in the prospect. Every such employment will entail a large expenditure in refitting these vessels at the end of the war – something I have up to the present time been able to avoid.

It will be just like the army to want the *St. Louis* and her sister ships to bring north any prisoners whom General Shafter [6] may have taken. Of course this would not be an emergency and therefore would not be permitted. I found in my intercourse with army officers that a most courteous "no" always worked well. It achieved its immediate purpose and was of educational value as well. They need lots of the same kind.

We have no news from our prize the *Twickenham*.[7] If the court should decide to acquit the ship – a very dangerous precedent will be established under shadow of which neutrals can serve a belligerent – practically with impunity. Should such an unfortunate decision be reached, I know Admiral Sampson will be glad to have the government appeal the case. A very important principle is at stake.

Recurring to the personal matter of giving me a fighting ship, I hear that Captain Philip who is on the eve of promotion is quite ready to give up the *Texas* now that he has had his fight and done so well.

Was I not right about Sampson? and is not his fight the most complete victory on record?

Pardon the length of this letter and believe me

Very sincerely and respectfully,

C. F. Goodrich

SECRETARY LONG TO SENATOR LODGE

Navy Department
Washington
July 11, 1898

Dear Lodge:

Of course Weeks can't be made a lieutenant-commander, and the Massachusetts people ought to understand that. Any commission in the navy makes it possible that an officer may be ordered

[6] Major-General William Rufus Shafter (1835–1906), commanding the army investing Santiago, which surrendered on July 17.

[7] A British collier with coal for the Spanish squadron.

anywhere. Just think for a moment of sending Weeks, who I think served only a year or two as a midshipman and then resigned and went into civil life, as a lieutenant-commander on a ship, superior in rank to his classmates and men who have been serving for years and years.

There have been only three lieutenant-commanders appointed, and their classmates are commanders or captains.

The best I can do for Weeks, and he has been so informed, is to date his commission back to the breaking out of the war, April 25, so that he will take precedence over other naval reserve men.[1]

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

Honorable H. C. Lodge
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN GOODRICH TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

U. S. S. *St. Louis*
July 13, 1898

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

Is it not possible to attach me to the squadron going to Spain? I would rather go in this ship there than have a battleship elsewhere.

As to that *Herald* man whose presence seems to have raised such a fuss. I forbade his speaking with Admiral Cervera, and I have every reason to believe that he never exchanged a word with a single Spaniard during the trip. I foresaw the difficulty and provided against it. On board the *St. Louis* he ceased to be a newspaper man according to my best knowledge and belief.

Sincerely yours,
C. F. GOODRICH

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
BOSTON
July 15, 1898

DEAR LONG:

Events follow each other now so rapidly, developing gravely momentous questions, that it may be useful to indicate to you at

[1] The commission of Lieutenant John W. Weeks was dated April 23, 1898.

once some of the points discussed in the paper I am preparing for the September *Atlantic*.

I. That "commercial relations," the ordinary relations of intercourse between nations, are based upon mutual concessions deemed necessary and therefore adopted by custom. Hence the names "necessary law of nations," "customary law of nations," are given to this unwritten code of rules and principles called international law, — the basis of which is *precedent*.

II. That "political relations" are based upon the "policy" adopted from time to time by the national government to promote or protect the great permanent interests of the nation. This fixing of a "*policy*" is an act of sovereignty, with which other nations can not meddle without becoming "unfriendly"; and it depends upon circumstances what principles should be adopted, of whose importance the nation itself is the sole judge; and as circumstances change, the policy may be changed in principle or in its application.

Hence the political relations and the political policy of a nation are not controlled by precedent, nor by the policy or customs of other nations, and consequently rest upon an entirely different foundation than that of the "commercial relations." Whence it follows that the political relations and policy of a nation are not subject to the fixed rules of international law.

Examples

A. European intervention to emancipate Greece from Turkish tyranny is aptly called by Sir William Vernon Harcourt "An act of high policy above and beyond the domain of law."

B. In like manner, United States intervention in Cuba to put an end to Spanish tyranny is "An act of high policy above and beyond the domain of law."

Corollary — Hence also the results of the present war are the results of an act of high policy, which — as an act of sovereignty on our part — can not be submitted to foreign judgment or dictation; and any attempt to force us to do so, is unwarrantable insolence, to be promptly and sternly answered by our government. The reported German interference at Manila (*Irene* incident) [1] seems to be

[1] "Aguinaldo was prevented from completing his conquest of Subig Bay by the German cruiser *Irene* [one of Rear-Admiral von Diederich's squadron], which took Isla Grande under her protection. The *Raleigh* and *Concord* were at once

an act of insolence which needs prompt correction by us and apology from Germany; if refused, it may well be represented to the German government as intolerable, warranting us in proclaiming non-intercourse and taking such other steps as may be called for as the incident develops, — even by the sinking of any German warships found in our sphere of naval operations, after being warned to leave. Really it is the act of a bully, who seeks by blackmail and bluster to attain ends he dares not yet to demand openly. The bully, foot-pad and blackmailer usually back down before a man who knows his rights and promptly defends them.

III. The foreign policy of the United States, as formulated in the "Farewell Address," the Monroe message and subsequent applications of the same, — is limited exclusively to our intervention in European politics and European intervention in American politics.

It was based upon our determination not to be drawn into the questions raised by the balance of power in Europe, nor to allow Europe to introduce questions of European balance of power into America. Its prime object of attack was the Holy Alliance, which has been succeeded by the doctrines of the primacy of the great powers and the concert of Europe.

Therefore, whether the dominant factor of European politics be the balance of power or the succeeding schemes for European *dynastic* control, it is as utterly apart from the interest and policy of the United States, as are the structure and conditions of life on the planet Mars.

Hence our foreign policy outside of America and Europe — whether in the Pacific, eastern Asia or southern Africa — has no connection with, nor can it in any way affect, our Monroe Doctrine for good or for evil.

IV. Our policy towards the East Indian or West Indian Colonies of Spain, like our policy towards Hawaii, is utterly distinct from our Monroe policy and, therefore, apprehensions as to the effect of such expansion upon our Monroe Doctrine are groundless.

V. In war, victory means an increase of responsibilities. If we destroy an army or conquer a province, we not only break down the enemy's prestige and power, but we assume the former re-

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sent to that point. The *Irene* hastily retired and the Spaniards surrendered to the American ships." Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 111–113. Emilio Aguinaldo (b. 1870), Filipino insurgent.

sponsibility of the expelled government for the protection of peace and order.

Corollary: If, instead of assuming the government of the conquered district or dependency, we should merely content ourselves with taking a coaling station, leaving the district without orderly government, we should become responsible to God and man for the anarchy that ensues. If we should, after taking what we wanted, sell or otherwise divide the rest of the conquered dependency, we would act the part of a highway robber dividing the spoils with other robbers.

VI. The disposition of the conquered territory is as much an act of sovereignty as the act of making war: consequently no foreign power, or group of powers, can justly step in between the victor and the vanquished in fixing terms of peace. But if, instead of their seeking easy terms of peace for the victor, such intervention is for the purpose of sharing the spoils of war, their intervention is an insolence justifying summary and extreme measures of repression. A nation like ours, thus insulted, would become a solid unit to avenge the insult and punish the highway bully to the utmost extent.

I expect to finish my paper for the *Atlantic* before the middle of next week and will send you an advance copy. This brief outline will be supplemented, – I think tomorrow, so that you can have it for Sunday reading, – by a more complete paper; and I hope you will send me criticisms and suggestions with a view to perfecting the paper as published. Meanwhile you can rely on my assurance that these six points will be thoroughly established by my paper.

Yours truly,

HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETARY LONG TO HENRY T. SCOTT

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
July 21, 1898

SIR:

It becomes my pleasant duty to extend to the shipbuilding firm of which you are president the congratulations of the navy department upon the admirable qualities which have been displayed by

the United States battleship *Oregon*. Without going into details with which, it may be safely assumed, you are as well acquainted as the department, it is sufficient to say that the performance of this vessel in making, under circumstances of grave exigence, the voyage from San Francisco, California, to Key West, Florida, without delay or accident of any kind, is of itself highly creditable to her builders; but the fact that after having successfully accomplished such a voyage the vessel was found to be ready at once, without repairs or attention, to enter into the activities of an important naval campaign, renders her achievement most memorable, as one which challenges the admiration of naval experts throughout the world and becomes a subject of especial gratitude and pride on the part of our own people. The *Oregon* is, in all of her complicated parts, of American design, materials, and workmanship, and she has shown herself to possess the highest qualities sought to be attained in a great battleship, — a wide practical radius of efficient action and splendid fighting capabilities. Since these results are not achieved by accident, but reveal high technical ability as well as thoroughness and honest fidelity in the countless details of construction, I have considered it proper to address to you this expression of the appreciation of the department of the manner in which you fulfilled your contract in building the United States battleship *Oregon*.

Very respectfully,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

MR. HENRY T. SCOTT [1]
President of the Union Iron Works
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

REAR-ADMIRAL SICARD TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
Office of Naval War Board
WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 21, 1898

SIR:

In pursuance of the terms of your memorandum of the twentieth instant, the board begs leave to make the following reply:

Ceuta

The board considers it inexpedient to attack Ceuta. It is believed to have been reinforced lately, and heavy modern guns mounted on

[1] Henry Tiffany Scott (1846–1927).

the defences. Furthermore, its possession would not entail any advantage at all adequate to the expense of its reduction and maintenance. By reason of Gibraltar, and of its fleet, England dominates the Straits of Gibraltar, which, in any case, would be controlled by the most powerful navy, and in that sense we control it now as regards Spain.

Canary Islands

The Canary Islands occupy towards our possessions the same relative position as did the Cape Verdes lately — that is, a hostile fleet at the Canaries menaces in about an equal degree, our ports, from Boston to the southward, and our new possessions in the West Indies to a somewhat greater degree. Nevertheless, as long as these islands remain in the possession of Spain, they do not seriously threaten us; they are reported to have been lately considerably reinforced, both by troops and heavy modern sea-coast guns, and therefore their reduction would require a considerable fleet and army, and would probably consume a considerable time, without apparent compensating advantage. The islands are understood to be about self-supporting, as regards food, and therefore their reduction by blockade alone would consume much time, and probably many ships, which we could now very illy spare.

It is therefore suggested that as long as they are in Spain's possession, we do not attack them. The board deprecates the further dispersal of our efforts, as we are already engaged at Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines.

American Liners

The board would much prefer to retain all four of the American liners for regular naval use, as they have been very useful already and would be especially so in case of any movement that would take our fleet across the ocean; nevertheless it is thought that two of them might be spared temporarily as troop ships, under the following conditions: The ships to belong to the navy department and to retain their organization as men-of-war, being lent to the war department for the express purpose of transporting troops, but to be subject to withdrawal, for naval use, on one week's notice.

The above arrangement would of course be subject to the conditions of the ships' charters, which, it is thought, provide for strictly naval use only. In view of this, it is doubtful whether they

could be turned over to the absolute control of the war department; neither is it certain that they could be used as transports without infraction of the spirit of the charters.

Respectfully,
M. SICARD
President

The Honorable
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SECRETARY LONG TO HENRY J. WRIGHT

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
July 28, 1898

DEAR SIR:

You are in error in your supposition that any discrimination was intended against the evening papers in the publication of Admiral Sampson's report of the battle of July 3. Instead of being withheld from the evening papers it was given out for publication in both the morning and evening papers of Wednesday.

When news comes of a battle, or of any other event, it is given out immediately, as was the case with the news of the victory of July 3. But the formal reports, which afterwards follow, and which are of great length, are more like other reports: for instance, the annual report of the navy department. When, therefore, Admiral Sampson's report came in, accompanied by that of Commodore Schley, and of the captains of vessels engaged, it made a great amount of matter. The only object of the department was to be entirely fair to the public and to give it this information at the earliest moment and to the widest extent, in the usual way. As you can well understand, every newspaper was after it. A time was fixed at which it might be published. This was fixed for the morning and afternoon of Wednesday, or two days ahead, in order that the remoter papers of the country might, as far as practicable, and without too much delay, publish it in full at the same time with the East. Had these voluminous reports been given out as soon as received, nothing but a mere telegraphic synopsis could have been published in the afternoon papers. The result would have been that the public would not have had that clear, full, comprehensive knowledge of the matter which they desire and which, under the circumstances, it is very important they should have. By "under the cir-

cumstances" I refer to the great interest which, in some cases, has developed into discussion, with reference to the merits of the naval officers connected with the battle.

The department has from the first felt assured that no friction existed and that when the facts were fully made known by official report the public would be satisfied that every officer had done his duty fully, and all were entitled to the credit due to them for the full discharge of the duties attaching to their several official positions. The department was, therefore, very desirous that when these reports were published they should be published in full, and that the newspapers of both Wednesday morning and afternoon should have ample time to get not only the reports, but the orders under which the battle was fought.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG

MR. H. J. WRIGHT [1]
Editor of the *Commercial Advertiser*
29 Park Row
NEW YORK CITY

MOORFIELD STOREY TO SECRETARY LONG

735 Exchange Building
BOSTON
July 28, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I see in the newspapers that the President is inclined to make the surrender of Porto Rico to us a condition of peace, and that he thinks this is desired by the country. I do not assume that this report is correct, and if it is not, my letter need not trouble you.

If however there is any truth in this report, and if it means that by treaty between our country and Spain, Porto Rico is to be surrendered to us without consulting its inhabitants, I feel that this is a thing so absolutely inconsistent with the principles on which our government rests that I can not refrain from stating my reasons for your consideration.

I think the precedents between European or Asiatic nations are not to be considered. Their systems of government rest on the divine right of kings and other political theories which we repudiated in 1776 and which we have been denouncing ever since.

[1] Henry John Wright (b. 1866).

Our government is a government "of the people by the people and for the people." It rests on the two propositions that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," and that "taxation without representation is tyranny." These are constitutional principles which limit the powers of every officer of the government, executive or legislative. They all take their authority on trust not to disregard them, and while war and its attendant excitement may create a clamor among the unthinking, it is the duty of those in power to remember these terms of their trust and withstand the public pressure.

Applying these principles to Porto Rico, we have there an island whose people seem always to have been contented with their government. Upon our theory they are oppressed, but if so they do not seem to have discovered it. It is a well established, ancient, civilized community whose population is larger than that of some of our states and more intelligent than the majority of mankind. If now we go with fire and sword, attack their cities, and subvert their government and then by right of conquest impose our government upon them without their consent, how can such a proceeding be reconciled with the fundamental principles of our government! How can it be distinguished from any ordinary conquest by king or emperor applying the good old rule that "might makes right"? The power of the United States was never confided to the government for purposes of foreign conquest, and I am sure that only disaster can follow if they are so used. I do not know how we can longer read the Declaration of Independence or assert the great principles of free government, when we show that at the least temptation we disregard them.

Again, at the outbreak of the war the President informed the assembled ambassadors of Europe that we proposed only "an unselfish endeavor to fulfil a duty to humanity by ending" the situation in Cuba.

Congress reasserting the principles, and even the words of the Declaration of Independence, asserted that Cuba "is and of right ought to be free and independent." In the same resolutions any intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over Cuba was expressly disclaimed. Do these words, these solemn promises, mean nothing? To say that we meant only Cuba and no other territory of Spain is to construe a great public declaration as if it were

a criminal indictment. It is to put this country in the position of deliberately trying to deceive. It is impossible *in fore conscientiæ.*

To say that circumstances have changed is absurd. Nothing has occurred that was not clearly to be expected, when war was declared. Resistance was certainly probable, victory we felt was sure. Porto Rico was plain on the map and nothing in its condition or circumstances has changed since.

The lawyer does not live who can explain why Cuba ought to be free and independent and Porto Rico deprived of independence. If we meant to take Porto Rico then, and purposely limited our disclaimer to Cuba, we were not proposing "an unselfish endeavor to fulfil a duty to humanity," but a selfish war of conquest, and our declarations will not stand the sober verdict of history.

Lastly, to say that we take Porto Rico in lieu of indemnity is the least defensible position of all.

Porto Rico means a large body of men, who have never attacked us or injured us in any way. According to our professions they are oppressed, and it is to relieve them and their neighbors from oppression that we are fighting. We say that Spain is wrongfully there, has no right to govern or control them and therefore is to be expelled. Grant that we in a case like this can afford to exact indemnity, which I deny, who owes it to us? Clearly Spain, our enemy, whom we are fighting to drive away. Clearly not her oppressed subjects whom we are fighting to free. If now we take Porto Rico as our own, not by the will of its citizens but by grant from Spain, we are taking title from Spain that has no right to govern, and *a fortiori* no right to sell Porto Rico, and we are taking the liberties of the unhappy citizens of that island in payment of a debt which they do not owe and from a country which has no right to dispose of them. One oppressor succeeds another, and the people whose liberties we rise to defend are not consulted by either. Can this country stand in such a position?

In conclusion, if we take a *plebiscite* and bring Porto Rico in by the consent of its people, they have a right to representation. Porto Rico is not an Alaska, but such a community as I have described. The island must come in as a state, and to the load which we now carry will be added the danger which must come from such additions as they will send to our Congress. They will help to govern us, and against such government I pray to be delivered.

I believe I express the opinions of most thinking men in New England. Certainly those whom I meet of all classes share these views. My strong interest in the subject must be my excuse for troubling you.

Yours very truly,
MOORFIELD STOREY

To the
Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

July 28, [1898]

DEAR MR. LONG:

I venture to put my oar in again, because I think I have an idea which will scarcely occur to any one else. I assume that the published news of Spain asking our terms of peace is true. It is not improbable that she will ask an armistice, which I trust will not be granted; but whether she asks or not, the agitation of the question of peace puts a new view upon our proposed expedition to the Straits of Gibraltar, *etc.* It is said that the expected approach of Watson's [1] squadron stirred up the war spirit; and a recent confidential despatch of our secret service at Madrid, through our attaché [2] at Paris, said (I quote from memory) that the postponement of Watson's sailing strengthened Sagasta's hands — *i.e.* for peace. Now what I have to suggest is this: While a *general* armistice could work us nothing but injury and expense, *local* armistices are not uncommon. Whether Spain ask an armistice or not, it would be open to us to say that we had a large expedition just ready to start for the coast of Spain, but, understanding that the effect of such a step upon the susceptibilities of the Spanish people would be unfavorable to the attainment of peace (which we most heartily desire), we will consent to postpone the sailing of the fleet for a reasonable space to permit the conclusion of negotiations, and will accept an armistice for the European possessions of Spain, including her European trade and the Canaries; *provided*, that Spain on her part engages not to molest our two battleships and our cruiser and colliers, which were to have gone to the East under cover of the operations, nor to object to their coaling (from their own colliers?)

[1] Rear-Admiral John Crittenden Watson (1842–1923).

[2] Lieutenant William Sowden Sims (1858–1936). In the World War he commanded the U. S. naval forces in European waters, with the rank of admiral.

in neutral Mediterranean ports. I should insist that those ships must go forward without delay, because we must increase our force in the Pacific; and that unless they accept this condition the fleet will sail as first proposed.

It is evident this step would relieve us from an onerous undertaking, and it seems to me also evident that it will tend to facilitate peace. We *should* undertake that the two ships would not appear in sight of the coast of Spain except as unavoidable in passing through the straits.

Very respectfully,
A. T. MAHAN

[Endorsement]
Dear Mr. Long: There are some good suggestions in the foregoing. Think of them. W. McK.
July 28, 1898

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department, Office of the Secretary
WASHINGTON
July 29, [1898]

DEAR MR. LONG:

Not to trouble you with an interview, may I add to yesterday's letter, that if any such advance come from our side, it should not be till as nearly as possible when our expedition is ready to start; and if from theirs, that the reply from us should be delayed as far as propriety admits for a similar time; and that they should not be allowed over forty-eight hours for a reply, yes or no; in the latter event we to start at once.

What I mean is, that the risk of our move, which against a valid enemy would be appreciable, should be minimized by giving the enemy the least possible time to *prepare his mind* what to do against our coming.

Very respectfully,
A. T. MAHAN

BENJAMIN F. STEVENS TO SECRETARY LONG

Post Office Square
BOSTON
July 29, 1898

DEAR SIR:

It is now more than half a century since I returned to the United States from a cruise around the world in the United States frigate

Constitution ("Old Ironsides"), which was begun in 1844 and completed in 1846, during which period the ship sailed fifty-four thousand miles and visited, besides China and Cochin China, the most important islands of the Indian Archipelago, with which our government was on terms of amity, such as Sumatra, Java, *etc.*

At that time Honorable David Henshaw [1] was secretary of the navy, and Captain John Percival [2] was appointed to command the *Constitution*, which sailed under a roving commission, that is to say, she was not attached to any squadron, the understanding being that there should be no interference with her sailing orders unless in case of actual necessity. I was clerk to the captain and messed with him in the cabin. My duties were to write all his correspondence, keep his daily journal, write his orders and perform all the ordinary duties he required of me.

The ship sailed under sealed orders. In addition to other matters we were required in the course of the cruise to proceed to the island of Borneo and examine into the resources of the island of Labuan, which lies a few miles from the coast of Borneo, and if satisfied of its coal-bearing quality, purchase it of the Sultan of Borneo.

A reference to the sailing orders of the *Constitution* will show the exact language of this purchasing order.

The British government at that time had through Rajah Sir James Brooke [3] possession of a portion of the coast of Borneo and was engaged in checking or endeavoring to put a stop to piracy upon that coast. Rajah Brooke's occupation of the coast was the means of doing away with this dreadful evil.

In the entire cruise of twenty-seven months or more, we saw only two steamers from the time we left the United States until we returned. If steamers were to take the place of sailing ships, there must be coaling stations. Both England and the United States happened to strike upon the same island — Labuan — for that purpose. I wish to prove to you that more than half a century ago, our government sent out to the Indian Archipelago one of its ships for the purpose of buying an island to be used for a coaling station. *Labuan is now one of England's coaling stations.*

I refer you to *The Indian Archipelago*, a book published in Lon-

[1] David Henshaw (1791–1852).
[2] John Percival (1779–1862).
[3] Sir James Brooke, Rájá of Saráwak (1803–1868).

don in 1853, which gives a history of Rajah Brooke's government of that portion of the coast of Borneo, ceded to him by the Sultan of that country for the purpose of putting a stop to piracy and which he placed under the protectorate of Great Britain, where it has ever since been.

Speaking of the operations of Rajah Brooke, *The Indian Archipelago* says: "meanwhile the American frigate *Constitution* came into the river, offering a treaty to the Sultan, engaging to protect the Borneo government on condition of a monopoly of coal and permission to trade. A short time would probably have lost the opportunity of securing an influence."

So that one object of the United States government in sending the *Constitution* to the Indian Archipelago was to secure a coaling station.

I have called your attention to the fact because if a half century ago it was the policy of the government to obtain a coaling station in the vicinity of the Philippines, how much more necessary it is that one should be provided at the present day. Many are unaware that the *Constitution* sailed in 1844 under a Democratic administration (John Tyler, who changed his political faith) to secure an island of coal. I think few politicians remember the fact. I think I recall it in good time; it may be useful for you in dealing with political foes who declare that it is against the policy of the United States to hold foreign territory, forgetting how much of our country is the result of purchase.

Very respectfully yours,
BENJAMIN F. STEVENS [4]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GEORGE W. STONE TO SECRETARY LONG

25 Beacon Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
July 29, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

It looks as if this was the time for those who desired to say anything about terms for peace to speak. I do want to say a few words,

[4] Benjamin Franklin Stevens (1824–1908), president of the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company.

if you will bear with me. I presume most men speak from their own point of view, and consciously or unconsciously from the interests they represent. I will not deny that this [is] my own case. I will not *argue*, but *state* my points.

First. The Spanish colonies are now in our hands. Our flag consecrates and dedicates the land over which it floats, to civil and religious liberty *for ever*. Whatever may be our wishes, we can not haul down that flag until *civil* and *religious liberty* is [*sic*] secure for all time in those islands, without being false to our trust.

Second. The work to be done in these colonies is chiefly one of civilization and religion.

Third. We *can* govern these colonies — *as colonies*. We inherit the genius for government from our English ancestors. We are not handicapped as our English friends are by an established church. The dominant religion of this people is to-day so interwoven and intermixed with daily life — so much a part of our *civilization* that it is impossible to spread either without the other.

We are rich and prosperous, we are graduating thousands of splendid young fellows each year who are able to go into this work with every advantage and every prospect of success. Your recent experiences in receiving applications for service from this class must have been a revelation to you. With this splendid force we can raise the standard of manhood and intelligence in those islands quicker than any other nation on the face of the globe. Everything good grows in the soil of *liberty*.

Fourth. We need to do the work, for our own sake. We need to lose some of our national self-consciousness. We need the experiences it will give us.

Capital needs employment as well as labor, and here is its opportunity: if it is being profitably employed in these islands, there is no danger that it will oppress us in our own homes. It will go very far towards solving the tough problem we call "*labor* and *capital*."

This is a great nation and it can only be healthy and happy when it is loaded heavily with great undertakings.

Fifth. It is our *missionary opportunity*. I am so deeply impressed with this that I firmly believe that a power greater than human has chosen us to do this work. I believe we have no right to consult our *wishes* in this matter. If we do, why should we not burn our Bibles and close our churches? If our religion is not equal to *this*

emergency, if our Christianity is represented by the priest and the Levite, who passed by on the other side, then it is not worth even *professing*.

Sixth. I believe it will result in great benefit to our civil service. It will mingle that service so thoroughly with the highest human interests that all the moral and religious forces in the nation will be enlisted to support and sustain the executive in his determination to do exactly right. It will mix politics and religion in the only way they can ever be safely mixed, by making it impossible for any party to sustain itself that did not furnish good men to do its work.

This is all I will trouble you with. I feel it to be my duty to say this much. I hope we will keep every inch of territory our gallant sailors and soldiers have taken for us. When the peoples and tribes inhabiting these islands shall become fit for self government, and are able to furnish sure guarantees they can and will perpetuate civil and religious liberty throughout their borders, then I think we should set them up in business and give them our blessing. I hope you will see your way clear to use your great influence to this end.

I am saying this first, because I am an American citizen – a partner in the concern – and again because I am your friend and admirer.

GEORGE W. STONE[1]

A nation is bound to do good when it has the opportunity as much as an individual. Henry Winter Davis[2] once said on the floor of the United States Senate, and I hope somebody will repeat it when the Senate discusses this treaty of peace, "*God never forgives wasted opportunities.*"

THOMAS H. TALBOT TO SECRETARY LONG

BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS
July 31, 1898

DEAR GOVERNOR AND SECRETARY:

It is a tough problem that you rulers are trying to solve: the question of extending our sovereignty half-way round the globe, into the alien seas of farther Asia.

The logic of events, however, has guidance for you:

[1] Reverend George Whitfield Stone (1840–1923).

[2] Henry Winter Davis (1817–1865), M. C. – not senator – from Maryland.

True it is, that before the outbreak of this war Spanish misgovernment of the Philippines was no concern of ours: gave us no right to interpose in the affairs of those islands; and the blow which we have struck at them, and by means of which we now hold them, — if at all, — had its justification, purely in reasons of war.

But that is not the influential fact to-day. The heavy blow we struck has connected the Philippines with ourselves. We have taken hold of them: the Lord has delivered them into our hands; and with the aid of their insurgent people, with whom we have entered into common action and practical military alliance. If those islands now go back under the misgovernment of Spain, they will go by our consent and our action. And our action does concern us: raises responsibility in us.

Such restoration of those islands with their millions of inhabitants to the misgovernment of Spain, it seems to me, will be little more consistent with our duty in the premises, than would have been, in the war of the Rebellion, the sending back into slavery of the negroes who came into our lines, and even those who fought as soldiers under our flag.

But, most likely, there is little that is new to you in this view, and I write it mainly for the purpose of expressing my concurrence with others who may have urged it upon you. There comes a consideration, however, not so much worn.

Really and substantially, can there be any such thing as a restoration of those islands to Spain; that is, " for keeps," as children say?

Why not, you ask. And I answer: because of Spain's inability to hold them. That inability disclosed by the war as an inability against us, is equally an inability against several continental powers of Europe, certainly, France, Russia and Germany; and if our country does not hold them by her own strong right hand, you have a good chance of seeing them seized by the rapacity of one or more of those powers.

And it is not in the interest of humanity: it is not for the cause of righteousness, or the advance of civilization, that those islands should pass entire[ly] into the control of either of those powers: still less that they should be partitioned between the three or between either pair of them.

The newspapers, so far as I know, have not undertaken to state the position of any member of the Cabinet upon the momentous questions in which the President has been taking their counsel in these last few days. But it rejoices me to hope that you are one of

his advisers who understand the bigness of the time, and who have done much towards holding him back from a surrender which would breed in us, with the passage of years, endless regret and mortification.

I make no display of the advantages that can come to us from the good government of those islands as a part of the United States, because I have no time to treat that matter. I urge the duty of the hour only: a duty not wholly agreeable in all its future aspects: not ministering to our love of ease: not indulgent to our inclination to shirk responsibility. Nevertheless a duty: one which we can perform better than any other nation of the globe, and which has fallen upon us in the twinkling of an eye.

Heartily exulting in all the glory which the department under you has achieved since I last wrote you,

I am yours truly,
THOMAS H. TALBOT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

FREDERICK C. SHATTUCK TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
August 1, [1898]

DEAR GOVERNOR:

Thank you very much for your kind and prompt answer to my letter in behalf of Mrs. Lewis's desire to get her boy into the Naval Academy. I did not mean to give you the trouble of an answer — for I can imagine the demands upon your time and thought. I venture again to write you — this time in reference to my own views in regard to the Philippines and my estimate of the trend of opinion among those whom I meet.

I read that Mr. McKinley wishes to know the sentiment of the citizens. I am an "imperialist" if the feeling that we must accept the consequences of our own acts and fall in line with world evolution is imperialism.

We have interfered in the Philippines. Can we give them back to Spain and her medieval rule? Can we trust any promises of reform which she should make as a condition of retention of power? Even if we did turn them back could Spain, without a fleet and bankrupt as she is, hold them? To my mind "no" is the only answer which can be given to these questions. If we take a part, say Luzon or a portion of it, what will be the result? The rest will revolt from Spain and we shall either have to take it later or see it pass into the

hands of continental powers, with or without the full consent of Spain. Then there would be opportunities for friction and the seeds of future trouble will be sown – almost sure to bear bitter fruit sooner or later. I should have preferred that the question of the Philippines were not forced on us. But it is, and I can see no way but to manfully meet our responsibilities and, with a broad view into the future, take the whole thing and do our best. So much for my personal position.

It is my belief that people in this section are coming round to this view. In the abstract they say, "We don't want and mustn't take the Philippines." But when you ask, "What are you going to do with them then?" and push them home, they are at a loss what to say. These are the conservative, highly educated people. I believe that the "plain people" as Mr. Lincoln called them, are less timid, less analytical, and more heartily in favor of the retention of the whole group of islands. The difficulties ahead of us are patent – the new problems. But is there anything which we set out to do that we can't do, especially when duty drives?

If we take the islands, we follow what seems to me the lead of Providence. If we adopt half measures, our descendants will have trouble. With the United States, England, and Japan united in the East peace and civilization will advance in rapid strides.

Moorfield Storey has small following, and his "fire and sword" is not illustrated by the reception of the Porto Ricans. Excuse my length. But I have intense conviction in this matter and can not be satisfied to sit still at this time. We really seem to be instruments in the hands of God and I believe this people here see it.

Believe me, dear Governor,
Yours sincerely,
FREDERICK C. SHATTUCK[1]

SENATOR ALLISON TO SECRETARY LONG

DUBUQUE, IOWA
August 2, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

On behalf of the naval cadets of the class of 1897 I wish to suggest to you the propriety of commissioning these cadets as ensigns as, if they are not commissioned soon, they will stand below officers who have previously been dropped from the Naval Academy, or

[1] Frederick Cheever Shattuck, M. D. (1847–1929), Harvard College '68.

who have been appointed from civil life. These young men, I believe, are all in the service now, and I have no doubt have all performed excellent service. I write this letter at the request of the father of one of these cadets who in conversation with me expressed the ideas that I have endeavored to convey.

If this can be done, I think it will be a wise thing to do, and a just thing.

I wish to congratulate you upon the probable close of the war with Spain. I think we should have a pretty permanent foothold in Manila, and therefore am glad to see that the adjustment of this part of the contest with Spain is to be postponed for a commission and that in the meantime we are to hold Manila and its harbor.

With high esteem, I am,
Yours truly,
W. B. ALLISON [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

August 5, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

Every one in general and Mr. Day [1] in particular knows the procrastination and prevarication of the Spaniard. Of this, therefore, I say nothing; but from the point of view of Sampson's and Watson's sailing, one thing must be clearly remembered. It has been expected that the ships must coal somewhere near [the] Straits of Gibraltar, whether within or without [the] Mediterranean. This is a step vital to their existence; and in its recommendations to the department, the board have counted upon the probability of weather, good enough for coaling *outside*, to the end of August. There is an old saying, June, July, August, and Port Mahon [2] are the only good harbors in the Mediterranean. It is needless to observe that by the time the fleet reaches the other side, *now*, the last of the three good months will be declining. In this respect, and in the advance of the hurricane season, Spanish delays, however convenient to their mental habits, are most embarrassing, and may be most injurious, even fatal, to our naval efficiency.

[1] William Boyd Allison (1829–1908), U. S. senator from Iowa.

[1] Day served as secretary of state, in succession to John Sherman, from April to September 1, 1898.

[2] Port Mahon, Island of Minorca, often the headquarters of the U. S. Mediterranean Squadron.

May I remind you again, what each day increasingly shows, that upon the armored fleet depends *entirely* the present imposing position of the United States. The demoralization of the army in Cuba seems to be complete. Miles's[3] line of operations in Porto Rico, I have viewed from the first with great distrust, and the news is not calculated to justify his course in choosing the farthest point, almost, we could find from San Juan to land.[4]

Respectfully,
A. T. MAHAN

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
BOSTON
August 5, 1898

MY DEAR LONG:

Thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending me, with your yesterday's letter, the acknowledgment from the President of a letter sent to you July 29.

I may add that the advance copy of my paper for the *Atlantic Monthly* should be ready inside of a fortnight and I will send you such number as you may inform me you can use advantageously.

In Professor Bernard's[1] *Oxford Lectures on Diplomacy* there is an *à propos* note on Spanish diplomacy to this effect: "When a certain Spanish ambassador arrived in Paris to relieve the old ambassador, the latter warned him that the French ministers were awful liars; to this warning the new Spanish ambassador replied, — 'Tut! tut! for every lie they tell me, I will tell them a hundred.'" This faculty of "finesse," as they politely style it, is abnormally developed throughout the Spanish race and makes them tricky fellows to deal with: no matter how far negotiations may have gone, the Spaniard is ever ready to take advantage of every incident, as it arises, which may enable him to gain any advantage in negotiation, irrespective of what we consider honor. I think that their *mañana* system of procrastination is largely due to the hope of something turning up for their benefit during the delay.

I remember commenting on this peculiar system of finesse to a

[3] Major-General Nelson Appleton Miles (1839–1925).

[4] The landing was at or near Ponce, on the southern coast of Puerto Rico.

[1] Montague Bernard (1820–1882), Professor of International Law at Oxford; as high commissioner signed the treaty of Washington May 8, 1871, and was one of the counsel of the British government at Geneva in 1872.

well-known South American diplomat and his reply, "You must remember that the Spanish-American states are comparatively weak and therefore we have to make up our weakness by finesse in negotiations."

With this principle in mind we can understand the full significance of Philip II's policy, "Time and I are a match for any two." It rather looks to me that the course which Spain is now following is exactly on this line, – waiting for something to turn up, whereby she can make better terms of peace.

You may rest assured that the reported sickness in our camps at Santiago is accounted in Spain a dispensation in her behalf; and that every day's delay betters her chances, also that friction between Aguinaldo and our commanders at Manila is another delectable morsel, not improbably (as I wrote you) of Spanish origin.

Under these circumstances the sterner we push on the war, the better the prospect of a speedy settlement. When Spain distinctly understands that she must answer within a specified time or our terms will be absolutely withdrawn, once and for all, you will find that their flimsy technical objections will be smothered in face of the consequences bound to follow this dilly-dallying-fencing for time.

So my suggestion is to push Porto Rico to a finish with unrelenting energy and have our offensive European squadron got ready for carrying the war into Africa – or rather the Spanish coast and islands thereabouts. It however seems imperatively necessary to give General Merritt[2] reinforcements to whatever extent he may require; it is better to have an excess of forces available than to lack the number essential to an overwhelming victory.

An object lesson of this kind would marvellously assist Spain to decide whether or not to act honestly and expeditiously for peace. Even after the basis of negotiation is agreed to by Spain, we must allow several weeks – perhaps months – to formulate a treaty, which will then have to run the gauntlet of [the] Cortes and Congress. I think you will be quite expeditious if the treaty is finished for submission to the Senate when it convenes next December. The only way to expedite is to present the alternative – "Answer yes or fight away." Sharp and decisive action, compelling Spanish negotiators to answer yes or no within a given time, is the best goad to make Spanish bulls pull from the shoulder.

They know that Shafter's army is badly crippled with fever;

[2] Wesley Merritt (1836–1910), commanding the army in the Philippines.

they know that a general howl is being raised by the several states, which seem to forget that every volunteer is a United States soldier and no longer a state militiaman, about keeping their state troops exposed to fever in Cuba; they know that General Shafter and his lieutenants are protesting energetically. These are the choice elements of a grand game at finesse, which these Spaniards are now (I think) playing very skilfully. But the Gordian knot is easily cut by manly courage, while impossible to untie. Cut it then boldly and without questioning the right to do so.

With kind regards,
Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETARY LONG TO WILLIAM R. HEARST

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
August 6, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

Upon my return this afternoon, I have received from the President the accompanying letter from Mr. Impson,[1] enclosing your telegram to him of August 4. I have received a similar request directly from Mr. Impson and, being obliged to be away this forenoon, requested the assistant secretary, Mr. Allen,[2] to confer with him, and to arrange with the bureau of navigation to permit you to go with the *Buccaneer* on her mission to Porto Rico. Mr. Allen understood that this authorized your appointment as an ensign. This is a mistake on his part, as no person can be appointed an ensign without passing the physical and professional examination, which has not been done in your case.

We all appreciate very much your generosity with reference to the *Buccaneer*, and it is with great pleasure that I enclose an authorization for you to go upon her.

With regard to the *Buccaneer's* being ordered to run up the American flag on one of the small islands adjacent to Porto Rico, this is a matter which is necessarily under the direction of the commanding officer of the fleet there. I shall be happy to authorize

[1] Not identified.
[2] Charles H. Allen, Roosevelt's successor in the navy department.

you to show him this letter and if in any way he can aid the *Buccaneer* to such an opportunity, he is authorized to do so.

Very truly yours,
[JOHN D. LONG]
[*Secretary*]

MR. WILLIAM R. HEARST
NEW YORK CITY

SECRETARY LONG TO LIEUTENANT MAYER

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
August 6, 1898

SIR:

This letter will be presented to you by Mr. William R. Hearst, of New York, whose generosity in placing the *Buccaneer* at the service of the government is much appreciated. You will permit him to go with you on the *Buccaneer* from Key West to Porto Rico, and to remain on board. The department will be glad if you will extend him such courtesies as you can and avail yourself of any services which he may be able to render.

Very truly yours,
[JOHN D. LONG]
[*Secretary*]

To the COMMANDING OFFICER [1]
U. S. S. *Buccaneer*
KEY WEST, FLORIDA

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

August 7, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

Sampson's telegram, which you showed me yesterday, shows evidently the unrest and relaxation of temper which naturally follows upon a prolonged tension, when that is succeeded by a period of inactivity. He reflects, doubtless, the feelings of officers and men; many of the former not improbably have been urging the claims of the crews to some indulgence. Yesterday also Captain Bartlett [1] told me that the governor of Michigan [2] had telegraphed that, now the war was over, he would like the Michigan reserves, on board the *Yosemite*, let go; and Bartlett was replacing them with Rhode

[1] Lieutenant Augustus N. Mayer (d. 1901).

[1] John Russell Bartlett (1843–1904), chief of the U. S. auxiliary naval force.
[2] Hazen S. Pingree (1840–1901).

Island reserves. As the *Yosemite* is detailed to convoy the colliers for Sampson, I begged him to see no delay was thus caused.

All these incidents show incipient demoralization, which will increase in geometrical progression as unemployed days go by; and, coupled with the expiring of enlistments, of which I spoke to you yesterday, may seriously cripple the fleet for an appreciable time.

The cause is the absurd delay of Spain. Why should not the President send for M. Cambon,[3] and civilly tell him the brute truth, *viz:* that we thoroughly understand that Spain is powerless before us owing to our relative naval supremacy; that she would still be so, did every man in our armies die to-morrow; that she is unable to replace her navy; that delay is for many reasons inconvenient to us; that our terms are a minimum, and therefore an ultimatum; and for these reasons the offer of them, if not accepted, will be withdrawn at noon of next Wednesday (Washington time).

I *believe* this peremptory dealing would strengthen the Spanish ministry in accepting the terms. I *know*, that a prolongation of this uncertainty will produce restlessness, discontent, and disorganization which is the worst thing that can befall us. Settled peace, or renewed war, will avoid this. Let it be known that war is again on, and start Sampson's armored ships, whether towards Europe as proposed, or north, (*not for relaxation* but for refit) and officers and men will all be contented – even happy.

Respectfully,
A. T. Mahan

I can not exaggerate my sense of the importance of this matter.

GEORGE S. BOUTWELL TO SECRETARY LONG

Groton, Massachusetts
August 7, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The coming of peace is a great event. I did not believe in the war, but we engaged in it in a constitutional way which bound us all, and its conduct has been admirable.

I shall not trouble the President with a letter of congratulation,

[3] Jules Martin Cambon (b. 1845), French ambassador at Washington, in charge of Spanish affairs during the war.

but I may say to you that the terms of peace which he has imposed upon Spain are altogether reasonable and they will receive general approval at home and abroad.

Very truly,
GEORGE S. BOUTWELL

To the Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

Private and confidential

NAHANT, MASSACHUSETTS
August 8, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I have been away and have only just received your letter of the twenty-eighth. I do not see how it is possible under the present circumstances to do anything more for Mr. Simes,[1] although he is a most excellent man and I should have been very glad if he could have had an appointment, but the war seems to be drawing to a close, and although I do not expect an honest acceptance from Spain of our terms and look for every effort to trick us, still I think the end is not far off. Under these circumstances of course it is impossible to appoint additional acting officers.

I want to take this opportunity, as I am writing to you, to say a word — in entire confidence — in regard to myself. The newspapers here the last few days have been saying that the President is considering my name, among others, for one of the peace commissioners. If any of the commissioners are to be taken from the Senate, as Cullom,[2] Morgan[3] and Gray[4] are now all on commissions, I am the ranking member of the committee on foreign relations after Davis[5] and Frye.[6] I have no desire to press or push myself in any way for such an appointment. It would be manifestly improper for me to do so, and I should not mention the subject to any one except yourself, but as you are one of the President's advisers and also an old and good friend of mine I am going to say to you with perfect frankness that if the President's choice

[1] Robert Fields Simes (1864–1901), Harvard College '85, passed the examination for ensign just before peace.
[2] Shelby Moore Cullom (1829–1914), U. S. senator from Illinois.
[3] U. S. senator from Alabama.
[4] George Gray (1840–1925), U. S. senator from Delaware.
[5] Cushman Kellogg Davis (1838–1900), U. S. senator from Minnesota.
[6] William Pierce Frye (1831–1911), U. S. senator from Maine.

should fall upon me for this post I should consider it one of the greatest honors of my public life, and I believe that I am fit for the work, both by study and training. Very likely there is nothing whatever in the newspaper accounts and very probably the President had not thought of my name at all, but if by any chance he should do so, I want you, and you alone, as he will of course consult you, to know my personal feeling in regard to it.[7]

The feeling here in regard to the war department[8] is intense. One hears it on every side, and I fear that a storm is brewing which will do great damage if something is not done. I know of course in your position how utterly impossible it is for you to say anything, but to give you an idea of what the feeling is here I enclose a letter which comes this morning which I will ask you to return. I confess the matter troubles me more than a little, and it is assuming very serious proportions. It gives me a new cause for thankfulness to think of the complete success of your administration of the navy department, in which not only the state but the country feels the greatest pride. One hears also on every side nothing but praise for the navy and the administration of the department.

Sincerely yours,
H. C. Lodge

E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS TO SECRETARY LONG

Providence, Rhode Island
August 9, 1898

My dear Sir:

I can not refrain from thanking you for your published letter[1] rebuking Sampson's critics. You say, with authority and perfect knowledge, what I have been declaring ever since the battle, only, of course, without the means of verifying my statements. You have done the public, as well as Sampson, a noble service. That grand

[7] The peace commissioners selected were William R. Day, ex-secretary of state; Senators Davis, Frye, and Gray; and Whitelaw Reid (1837–1912), editor of the *New York Tribune*.

[8] The war department was severely criticized for its conduct of the war, especially in relation to the quality of the supplies furnished to the army. For defense of Secretary Alger, see Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 144.

[1] Secretary Long's letter of August 8, 1898, published throughout the country in the papers of August 9 – a strong defense of Admiral Sampson – seemed to have little effect in checking the abuse heaped upon the admiral and the department.

commander, to whom this nation owes so much, need not fear for his laurels. Schley and the rest of course did each his duty; *and Sampson gloriously did his.*

May I add, my dear Sir, that I think you and all New Englanders have reason to feel proud of the conduct of your department of the government during this war. While you give all the praise to the brave officers and men of the navy, the country will never forget the land origin of the orders under which they were victorious.

Very respectfully yours,
E. Benjamin Andrews[2]
President

Let no one take time to answer this. E. B. A.

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

SHERMAN HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

Hotel Gordon
Washington, D. C.
August 9, 1898

Dear Mr. Secretary:

What I want to get is stated herewith, first, I want a general hospital equipped at once at both Santiago and Ponce. At Santiago immune doctors and nurses must be; at Ponce competent doctors and nurses, out of whom our Massachusetts Aid Association will send and furnish a goodly number. In regard to the Ponce hospital, I am practically informed that the men from Camp Thomas and Camp Alger are breaking down with typhoid carried with them, or given them by infection on the transports, because of hemorrhages, *etc.* These typhoids ought not to be moved north until fairly well along the road to recovery. There is no yellow fever at Ponce; the climate is good. [The] surgeon-general[1] believes in this, and if the President would only direct or even suggest to the secretary of war, that this thing ought to be attended to at once, and the proper transportation should be given to the supply needed, I have no doubt it will be done.

Dr. Greenleaf[2] at Ponce has telegraphed to Sternberg for tents

[2] Elisha Benjamin Andrews (1844–1917), Brown '70, president of Brown University.

[1] George Miller Sternberg (1838–1915), surgeon-general of the army.
[2] Charles Ravenscroft Greenleaf (1838–1911), assistant surgeon-general.

and supplies. Sternberg has asked me to get from Massachusetts competent doctors and nurses; the difficulty is in transportation.

If you do not wish the army at Porto Rico affected with typhoid, as the army at Santiago is with malaria, something should be done at once. Second, whatever is felt about female nurses in field, there ought to be female nurses on every transport bringing sick north. On the *Lampasas*,[3] the almost accidental presence of twenty-six Red Cross nurses, sent home by the army, saved numbers of human lives, only two out of one hundred and four patients dying on the voyage. All of the doctors on the boat agree that the death rate would have been appalling, but for these valuable women. Just a suggestion from the President, that no transport should start back with sick without trained nurses, would be sufficient. There are plenty of trained nurses offering their services; the doctors want them; their presence means the saving of life; they ought to be sent both to the physical hospital at Ponce, and to Ponce and Santiago to come home on every transport bearing sick or wounded. This is not a difficult thing to arrange, and the President's word would make the thing a certainty.

Pardon me for saying, as a gold Democrat, that twenty-five thousand men are impressed with the idea that their physical welfare is not being looked after by this government. Even if that idea is erroneous, it makes a dangerous number of enemies in the community for the administration and for the things which it represents, and which I feel are essential to good government in this country.

I believe that not only humanitarian reasons, but strong political reasons, can be given why the administration ought to stir things up in regard to transportation and care of the sick and wounded soldiers.

I remain,
Yours faithfully,
SHERMAN HOAR[4]

P. S. The secretary of war has agreed to attend to this.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[3] Chartered army transport.

[4] Sherman Hoar (1860–1898), Harvard College '82, member of the executive committee of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association, contracted typhoid fever while visiting camps and hospitals and died on October 7.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba
August 10, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I received, by the last mail, your most welcome letter of the twenty-fifth [of] July. It is no idle statement to say that it was welcome, for that but faintly expresses the gratification I felt in reading your kind and appreciative words. To have met your expectations and those of the President of the United States is the highest award an officer can expect or wish for. It will give me great pleasure to convey to the commanding officers of the fighting ships how appreciatively you have spoken of the result of their labors.

No commander-in-chief could possibly have received such active, intelligent support as was given by the commanding officers of the squadron. Although the work was difficult and almost ceaseless, not one ever complained, – except in a jocular way after the enemy was destroyed. The dash and determination shown by each one of them, in the fight, was perfectly overwhelming; had the enemy's force been doubled, they could not have successfully resisted the terrible attack of our ships. Your kind assurance that their merits shall be recognized as they deserve will be the highest incentive toward a future performance of duty.

Believe me, Secretary,
With respectful sincerity,
W. T. Sampson

The Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

COMMODORE CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
August 19, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Commodore Philip, recently promoted, writes me that he has no desire to command the Mare Island Navy Yard; that he has a son at school in Boston, and that he has already passed fifteen years on the Pacific Coast, and for other reasons he dislikes very much to

go there. I suggest Commodore Remey [1] as a successor to Admiral Kirkland,[2] who died, as you may know, a week ago.

Owing to the outbreak of yellow fever among the marines stationed at Key West, all the vessels that were there, including all that have been on the blockade of Cuba, have been ordered to Hampton Roads. This was strongly recommended by the surgeon-general,[3] in order to avoid the very great risk of getting yellow fever into some of our ships, which would, undoubtedly, have occurred if they had remained. Admiral Howell [4] and Commodore Remey are now both on their way in these vessels to Hampton Roads. I think Howell could be left in command of them for the present, and then Remey should be consulted in regard to his taking command of the Mare Island yard.

Owing to the selection of Admirals Sampson and Schley for the commissions [5] to Cuba and Porto Rico, Philip will be given temporary command of the battleships which are about to arrive at Tompkinsville, as some officer of flag rank should be present with the ships to attend to the routine business of the squadron. These vessels will go to the navy yard in turn to be docked and put in order without delay.

It is the opinion of the war board that the ships originally intended to go to Manila should be put in order first, so as to be ready to move whenever the President decides that they are to go.

I beg leave to enclose for your consideration a memorandum I have just received, by Captain Dickins,[6] on the subject of advancement of officers over others. I quite agree with Dickins, and have already decided to incorporate similar suggestions in my annual report, and I sincerely hope you can see your way clear to take a similar view, namely that the government should find some other way of rewarding officers for gallant conduct than at the expense of those who have not been fortunate enough to be present at a naval battle. Captain Dickins might have included my name with that of Captains Miller [7] and Chester,[8] as the promotion of Captain

[1] George Collier Remey (1841–1928), commanding naval base at Key West.
[2] William Alexander Kirkland (1836–1898).
[3] William Knickerbocker Van Reypen (1840–1924).
[4] John Adams Howell (1840–1918).
[5] Commissions appointed to superintend the Spanish evacuation of Cuba and Puerto Rico.
[6] Francis William Dickins (1844–1911).
[7] Merrill Miller (1842–1914).
[8] Colby Mitchell Chester (1844–1932).

Wildes[9] will probably prevent me from ever reaching the grade of admiral. In my opinion, if the government desires to reward officers for gallant conduct, it should also be willing to do it itself and, if necessary, to pay for it. A medal or other decoration will cost the government very little, but I know no officer who would not prefer to have it, many times over, to his advancement of a few numbers over the heads of others. This, together with a slight increase in his salary, as suggested by Captain Dickins, will be a real and substantial reward.

With kind regards, and hoping you will enjoy your outing, I remain,

Yours very respectfully,
A. S. CROWNINSHIELD

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

REAR-ADMIRAL SICARD TO SECRETARY LONG

Unofficial

Navy Department
Office of Naval War Board
WASHINGTON, D. C.
August 23, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I received this morning with very great gratification your most kind and flattering letter regarding the manner in which this board has carried on its duty during the late war. I furnished a copy of the letter to Captain Mahan and also to Captain Crowninshield, and doubtless they will value it most highly.

If I may be allowed to say so, the board always felt that it had your confidence and support, and I am sure that it was always anxious to despatch the business you confided to it, and to consider carefully with unprejudiced minds, the many points that arose whereon a correct judgment was of the first importance.

Again thanking you, both personally and in the name of the board for your very kind letter, I am,

Very sincerely yours,
MONTGOMERY SICARD

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[9] Frank Wildes (1843–1902).

REAR-ADMIRAL DEWEY TO SECRETARY LONG

Flagship *Baltimore*
MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
August 29, 1898

SIR:

1. Referring to the department's telegram of the twenty-eighth instant, I have the honor to transmit by the hand of Brigadier-General F. V. Greene, U. S. V.,[1] the following views and information upon the subject of the Philippines. A copy of this communication is also given to Major-General Merritt.

2. The most important islands of the Philippines are Luzon, Panay, Cebu, Negros, Leyte, and Mindanao. The others, owing either to the character of the inhabitants, the limited amount of civilization or the almost entire absence of cultivated land, may be neglected in any consideration of the relative importance or desirability of these islands, especially those of the southern group, which are almost wholly given over to savages.

3. Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands, and therefore the one to retain. In it is situated Manila, the most important commercial, as well as the most populous port, of all the islands — a port that in our hands would soon become one of the first ports of the world. Not only is tobacco produced in large quantities, but *all* the tobacco of fine quality grown in the Philippines comes from the northern provinces of this island. The interior has as yet not been developed.

There is but one short railroad from Manila to Dagupan and no highways, so that almost all the commerce is carried on by water. Were railroads and highways built — and labor is very cheap — there is little doubt that this island would rapidly increase in productiveness and wealth. The population of Luzon is reported to be something over three million, mostly natives. These are gentle, docile, and under just laws, and with the benefits of popular education, would soon make good citizens. In a telegram sent to the department on June 23, I expressed the opinion that "these people are far superior in their intelligence, and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races." Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion.

4. As Luzon is the farthest north of the large islands its climate

[1] Francis Vinton Greene (1850–1921).

is naturally the most temperate. In this connection it may be mentioned that out of a force of over two thousand on the ships of my squadron, the number of men on the sick list at any time has not exceeded forty, nor has there been any considerable sickness among our troops on shore, though they were much exposed for three weeks in the trenches during the rainy season. As a matter of fact Manila is far from being an unhealthy city, and the climate is as fine as that of any place in the tropics.

5. About sixty miles from Manila, and to the northward and westward is Subig Bay, decidedly the best harbor in the Philippines, having no equal as a coaling station or naval and military base.

The entrances are narrow, the shores bold, the water deep, the bay land-locked, easily defended from attack by sea or land, and the fresh water supply ample. As it is just off the trade route between Manila and China and Japan, it strategically commands Manila. It is there that the Spanish government had planned to place its principal naval arsenal in the East. Already a great deal of money has been expended, many buildings erected, and much work done. A contract has been made with an English company to construct a floating dock of twelve thousand tons capacity, some of the material has been delivered and payments made. The arsenal is on the south side of the harbor at the village of Olangapo. It is expected that a connection will be made with the railroad from Manila to Dagupan, thus putting Subig in easy reach of Manila.

6. The principal naval station in the Philippines is now at Cavite in Manila Bay. It has very fair work shops for light work, and ways for vessels of less than one thousand tons. But it is capable of little expansion, and the small depth of water precludes the building of dry docks for large ships or even the use of floating docks of much capacity.

7. Luzon has other decided advantages, both in a commercial and military sense. It is nearest the great centres of trade in the Far East — such as Hong Kong, Canton, Shanghai, Pekin, Nagasaki, and Yokohama — and nearest the trade routes from the United States and Honolulu to those centres; consequently its influence would be greater if held by us. It also commands San Bernardino Strait, the principal water route through the Philippines from east to west.

8. From all the above facts it seems patent that Luzon is by far the most valuable island in the group, whether considered from a commercial or military standpoint.

9. Panay, Cebu, Negros, and Leyte are very thickly populated and well cultivated. In these islands the natives are conceded to be the best educated and furthest advanced in civilization.

10. In Panay is situated Iloilo, the second commercial port of the Philippines, and the centre of the sugar trade. It has a good harbor, with two entrances, and one that has great strategic importance.

11. Cebu, the third commercial port, in the island of the same name, has a harbor much like that of Iloilo.

12. From the best information obtainable it appears that the Philippines contain varied and valuable mineral resources, as well as admirable timber.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,
GEORGE DEWEY

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

GLEN RIDGE, NEW JERSEY
[September, 1898]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Permit me to thank you with all my heart for the splendid letter [1] which you caused to be published August 8.

It was more — much more than I hoped for, because it so completely met and neutralized the many mean things which had been published. I did not see or know of its existence until after my arrival here. It had been sent me, but the mail did not reach us, for this reason my attention was not called to it even when I first reached home. It has lost nothing of its importance to me by the delay.

I am sure it completely revolutionized the character of my home coming, and made it one of great happiness to me. My faith in you[r] justice was always undoubted, and I now see that you knew better than I what to do under the circumstances. I will not trouble you at this time by a long recital of my thanks but will leave them till I am so fortunate as to see you. You know that I return to Cuba shortly as a member of the evacuation commission. I had hoped to escape any more service there at the present time, but

[1] See President Andrews's letter of August 9, note.

finding the President had decided the matter before I saw him, I could not ask him to excuse me.

When in Washington I found the department was undecided in what ship to send the commission and I have not yet learned how we are to go. This is not, however, a matter of importance, but I would like, Mr. Secretary, to know whether I am permanently to be detached from command of the squadron. I was in command but five months and I would like to continue if it meets with your views.

Allow me, Mr. Secretary, to ask your attention to one of the recommendations for advancement made with the others. I would be much pleased if Lieutenant S. A. Staunton [2] could be advanced as recommended. He worked hard and well earned his reward, not by the simple performance of his duty but by an energy and zeal which went entirely beyond such limits. He has learned that for some reason his name was omitted, which now places him in a very embarrassing position, especially when it is know[n] he was recommended. I understand how difficult it was for you to decide in so many cases.

Yours most sincerely,
W. T. Sampson

SENATOR HAWLEY TO SECRETARY LONG

Woodmont, Connecticut
September 2, 1898

Dear Sir:

A novel suggestion comes to me which I pass on to the navy department. It is that able officers who have distinguished themselves would prefer a suitable medal to the ordinary brevet or promotion even. By promotions many worthy men are likely to be jumped, which creates a great deal of dissatisfaction and mortification.

Yours truly,
J. R. Hawley [1]

To the Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[2] Sidney Augustus Staunton (b. 1850).

[1] Joseph Roswell Hawley (1826–1905), U. S. senator from Connecticut.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Glen Ridge, New Jersey
September 4, 1898

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Mr. Scovel [1] about whom we have before corresponded, and who proposes to call upon you at Washington has asked me to give him this note.

I have known Mr. Scovel for some months and believe him implicitly. You will recall that you found it necessary to issue a general order forbidding him to visit any man-of-war or naval station, because he had been reported to you for stowing himself away in one of our vessels bound for Havana. I think that report was in error. I trust you will kindly listen to his story and if there is an error your keen sense of justice will lead you to rectify any injury unintentionally done him.

With much respect,
W. T. Sampson

REPRESENTATIVE MOODY TO SECRETARY LONG

Haverhill, Massachusetts
September 10, 1898

My dear Governor:

I have been talking with Mr. T. Jefferson Coolidge,[1] as you know, one of the members of the joint high commission, for the settlement of Canadian questions.

We find the Canadians at their old tricks, trying to ruin the American fisheries by seeking a free entry for Canadian fish to the American market, which is now enlarged by the important addition of Porto Rico. This in spite of the assurance that the Canadian agent,[2] at Washington, repeatedly gave Senator Hoar and myself, that Canada would not attempt to obtain free entry for their fish.

As you know, the protective duty on fish is small. Our competitors, the Canadians and French, are sustained by a government bounty. Fishing industry has but a precarious existence under pres-

[1] Sylvester Scovel. See Admiral Sampson's letter of June 6, 1898.

[1] Thomas Jefferson Coolidge (1831–1920), Harvard College '50, minister to France in President Harrison's administration.

[2] Not identified.

ent circumstances and would utterly perish, if it lost the protection of the Dingley Act.[3] I should not trouble you about a merely local interest, as the fisheries are considered as so much traffic, but I believe that now, of all times, is the moment when we should nourish the fisheries and not destroy them.

The port of Gloucester has, roughly speaking, six thousand finished seamen, from which from time to time the maritime marine and the navy profit.

I fear that Senator Fairbanks [4] does not appreciate the importance of the fisheries as a nursery for seamen and is inclined to consider it a local industry of comparatively little importance. In my judgment, no concessions which we can possibly obtain from Canada would repay us in the long run for the ruin of our fisheries. I can not help feeling that the time is coming again when New England's seaboard must play a large share in her fortunes.

I believe that before returning to Quebec, the United States commissioners will consult with the President. As the New England member of the Cabinet, and above all as the head of our navy, may I not invoke your interest in the subject and ask you to lay it before the President in the light which you think it deserves?

Permit me to thank you for the very kind letter you sent me, as well as the service you rendered in obtaining the return of the body of Private Sanders of Salem.

Yours very truly,
W. H. Moody

P. S. Since completing the dictation of the foregoing, an incident has occurred which marks in a very special degree to my mind the bearing of this question on the future of Massachusetts.

My constituents engaged in shoe manufacturing are starting a movement to secure entry in the markets of Cuba and Porto Rico. We can compete with the world on equal terms in the manufacture of shoes, but New England has much to fear in the home market from Western competition. Our leading manufacturers understand that, and are reaching out for a foreign market. We have Australia. We are putting our shoes in Great Britain, France, and

[3] Nelson Dingley, Jr. (1832–1899), Dartmouth '55, M. C. from Maine, chairman of the committee of ways and means, and author of the tariff of 1897.

[4] Charles Warren Fairbanks (1852–1918), U. S. senator from Indiana; a member of the joint high commission; Vice-President of the United States, 1905–1909.

Germany in competition with theirs. In foreign trade the West can not compete with us owing to our proximity to the sea.

What is true of the shoe industry will be true in the future of others, if it is not so now. To do anything which would diminish the aptitude of our people for the sea is, in my opinion, the most insensate folly. As the *Boston Herald* has advocated giving up of the fisheries for a temporary traffic with Canada, I have written earnestly because I feel deeply on this matter and believe it to be of the most vital importance.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

Confidential

Slumberside
QUOGUE, LONG ISLAND
September 14, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

I learn that Captain Taylor,[1] doubtless after due consideration, and I am led to infer after having satisfied himself as to the attitude of the bureau of navigation towards the War College, has decided finally that he would not be willing to accept again the headship of that institution. He might justly anticipate, and I myself presume, that it would be given him by the department, if he so wished, as its friends have wished.

As my chief anxiety with reference to the navy is that my nominal retirement may become actual and complete – final, it is with regret I yield to the conviction that I ought to write you on this matter. Briefly, what I have to say is this, with all the weight that can be attached to my opinion, that the college stands for, and tends to supply, that in which the navy is beyond all things deficient (in my judgment): a knowledge, ingrained, of the principles and methods involved in the correct conduct of war; a thing quite distinct from all questions of seamanship, of technology, and of administration, though doubtless affected by each of these. My observation of officers in general, and of the board as well, satisfied me how much this is needed.

To correct this is needed: (1) the introduction into the course of the Naval Academy of an elementary course of naval history (not confined to American) with an analysis of great naval opera-

[1] Henry Clay Taylor (1845–1904).

tions, in which, until recently (Farragut), our navy had little share; (2) the fostering of the War College on its general lines heretofore observed — *i.e.* since 1886.

I do not undertake to criticize the steady, quiet, opposition to the college of the bureau of navigation since Admiral Walker's day; it doubtless has had reasons that seemed to it adequate; nor do I know Crowninshield's position. There is one plausible argument against which I would guard you, *viz:* that the work of the college, mainly intellectual and studious, can be supplanted by problems worked practically by the North Atlantic squadron. This can not be done, for experience has shown it; and moreover strategy, as Jomini[2] says, is an affair of the closet, and as Napoleon said, it is the fruit of *study*, preëminently of history.

Wishing to be drawn into no controversy, nor further action of any kind on this subject — wishing, in fact, that this letter may prove my last will and testament in relation to the active affairs of the navy, I have marked it confidential. Its intention is simply to put you in possession of my views on a subject matter, to which I owe *all* the acquirements that have underlain the reputation I have gained. Granting any natural capacity you may attribute, the fact remains that all my usefulness this summer depended upon my studies at the college, which illuminated to me every step I advocated to you.

Unless you are willing to let the college drop, I would suggest your sending for Taylor, and learning from him, personally and thoroughly, just the difficulties he sees. If you decide that the college may die, so well. If you decide otherwise, it will probably be necessary for you to say decisively to the opponents, or advocates of change, whether at the department, or the command[an]t at Newport, that the thing *must* be heartily supported; that they must suppress all indications of opposition, whatever their opinions. This practically Herbert[3] did, who from the bitterest enemy became a warm and stubborn friend.

Very faithfully yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long

[2] Baron Henri Jomini (1779–1869), Swiss military writer.
[3] Secretary H. A. Herbert.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
October 6, 1898

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I have not received any bill for pew-rent myself, and I am afraid, to speak frankly, that you have not got a great deal of religious instruction by reason of your right in that pew [1] for the past year. But if you think it worth while to pay the quarter bill and will send your twenty-five dollars to Mr. French of the treasury department, who is the treasurer, that will be the way to do it. I think his name is Henry F. French. But of that I can not speak positively.

I hope Roosevelt will get through all right. If he does, I think it will be largely due to the dread of the country people in New York of having the state and the city of New York both under the control of two men who are brothers [2] and both tools of Tammany. Brother Roosevelt is a worthy and estimable person, but rather careless with his affidavits.

I am, with high regard,

Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN CLARK TO SECRETARY LONG

ASHVILLE, NORTH CAROLINA
October 6, 1898

DEAR SIR:

With reference to your personal letter of the third instant I have the honor to inform you that I have written Mr. T. C. Clarkson [1] telling him why I can not accept the invitation to be present on Army and Navy Day at the Trans-Mississippi and International Exposition at Omaha. The telegraphic invitation from Chicago sent through the bureau of navigation I have answered through the same channel.

[1] In All Souls' Unitarian Church at Washington.

[2] Judge Augustus Van Wyck (1850–1922), Democratic candidate for governor of New York, and Robert Anderson Van Wyck (1849–1918), mayor of New York City.

[1] Thaddeus Stevens Clarkson (b. 1840), general manager of the Omaha Exposition.

I have already informed Captain Crowninshield that I am ready for duty if my services are required but I can not after the stomach troubles that first weakened me on the Cuban Coast, the anxieties that most people do not understand but which must come to an officer who had to consider the sacrifice of his ship and crew as her capture might have given the enemy the preponderance, and the nervous troubles to which my wife has been subjected owing to alarming and often false reports that reached her, accept invitations. I am grateful for them but if I accept one I must others and another breakdown might follow. I have written at such length because the last telegram through the department stated that my presence would subserve naval interests. I do not wish it to be understood that I am indifferent to the attentions others would show, or the interests of the public service.

Very truly and respectfully yours,
C. E. Clark [2]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN CLARK TO SECRETARY LONG

Ashville, North Carolina
October 14, 1898

My dear Sir:

I feel that I must write some acknowledgment of your personal letter of the eighth instant if it is only to say that I can not thank you sufficiently for the expression of your opinion about my services in the *Oregon*. You must know how an officer would feel at having the secretary of the navy write to him in that way better than I can tell you. So I will not trouble you further than to say that I shall always be

Very sincerely and gratefully yours,
C. E. Clark

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[2] Captain Clark commanded the battleship *Oregon* during the war with Spain.

COMMANDER CLOVER TO SECRETARY LONG

Office of Naval Intelligence
WASHINGTON
October 17, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

In reply to your inquiry regarding circumstances connected with the Santiago convoy, I will give a brief resumé of facts and conditions from the time of my first association with the convoy to its sailing.

The *Bancroft* arrived at Key West the evening of May 9 under orders to report to commander-in-chief, North Atlantic Squadron. The day following [she] coaled and the next day, the eleventh, was about to proceed to the blockade off Havana, when word came that orders from Washington were to hold vessels ready to convoy army. [The] *Bancroft* was kept with full steam, ready to move on notice, replenishing daily consumption of coal with ship's boats, so as to start with full supply. On the evening of May 17 got urgent orders to proceed to Tampa for protection of army transports, the authorities there reporting that a Spanish torpedo boat had been seen in that vicinity. In company with the *Helena*, the *Bancroft* arrived at Tampa Bay the following evening and moved up to Port Tampa, the embarkation point, the following morning. The same day I called upon General Shafter, in company with Commander Swinburne,[1] going by train to Tampa. I learned that the torpedo boat had been reported to the army officials through the pilots, some one having seen a vessel of peculiar construction outside. It was suggested that the army might assist in a defense of the transports which were inside a long canal, by placing a field battery on end of wharf at canal entrance, which was done.

Being anxious for active service and feeling that the torpedo-boat alarm was unnecessary and that there was no prospect of the army being ready to embark for some time, I wrote a personal letter to Commodore Remey[2] to that effect, asking that I might be ordered back to active service. The night of the twenty-third telegraphic orders came and at daylight the *Bancroft* was on her way to Key West, the *Helena* remaining to guard transports.

Arrived at Key West following morning, coaled immediately,

[1] William Thomas Swinburne (1847–1928), commanding the *Helena*.
[2] Commanding the naval base at Key West.

and at daylight the next morning proceeded to return to Port Tampa under telegraphic orders from navy department, to procure money coming there by express for the fleet. En route chased a large steamer to the eastward supposed to be Spanish; *Bancroft* was outspeeded and after dark gave up chase and stood course to westward. At eleven o'clock the following morning brought to a steamer, which proved to be the *Faneta* of New York. Sent an officer on board, who reported she had as passengers a General Rodriguez and party, with a cargo of arms and ammunition, furnished by the army, to be landed in Cuba for the insurgents. Her papers were irregular, but a letter in regard to her being allowed wharf room at Mobile, signed by an army quartermaster at Tampa, indicated that the movement, as claimed, was under the approval of the army, so after an hour's delay she was allowed to proceed. Subsequent events showed that she engaged in a filibustering expedition against Haiti, and that, in attempting to land, the leaders were killed. Had I, however, taken her in, the true destination would have been disclaimed, and it would have been chronicled as a stupid interference on the part of the navy, preventing supplies reaching the Cubans.

Arrived at Port Tampa on the morning of May 28; left morning of the twenty-ninth, and arrived at Key West on the morning of the thirtieth. Coaled immediately, and at four P.M. reported ready for sea. Commodore Remey stated that he could not send me to active service, but that I must hold the *Bancroft* in readiness to convoy the army, it being expected that they would embark immediately, as orders had just been received to that effect. This was a surprise to me, knowing from observation how unprepared they were at Tampa. Vessels were urgently needed on the blockade, but the *Bancroft* with other vessels with steam up were held ready to respond promptly to the movements of the army. Ten days of this demoralizing suspense passed, until at daylight on the morning of June 9 the *Indiana, Detroit, Montgomery, Vesuvius* and *Bancroft* cruised to the eastward in search of suspicious vessels reported the previous day by the *Eagle* and *Resolute*. The search was thorough and expeditious, under the direction of the senior officer, Captain Taylor, each vessel being given certain ground to cover. The *Bancroft* landed a party on Cay Sal, a Spanish island, near which the suspicious vessels were reported as seen, but no signs of life were observed and during the night she skirted the Cuban coast and in the morning visited the port of Cay Frances and in the afternoon met the *Indiana*

and other vessels at rendezvous south of Anquila [Anguila] Isles. During the night the fleet cruised to southward and eastward and at daylight picked up the *Montgomery*, which had made a rapid search up the Old Bahama Channel. The squadron then proceeded to return to Key West, and soon after the *Eagle* was sighted bringing dispatches from Commodore Remey ordering the squadron to return at once. Later in the day the *Uncas* met the squadron with dispatches, and the *Vesuvius* was ordered to proceed to Santiago. At midnight the squadron was off Sand Key Light, where the *Indiana* anchored, and at early daylight on June 12 the other vessels proceeded into the anchorage at Key West. All vessels were ready to proceed immediately as convoy if necessary, but orders were given to fill up with coal and during the afternoon all reported ready for sea and got orders to join the *Indiana* outside at daylight the following morning. At three-thirty A.M. June 13 when the ship was about to get under way, Ensign Belknap [3] came on board with orders from Commodore Remey to delay for thirty-six hours, *as the army was not ready*. At four-thirty P.M. June 14 the squadron got under way and proceeded to the rendezvous near Tortugas Island, where we arrived during the night and lay there the next day waiting the arrival of the transports. Before dark the squadron got under way and stood to the westward and shortly after dark our scouts, the torpedo boats, signalled that the transports were in sight, this being the night of June 15.

Very respectfully,
RICHARDSON CLOVER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

NAHANT, MASSACHUSETTS
October 18, 1898

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I enclose herewith the advance sheets of an article by Mr. Hart,[1] who is professor of American history at Harvard College, as you know. The article is to appear in *Harper's Magazine*, and it seems to me one of the best and most important that I have seen, very suggestive, and, even to those who are familiar with American his-

[3] Reginald Rowan Belknap (b. 1871). He laid the North Sea barrage in the World War.

[1] Albert Bushnell Hart (b. 1854), Harvard College '80.

tory, full of information. Professor Hart would like very much to have the President read the article. That is all. He asks nothing more, and I am sure that the President would enjoy reading it and be as much interested in it and struck by it as I have been. Will you do me the favor to read it over yourself and hand it to the President?

I am delighted to see by the papers that you are to come on here and speak at the Republican Club. A speech from you will help us very much.[2] There is a good deal of apathy here, and a feeling about the administration of the war department which I do not think is appreciated in Washington, but which is going to hurt us at the polls unless we can rouse the Republican voters to a sense of the importance of the election. What is needed is a strong appeal to our Republicans here to stand by the President. They do not seem to see that the election of a Democratic House would embarrass us very much in our negotiations, perhaps bring them to naught, and postpone the making of peace. No one can have so much effect as you with the Republicans of Massachusetts in a direct appeal to them to turn out in every district and sustain the President's policy, and I rejoice to know that you are coming on.

Very sincerely yours,
H. C. LODGE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
NEW YORK
October 24, 1898

DEAR MR. LONG:

This morning's papers announce that advance proofs of Sampson's report of his operations, up to and including the destruction of Cervera's squadron, have been made public by the department. Assuming this to be so, I write to ask if you will permit your secretary to send me a copy. I am writing not so much a narrative of the war, as a discussion of the lessons, I think, deducible from it. The proofs in question will be useful to me, not for purposes of quotation, but to keep my ideas exact as to the sequence of events, and what actually happened.

I may add that the first of the papers in the series — which will

[2] Secretary Long's speech was delivered in the Boston Music Hall, October 26, 1898.

probably run to five – appears on December 1 in *McClure's Magazine;* so that any reference to the proofs I now ask would not appear before January 1, by which time I presume they will be in the hands of the public in full.

Very truly yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable J. D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN WISE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Receiving Ship *Franklin*
Personal Norfolk, Virginia
November 1, 1898

Dear Secretary Long:

Replying to your kind letter regarding complaint of Sixth Massachusetts soldiers on the *Yale*, I hasten to assure you that there is not any truth in the complaints, so far as myself or the navy is concerned, and your understanding as to the transportation of troops on the *Yale* is entirely correct.

When called on for the number of troops that could be carried, I replied, about eleven hundred, was informed more must be taken and eighteen horses, *etc.*, that the secretary of war assumed all responsibility for overcrowding and discomfort, and that fifteen hundred must be carried. When the Sixth Massachusetts came on board off Charleston, in addition to General Garretson,[1] and staff, the brigade-commander, we carried General Miles and his staff, so that we had nearly sixteen hundred troops, exact number I do not recall, and with our crew we numbered nearly two thousand men. Of course the ship was crowded and not fitted to carry any such numbers, especially in the tropics, and there was some discomfort and the men had to sleep on deck, there was no place else, they would not go into the holds and steerage, on account of the heat, very fortunately we had most delightful weather.

There were no vacant rooms of any kind, and when the troops were received on board they were distributed by their own officers and every available space given and utilized. I thought the troops behaved remarkably well and they certainly appeared contented; perhaps the complaint came from some persons who were confined for gambling and breaking into stores, *etc.*

[1] George Armstrong Garretson (1844–1916).

The Sixth Massachusetts was on the *Yale* seventeen or eighteen days and during that time we had nearly eighty cases of what the army surgeon called "typhoid" but the surgeon of the ship, Doctor Pickrell,[2] United States Navy, diagnosed as "typhus," which, I certainly believe to have been the correct diagnosis, a number of cases of measles, mumps, one of small-pox. The Sixth, coming from Camp Alger, [Virginia], left a trail of fever and death, and I beg to assure you that every attention and care that humanity demanded was given them by the navy. We divided half our hospital stores and medicine, fresh beef, *etc.*, when we put the last fifty-five cases of fever on board the *Lampasas* at Guanica, Porto Rico, retaining only enough to carry us north, the *Lampasas* being totally unprovided.

I feel sure that a note from General Garretson, or Colonel Greenleaf, General Miles's chief surgeon in the field, both on board the entire time and who were unremitting in their efforts for the care and welfare of the men, will more than corroborate what I have written, and if the gentlemen who complained to you will take the trouble to write to these officers they will learn exactly the state of affairs on the *Yale*, and if they will also investigate the care of the men by its colonel and other officers, feel quite sure they will realize that everything possible was done by the navy, and that we are in no way responsible for any discomfort.

I will be very glad indeed for any scrutiny into the conduct of myself and officers in handling the troops.

With assurances of my highest consideration, I remain,

W. C. Wise[3]

Secretary of the Navy

EDWARD ATKINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
November 1, 1898

My dear Sir:

A case of apparent grave abuses on the *Yale* was named to you by Mr. Phineas Pierce[1] who told me that you would like to have the details submitted to you privately. I have already sent them to the

[2] George Pickrell (1862–1933).
[3] William Clinton Wise (1843–1923).
[1] Phineas Pierce (1834–1915), Boston merchant.

committee of investigation and have a line from General Dodge[2] stating that the matter will have attention when the committee comes to Boston. I do not name the young man because he is still in the service and he is himself very averse to pleading baby. He went into the service with a full understanding of the hardships to which he was to be subjected. He was so cheery in the camp and kept up the spirits of the men so well that he was almost immediately promoted to be corporal and was on the way up. His sister gave the facts to my daughter. Our families are very intimate. I then visited the young man, who is still unable to walk and may be permanently disabled, at the general hospital, persuaded him to let me take down through my stenographer his statement of the facts as they appeared to him, with the understanding that I should not give his name without his future consent. I therefore submit this dictation *ex parte* as it may be, for whatever it may be worth. I understand that the general features of the case are fully sustained by others and it seems to me one of the cases which ought to be cleared without fear or favor.

Yours very truly,
EDWARD ATKINSON[3]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PROFESSOR HOLLIS TO SECRETARY LONG

Harvard University
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
November 1, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Please let me thank you for your letter on the subject of the *Atlantic Monthly* article. I value your opinion that my statement of the case is fair and in good tone more than anything else. It has seemed to me that Congress and our people might be led into a fool's paradise by the exploits of the navy in this war. There is so much to feel proud over that even the navy may lose sight of its weaknesses. We have still a great deal to learn about the modern machines which enter so largely into the management of ships of war. I take great interest in the personnel bill and shall be glad to assist towards its passage this winter, if I can. The only possible

[2] Grenville Mellen Dodge (1831–1916), president of the commission to inquire into the management of the war with Spain.

[3] Edward Atkinson (1827–1905), economist.

element of weakness in the bill springs from its effect upon the Naval Academy. If the course of studies there is not reshaped to fit this bill, and to give all graduates a respectable education in engineering, the effect may not be happy. I sincerely hope that Congress will act speedily, so that the change required at the school may be made during your administration. I shall feel gratified, if you will call on me for any help which you may wish me to give to the service which is still dear to me.

Yours very respectfully,
IRA N. HOLLIS[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMANDER STOCKTON TO SECRETARY LONG

War College
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
November 3, 1898

MY DEAR SIR:

I write to thank you for the honor conferred upon me in detailing me as the president of the War College. Coming in the way it does I trust I am not wrong in relying upon the hearty support of the department while retained in this position. Just now, perhaps not unnaturally, I am more weighed with the responsibilities, than the honors conferred.

As it is not likely that we will be very strong numerically for the present in our permanent staff, reliance will have to be placed largely upon lecturers from the outside both in and out of the service. I ask therefore for permission to use your name in extending an invitation to the following gentlemen to address the officers in attendance next summer, Mr. James C. Carter[1] of New York, Mr. John C. Ropes of Boston, Professors Hollis and Strobel[2] of Harvard University and Senator Lodge.

I write this to you privately so that the name of any one can be withdrawn quietly if it should not meet with your sanction.

Very respectfully,
CHARLES H. STOCKTON

[1] Ira Nelson Hollis (1856–1930), graduate of the Naval Academy and professor of engineering at Harvard.

[1] James Coolidge Carter (1827–1905), Harvard College '50.

[2] Edward Henry Strobel (1855–1908), Harvard College '77, professor of international law.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Hotel Trotcha, Vedado
Personal HAVANA, CUBA
November 4, 1898

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Mr. Charles W. Gould,[1] who has been detailed by the attorney-general to advise with the commissioners, has, I understand, orders to return to New York to-morrow, and to be in Washington a few days. If you have not met him, I will be very glad if you will consider this note as one of introduction.

It has been my pleasure to meet and consult with him on several occasions, and I may add that the commissioners have not consulted him to the extent that I think would be advisable, considering his legal attainments.

If he calls upon you I request that you will speak freely with him regarding your wishes.

The character of the work which Mr. Gould has had in hand he seems to have pursued with zeal, and to have won the confidence of the Cubans with whom he has been associated.

Yours sincerely,
W. T. SAMPSON

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN WISE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Receiving Ship *Franklin*
Personal NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
November 4, 1898

DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

Replying to your letters of the second instant, enclosing letter of Colonel Sohier,[1] and also one from an unknown person, I feel that my letter to you of the second [first?] instant covered the ground, but as you desire an answer to each complaint, in detail, desire to say that there is no truth whatever, in the first statement

[1] Charles Winthrop Gould (1849–1931), Yale '70, counsel to the commission for the Spanish evacuation of Cuba. The commissioners were Major-General James Franklin Wade (1843–1921), Rear-Admiral Sampson, and Major-General Matthew Calbraith Butler (1836–1909). The relations of the commissioners seem not to have been harmonious. See Captain Chadwick's letter of February 3, 1899.

[1] William Davies Sohier (1858–1938), Boston lawyer.

regarding my not allowing the lighter to unload rations, *etc.* The *Yale* received all the rations sent off at Charleston from the lighter. In this case, as in every other, when rations, ammunition, *etc.*, were sent off by the army, no officer or man was present to attend to the unloading or stowing of the rations, *etc.* Absolutely no care whatever or oversight — only an unreliable clerk on the lighter checking off; that was all. It was a gross neglect of duty and incompetency on the army part. The *Yale* received provisions and troops the same day and sailed at midnight. I am positive that the lighter was unloaded and that the men were never short of provisions. There was gross neglect of duty on the part of those whose duty it was to see and care for the rations and that they were properly stowed. We unloaded at Guanica[2] provisions that the army people did not seem to know were on board. The troops used "travel rations" you know, and the navy had absolutely nothing whatever to do with their subsistence.

There is no truth in the complaint that the use of only a small cooking galley was allowed. The galley, known as second-cabin galley, and used for cooking for second-cabin and steerage passengers in transatlantic steamers, was set aside entirely for the use of the troops. It is capable, I believe, of cooking for a thousand, but all the cooking facilities of the ship were utilized and also the ship's cooks worked day and night to help the incompetent and ignorant army cooks in making coffee, *etc.*, for which they never received a "thank you."

True, the men were kept on board eighteen days and also that they had to sleep on the decks as stated in my former letter. With nearly two thousand people in a vessel entirely unsuited and not fitted, where else could they go? But these decks were nearly all covered and the upper deck all awnings were spread, the lower deck entirely covered. In fact it was tent life, with a deck for sleeping on, instead of the ground. The troops would not go into the steerage and holds for it was too hot, and they could not sleep below. I think nearly all of the officers slept on deck. The weather was fine throughout. I think we had one rain only during the entire time. The open air was unquestionably the place for them, and I never before heard of persons in the tropics wanting a place to keep warm in. I never received, or heard of any complaints from a single officer or man. I carefully avoided in any way interfering with the

[2] Guanica, in the south-western part of Puerto Rico.

troops other than taking the necessary precautions to preserve their health and maintain discipline. General Miles never in any way said one single thing as to the condition of the troops. There never was any deficiency of food and as I have before said, we of the navy had absolutely nothing to do with this matter. The sickness, as I remember, was principally confined to one company and it came from Camp Alger, and it was sad indeed. It is not true that fifty per cent. of the men were sick when landed. I know nothing whatever of the non-commissioned officers trying to obtain the pickings from the officers' tables — do not believe any self-respecting man would do so, so, as I said before, there was no deficiency of food.

There seems to be a desire on the part of the volunteers and army people to unload on the navy the great burden of gross neglect, incompetency, and selfishness of the officers of the troops and in the matter of transportation as handled by the army; and we of the navy decline to have any share in the grave responsibility. The gentlemen seem to forget that the *Yale* was not a transatlantic liner with its corps of two hundred cooks and stewards, and all that the troops had to do was to march on board and they would be looked after in the ordinary passenger way, overlooking the fact that the *Yale* was an armed cruiser of the navy, with its battery, crew of over four hundred and ready for fighting at any moment, and that it was not a picnic, but real war we were engaged in, with necessary deprivation and discomfort. Now having answered statements, may I ask Colonel Sohier and the gentleman with him, to ask General Garretson, the brigade-commander, as to the status on board? Surely he is competent authority. In connection with the food, feeding, sickness and care of the men it is also proper to ask them to investigate the officers of the sixth, from its Colonel Woodward[3] down, and we must decline to assume any share in their utter neglect and incompetency.

I hope you will pardon me for speaking this plainly, but it seems rather hard that I am asked to answer complaints, *etc.*, for which I am in no way whatever responsible. I beg to return herewith the letters, and with assurances of my highest consideration, believe me to be,

With greatest respect,
W. C. Wise

[3] Colonel Charles F. Woodward (b. 1852), of the Sixth Massachusetts Infantry, who resigned his commission while in Puerto Rico.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[New York]
November 10, 1898

Dear Mr. Long:

I find, upon looking over the advance sheets you were good enough to send me, that they are almost entirely deficient in the very point I most need, in order to treat my present subject in the method employed in my previous works. The telegrams framed in the war board scarcely appear at all, except so far as quoted by the officers to whom sent; which presents of course only a partial, irregular and disconnected series. It is very important to me, in order to present an instructive commentary on the operations, to refer to the telegrams; and if you can have sent me the series, *after* the present need of the department for them has passed, it will greatly facilitate the work.

Permit me to congratulate yourself and the administration upon the result of the elections. It can fairly be construed as an endorsement; but, what I doubt not you will value more, it shows that under your conduct the country has been reverting to the paths of integrity, has gained in prosperity, and has placed in the hands of the administration the means of further progress.

Very sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
Personal [New York]
November 16, 1898

My dear Mr. Long:

Now that the opening of Congress is near, I beg your permission to suggest to you two considerations, not as urging you to act upon them, but because they may not have occurred to you yourself.

First: As to the rewards to our admirals. The administration has awarded promotion to three,[1] and so far made a final decision for

[1] Dewey, Sampson, and Schley. Sampson was awarded an advance in grade of eight numbers and Schley of six numbers, but these promotions were not confirmed by the Senate because of the controversy brought about by the friends of the two officers. See Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 43–45.

which I have neither criticism nor quarrel. There remains the question of a vote of thanks. This carries with it, when given *individually*, ten years additional on the active list. In my judgment it is not desirable to give Schley ten years on the active list. Personally, if again called upon for the duty I performed this summer, I should strongly protest against any responsibility for operations intrusted to him as commander-in-chief, on the ground of what he did while acting as such. It appears to me that the well-earned vote of thanks to Dewey and to Sampson should not go below them, *by individual mention* unless for *special* services; nor, in the nature of things, is there necessity for going below the one man responsible.

Second: Assuming that Dewey be brought forward for promotion to vice-admiral, should it be tolerated that there should be hooked on to this rightly earned recompense a measure to promote Miles to lieutenant-general? [2] I don't propose to resist the latter measure, standing by itself, but I do suggest that it should stand upon its own merits — or Miles's own — and not that the army should have because the navy receives. Dewey has made proof of very eminent qualities, both at and after Cavite. If promoted, as I hope he will be, I trust that the praise will not be watered down by coupling in the same measure a man who is undoubtedly a very gallant soldier, but who has done nothing conspicuous this war. You and I know that to the President's tenacity was chiefly due that the Santiago garrison was not permitted to retire to Holguin with the honors of war, as Miles recommended. Miles may have been right, but if so, our achievement at Santiago would have been far from brilliant. The Porto Rico landing I once said to you, at Guanica, and the initiation of operations there, appears [*sic*] to me a military stupidity so great, that I can account only by a kind of obsession of vanity, to do a singular and unexpected thing. This opinion I *may* modify after closer study; but I still retain it after reading his letter to Higginson.[3] It seems to me, however, perfectly clear that to build upon Dewey's advancement a claim for the same reward to Miles, to equalize the two services would materially detract from the compliment and reward due to the former, implying that their achievements were equal — or their merits.

I have been more argumentative than I intended; but, while submitting cordially to your final decision, there seems no impropriety

[2] Miles was promoted to lieutenant-general in 1900.

[3] Captain F. J. Higginson, commanding the battleship *Massachusetts*.

in suggesting these views and their reasons. It is for you only to take action – positive or negative; and it would not be becoming in me to do anything of myself, beyond writing to you. The two questions concern, one the interests, the other the credit, of the navy, and are therefore especially in your hands and those of the President. My own views upon them may be wrong, and I recognize also that policy as well as strict right has to be considered, in many cases.

Very truly yours,

A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

HAVANA
November 18, 1898

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Your very kind letter of November 10 just received and I write to thank you for it.

I am very much better, and shall improve as rapidly here, perhaps, as anywhere. That you and the President wished me to come is reason enough why I should remain until my work is finished, but when it pleases you I shall be glad indeed to return to the work of the squadron, or any other work you may have for me.

Most sincerely,

W. T. SAMPSON

CAPTAIN BARKER TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

U. S. S. *Oregon*
RIO DE JANEIRO
November 19, 1898

MY DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

We have just said good-bye to the authorities on shore and to the foreign men-of-war and are about to leave these waters, where, during our stay, it has been one round of visiting, banqueting and ceremony. Our reception on board the *Oregon* was a fine affair, about one thousand persons being present. Colonel Bryan, our minister, is delighted at the success of our visit. " They say " that there has not been such a reception on a man-of-war for a good many years, but as you will see by an official communication on the subject, it cost eight hundred and ninety-seven dollars instead of five hundred dollars, the affair having grown after its inception like Jonah's gourd.

At the banquet given by the retiring President, Dr. Moraes,[1] to his successor, Dr. Campos Salles, I had the honor of sitting between the incoming minister of foreign affairs, Dr. Olyntho de Magalhães, and the incoming minister of marine, Admiral Balthazar, and as both spoke English and were disposed to be agreeable, I had a particularly pleasant time. It was by far the most desirable seat at the table under the circumstances, though at the moment these gentlemen were not government officials. I took this occasion to tell the future foreign minister such things as I thought would be proper to say to him, in regard to matters of the war; how the President and you were strongly averse to war, and how you had opposed it as long as possible, I told him that the President wished to do what was perfectly right in all things, that he was guided by the Golden Rule, which I supposed should be followed by governments as well as by individuals. (To this he assented!)

I was particular to tell him of the President's desire for peace, as the Spanish chargé was seated right opposite to me — across the table, and as our war has not yet ended I did not know how soon some question might arise. I also told him that on the part of the navy there had never been any bitterness against the Spaniards.

We spoke of the Philippine Islands and I mentioned that until after Dewey's victory no one had dreamed of our annexing them or of establishing a protectorate over them, but that after the Spanish fleet was destroyed we were confronted with the very serious question — what shall be done with the islands.

I have seen the minister several times since the banquet and last night at the minister of marine's banquet he told me he was sorry we were not to sit together. My companion on this occasion was the secretary of the interior, a very pleasant young gentleman whose knowledge of English about equalled mine of French, so neither of us could *enthuse!*

It was at the banquet on the fourteenth that I decided to remain until the nineteenth in order that the new president might have all the vessels here at the naval review and that we could be present at the minister of marine's banquet to the foreign naval officers. I saw that this would please the new President and his cabinet, who conversed with me on the subject. I think that some of the other foreign men of war remained because we did.

All the foreign men of war leave to-day, except the Portuguese.

[1] Prudente de Moraes.

Yesterday, during the review the President visited all the ships of the senior officers. While on board the *Oregon* he expressed his satisfaction at our being here, and his respect and admiration for our country. The minister of marine, after his banquet was over, told me that our coming here had given him and the Brazilians generally a great deal of pleasure.

This official, Admiral Balthazar, was in Washington during President Harrison's administration on some official business, and Secretary Blaine [2] gave him a banquet and Secretary Tracy a reception, which I remember very well. The admiral asked after a number of our officers whom he remembered, Walker, Ramsay,[3] Franklin,[4] Rodgers,[5] Sampson, Schley, *etc.*

Among the interesting incidents that have occurred is the following. A gentleman who sympathizes with the Spaniards visited the *Oregon*, and was asked upon his return, what he thought of her. He replied, "The Spaniards must have been very brave to attack those vessels" (*Oregon* and *Iowa*).

Well, I think our visit has done much good, but it has been hard work. Not a day that I did not make official calls. And not a single personal or rather private visit during the week that we were here.

Very sincerely yours,
A. S. Barker

EVERETT FRAZAR TO SECRETARY LONG

63–65 Wall Street
New York
November 22, 1898

Dear Sir:

Referring to my interview with you in Washington on Friday last, and to the special interest shown by you in our conversation together upon the matter of the cessation of war premiums, brought about promptly by the action of Admiral Dewey in destroying the Spanish fleet at Manila, I think it may be of interest to you, in connection with your coming report to Congress, that I furnish you

[2] James Gillespie Blaine (1830–1893), secretary of state in the administration of President Harrison.

[3] Rear-Admiral Francis Munroe Ramsay (1835–1914).

[4] Rear-Admiral Samuel Rhoads Franklin (1825–1909).

[5] Probably Rear-Admiral Frederick Rodgers (1842–1917); possibly Rear-Admiral Christopher Raymond Perry Rodgers (1819–1892).

a little more in detail, taken from a special letter I addressed to President McKinley on November 11, in the matter of war premiums charged by marine underwriters from the inception of the late war with Spain to the time of destroying the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey. In that letter I stated as follows: —

"The prompt action at Manila in the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey, and the holding of Manila Bay and city, was a master stroke of policy in favor of our American trade and interests in the Far East, for the reason, that, at once the Pacific Ocean was rendered safe and secure from the actions of Spanish men-of-war or privateers, thus saving our American Pacific mail steamers, running between San Francisco and Hong Kong, from capture, and relieving our Pacific coast ports of San Francisco, Seattle, Tacoma, *etc.*, from the risks of visits from Spanish ships, and the payments by American merchants of excessive war premiums of insurance which were beginning to advance almost daily, and likely to continue as long as Spain's ships were in the Philippines, ready on short notice to leave on their cruises towards Hong Kong to intercept and capture our American vessels, and to proceed to our Pacific coast possessions.

"Up to one and one-half per cent. war premiums were paid, and had Admiral Dewey not destroyed the Spanish fleet, in all probability, five or even ten per cent. war risks would have been charged by marine underwriters. This would have been ruinous to the large American interests involved, under contract deliveries for American products and manufactures, being shipped to the full capacity of all the various steamship lines; six from Pacific Coast ports, and four from New York, via Suez Canal, to Japan, China and Korea. Many millions of dollars to my own knowledge and personal experience were involved.

"The fact of Admiral Dewey's action resulting in the war premium not advancing beyond one and one-half per cent. and then ceasing altogether promptly, has been a cause of great rejoicing on the part of all our merchants, and of passengers on our mail steamers, as well."

Large sums of money were thus saved to numbers of those interested in property, both merchandise and steamers, as well as to passengers, and their effects, to say nothing of the probable serious inconveniences and losses which would have arisen had Spain been in the position to have made captures either by her own warships

or by the commissioning of privateers. The quick, sharp and decisive blow given by Admiral Dewey brought the desired effect in favor of all American interests, for which we ought to be truly thankful.

In this you have the honor to reap a large share of the success and glory, to which, as an humble American citizen I am only too happy to give my testimony, and to show my appreciation.

You very kindly offered to send me a few copies of Admiral Dewey's reports as supplementary to your annual report to Congress. I would be pleased to receive four or six copies, if you can spare same, of each as soon as may be convenient to you.

You will pardon the liberty I have taken in thus going into detail above. Trusting same may not be found uninteresting or unacceptable to you, I have the honor to remain,

Your obedient servant,
EVERETT FRAZAR

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN BARKER TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Oregon*
MONTEVIDEO
December 1, 1898

MY DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

We leave in a few hours for Valparaiso via the straits.

There is no doubting the fact that a visit to these ports of such ships as the *Iowa* and *Oregon* does good, so long as the officers and men behave modestly and show nothing of a disposition to brag. For fear that some of the men might abuse liberty and create a disturbance with the Spanish subjects ashore of whom there are over one hundred thousand, I have given no liberty here. By the way, the *Temerario* [1] is in dock at this place. She arrived the same day that we did I believe! A good many Spaniards have visited the ships quietly, wishing to see, doubtless, what kind of ships thrashed their fine navy. And they return perfectly satisfied! All officials have shown themselves friendly. Many have sent members of their families to visit us. Considering the fact that we are six miles from

[1] Spanish torpedo boat, supposed to have been at Montevideo in the spring of 1898 lying in wait for the *Oregon* and *Marietta* on their passage around South America.

shore and that the sea is quite rough most of the time one can see what interest is attached to our visit. Yesterday the President [2] sent an army officer of rank to represent him.

The *Oregon* is in perfect condition. No trouble of any kind with her machinery. Have not had to draw from the water supply which we took in at New York.

I hope the remainder of the cruise will be as successful.

With kindest regards to your family and with congratulations upon the termination of the war, I am

Yours sincerely,
A. S. Barker

CHARLES F. DOLE TO SECRETARY LONG

Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts
December 5, 1898

My dear Mr. Long:

I venture somewhat reluctantly to write to you what is coming to be a burden upon my mind. I begin to think that the multitude of us who have never believed in the Spanish war, were wrong in our silence and seeming acquiescence all through the period of the war. We surmised that it was useless to say any more. It looks now as if the President had misconceived our silence to mean good-natured consent. I wish you to know, I wish that the President might know, the strong, and I believe also earnest and thoughtful feeling, which the apparent outward success of the war has in no way diminished, that it has been from the first, and is now in its tremendous consequences, a vast national evil. I say this very carefully, I do not fail to see certain incidental compensations. They seem to me the same kind of compensations that I am accustomed to hope for when sickness or death comes into a household.

I can hardly believe, that what confronts us now in our assumption of the Philippine Islands as well as Porto Rico, could have ever been undertaken, if the administration had really known the mind of the country. We are asked to pay twenty millions for what? For a bad title to a sovereignty that Spain had never rightfully possessed or indeed fully exercised. It seems to many of us exactly like paying for "stolen goods." If we are really paying for them in order to return them to their rightful owners, we are failing lamentably to make any one understand our action. It has every sem-

[2] Don Juan Lindolfo Cuestas.

blance in the eyes of the world, and in the thought of our own people, of action taken in the ambition of power, mingled with the greed of gain.

I think you know well that I do not speak as a conservative. I know of no respect in which I can be classed with the timid set who hold back from all new and forward movements and prophesy evil. I am a progressive wherever I see progress. I mean to be hospitable always to new measures. But the more I live and believe in progress, the more wary I become of any movement that crosses the sacred lines of right. I am sure in the case of the nation as with the individual, that this is misnamed progress, and if ever gain seems even thus to come at last, it comes inevitably at the dire penalty of broken law.

What are we going to do with our army and navy in the Philippine Islands? We are going to shoot and kill men who do not choose to submit to our authority, which they have never invoked or recognized. The very idea of this likelihood makes every drop of my American blood stir in abhorrence.

Yes, Mr. Long, we have been too quiet. We have let the administration think that we trusted it. Little did we dream how far in this easy trust we were drifting. There is one righteous thing even yet that we can do. We can pay, if we must, for the extinguishment of Spain's worthless title to the Philippine Islands, and then as soon as we can make temporary arrangement for the safeguarding of life and property at Manila, we can leave the title, where alone it belongs, with the inhabitants of the islands. They may suffer? Yes, as they suffered before Spain attempted to plunder them, as they will doubtless suffer, if we keep them, as all people must suffer from ignorance and barbarism till they learn true civilization. What is clear to me is, that we have absolutely no right to subjugate them even in the plausible name of humanity. Nothing but the old heathen argument for slavery will suffice for this purpose.

Meanwhile, so far as our people honestly love humanity there are plenty of "open doors," through which we can carry all the civilization of which we have yet attained any surplus. Does the United States care enough for the Philippine Islands to send them a million dollars a year in schools like Hampton and Tuskegee? I believe that we can do this without the intervention of a single ironclad ship.

I write with great regret and hesitancy about troubling you.

But if you are going to take the opinion of the people, you will surely be willing to weigh the opinion of many thousands of those who have as yet hardly spoken. We are not pessimists, we are not mere conservatives, we never despair of the republic. We believe that the advancement of the national welfare is not in the path of military glory, of territorial aggrandizement, or of arbitrary protectorates over half-civilized peoples. Our real welfare must be in perfecting our free institutions, in realizing our splended democratic ideals, in doing justice to all our own people, of different colors and races, who heartily call our flag their own, in directly promoting international good will, and finally in creating such national happiness that other nations seeing what freedom, law, enlightenment, peace do for us, shall follow our beneficial lead.

With great respect,

Yours sincerely,
CHARLES F. DOLE[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

P. S. Of course this is not to make you trouble by way of reply.

A. K. MCCLURE TO PRESIDENT MCKINLEY

The *Philadelphia Times*
December 6, 1898

MY DEAR FRIEND:

The hardest place on the continent to learn the truth is Washington, and the places farthest out of touch with the sovereign power of the nation are the cloistered bureaus of government departments. I write you because I think it a duty to you.

I have never met or had any intercourse, direct or indirect, with either Admiral Sampson or Admiral Schley, excepting a recent meeting with Admiral Schley when he visited this city, and it is due to him to say, that he is not my authority for any of the statements I make. I have no prejudice against either and certainly no partiality to influence my judgment, but it is evident to any intelligent and dispassionate observer of existing conditions, that the administration and the navy department have become committed to an act of great injustice to the navy and to the country by the proposed promotion of Sampson over Schley.

[1] Reverend Charles Fletcher Dole (1845–1927), Harvard College '68. See Professor Thayer's letter of July 6, 1899.

The public know, and I mean the intelligent and considerate public, that Schley fought the battle at Santiago; that his command was not accidental; that it was committed to him by signal from his commander-in-chief; that he was nearest the enemy when the first gun was fired; nearest the enemy at every stage in the conflict, and nearest the enemy when the flag was struck, while Sampson had no [more] part in the actual conflict than I had.

The public know that Sampson took from his fleet his fleetest and one of his strongest cruisers apparently in obedience to the laws of the martinet, to confer with General Shafter, who had come to meet him on a mule or in a mud wagon. He not only took from his fleet the vessel most needed, but he could have gone in half the time in his own steam launch or any of the smaller vessels. Had our fleet been defeated or suffered serious loss, he would have deserved to be court-martialed and shot.

The public know that Sampson's first act after reconnoitering the harbor of Santiago, was to withdraw his fleetest and one of his best vessels from the squadron when he took the *New York* and spent twenty-four hours away from the harbor in search of a prize, and when Cervera's fleet had been entirely destroyed, and the *Brooklyn*, bearing more scars of battle than all the other vessels of the fleet combined, and the crew exhausted, he was ordered by Admiral Sampson to go, accompanied by the *Oregon*, to attack two Spanish war vessels reported off the coast, one of which was believed to be the *Pelayo*, the strongest battleship of Spain. Schley promptly started and after he had gone, the *Oregon* was halted by Admiral Sampson and Schley left alone on his mission to fight what was believed to be two Spanish men-of-war, and one of them vastly stronger than his own.

The public know that Sampson in his natural disappointment in losing the leadership of a great victory, gave no congratulations either to the commodore or any of the others who had won the fight, and he reported to the government in a bombastic dispatch, distinctly claiming the credit for himself; neither in that, nor any later report, gave any credit to the man who commanded the fleet from start to finish in the fight, and who would have been promptly court-martialed by Sampson had he failed in his great duty.

These facts seem to be steadily ignored in the navy bureau, and that bureau with its strong environments, political and social, seems to be dominant at Washington. It is a great wrong to the navy,

to the nation and to the administration, and I think if you shall attempt to make Sampson vice-admiral over Schley, you will be appalled at the protests that will come from the people of every section of the republic. I doubt not that the present efficiency of the navy that did so much in making our achievements lustrous, is due to Admiral Sampson's exceptional capacity as a bureau officer, but like McClellan, who could organize the best army in the world and could not fight it, Sampson can organize a navy, but is incapable of command, and his incapacity is specially shown in his efforts to claim the laurels won by others than himself.

I write you without the knowledge of any one, and only for myself. My only excuse is that I hope the administration may be saved from a blunder that would be little less than a crime.

Sincerely yours,
A. K. McClure [1]

Honorable William McKinley
Executive Mansion
Washington, D. C.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
Boston
December 26, 1898

Dear Long:

In December, 1884, President Arthur sent to the Senate for ratification a canal treaty made during the summer recess of Congress with Nicaragua. Whereupon a sharp discussion arose between members of Congress and between members of the diplomatic corps at Washington whether the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty [1] did not present an insuperable obstacle to the ratification of such treaty.

The then Chilean minister [2] telegraphed me to know whether I had made a study of that treaty and if I had arrived at a definite conclusion as to the force of that treaty (Clayton-Bulwer Treaty). My reply was " yes on both points." Whereupon he came to Boston to confer with me and stated the position substantially as follows:

(1) That the Senate and diplomatic corps were both about

[1] Alexander Kelly McClure (1828–1909).

[1] Negotiated in 1850 by John Middleton Clayton (1796–1856), secretary of state, and Sir Henry Bulwer (1801–1872), British minister to the United States.

[2] Don Joachim Godoy.

equally divided on the question whether the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was still binding; but that neither party could present arguments sufficiently conclusive to convince his colleagues on the other side.

(2) That Secretary Frelinghuysen[3] has sent for him and inquired, "What does your government think as to the validity and present force of this Clayton-Bulwer Treaty?" Godoy replied that he had no instructions from his government on the subject. Then the secretary asked what opinion he had personally formed on the subject; to which he replied that he was by no means clear and that, in view of the importance of the question, would prefer to withhold his opinion until he had consulted with Mr. Fisher, Chilean consul in Boston, who was an expert on Latin-American questions. Mr. Frelinghuysen then suggested that he would be very glad to know my views, which Señor Godoy said he would report to him as soon as possible: hence his telegram to me, and his visit to Boston on receipt of my telegraphic affirmative.

The subject had long been recognized by me as the knottiest problem in our American diplomacy and I had spent a vast amount of time in trying to solve it, in fact I had examined critically every available source of information as to both facts and opinions — perhaps "six thousand octavo pages" as I told him. But not without satisfactory results, however.

That result was the following opinion:

(1) Preamble and first seven articles refer to a particular canal concession made by Nicaragua in 1849 to the "American Atlantic and Pacific Ship Canal Company."

(2) That the right of Great Britain and United States to make any treaty in regard to a canal in Nicaragua depended upon the consent of Nicaragua that a canal should be constructed across her territory.

(3) That such consent had been given by the concession referred to above: but the permanence of such consent depended upon whether the concession was permanent and unconditional.

(4) That concession was conditional upon certain performances of the grantees, and therefore revokable by non-performance.

(5) For non-performance and abandonment of the undertaking, Nicaragua under the terms of the charter, revoked it in 1856.

[3] Frederick Theodore Frelinghuysen (1817–1885), secretary of state in President Arthur's administration.

(6) Therefore since 1856 the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, so far as the first seven articles were concerned, became *voidable on notice* by either Great Britain or the United States: but was obligatory until thus made void.
(7) The eighth article was general in terms and intentionally vague; providing for the contracting powers to take into consideration, *etc.*, other routes, but not binding upon either to do so.
(8) That this eighth article had been interjected into the treaty at the last moment to secure the ratification of the treaty in general, the Senate being very close.
(9) But the British negotiator recognized this incidental and immaterial character of this eighth article and signed the treaty without submitting it to the foreign office for approval as the first seven articles had been submitted and approved.
Consequently my opinion was that the eighth article, as well as the other seven, was voidable on notice by either party subsequent to 1856.

At Mr. Godoy's request I wrote out these points in my "memorandum of March 7, 1885 on the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty" (held back until then, as the Senate had decided not to act until after Mr. Cleveland's administration came into power), which was sent to Secretary Bayard,[4] who told me afterwards that it was absolutely conclusive, "the ablest exposition of the subject in state department." Mr. Cleveland was equally emphatic; and the proposed treaty was called back from the Senate and cancelled.

In these later days the same question having come to the front, I have had a typewritten copy of that memorandum made, with supplement to date, which I should be pleased to furnish to the President or state department, or Senate committee as you may advise.

Awaiting reply, I am

Yours very truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

[4] Thomas Francis Bayard (1828–1898), secretary of state in President Cleveland's administration.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[New York]
December 28, 1898

My dear Mr. Long:

I noticed in General Miles's testimony a week or so ago, a statement, or at the least an implication, that the navy had in some way failed to meet its engagements to provide facilities for landing the army at Santiago. I presume there was not wanting some one to remind you — if *you* forgot — that the department at the suggestion of the war board wrote to the war department, to know if such aid were wanted; and that the reply was that they would do their own landing, asking of us only safe convoy to the spot.

I wish also to say to you that an opinion attributed to Senator Hanna [1] by the papers, that the conditions of naval war-ship construction are so unsettled, that we should postpone further increase of the navy, and should await the results of other nations' experiments, is wholly without *practical* foundation; by which I mean that there is nothing so far in sight, indicating such radical change, that it is expedient for us to postpone by a day such naval development as our political conditions demand, and our financial conditions permit. On political and financial considerations I do not undertake to speak; but on the military question I submit the above as my professional opinion.

With much respect,
Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

[1] Marcus Alonzo Hanna (1837–1904), U. S. senator from Ohio.

1899

COMMODORE PHILIP TO SECRETARY LONG

448 Washington Avenue
Personal [Brooklyn, New York]
January 14, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I desire to personally thank you for the confidence you have shown in ordering me to so important a command as the New York Yard.

I appreciate it very much, and it will be my endeavor in the execution of duty to do nothing that will ever cause you to regret the official act of the department.

I relieved Admiral Bunce[1] to-day: a sad scene to witness — the departure from active service of an officer of such long and honorable record in the navy.

Again thanking you for your kind consideration, I remain,

Sincerely and obediently yours,
J. W. PHILIP

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
NEW YORK
January 16, 1899

DEAR MR. LONG:

While you were good enough to dispense me from replying to your letter of the first, you will believe that I should not have availed myself of such permission had not a combination of press of work and indisposition prevented my doing so promptly.

After looking the matter up in the appendix to bureau of navigation report, I find that the navy convoy was reported ready to proceed Saturday evening, June 4. My *recollection* is very clear that on the morning of June 8, when Southerland's[1] report of a Spanish squadron was received, our anxiety was increased by the fact that we had gone home the evening before expecting the transports to sail on the morning of the eighth. Whether they would have got away I don't know, but they were stopped. The rest of the record, however, is clear. When the naval vessels returned from scouring the place where the suspicious sails were reported, they had to coal,

[1] Francis Marvin Bunce (1836–1901).

[1] Lieutenant W. H. H. Southerland, commanding the yacht *Eagle*.

and the result was (page 675) that they left Key West for the rendezvous the same day, June 14, that the transports sailed from Tampa (Remey's and Hunker's[2] telegrams, page 675). The delay in the final sailing was from the eighth to at least the fourteenth, unless I am wrong as to the army's readiness on the eighth; and was due to Southerland's report, and the action taken on it.

As regards the panic, I was speaking more from the popular point of view, as represented in the press and in general conversation. Since your letter, I have had three occasions to observe the impressions of other men, at dinner talks, in conversation, not originated by me. The coincidence was singular, as I had your letter in my mind; and I find that all those present agreed in the fact that very exaggerated apprehensions were felt, and precautions taken, by the seaboard populations. Writing as I was for the public as well as for the navy, hoping to convey ideas useful for the future, if a similar future should arise, I felt justified in pointing [out] pretty sharply the baseless nature of much of the fears, as well as the proper means of securing us against the recurrence of the same.

With regard to the function of the Flying Squadron, I think there is no real difference between us. Its object I apprehend to be as you say; to attack the Spanish fleet if it came north. That, however, in a military sense, is coast protection; the offenso-defensive, as some call it. My point was that proper fortification of the coast, would have released that squadron for offensive operations on the Cuban coast. I develop this further in succeeding papers.

I feel much indebted to you for your trouble in criticizing the papers. Even when a man thinks himself substantially right, it is helpful to see that his words may require modification, either by softening, or retrenchment, or amplification.

If you should ever happen to have the curiosity to look at the telegram I sent from Paris April 29, to [the] state department, you will recognize the relation my present papers bear to the general ideas with which I approached the subject. The telegram seemingly never got on the navy department files, and I had to recover it, for myself, through the state department.

With much respect,
Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

[2] Captain John Jacob Hunker (1844–1916), commanding the convoy which transported General Shafter's army.

EDWARD EVERETT HALE TO SECRETARY LONG

39 Highland Street
Roxbury, Massachusetts
January 17, 1898 [1899?]

My dear Governor:

Your note, I need not say, gratifies me very much. I had no thought of offering advice. I only meant to say, "Amen." The only advice I have given in my pulpit to the South Congregational Church, is that they should do what they were told to do, and *not offer their* advice to people who know more than they do. The army, of course, must be governed by the terms of surrender. But for the seamen and their officers, you have white paper. The war itself is a new-fashioned war. It is for new motives, and may make its own precedents. If you send home these officers *without parole,* you gently intimate that they will do us no harm, wherever they are — while you are doing a great courtesy to them. You could say, "We intend to leave these gentlemen quite free as to their future lives." I am quite clear that this would be a real step forward, toward the war code of the twentieth century.

Always yours, with admiration,
E. E. Hale[1]

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Texas*
Havana, Cuba
January 18, 1899

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Several days ago Commodore Cromwell[1] permitted me to select a souvenir of what is left of the wreck of the *Maine* — a very well stripped wreck. I selected a brass railing that protected the after search light, which has no value beyond that of scrap brass. May I keep it? It is my wish to present it to some institution in Albany, my native city, or to the capitol at Albany. I visited Albany several weeks ago and was received by the people in a way to make me wish to show some recognition in the manner suggested. While at Havana previously I gave no thought to the collection of souvenirs. I should like to feel that I have secured the souvenir openly.

With much respect,

Yours sincerely,
C. D. Sigsbee

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[1] Reverend Edward Everett Hale (1822–1909).

[1] Bartlett Jefferson Cromwell (1840–1917).

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[New York]
January 19, 1899

Dear Mr. Long:

Dining out last night I found myself close to General (Wallace) Randolph,[1] who was, I believe, chief of artillery with Shafter's corps. I asked him whether it was true that the expedition was ready when held up by the report of a Spanish division. He replied yes, that four transports had already gone down the bay; and that in the intervening time water had been used to such an extent on board some vessels as to require rewatering before another start, involving a fresh delay. One man's memory of course is not final demonstration; but it shows the need of establishing the point decisively, for such recollections find their way through society and become part of the stock of belief as commonly held.

Very truly yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long

SENATOR PLATT TO SECRETARY LONG

Senate Chamber
Washington
January 19, 1899

Sir:

Referring to our conversation, I send you copy of the paper which I referred to as having been furnished me by a friend of Captain Goodrich giving a summary of his services during the war with Spain.

I hear that Admiral Sampson is in Washington or is soon to come here, and I should certainly feel much gratified if you had the occasion to speak with him regarding the services of Captain Goodrich.

Yours truly,
O. H. Platt[1]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[1] Wallace F. Randolph (1841–1910).

[1] Orville Hitchcock Platt (1827–1905), U. S. senator from Connecticut.

[Enclosure]

SUMMARY OF SERVICES DURING THE WAR WITH SPAIN OF CAPTAIN C. F. GOODRICH, UNITED STATES NAVY

1. Organized the coast signal service [2] so efficiently, and without expending a dollar, that within twenty-four hours of the sending of a telegraphic order on April 22 "to establish and man coast signal stations already determined by me" the service was in order from Maine to Texas. (See report of the superintendent of the United States Coast Signal Service).
2. Took command of the auxiliary cruiser *St. Louis* on April 24 and scouted until May 10 off the Windward Islands.
3. May 13, the *St. Louis* cut the cable between St. Thomas and San Juan, Porto Rico.
4. May 18, in company with the tug *Wompatuck*, she cut one of the two cables from Santiago to Jamaica, being for over seven hours within easy range of the forts. After her hooking onto the cable the Spaniards opened up on her and for forty-two minutes the *St. Louis* with her two six-pounders in broadside, and the *Wompatuck*, with her one three-pounder, fought the batteries on shore. She brought the cable to the surface, cut out some two hundred fathoms, and then steamed away.
5. May 20, cut the French cable from Môle St. Nicholas to Guantánamo.
6. June 7, the *St. Louis* cut the cable from Guantánamo to Santiago.
7. During the nights of June 14 and 16 the *St. Louis* went closer in to the western battery and the shore than any battleship ever got. She was grappling for the Santiago-Cienfuegos cables. Why she was not blown out of the water possibly the Spaniard can say.
8. At midnight of June 18, the *St. Louis* went alongside the patrol battleship off the mouth of the harbor, grappled and cut the second Santiago-Jamaica cable. Captain Goodrich had now completely isolated Cuba from Madrid by himself cutting every one of the three foreign cables leading to that island. From this time on, Blanco [3] had no communication with his home government, or the outside world, except such dispatches as were permitted to pass over the American lines between Havana and Key West.

[2] See Captain Goodrich's letter of March 24, 1898.
[3] Marshal Ramon y Arenas Blanco (b. 1833), Governor-General of Cuba.

9. June 20, Captain Goodrich went on board the *Suwanee* and took her close in to the harbor mouth at Santiago in another night attempt to grapple the Cienfuegos-Santiago cables. Spanish officers on shore subsequently stated that the *Suwanee* was so near the beach that conversation on board was heard on shore. One again wonders why Captain Goodrich was allowed to escape alive.

10. From June 22 to June 27, Captain Goodrich had sole charge of the landing of General Shafter's army, winning great praise for the navy. The President, in his message, says of this operation, "This was accomplished under great difficulties, but with marvellous despatch." General Shafter never fails to express his obligation to the navy and to Captain Goodrich, personally, when he has occasion to refer to the matter.

11. That Captain Goodrich was not present when Cervera's fleet was destroyed, is due to his voluntarily staying at Cape Cruz until word could be heard from the *Scorpion*, which had gone into Manzanillo, or another ship should arrive to relieve the *St. Louis*.

12. Captain Goodrich brought Admiral Cervera and nearly 700 other Spanish officers and sailors north. None were killed or wounded on board the *St. Louis*, none died and so well were all treated that Admiral Cervera recorded his gratitude in his letter of thanks to Captain Goodrich, published by the navy department.

13. The *St. Louis* took Major General Brooke, his headquarters and the Third Regiment Illinois Infantry from Hampton Roads to Porto Rico. General Brooke wrote to Captain Goodrich, "I can not refrain from expressing to you my gratification at the complete and comfortable arrangements which were made on your ship for the transportation of my headquarters and the Third Illinois, from Fortress Monroe to this point. The uniform courtesy and consideration shown by yourself and officers will also be a pleasant remembrance of this time of war." Captain Goodrich appears to stand alone in winning laurels in the transportation of troops.

14. August 1, Captain Goodrich, having the *Gloucester* and *Wasp* under his immediate command, demanded and received the surrender of Arroyo, Porto Rico, selected as the landing-place of the First Army Corps under General Brooke.

15. August 8, Captain Goodrich was transferred to the *Newark*.

16. With the *Resolute*, carrying the marine battalion, *Hist*, *Osceola*, and *Alvarado*, in company with the *Newark*, Captain Goodrich went through the Barrier Reef on the south side of Cuba and

through the Inland Sound, some seventy miles of indifferently known navigation, drawing six feet more water than any ship that ever before had gone there. He appeared on August 12 off Manzanillo, and demanded a complete surrender. That being refused he commenced to bombard the place at 3.45 P.M. At sunset he hauled off the smaller craft — but, from the *Newark*, kept up an irregular fire during the night. It is creditably [*sic*] reported that some three hundred Spanish troops were killed and wounded in the affair. At daylight, August 13 white flags were seen flying all over the town, and a flag of truce brought out a telegram from the secretary of the navy, announcing the armistice. Subsequent information proves that the Spaniards had drawn up and signed a letter on unconditional surrender of the place, its dependencies and several thousand troops. So near did Captain Goodrich come to achieving the fourth great victory of the war, Manila, Cervera's fleet, and the fall of Santiago, being the other three.

IRA N. HOLLIS TO SECRETARY LONG

Lawrence Scientific School
Harvard University
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
January 19, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I send you by mail to-day an invitation to a dinner given in honor of Admiral Sampson here in Boston. We all hope that you can be present, and I shall be especially glad to be able to convey the good news of your coming to our committee having the matter in charge.

While writing you I find occasion for congratulation in the passage of the personnel bill by the House of Representatives.[1] The practical disappearance of opposition seems to augur well for the Senate and I sincerely hope that it will go through the Senate. If you have anything to suggest which can be done from Cambridge towards its speedy passage I shall be glad to assist. I venture to add that the most important thing in connection with this bill will be a practical examination and overhauling of the course at the

[1] The chief feature of the personnel bill, enacted March 3, 1899, was the amalgamation of the line and the engineer corps. For discussion of the subject, and of the line and staff controversy, see Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 77–88. For the line point of view see letter of Admiral Selfridge, November 19, 1897; and for the staff point of view see letter of Chief-Constructor Bowles, December 6, 1901.

Naval Academy in order to put it in the way of carrying out the ideas suggested in the bill. All reorganizaton must begin in the school, and if our men are to do good work in the engine room and on the quarter-deck the fact must be recognized in their education.

I have been tempted to write you that I should be delighted to serve in any way in connection with a report on the Naval Academy course, or to draw up some kind of a report for the board of visitors in the spring. My interest is great, doubly so as I should like to see the whole project started before your administration comes to an end.

Yours very truly,
IRA N. HOLLIS

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *New York*
February 3, 1899

Personal

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Writing you as requested: I think the admiral's health has decidedly improved in the last few days and I believe his going to sea in the normal conditions which we shall have, will go a long way to re-establish it completely. To the great strain of responsibility up to July 3 followed the attitude of so many which in a large number of cases extended to vituperation. Papers came to him marked with the most outrageous expressions and even papers of the class of the *Baltimore American* spoke of him as a coward. He never said anything more than "Oh, it will all come right," but it was not in human nature not to be affected by such things. As you well said in your letter on this subject, had he been an enemy of his country, he could not have been spoken of more harshly.

Following this came the very unsympathetic association of the commission in Cuba.[1] I need not say much about this, but it was far from agreeable. These things largely account for his ill condition.

I think the next three months of active duty of the sort he will have will bring him back in the health in which we should all like to see him.

I am,
Very truly yours,
F. E. CHADWICK

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

[1] See Admiral Sampson's letter of November 4, 1898.

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Texas*
Havana, Cuba
February 7, 1899

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Your recent letter makes it quite clear, that you could not authorize me to retain the piece of railing from the *Maine*. I was misled by Goodrich's presentation of a gun to the state house at Hartford. I note that his case is covered by the statute. I shall hold the railing subject to your order, and later may request that it be set up in some government building – perhaps the Naval Academy Library. I regret that the hinges should fall under the ban: they were not worth more than twenty-five cents as I found them. It is the work put on them since that makes them what they are. In choosing I took only what I thought had paltry intrinsic value, – and nothing for myself except two or three rivets which I have lost. With cheerful concurrence in your decision I remain,

Yours most respectfully,
C. D. Sigsbee

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Texas*
Havana, Cuba
February 7, 1899

My dear Mr. Secretary:

May I ask your acceptance – personally – of a copy of my book, the *Narrative of the Maine*, which I have requested the Century Company to mail you. The facts in the book are set forth correctly, I think, but I fear the literary style is very wooden. I would like to call your attention to the last appendix and, especially, to that giving Powelson's[1] discussion of the seat of the originating explosion. He gave to the court facts only: in the appendix he draws deductions. His argument is very able. My book was issued by the

[1] Ensign Wilfrid Van Nest Powelson (b. 1872), whose testimony before the court of inquiry tended to prove that the *Maine* was blown up by an external explosion.

Century [Company] on February 4. It goes to you with my sincere good will and my full appreciation of your kindness towards me.

Most respectfully yours,

C. D. SIGSBEE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
BOSTON
February 25, 1899

MY DEAR LONG:

There was another dinner in Boston last week in addition to that of the Home Market Club; [1] and very naturally the position of the President in his speech at the great dinner and subsequent addresses on the following day, was discussed at the Free Trade League dinner last Saturday, under the general subject for the evening — "United States in the East." As the guests of the evening, Mr. E. B. Haskell [2] and I spoke in favor of our expansion policy, while the opposite side was taken by Mr. W. L. Garrison [3] and Mr. H. W. Chaplin,[4] members of the club and apparently its exponents.

I have had my address typewritten for you and enclose it with my compliments: as an appendix you will find the table I promised you on the "Comparative Value of Latin-American and Asiatic Trade," which has been carefully prepared: some time since I sent you my ethnographical chart of America, showing per cent. of the different races in each of the American countries. I refer you to it for details as in the sixth point of my argument I state the reasons, thus proved by three centuries of experience in America, why there seems to be a paramount natural law governing the colonization and immigration of Caucasian race; that the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian in both the north and the south temperate zones drops to twenty-five per cent. upon entering the tropics and steadily declines to ten per cent. at the equator, whether it is approached from the north or the south. Consequently we may assume the rule that, where the Caucasian element is greatly over-

[1] A political club advocating a high protective tariff.

[2] Edwin Bradbury Haskell (1837–1907), editor of the *Boston Herald.*

[3] William Lloyd Garrison, Jr., anti-imperialist, secretary of the Free Trade League.

[4] Heman White Chaplin (1847–1924), Harvard College '67, Boston lawyer.

shadowed by the mixed or native races of the tropics, political systems of government found suited to the Caucasian peoples of the temperate zone must be radically modified to suit the condition of such tropical peoples. Just what modifications are necessary depends upon more accurate information than we at present possess, but without which it would be hazardous to plan a system of government.

There are, you will observe in the sixth and seventh points of my argument, two fortunate exceptions to this general rule: that Cuba and Porto Rico have respectively sixty-five per cent. and fifty-seven per cent. Caucasian in their population, and thus stand upon a similar race-footing with North Carolina (sixty-two per cent.) and Georgia (fifty-three per cent.): whence we may feel encouraged in the belief that those islands may ultimately become fit for self-government in accord with our American ideas of republican government.

In the absence of a Caucasian predominance I believe that experience is unanimously in favor of a *strong* government, — whether it be by an oligarchy or by a president-dictator, — as the only prospect of assuring peace, order, and justice. This explains the numerous "dictatorships," which are synchronous with order and prosperity in the tropical states of America, which otherwise are in a state of revolutionary chaos due, I think, to investing their people with universal suffrage before they are prepared to use that political privilege wisely and intelligently. If nations or individuals can not or will not control their passions, they must be controlled by the strong hand.

In the seventh point — "Common Origin of Local Government in Spanish America and the United States" — I state the historical fact that the Anglo-Saxon invasion of England took place at the same period of the Visigothic invasion of Spain; that these two peoples were branches of the same race and neighbors in north Germany; that presumably they had similar customs and ideas of government; that their local government (and the idea of national government, properly so-called, did not develop until long after the fifth century) would probably be traceable to a common origin.

Such, I show in my address, was the fact; the pueblo of Castile (Gothic Spain) was transplanted in Spanish America, just as the Anglo-Saxon town was brought to New England by our forefathers. You will find unanswerable evidence in that part of my address

of the common origin of the pueblo of Gothic Spain and of Spanish America, and of the New England town as first organized in Massachusetts: that both were democratic republics, with town officers annually elected, with town meetings, common mowing-fields, cow pastures, wood lots, and planting-fields; with house lots of twelve acres for married and eight acres for unmarried men, held in fee simple; with public worship supported by town taxation; and the same general overseers of commons, *etc.*, as we still elect at March meetings. Thus we find a common original basis for the New England town, from which self-government has been developed in the United States along the line from school district and town to state and national government. In Spanish America, the "pueblo," or town, was the political centre from which radiated the marvelous success of the Spanish conquerors for the first century after the discovery of America. Under Philip II popular liberty and local self-government was suppressed in both Spain and Spanish America, and the proconsular government of centralized despotism substituted completely in Spain and to a considerable extent in Spanish America.

Under this new dispensation, the Spanish rubbish of centralized government can be swept away and thus uncover the sound system of the original pueblo (still existing in Mexico and Chile and some other parts of Spanish America), which is the same as our own original town government; and thence by carefully following the lines of development which we have followed, the local government of Porto Rico and Cuba may be gradually assimilated to our American system; and, once in successful operation there, this adaptation will ultimately spread to other Latin-American countries and assimilate them to the United States, resulting in a genuine commonwealth of American nations under the hegemony of the United States. This would be constructive statesmanship of the highest type: and this explains what I said in a former letter — "I had rather have entrusted to me the Americanizing of Porto Rico, than be President."

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[New York]
February 26, 1899

Dear Mr. Long:

I have to thank you for the copy of Hunker's letter to Southerland. I have read it twice attentively. It is clear that the expedition, so far as the army was concerned, could not have started on the day which we were at the time given to understand; *i.e.*, June 8. It seems equally clear that much delay was occasioned by the telegram of Southerland's report, which was the point I desired to emphasize. The delay was improved – or more properly was beneficial – in permitting a larger number of troops to go; but I should say from Hunker's letter there can be no question that delay there was. This in no way reflected upon the navy at large, and if any expression of mine seems to imply it, I will to the utmost of my power correct it. No such impression has ever been in my mind; but I thought then, and think now, that the precipitancy with which the report was brought – or, it may be more accurate to say, the failure to wait till daylight to test an appearance antecedently most improbable – was a grave fault on the part of the officer. I don't suppose there was a man on our board who believed the report to be well founded; but when sent by an officer of Southerland's intelligence, we thought then, and I think now, it would have been culpable to disregard it. Had that convoy been seriously injured, we had *no* army to replace the one it carried.

The precipitation to carry the report, when waiting a few hours for daylight would have tested the matter, is one of those lessons which the service should take to heart.

I shall of course be at pains to bring my paper into strict accordance with the facts, as now shown to me. I fear it may be too late to make the change in my final paper, due to appear April 1. What I say, however, is entirely general, no names mentioned, and the whole incident treated merely as a military lesson. It is mentioned, also, wholly incidentally. The date June 8 is really the only thing out.

Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

SECRETARY LONG TO B. F. BROWN

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 28, 1899

MY DEAR SIR:

I thank you for your kind letter, in which you refer to the article in the *Atlanta Constitution* with reference to Admirals Sampson and Schley.

You are quite right in the impression that this article does injustice to the navy department in accusing it of injustice to Admiral Schley. I am sure the *Constitution* would not have done this, if it had been more familiar with the action of the department. It so happens that the navy department has treated Admiral Schley with the utmost consideration. It selected him for command of the Flying Squadron, although he was the junior officer on the list of commodores. It gave him the opportunity to take that squadron to meet Cervera's fleet when it was approaching the southern coast of Cuba, which was one of the great opportunities of the war. After the battle of Santiago, when Sampson, as commander-in-chief, was recommended for advancement, Schley, being next in command, was recommended for advancement with him. The department has never expressed any criticism of Admiral Schley, unless it be criticism that when the Senate, at the request, I am informed, of his friends, called upon the department for a report of the facts, it reported them in its communication of February 6, and then reported simply the record. Before doing so, it submitted its report to a board of officers, one of whom was Admiral Schley's flag-lieutenant, and they certified that the facts as stated in the report corresponded with the facts and records of the department. It is true that the report shows what I think Admiral Schley himself will frankly admit, that he committed a mistake in retreating from before Santiago in his original approach to that port, without first ascertaining, what he would easily have discovered had he held on, that Cervera's fleet was there. The backward step which he took at that time starting on his return to Key West caused a great deal of anxiety to the President and to the department, and I am sure that nobody now regrets it more than Admiral Schley himself.

You will thus see that the department has treated him, as I said above, with the utmost consideration. It has been the desire of the department to avoid all frictions. Although, as Admiral Schley

once remarked to me, the best of men sometimes make mistakes, I had hoped that both officers would be confirmed, as I have nothing but the kindest feelings for each of them. I am sure you will agree to this when you reflect that the only word that the department has uttered that could in any way be construed into a criticism of the officer in question is contained in the report which it was compelled to make in reply to the demand of the Senate for the facts and records in his case. You may be sure that Admiral Schley, who is an officer of long experience, would demand a court of inquiry if he thought the department had put on record anything that unjustly reflects upon his discharge of his duties as a naval officer.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

MR. B. F. BROWN
3 Goodrich Street
AUGUSTA, GEORGIA

ADMIRAL DEWEY TO SECRETARY LONG

Flagship *Olympia*
MANILA
March 8, 1899

Personal

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

For over a year I have been in a trying climate with many cares and responsibilities and now begin to feel the effects. So when the work of the commission is completed I shall ask to return to the United States. This I can do the more readily from the fact that it should cause you little embarrassment, as Captain Barker of the *Oregon*, now on the eve of promotion, will be here to take my place in the interim until my successor can arrive on the station. Captain Barker is a man of rare good judgment, as you know, and is in my opinion fully able to act upon any of the many delicate questions continually arising here.

If you concur, I should like to return to an Atlantic port, via Suez, and in the flagship *Olympia*. I need not remind you that the *Olympia* was ordered home over a year ago for repairs. The *Baltimore* now on the station is fully equipped as a flagship, so that the absence of the *Olympia* would not leave my successor without one. I ask this not only for myself but also on behalf of the officers and men of this ship as a reward for faithful services.

I will, of course, make the above request officially at the proper time.

Thanking you for your uniform consideration, and with assurances of my high esteem, I am,

Very truly yours,
GEORGE DEWEY

My successor should leave United States as soon as convenient. He should be made member of the commission to Philippine Islands.

The *Baltimore* requires mess outfit for commander-in-chief.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
HAVANA, CUBA
March 9, 1899

MY DEAR SECRETARY:

I am sending you a letter addressed to the President in the hope that it may put a stop to the unseemly discussion regarding my promotion.

It appears that no matter how clearly you may place the matter before Congress, even when called for by Congress, such statement has only produced anger where it was intended to produce conviction. Probably any further argument or reasons would meet the same fate. I therefore see no other course left but acquiescence and silence.

I do not ask that anything be done for myself; but I shall deeply regret that any dislike to me personally should deprive those who served with me, and to whom I am greatly attached, of the honor and reward they so justly deserve.

If the enclosed letter meets your approval, I ask you to hand it to the President.

Yours sincerely,
W. T. SAMPSON

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

SECRETARY LONG TO REAR-ADMIRAL SCHLEY

Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 17, 1899

DEAR ADMIRAL:

In view of the suggestion in some of the newspapers that injustice has been done you in the matter of your examination for promotion, although I am sure you entertain no feeling of that kind, the department having only followed the usual routine as pro-

vided by law, I shall yet be glad if you will freely inform me if I am in error in that respect and, if so, in what manner I can make the method of examination better or more satisfactory.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG

Rear-Admiral W. S. SCHLEY

REAR-ADMIRAL SCHLEY TO SECRETARY LONG

The Everett
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 17, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

In reply to your note of this date I beg to say that I am in no way responsible either by intimation or inspiration of [*sic*] the suggestion that injustice was being done me in the matter of my examination for promotion, and I am gratified that you should feel sure that I entertain no feeling of that kind: I would state that you are not in error in that respect.

I could have no objection to the examination which the department orders upon all officers alike preliminary to promotion, and I have already presented myself and have been examined by the medical board at the navy yard, Washington, D. C. Nor could I, in all fairness to my brother officers who like myself are to be examined for promotion, ask the department to make the method of examination other than that which has been usual heretofore.

Availing the invitation of your note to freely inform you if there is any error in this respect to the end that you can make the method of examination better or more satisfactory, I feel some surprise that the matter should have become one of controversy.

Very truly yours,
W. S. SCHLEY[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

Confidential

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 20, 1899

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I have just finished the most minute study I can make of the course of Admiral Schley during the war, and I have come very

[1] This is the only Schley letter in the Long collection.

strongly to the conclusion that the only way to settle this matter properly and clear the public mind is to have a court of enquiry. I should think you could order such a court for both Sampson and Schley on the ground of the controversy that has arisen and the earnest desire of the department to have absolute justice done to those officers. In that way you will get all the testimony before the public in a conclusive manner, and I know of no other. Of course Admiral Schley's failure to ask for a court of enquiry is conclusive to those who understand the situation, but the public does not understand it, therefore it seems to me that it is of great importance that the records of both Sampson and Schley should be submitted to an impartial court.

Sincerely yours,
H. C. LODGE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

ALEXANDER AGASSIZ TO SECRETARY LONG

Long's Hotel, New Bond Street
LONDON W.
March 22, 1899

MY DEAR SIR:

I take it that you have been informed by the Honorable George M. Bowers,[1] United States fish commissioner, that he proposes next September to send the United States fish commissioner ship *Albatross* on an exploring trip to the islands of the South Seas in the Pacific. He has kindly offered me to take charge of the expedition and to enable me to explore the coral reefs of the paumotus [2] of the Friendly Islands, the Gilbert and Marshall Islands and on our way to sound out and explore by trawl and dredge the part of the basin of the Pacific which we cross and which lies outside the track of any of the expeditions thus far sent out by the English and German governments.

I look upon this expedition as one of the most important which has ever been sent out. The *Albatross* as you know is the best equipped vessel for such a purpose existing. On a former occasion when the *Albatross* was placed at my disposal for three months off Panama we accomplished more than the *Challenger* expedition [3] did in three years in certain lines and a trip of five to six months such

[1] George Meade Bowers (1863–1925).
[2] British chart, the equivalent of the French official tuamotus.
[3] British scientific expedition, 1872–1876.

as is proposed can not fail to be of the greatest importance both from the hydrographic and the natural history point of view.

My object in writing is to ask your friendly coöperation, for the success of the expedition must in a great measure depend upon her officers and crew. The present commander of the *Albatross*, Lieutenant-Commander Jefferson F. Moser,[4] United States Navy, has had great experience in the handling of all the machinery designed for sounding and deep sea trawling and I hope it may be possible to retain him in command at least for this trip as well as such officers as have served on such work before or have a special interest in it. As I remember the crew of the *Albatross* many of them were old hands at the work and thoroughly familiar with the routine of deep sea work and naturally I am anxious that the crew of the *Albatross* should be men specially selected for their capacity.

Since the expedition of Wilkes in 1843 the United States have not sent any expedition to the Pacific except the one of the *Albatross* in 1891 and I am sure that under favourable conditions the results can not fail to do honour to the department and the country.

I hope to be in Cambridge again the first of April and expect to be at Washington in the middle of April and will if you allow me take the liberty of calling upon you and explaining more in detail the objects of the expedition as well as the conditions under which the *Albatross* has been placed at my disposal by the United States commissioner of fisheries.

I am,
Yours very respectfully,
A. Agassiz[5]

To the Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

LIEUTENANT STAUNTON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *New York*
Kingston, Jamaica
March 30, 1899

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of March 11, and to thank you for its kind tone, and for the interest in myself which you express. I beg that you will believe that I wish no recognition except that due to my professional service and record; fur-

[4] Jefferson Franklin Moser (1848–1934).

[5] Alexander Agassiz (1835–1910), director of the Museum of Comparative Zoölogy at Harvard.

ther that I desire to give to the department's wishes in all respects the same heed that I give to its commands. I think my record of thirty-one years' service bears out both of these positions.

I think, Sir, that under the circumstances I should state briefly my reasons for complaint of the department's action. I can not "take my case alone" as suggested. The whole question is one of comparison with similar cases; its professional bearing and importance lie entirely in the difference which has been made between myself and others of the same service and recommendation.

The navy knows very well that of the considerable number of officers named for advancement, only a small number had especially and individually distinguished themselves under fire. Excepting a few cases of especial gallantry like those of Hobson, Blue,[1] Wainwright, and Winslow,[2] the service was good, steady reliable service on a high plane; always ready for duty and always struggling for a place at the front. This became conspicuous only when it was connected with brilliant and dramatic successes which commanded the attention of the whole country. These cases, I submit, stood together and were entitled to the same treatment. If a part were advanced without reference to the naval promotion board,[3] the others should have been so advanced. If some were referred to that board, all should have been so referred. I have no exception to take to any construction of the statute which the department sees fit to adopt, but I think it is incontestable that the construction adopted should be of uniform application. This, if my information has been correct, the department has failed to accomplish. Of the considerable number of officers nominated by the two commanders-in-chief all but a few were acted upon directly; and those few were referred to the naval promotion board which sent back an unfavorable opinion.

This distinction, injurious to myself, was continued to the last. On August 14, several days after Admiral Sampson's recommendations of July 10 had been acted upon by the department and myself alone refused advancement, Admiral Dewey asked promotion for Lieutenant Brumby[4] on the ground solely of efficient staff service

[1] Lieutenant Victor Blue (1865–1928).

[2] Lieutenant-Commander Cameron McRae Winslow (1854–1932).

[3] Board on promotions: Rear-Admirals Sicard, president, Edmund Orville Matthews (1836–1911), and Charles Stuart Norton (1836–1911). See Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 96–98.

[4] Thomas Mason Brumby (1855–1899).

during the campaign. Favorable action was at once taken upon this recommendation. Later, on September 16, Admiral Dewey requested for the executive officers and chief engineers of his ships "similar advancement to those of the fleet which destroyed the Spanish squadron at Santiago de Cuba." Admiral Dewey did not recommend these officers after the battle of Manila; and not until he had been informed of the rewards in the North Atlantic Fleet; and then for the expressed purpose of securing an equitable distribution of favors; and these nominations also were promptly made. I do not forget, Sir, that you personally disapproved of some of these advancements; but I do not think that I can be expected to look at anything but the final result.

I refer in this letter only to officers recommended by name for reward by the two commanders-in-chief. Men of military training and tradition attach exceptional importance to such recommendation and regard it as the highest certificate of merit. No one can judge so well of an officer's worth as the admiral or general under whose eye and command and responsibility that officer's work has been done. Especially is this true of an officer of the personal staff whose duties are intimate and confidential, and do not attach to any particular ship but to the whole command. The commander-in-chief whom he serves alone can judge in any degree of the value of his efforts. The members of the promotion board could not judge – had no means of judging – of the value of my services during the war, except as they were informed by Admiral Sampson's despatches.

Finally I desire, Mr. Secretary, expressly to disclaim any argument in favor of my own merit or services. Admiral Sampson's recommendation came to me voluntarily and without my previous knowledge of his intention. But I can not submit without respectful protest to action of the department which discriminates in such a manner as seriously to reflect upon my professional standing. If I am persistent in my objections, it is for self-defense, and not for self-seeking. I care little for five numbers; where I stand on the navy list they are of small moment; but I care a great deal for the principle which refuses to me what is granted to others of no greater claim. For as to actual participation in battle the *New York* was engaged oftener than any other heavy ship except the *Iowa*, and you have yourself stated that the battle of Santiago began on the first of June.

It is a gratification to know that many officers of this command, captains and others, think the admiral's recommendation deserved; and it is a mortification to know that other officers, not of the squadron, deem the performance of staff duty in the North Atlantic fleet less excellent than in the Asiatic fleet; – a natural and obvious conclusion; – for neither to the public at large nor to the navy was any notification given of a different estimate until February last, and first impressions are not easily dispelled. Admiral Sampson's despatches of recommendation of July 10 were published for the first time in your communication to the Senate after the removal of the injunction of secrecy.

I have written frankly, Sir, because I feel that with the compliment of your personal letter, it was due to you as well as to myself; but I have written with perfect respect, and I hope with entire propriety. I beg to thank you again, Mr. Secretary, for your kind letter.

Very respectfully yours,
S. A. STAUNTON

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
Personal KINGSTON, JAMAICA
March 31, 1899

DEAR SIR:

I have been so much impressed by the seriousness of the questions involved in the action of the Senate in the matter of the President's nominations of certain officers, that I hope I shall not be taken as going beyond my province in writing this letter. There is much more than merely the failure of a number of officers to be promoted: the failure of the Senate to act in the circumstances, is, to my mind, a blow struck at the efficiency of our governmental system itself.

The executive is charged with the discipline and administration of the army and navy and on any proper theory of good government its efforts toward the discipline and well being of the service should, under every circumstance, be upheld where possible by both houses and particularly by the Senate. These promotions can properly only be looked upon as disciplinary in char-

acter: not particularly as rewards to individuals, but as incentives to the service at large, — they must be taken to have been well considered — to ignore them, and particularly under the circumstances in which it was done, is a step destructive in character, a step in the direction of the worst tendencies of our system of irresponsibility, an irresponsibility which to my mind we shall find more and more a serious flaw in our system. It is vain to set up a department charged with the administration of such a branch as the navy, and utterly ignore its views without weakening, and most seriously weakening, authority in general.

I shall not venture to characterize the action of the Senate, but I am forced to believe that the conduct of a considerable number of members was probably beyond doubt based upon personal considerations advanced by officers of the navy, rather than upon the interests of a great service, and in so far as this was so, it was directly subversive of the authority of the commander-in-chief (the President). It is not that officers who thus opposed do not favor such action in the abstract, but the personal question involved was, combined with their knowledge of the senatorial attitude, too much for their sense of duty and fitness; I have every sympathy with those who were passed over, I have had so far as I know, no particular desire for promotion, or if I have had, it has been largely nullified by the feeling that I did not in any wise desire it at the expense of others, and I am far from writing this in any personal sense; but the promotion of officers who have had opportunity to see active war service and who have acquitted themselves in particular circumstances so as to meet approval is in the abstract right, is usual the world over and is desired by the service at large. If it were not so desired, then we would have lost all the finer sentiment which should govern a military organization. Certainly it can be stated as a general principle that no senator has a right to lend himself to such insubordination on the part of officers as that I have mentioned: he has no right to discredit the authority of such an administrative department and of the executive head of the nation, by ignoring their action because some special protégé is not included, and far less has any one in such a body a right to talk of such a department's having entered into a conspiracy against a particular officer.

The inability shown to grasp the merits of a particular question as it was so plainly and succinctly put by the department is too

astonishing for the naval mind to grasp, but "truth is the daughter of time" and I have no doubt about its final prevailment.

I speak as I have done above, because I am much impressed by the Senate's action simply from the point of view of good government. I have long, as have so many, deeply felt the very important and dangerous defects of our system arising from its irresponsibility, and the necessity of mending rather than still further weakening its weak points. Congress should by the plainest dictates of common sense be chary of discrediting its principal instruments: to do so unless under a stress of great necessity, makes a travesty of government and can only tend one way, and that a fatal one.

Very truly yours,
F. E. CHADWICK

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN BARKER TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

U. S. S. *Oregon*
MANILA BAY
April 8, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

During this cruise I have thought of many things to say to you but have not carried out my purpose, thus far.

At Guam I wrote a long letter and then tore it up — and sent none at all, but you have been so kind to Mrs. Barker in your conversations about the *Oregon, etc.*, I must thank you most sincerely. A few pleasant words go a long way to smooth over difficulties, in this little world of ours.

First, Guam can be made a fine place. The natives are good-natured and glad to be under our flag. I am sorry the whole group was not taken, so that we may have no near foreign powers, and I suppose if Spain sells her possessions in the Pacific, the other islands of the Mariana group could be bought for a very little. I believe they were all surrendered to Captain Glass,[1] when Guam was taken.

Our officers were very much pleased with Agaña, the principal city of the island. It was very clean — the cleanest city they had ever seen, though to do justice to our own officers, I will add that

[1] Henry Glass (1844–1908).

Commander Taussig [2] of the *Bennington* and the surgeon [3] of that ship advised the local government what to do to keep sickness away.

It is not easy to realize that ninety-nine years before the Pilgrims landed at Plymouth, Magellan had landed at Guam!

I fear that the fact that Spanish soldiers will be on the neighboring island, but a comparatively few miles distant where there is something of a harbor, will be bad for us, *i.e.* it will make it harder for a governor at Guam. It is said that the natives are only too glad to work if encouraged.

On the eighteenth of March I had the pleasure of saluting my old shipmate Admiral Dewey with seventeen guns. If ever you saw a pleased man, it was Dewey when the *Oregon* arrived.

And by the way, Manila Bay is just the place for the *Monadnock* and *Monterey*. No one who sees those vessels in this harbor can say a word against their efficiency. They can get close in shore and station themselves in such positions that they ought to beat off a very large force — much larger than their own. With the *Oregon*, *Monadnock* and *Monterey* here, Dewey says no foreign power would dare attempt the capture of Manila. Fighting has been going on almost every day since we have been here. The *Helena* is stationed on the northern flank, the *Monadnock* on the southern flank of the insurgents. The *Monadnock* has fired her guns almost daily at intervals — her smaller guns — but yesterday and to-day the insurgents are being driven from their positions.

I think there is but little doubt but that the backbone of the war has been broken. What vitality there may be in the creature after its back is broken remains to be seen. We have a splendid navy yard at Cavite. No one realizes it until he has seen it. Of course there is a great deal to do among these islands before they are entirely quieted, but I trust it will not be long before the natives will see that we are here for their own good.

Admiral Dewey has me with him almost every day. We drive about the country, in all directions. He seems to be very popular among the natives, and I admire him for the pains he takes to return all their salutes, to greet the mothers with a kind word, to pat the children, *etc.*, *etc.* He really has a kind heart, and he shows the natives that he has a regard for them.

Sometimes I think if he could have had five thousand marines, he

[2] Edward David Taussig (1847–1921).

[3] Passed Assistant Surgeon Eugene Potter Stone (1861–1916), Harvard Medical School '84.

would have been able to manage so that there would have been no war — but perhaps not. And again, it is very likely it is best that we have had war. The western soldiers have done splendidly. They are accustomed to the open air, and they have done excellent fighting.

Admiral Dewey seems to think that I am to relieve him, but I tell him I do not see how it is possible, for now that we have eighteen rear-admirals there will be no more *acting* admirals, and there seems to be no prospect of my promotion for a long time yet. I tell him that so far as I know I am here temporarily until relieved. He has already given me his rear-admiral shoulder straps! I do not envy the officer who relieves him. He is a *hero* in the eyes of the great American people and woe to any one that succeeds him, if anything should go wrong.

Although one gets no credit for sea service, in a junior position (I mean that sea service as a captain does not count for anything when promoted, but one is expected to go to sea again in the new grade just the same) still I am perfectly willing to remain here until the department chooses to relieve me, if the department really wishes me to stay. I leave it all to you.

Please excuse this rambling letter. I am writing it hurriedly in order to catch the mail which leaves this morning. Again thanking you for your kind words to Mrs. Barker and with kindest regards to the ladies, believe me

Very sincerely yours,
A. S. Barker

ALLAN D. BROWN TO SECRETARY LONG

Norwich University
Northfield, Vermont
April 11, 1899

Sir:

I beg leave respectfully to call your attention to the fact that after correspondence with Admiral Dewey on my part, the trustees of this institution have decided to erect here a building to be called Dewey Hall, as a testimonial to the admiral. This project has his explicit approval conveyed to me in a cable message on January 20 last. It was at this university that the admiral received his first military education, having been one of her cadets for three years prior to entering the Naval Academy; he has frequently expressed

his warm regard for her and has said that "nothing the state could do for him would give him greater pleasure than to have the legislature vote substantial assistance to Norwich University as in his opinion circumstances have shown the excellent character of the training received by young men here."

We seek to obtain subscriptions from the public at large for this purpose, believing that no more worthy memorial of the deeds of the great admiral could be erected. We desire to obtain sufficient funds not only to erect, but also to maintain, the building in proper manner, and if you will be good enough to signify your approval of this plan, I am sure its success will be assured.

Messrs. Atwill[1] and Knox[2] inform me by telegraph that they have this day called upon you in person in the interest of this plan, and that you have signified your wish that I should address you in this manner.

Trusting you may be able to render us the assistance we desire and with many thanks for the kind attention shown to our representatives, I am, Sir,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
ALLAN D. BROWN[3]
President

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON

SECRETARY LONG TO ADMIRAL DEWEY

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
April 12, 1899

MY DEAR ADMIRAL:

I have your letter of March 8 and am not surprised that you begin to feel the effects of the cares and responsibilities to which you have been subjected for more than a year, not only in a trying climate, but in a most trying crisis of official duty.

I have shown your letter to the President, who joins with me

[1] Probably the Right Reverend Edward Robert Atwill (1840–1911), Episcopal bishop of Western Missouri, who had lived several years in Vermont and had given an address at Norwich University.

[2] Possibly William Shadrach Knox (1843–1914), M. C. from Massachusetts.

[3] Reverend Allan Danvers Brown (1843–1904).

in hearty appreciation of your work and in sympathy with the purpose which you express of returning to the United States when the work of the commission is completed.

I need not say that it is with a great feeling of regret that I contemplate your coming away from the position in which your services are so vitally important. I will at once confer with the bureau of navigation, and meantime will await the official request which you say you will hereafter make.

With most cordial kind regards, I am,

Very sincerely yours,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

Admiral GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N.
Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station
MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

REAR-ADMIRAL PHILIP TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
NEW YORK
April 20, 1899

SIR:

In reply to your letter of the eighteenth I would submit the following statement.

Upon the recent visit of our President to the southern states, I read his speeches and remarks in the papers and, with pleasure, noticed how he referred to all matters connected with the rebellion of 1861–1865. I have also been in the South of late and had the pleasure of noticing the great patriotic feeling manifested everywhere. During the late war we all know the spirit which animated the southern people and the eagerness with which they responded to the President's call.

After assuming command of this yard I noticed that the inscription on the ram needed repainting, and that the said inscription read as follows: "Taken from the Rebel Ram *Mississippi*." I sent word to the captain of the yard and the ordnance officer that when the ram was repainted the word "rebel" should be left out, as I thought that term no longer existed in our country. This was done and the inscription now reads: "The Ram of the *Mississippi*."

There is no definite information here concerning this ram; but it is said to have been brought to the yard in 1865, and it is probable that the inscription was then placed upon it, with the approval of the commandant at that time.

If I have committed any error in changing the title, which appeared to me inappropriate at this date, I regret the act, and remain,

Very respectfully,
J. W. Philip
Commandant

The Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

GEORGE BATCHELOR TO SECRETARY LONG

272 Congress Street
Boston, Massachusetts
April 20, 1899

My dear Mr. Long:

I am moved to write to you some things that I would not say in the *Christian Register*. I would write to the President, but probably my letter would never come to his notice, and if it did it would mean nothing to him. I am a straight Republican, having never voted any other ticket since the days of John C. Frémont. I am not an outsider or a kicker. I have some opportunity of knowing what thoughts are moving in the minds of men, and I am extremely solicitous for the welfare of the Republican party. I am going to write therefore, from the lowest point of view as a practical politician, stating a few facts which are daily brought to my notice.

The war in the Philippines is slowly alienating the American people from the administration. The President's personal popularity is steadily waning. That which the extreme anti-imperialists are saying publicly, is slowly in some form taking possession of the minds of men. The reticence of the President in regard to his policy is interpreted in two ways: both to his disadvantage. Those who think he is drifting and trying to find and express the wishes of the people, say that he mistakes their wishes, and is weekly leading us to disaster. They who think that he is secretly moved by an ambition to be the first great American expansionist are beginning to distrust his sincerity. They who believe in him and admire him, but do not believe in subjugating the Philippines, say that he is taking upon himself unnecessarily a responsibility which threatens to overwhelm him.

So great is the change which is coming over the silent people who are not politicians, that within three or four weeks the unexampled enthusiasm for Admiral Dewey has begun to suffer eclipse. The change from intense admiration to a negative atti-

tude is very striking. No military personage in the Philippines has by his exploits excited any popular enthusiasm; no one returning will be hailed as a popular hero because of military achievements in the Philippines.

The country is divided into three parties. First those who favor colonial expansion and advocate it freely. Second those who oppose it and are vociferous in their denunciation of the government. Third, a rapidly increasing, silent multitude who will have to be reckoned with at the ballot box.

I look forward with apprehension to the possibility of a popular reaction against the administration and the Republican party. The one thing we may count upon to save us, is the folly of the Democrats. Between Bryan and Croker [1] they can not put up any candidate who would win the votes of the Republican party; but if they were able to unite the Democratic party upon say Grover Cleveland, they would, in my opinion, catch the votes of one-third of the Republicans of the United States. The change in the tone of the religious press during the last month from the expression of an elated expectation to silence is very striking, and to me ominous of misfortunes which may befall the party which I have loved and trusted since its beginning.

Very cordially yours,
GEORGE BATCHELOR [2]
Editor

P. S. Since writing the above and letting it lie on my table for consideration, the decision of Mr. Reed [3] has been announced. I do not know whether he intends to be a candidate or not; but if the change of feeling which I have described should become more pronounced six months hence, nothing could prevent the nomination of Mr. Reed. You said in Boston, "It will be a cold day when the President gets left." Men remember that remark and now begin to quote it with the addition, "the cold day is coming." As I read the signs of the times, we are at the beginning of an ominous silence which may precede a storm. If a reaction comes, the very intensity of the emotions which accompanied the beginning of the Cuban

[1] Richard Croker (1841–1922), leader of Tammany Hall.

[2] Reverend George Batchelor (1836–1923), editor of the *Christian Register*. Secretary Long's reply was printed in the *Christian Register* of April 25, 1899.

[3] Reed's decision to resign from Congress, which took effect September 4, 1899.

war, will make the revulsion violent and irrational. The word "Algerism" connotes vastly more in the common speech than any opinion about "beef."[4] It indicates a cloud which is casting an increasing shadow upon the administration, and threatens even to obscure the brilliant record of your department, and by association to dim the fame of the secretary of the navy, of which Massachusetts is justly so proud.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
New York
May 2, 1899

My dear Mr. Long:

As I see the *Evening Post* of this city is trying to pick to pieces your speech before the Essex Club,[1] I borrow a moment from the hurry of packing to say to you how much solid common sense I found in it. Of course I am of your way of thinking, but common sense, like good taste, is the final verdict of the great mass of sensible people, and that I am persuaded you have with you. The trivialities to which the *Post* is driven, and the calm logic of a respectable Democratic paper like the *Times*, alike endorse the course of the administration.

Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

EDWARD A. HORTON TO SECRETARY LONG

25 Beacon Street
Boston
May 10, 1899

My dear Mr. Long:

You have done great good by your address here before the Essex Club and through the letter published in the *Christian Register*. No one needs to describe to you the elements in Boston and the peculiar array of political forces. The excessive language and the offensive attitude of many who are our friends make the situation at times a little unpleasant. But I feel quite confident a clearer

[4] See Senator Lodge's letter of August 8, 1898, note.

[1] Celebration of Dewey Day, May 1, by the Essex Club, at Young's Hotel, Boston.

judgment is fast prevailing with regard to the policy of the administration. I do not say that I rejoice in everything that the administration has done; that would be an astonishing result. But I have cast what little influence I have in public and private toward creating a loyal support of the administration at the present time, especially with regard to the Philippine Islands. You may remember I said in your own home at Hingham months ago, that I hoped we should have little to do with that remote territory. But circumstances have led us on, we have followed in good faith, and there is only one statesmanlike thing to do. That course I believe is being taken by the administration.

I enclose a clipping from the *Transcript* which is a slight token of the kind of discussion which is going on here. You may be interested to know that two of our leading papers have been compelled to change their editorial position by the proprietors of the said papers. The first was the *Herald*. Mr. Holmes [1] is an old friend of mine, but I was frank enough to tell him I was glad the proprietors brought about this change, though it was undoubtedly a grief to him. The second and latest example is the *Transcript*. It is a curious condition of things that this clipping which I send you was written at the urgent request of the leading proprietor of the *Transcript*. The modification in Mr. Clement's [2] "leaders" has been caused by the pressure brought to bear by the *Transcript* owners because their convictions did not agree with his. I only mention these things to prove two facts; first, that the men of affairs, whose judgment we always respect, and who are not mere theorists, are very much in earnest in regard to supporting the administration. And the second conclusion is that sentiment is changing in this region, and the extremists for peace, and the extravagant theorists with regard to the rights of the people, are losing ground.

Best of greetings to Mrs. Long and best wishes for you and for your splendid work at all times.

Sincerely yours,
EDWARD A. HORTON [3]

[1] John H. Holmes, editor of the *Boston Herald*.

[2] Edward Henry Clement (1843–1920), Tufts '64, editor of the *Boston Transcript*.

[3] Reverend Edward Augustus Horton (1843–1931).

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
Personal BOSTON
May 13, 1899

MY DEAR LONG:

Your kind letter of eighth instant announced the President's selection of a director of bureau of American republics. If Mr. Rockhill [1] should decline the appointment, — as did General Hastings,[2] — when he returns from Athens, will you kindly inform me promptly, for reasons which you may easily imagine from what I have hitherto written. He was to leave Athens May 6.

It is said that the secretary of state [3] has, through our ministers and consuls, collected a large amount of information in regard to the details of colonial government by European powers; and I presume that it will be published for the use of Congress when it convenes — perhaps in extra session this fall. I am very desirous of obtaining a copy of this information at the earliest opportunity, as I have been studying this subject for the past two years (since Hawaiian annexation became a living question) and am preparing a paper for publication on this subject, which I expect to publish in August or September at the latest.

I will here only outline my idea of the true basis of colonial government for your consideration, as the most likely to assure success and permanence. But I should add that, to my mind, there must be a distinction between the governments of colonies in the temperate zones (north or south) and of colonies within the tropics where the Caucasian element is almost invariably largely outnumbered, if not overwhelmed, by the so-called inferior races. It is in regard to this latter class that my remarks more particularly apply.

It has been very truly observed that Great Britain and Russia have proved exceptionally successful as "colonizers," that is to say in governing colonies inhabited by alien and inferior races. This is largely due to their wise policy of appointing the ablest men of the native races to positions in the local administration, but under a *centralized civil government* in contradistinction to a military government.

In this respect they have followed the old Roman policy, which

[1] William Woodville Rockhill (1854–1914), U. S. minister to Greece.
[2] Probably Daniel Hartman Hastings (1849–1903), Pennsylvania lawyer.
[3] John Hay (1838–1905).

was exactly the reverse of the Spanish and French system of filling colonial offices with men sent out from the mother-country. This latter system establishes militarism as the corner-stone of colonial rule, the government of colonies by *military proconsuls* with military subalterns sent from home, ignorant of, and out-of-touch with, the natives who are studiedly ignored. Aside from the inevitable corruption of such a system and its reflex action upon the moral sense of the mother-country, the natural consequence is to keep the native population in a state of pupilage under military and often religious task-masters, and their brightest men naturally grow restive under these essentially foreign rulers and keep up a series of revolutions, instead of feeling honored by being associated with them in the burdens and responsibilities of government.

I think you will agree with me that the above diagnosis is fully confirmed by the course of events in Cuba and the Philippines during the past half century. And my studies of Latin-American affairs convince me that this was equally applicable to Spanish America as the cause of the great uprising at the beginning of this century.

Secretary Bayard, when I discussed with him the question of Hawaiian annexation, based his objections to foreign colonies largely upon the danger of a "proconsular system" as an incident to such colonies, which (he said) had proved fatal to the continuance of every republic in ancient and modern times which had held alien colonies.

We know that the system of centralized government introduced into Spain and her colonies by Philip II not only disturbed the previous manly vigor and personal initiative of the Spanish race at home and in America, leading to wholesale corruption, but debilitated the colonies into a condition of hopeless pupilage and ended in her loss of the colonies, their anarchic condition as states during a long period and the decline and fall of the once mighty Spanish monarchy. For generations the name *peninsulares* has been synonymous with everything bad throughout Spanish America.

We know from Parkman's histories that the French lost Canada through the shameless corruption of the French proconsuls and their train of unscrupulous followers.

On the other hand, England and Holland have (for the last half century at least) sought to govern their Asiatic dependencies by a carefully selected and trained *civil* service and have thereby suc-

ceeded in giving them an orderly, just, and progressive government, under which those peoples have been contented and prosperous.

In 1858 the Queen's proclamation to the princes and people of India set forth this great principle of native coöperation in governmental affairs: *viz.*

" It is our further will that, so far as may be; our subjects of whatever race or creed be freely, and impartially admitted to offices in our service, the duties of which they may be – by education, ability and integrity – qualified to discharge." [4]

That this was not an empty promise, witness these facts:

(1) that in 1890 nearly all the civil judges under the superior courts, and a great majority of the magistrates in courts of original jurisdiction, were natives of India; and that there were a considerable number of native judges in the appellate courts of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras.

(2) that, in 1892, there were seven hundred and sixty-one incorporated cities and towns wherein the public officers were all elected by the tax-payers and had exclusive charge of roads, sewers, water supply, markets, and sanitation, with the consequent right of making town by-laws, improvements and of taxation for local purposes.

(3) that this system has been extended to rural communities all over India, to a greater or less extent as circumstances warrant, under the Local Self-Government Acts of 1882 and 1884.

(4) that, in all the larger towns and many of the smaller towns, the majority of the town officers are natives, in many of them all are natives.

Thus it happens that with only one hundred thousand British-born residents in a population of two hundred and twenty millions the total military force (European and native) is less [than] one per one thousand, no more than in the United States: yet peace, justice, and prosperity reign throughout India.

The acquisition of foreign dependencies brings us face to face with problems of grave moment as to their government. But, in entering this new phase of our national life, we have the experience of centuries to teach us how to bear our new burdens and what errors particularly to shun. If we heed the lessons learned by other

[4] Royal proclamation published at a great durbar at Allahabad, November 1, 1858, announcing that the Queen had assumed the government of India. Parliament had passed the act for the better government of India, transferring the entire administration from the East India Company to the crown.

nations and adopt the true basis of colonial government, we shall do a noble work for those distant peoples "for their benefit and ours, and for the future ages of our posterity" (as Secretary John Quincy Adams said of the Monroe Doctrine).

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

T. JEFFERSON COOLIDGE TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
May 22, 1899

MY DEAR SECRETARY:

I have never applied to the President or yourself for a favor of any description but I shall make an exception in this case as I am warmly interested in Raymond Rodgers.[1] He was my naval attaché when I was minister in France and I found him one of the finest fellows I ever met: industrious, modest, and able. He is very anxious to have a separate command and I know nobody more deserving. He did his duty admirably in the war, as you know. If you would decide the question yourself and give him a vessel, you would oblige me besides making an excellent appointment.

Your remarks in Boston against anti-imperialism have, I think, borne good fruit, Boutwell and Atkinson and Storey do all the talking, but the heart of Massachusetts is with the President, and if it came to a vote, the state would support the policy of the administration overwhelmingly.

The whole matter will die out if we continue successful in the Philippines.

Please excuse the liberty I take in writing to you and believe me,

Very truly yours,
T. JEFFERSON COOLIDGE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
BOSTON
May 31, 1899

MY DEAR LONG:

Before you go back to Washington, I should be glad to have a half hour's talk with you — if agreeable and convenient for you to

[1] Commander Raymond Perry Rodgers (1849–1925).

do so. My object is to present certain results of my investigations in regard to local autonomy, which may perhaps prove suggestive in regard to forms, or rather principles of government suitable to be established in the Philippines.

In general, allow me here briefly to state that our New England town-government, for the first generation at least after the emigration, bears a most striking resemblance to the Spanish-pueblo system of Castile in the time of Columbus (afterwards changed by Philip II), which was transplanted into Spain by the Visigoths simultaneously with the emigration of the Anglo-Saxon race into England. These two systems of local government – the Anglo-Saxon and the Gothic-Castilian – had the same source.

The Russian "mir," or town system, has many of the salient features of the *original* Anglo-Saxon town system, though it is a later importation from Asia. Hence we may account for the solid reflux action of Russia eastward towards the Pacific, where the *mir* system finds congenial development. This seems to me a sufficient explanation of the solid growth of Russia's power in Asia; it proves that local autonomy in all prudential matters is not inconsistent with concentrated political and military control, as we shall presently see exemplified elsewhere.

As we trace our Aryan ancestry back to India, we may naturally expect to find, in the village communities of India, remnants at least of local institutions not much different from our own some centuries back. Led by this reasoning, investigations begun there half a century ago have led to such startling results that Sir Henry Maine [1] has justly said: –

"For many years the discovery and recognition of the existence of the village communities of India has ranked among the greatest achievements of the Anglo-Indian government."

Based upon that discovery has grown the regeneration of India now in progress, and the development of local self-government has so rapidly spread since the great Indian mutiny of 1857; whereby elected municipal bodies have the care of roads, drainage, water-supply, sanitation, and markets, with power to make by-laws, public improvements and public expenditures, paying therefor by self-imposed taxes. This applies not only to incorporated towns (which in 1892 numbered seven hundred and sixty-one with fifteen millions of inhabitants), but to rural communities all over India.

Thus we behold a general system of elected local self-govern-

[1] Sir Henry James Sumner Maine (1822–1888), author of *Ancient Law, etc.*

ments in successful management of their own "prudential" concerns, under an intense concentration of political power; as it is deemed incompatible to entrust political and military control to a population consisting of many different races and creeds.

Nor is the participation of the native peoples confined to "prudentials"; for a majority of the civil judges in the lower courts of original jurisdictions and of the magistrates are natives, while even in the appellate courts there are not a few native judges.

In like manner the *protected* Malay States of the Straits Settlements enjoy now, after endless contentions, internal peace and prosperity based upon the same discovery and application of elected village communities, as in India.

In Java, the Dutch are deriving similar benefits by following out the same general policy of concentrated *political* power with local autonomy in "prudential" matters; and it results that with a population of thirty millions in the Dutch East Indies, only thirty thousand troops are needed, half of them being natives under European officers; and that, with an independent colonial budget and financial system, the Dutch treasury does not pay out a farthing unless it be indirectly for naval operations in the Far East.

The population of the protected Malay States, as well as of Java, belongs to the same Malay race as the majority of the natives of the Philippines. Hence it would seem that, by following similar lines of action and principles of government, a practical form of government can be devised for the Philippines – say on the following lines:

(1) Local autonomy in *prudential* concerns under elected native officials for towns and rural communities.

(2) Perfect religious freedom and equality, for all creeds.

(3) Exemption from religious and from military over-lords.

(4) Prompt, cheap and fair justice, under native judges and magistrates and American appellate courts.

All this under a concentrated political and military control.

The question of the "monastic orders," whose greed, tyranny, and intrusive intermeddling everywhere has thoroughly alienated the Filipinos and was the great incentive to their rebellion against Spain, will require a strong hand and great wisdom and resourcefulness to handle successfully. Under one pretext or another the four mendicant orders of Spanish monks have appropriated vast landed estates and reduced to serfdom great multitudes of natives whom they ruled with a rod of iron; and, being practically in control of the government, established a system of theocratic despotism and

cruelty unsurpassed by that of the Spanish inquisition in the Netherlands.

Whence it seems necessary to abolish this system of monastic serfdom and to devise some equitable measures for the restoration of their landed estates to the colonial public use. Perhaps the Chilean method of meeting this evil might be applicable with such modification as the different circumstances might require; or the system devised by Cavour, whereby the monastery lands in Sardinia were taken by the crown in trust, their income being divided into three unequal parts, – one to pension aged monks and nuns, the second for public education, and the third for works of internal public improvement (such as railroads).

There is still another system of local government of extreme interest, which seems of practical application. I refer to the *mura*, or village system of Japan, each consisting of (say) some fifty neighborhood groups called *kumi*, – five families each; each *kumi* being responsible for the misdeeds of any member of the five households, much as with the Anglo-Saxons. Indeed a study of the *mura* system reminds one of the old Anglo-Saxon system; each had its "watch and ward," its "hue and cry," its common planting fields and commons of pasture, its common granary and its obligation to care for its poor and its orphans and its responsibility for "all within its gates." Each developed a similarly complete system of democratic self-government and of the responsibility of the individual to society.

This outline of my ideas can be developed if you desire it.

Yours truly,

HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

International Conference at THE HAGUE [1]
Commission of the United States of America
June 7, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

This morning's papers tell us that the question of maintaining offensive operations in the Philippines has been under consideration

[1] The Peace Conference at The Hague met May 18, 1899. American commissioners: Andrew Dickson White (1832–1918), Yale '53, U. S. ambassador at Berlin; Seth Low (1850–1916), Columbia '70, president of Columbia University; Stanford Newel (1839–1907), Yale '61, U. S. minister at The Hague; Captain A. T. Mahan, U. S. N.; Captain William Crozier (b. 1855), U. S. Army; secretary, George Frederick William Holls (1857–1903), Columbia '78.

by our government; and one, the *Manchester Guardian*, states that they were to be suspended. This, however, is contradicted by the *Standard*, which I believe and hope is better informed.

I feel it to be somewhat presumptuous to intrude my opinion, unasked; but the trust with which you honored me last year leads me to hope I may be forgiven for saying, that, from the point of view of *general* military principle and experience, in dealing with enemies of this character, the decision would be disastrous, and if in the *particular* case the commander on the spot favors continuance in offensive movement, all reasons would combine to adopt his view.

The effect of inaction upon our own troops would be demoralizing, especially as they are largely new to the habits of disciplined endurance; while relaxation would not only encourage the immediate enemy, but its influence would not unlikely be felt among the ill-disposed in Cuba and Porto Rico.

I doubt if our public at all realize under what odds we have been contending in Luzon. I do not refer to numerical shortness, though that there has unavoidably been, but to the comparative rawness of our troops, a condition which must still last some time; for our best regulars, though admirable material, (I am here quoting the opinion of Colonel Lee,[2] the British attaché), are still only recruits. This difficulty is the inevitable result of a large task thrown upon a nation that has heretofore maintained a very small army. It will diminish with every month, and when our men are *aguérri*, to use the expressive French word, they will handle the business decisively.

I have never seen any reason for discouragement in the military conditions; while, as regards the political considerations inseparable from a popular form of government, I am satisfied that steady persistence in aggressive advance will most surely lead to the success which people too impatiently desire.

It may interest you to know that, meeting Mr. Low casually this morning, he remarked " I don't like the news from the Philippines." He had see the *Guardian*, which is regularly sent to each of us. I then told him what the *Standard* said, at which he expressed himself relieved, and upon my saying I *thought* of writing to either you or Mr. Hay, he said he hoped I would, and to my inquiry replied he had no objection to being quoted. The opinion of this eminent civilian, joined to my own, is I hope but one of many the President is receiving.

[2] Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Hamilton Lee (b. 1868), British military attaché at Washington.

I have written with the view that you show this letter to the President, if you thought proper. May I add that in case serious doubt arises, I hope that General Francis V. Greene, who was last year in Luzon, may be consulted. He is a man who to great brilliancy of intellect, and military acquirement, adds unusual energy and sound judgment.

With much esteem,

Sincerely yours,
A. T. MAHAN

Army officers used to say that our western Indians began to be thoroughly overcome only when our troops gave up the habit of winter quarters, and followed the savages through the bitter winters of the plains.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

International Conference at THE HAGUE
Commission of the United States of America
June 7, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I have received an application from a Russian officer for detailed information concerning the course at the War College in its development and present condition. I replied that this could best be shown by successive reports of the presidents of the college, and at his request I undertook to ask that copies should be sent him for the last ten years if possible. They are included in the yearly reports of the bureau of navigation, until the college was transferred to the assistant secretary.

Would you give directions that they be sent as far as possible, from and including 1886? The officer's rank and name is, Lieutenant de Vaissian Ovtchinnikow, and I would suggest sending through the Russian embassy at Washington.

Very truly yours,
A. T. MAHAN

If there should seem any irregularity in sending through the embassy data, for which the request had not come through the embassy, the package addressed to Lieutenant Ovtchinnikow at the department of marine, St. Petersburg, would doubtless reach him.

They wish to establish a college of their own, with which this officer is to be associated.

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *New York*
Personal NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
June 28, 1899

DEAR SIR:

I beg to ask if the question of raising the *Colon* may not be again taken into consideration? She lies structurally intact and in a situation where she can, in my belief, be successfully handled. It will be a difficult job of course. It would require an effort of about thirty-eight hundred tons to lift her upright, if no aid were exerted by using the ship's compartments. The apparatus would be costly, and the whole expenditure would be large, but the result, if the ship be successfully floated, would be worth much, not only from the sentimental point of view, but from the material.

No wrecking company now in this country is, in my opinion, equal to the work.

I would beg to suggest an examination of the situation by such a man as Naval Constructor Bowles. I believe he is fitted by knowledge and temperament, not only to give a trustworthy opinion, but to do the work if it be possible.

The ship may lie there, if her rescue be not attempted, a hundred years, and if so left without a real effort to float her, will be a reproach to us.

Very truly yours,
F. E. CHADWICK

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

JAMES BRADLEY THAYER TO SECRETARY LONG

BAR HARBOR
July 6, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Yesterday I received by registered mail the valuable "Messages" of all the Presidents to 1897. These must have come from you in answer to my inquiries of a short time ago. I am very much indebted to you for them and for your kind attention. The books will be very useful to me.

I have just been reading our friend Dole's[1] letter to the President, — of June 16. It is a thing to make a man that likes him, as I

[1] See Mr. Dole's letter to Secretary Long, dated December 5, 1898.

do, pretty melancholy, — so unconscious is he of the true character and conditions of the problem, so naïvely superior in his morals, and so assured that others are wrong and do not understand what he perfectly understands, — or rather *mis*understands.

One of the best results of the new state of things will be that of putting a backbone into our people's ideas of government. It is astonishing to see with what foolish literalness many sensible people are applying our fundamental political maxims, and how ignorant they are of the simplest principles of international dealings and of the notions of political sovereignty.

Have you, or has the President, conferred ever with the Japanese minister [2] as to their experience in Formosa? He and his friend Káneko [3] were at Cambridge the other day. Komura is, of course, reticent, but Káneko talks freely and in a very interesting way on this matter. He thinks, and I was much impressed by what he said, that we might well profit by their experience. The situations have strong points of resemblance. Both these men were graduates, twenty years ago, at our law school.

Truly yours,
J. B. Thayer [4]

RICHARD HARDING DAVIS TO SECRETARY LONG

Marion, Massachusetts
July 23, [1899?]

My dear Mr. Long:

On my return from Europe I find among my newspaper clippings a certain number which refer to a statement I made here before I went to London in the course of a reading I gave at the Congregationalist church, on the "Santiago Campaign."

It was to the effect that when the Spanish fleet was in Santiago Harbor, Admiral Sampson desired to enter the harbor, and attack the fleet, and that he was restrained from so doing by you.

As usual, those papers which support Admiral Sampson applauded his desire, and those opposed to the administration criticised the secretary of the navy.

The matter is not important, and it may be that it has not reached you, but if it has, I sincerely hope that you will understand that I

[2] Jutaro Komura.

[3] Kentaro Káneko.

[4] Professor James Bradley Thayer (1831–1902), Harvard Law School, Harvard College '52.

made the statement on excellent authority, that I thought the facts showed the spirit of the admiral, and the judgment of the secretary of the navy, that it reflected credit on each, and that had I supposed the statement would be twisted into a criticism of either, I would not have made it.

The reading was a talk to a few of my fellow townspeople, which I gave to help pay for the church organ, or to paint the walls, or for some other innocent purpose, and in view of your recent courtesy to me in regard to the new book on navy uniforms, I am sorry to have been represented as making a criticism upon you and the admiral, when I intended a compliment.

I am sincerely yours,
RICHARD HARDING DAVIS

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

Slumberside
QUOGUE, LONG ISLAND
August 21, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

My recollection of the incident is as follows:

General Shafter had telegraphed that the Spanish commander offered to surrender Santiago, upon the condition that the garrison should be at liberty to march out and go where it chose. Both Shafter and Miles approved, under the conditions existing, and their telegrams to that effect were before the council, whom the President had called – among whom were several members of the Cabinet, yourself among them, our board and some army men. I favored the proposition myself, considering that the place was what we then needed chiefly, and also because of Miles's and Shafter's opinion, who were on the spot, and I understood most of those present to hold the same view; but the President was very emphatically opposed to it – indeed *vehemently*, and in speaking of the surrender I have for that reason always said since that it was owing to the President – primarily, and to no one else – that the Spanish demand was rejected. I think, however, that he was going to yield, not because of his own change of mind but in acquiescence with the weight of professional opinion, when it occurred to me, and I suggested, that to surrender and to return to Spain would meet all our requirements, and perhaps be acceptable to them. The matter

was settled, and the telegram to our general drawn up (if not sent) before we broke up, so there is no possibility of its having originated outside. As regards my part in it, I began to suspect my own memory, and wishing to reinforce it, I went to you a very few days after, and asked, "Do you recall who it was in the council suggested the Santiago garrison being allowed to return to Spain?" You replied at once and without hesitation, "Yes, it was you." This was before you left Washington, and you did not return until after I left. As I said, I have had no desire to have the facts made public, but I do object to the credit, if such there be, being attributed to another by the public and in history.

The telegrams would very probably establish the sequence of action, and the time of sending them. I suppose they are on record with their dates.

This seems a fitting time to suggest to you, that the navy department should insist upon [that?] the rules for adapting the Geneva convention[1] to maritime war, passed by the peace conference,[2] should undergo the scrutiny of its law officers. I formulated certain objections to them, and proposed amendments, for which I could obtain no support; but I am quite sure I was right, and I should regret to think that our government should accept this work (formulated in ten articles) without careful consideration of the articles themselves, and of my comments upon them. Our delegation left them unsigned, pending the decision of our government upon them.

Sincerely yours,
A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

44 State Street
BOSTON
September 1, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

When General Leonard Wood was in Washington, just at the beginning of July, the President kindly spoke of an order instructing him to establish a liberal school system in eastern Cuba, that is to say, in the portion of the island under his command. Thus far, no such order has been received by General Wood, and it is easily

[1] Geneva Cross Convention, August 22, 1864, signed by the United States, March 1, 1882.

[2] The Hague Conference of 1899.

understood that the President and all of you have been too busy to think of it. Would you consider it wise to bring this matter to the President's notice and ask if he will issue such an order in case he sees fit?

General Wood, when here, was very urgent that a liberal school system should be established at once and said that if we could help him to books for the school, we should do a great service. Some of us have therefore been getting together money to buy these books. We promised him ten thousand dollars and shall endeavor to carry the sum higher than that amount.

Will you kindly act in the matter as you see fit, and much oblige,

Yours truly,

HENRY L. HIGGINSON

Of course that which would seem to me best, is an order empowering General Wood to do as he sees best.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

QUOGUE, LONG ISLAND
September 27, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I received yesterday a letter from Mr. Low, in which he says that he told the President last week that, while he did not "venture to differ from me, as to the technical aspects of the Geneva Cross Convention," as adapted to maritime warfare,[1] in the "Ten Articles" recommended by the Hague Conference, he "thought it had a public and non-technical aspect which demanded careful consideration, and would lead me [him] to sign it."

Personally, I care little about the matter, although I have recommended non-concurrence. I wish chiefly to have no more bother; but I suppose I ought, in view of this act of Mr. Low, to write something to you.

The ten articles have two principal bearings: 1 – upon hospital ships belonging to belligerent powers, and flying their national flag; 2 – upon vessels of the same kind belonging to neutral states, and flying the flags of the latter, but benevolently attending belligerent fleets. The articles contain, besides, provisions to meet the

[1] See Captain Mahan's letter of August 21.

case of neutral vessels carrying sick or wounded belligerents, or picking them up.

To the provisions concerning the first class I had, and made, no objection. Concerning the others I formulated very carefully certain objections, which appear to me incontestable, and of which the *Deerhound* and *Alabama* incident gave a very concrete illustration.[2]

As all this is fully set forth in my reports to the commission, and in papers submitted by the latter, there is no need for me to repeat here. I have already recommended to you that the international legal aspect be reviewed by the legal authorities of the department. I venture now to suggest to you that the views of the latter, and possibly my own report, *etc.*, to the commission – in short the general subject of the neutral flag *authorized* on a scene of naval warfare – be submitted to Dewey and Sampson, with another flag officer or senior captain.

The United States will never need neutral hospital ships. Their presence will certainly incommode rather than benefit *us;* and as regards other neutral vessels, I would have such a board consider the embarrassment of neutral press-boats, which are going to be more troublesome even than war correspondents on shore, because it is so much more difficult to define the limits of belligerent naval local control than it is of military.

I don't believe our people will care a rap how our government decides upon this question of *neutral hospital ships* on a field of battle. Where not wholly cranky, (you should have heard some of the ideas), it is largely academic. It is most unlikely that there ever will be such neutral hospital ships; but there will be other neutral intermeddling, which, unless controlled by previous definitions, will do more harm than good.

I can't quite understand Low's point of view, but I have little congenital aptitude for getting into line. "Be sure you're right, then go ahead," is a motto not only simple, but on the whole most apt to win – even with the populace. There are, I conceive, grave military inconveniences, and consequent international difficulties between neutrals and belligerents, – possibly most embarrassing to the latter, – to be apprehended, unless further definitions be adopted,

[2] When the Confederate cruiser *Alabama* sank, after her battle with the *Kearsarge*, June 19, 1864, Captain Semmes was rescued by the British yacht *Deerhound* and, although he had surrendered, allowed himself to be taken to England and escaped.

in the sense of the recommendations we tried to carry in the conference. You yourself must remember that during the late hostilities the action of neutral powers, and the avoidance of occasion of offence to them, had to be constantly in our minds. Is it wise, is it just, to lay up additional causes for such anxieties for the future, in order to avoid in the present a possible grumble among our people? I personally do not believe discontent can arise on such a subject; there is more fight than compromise just now in the air; but in any event, the opinion of officers recently in responsible chief command, which they have borne with conspicuous ability, can not fail to contribute valuable light to the government in forming its decisions upon this question of extending neutral immunities, in a manner likely to cause hereafter international friction.

Very truly yours,
A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Fifth Avenue Hotel
NEW YORK
September 28, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I thank you most heartily for yours of the twenty-seventh. You are more than kind. I think I can understand the reasons.

Would it be convenient for you to have the *Dolphin* in Oyster Bay on Monday afternoon next? If not, where shall I meet her? If you will tell me where to telegraph her commander, I won't bother you with another word.

By the way, do you recollect how you used to lecture me on showing a proper spirit towards England! You see I have learned a good many lessons in the last year and a half.

On Tuesday I shall be on at the President's dinner to Dewey, and I hope I shall have the chance of seeing you. There are one or two matters I should very much like to talk over with Mr. Allen, if I were able to see him that afternoon. There is no need of my bothering you about them.

With hearty thanks to you and the President, I am

Very sincerely yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT [1]

[1] This letter, evidently a copy, is written in long hand but not in Roosevelt's handwriting, nor is the signature his.

EDWIN GINN TO SECRETARY LONG

9–13 Tremont Place
Boston
October 4, 1899

My dear Mr. Long:

Mr. Alexis Everett Frye,[1] the author of our series of geographies, tells me that he has been requested by General Brooke,[2] through the secretary of war, to go to Cuba in some capacity connected with education, and Mr. Frye will report to Secretary Root[3] Friday noon of this week. I should like to say a word in regard to Mr. Frye and to ask you as a favor to see Secretary Root personally if possible, before Friday noon, and lay before him the facts which I shall give you, in regard to Mr. Frye's fitness for educational work. In this way, he may be started in the work in a broader way than would otherwise be the case. Mr. Frye is one of the most successful educators and authors of school-books in the United States, and his services will be invaluable to Cuba if he is given latitude in which to work. Perhaps your introduction will start him in the right way with the authorities. They certainly will make no mistake in giving him all the responsibility he is willing to take.

Mr. Frye is willing to serve in any capacity, as I understand it, but I should like to suggest, if I may, his eminent fitness to act, for instance, as director of schools with the work of organizing a school system. President Eliot of Harvard has said that he knows of no man better qualified for this work than Mr. Frye. Mr. Frye would be specially interested, I think, in the industrial, the practical side of education. He is enthusiastic over the possibilities in Cuba, and two days ago, in half an hour, obtained pledges of money gifts for erecting six school-buildings on the island. I have no doubt that if set free to do the work there, he would not stop until he had built a school-house in every village and town in Cuba.

Mr. Frye is a graduate of the Chicago Normal School; a graduate of Harvard University with the degree of A. M.; a graduate of the Harvard Law School and a member of the Massachusetts bar. He has taught every grade from the primary through the high school; has been a teacher of methods in the Chicago Normal School; a city superintendent of schools in California; and has given over

[1] Captain Alexis Everett Frye (1859–1936).
[2] John Rutter Brooke (1838–1926), Governor-General of Cuba.
[3] Elihu Root (1845–1937), secretary of war.

fifteen hundred lectures on education, lecturing in nearly every state in the Union. He is the author of a series of public school text-books.

I send you a set of his geographies, and I may say that through these books Mr. Frye is now directing the work of nearly two million children and nearly one hundred thousand teachers. One of the books, the *Elements*, has been translated into Spanish and is authorized for the schools of Puerto Rico, and both English and Canadian editions of the complete book have been made.

We are selfish enough to wish that Mr. Frye would stay here and write other books which we have asked him to prepare and which if as successful as his geographies would be worth thousands of dollars to us and a small fortune to himself, but he prefers to leave all and serve the country in Cuba without pay and in any capacity. Under the circumstances, we can not ask him to stay.

I enclose a photograph of Mr. Frye. You can gather something of the man from this. I may add that I have never known any one with a greater capacity for hard work.

I hope it may be possible for you to see Mr. Root personally; but if it is not, may I ask that you will turn this letter over to him, letting him know at the same time that you know me personally?

Sincerely yours,
EDWIN GINN [4]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Academy
ANNAPOLIS
October 13, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

A friend sent me a copy of your speech [1] before I received one from you. I showed it at once to my wife and we agree that such very high praise, from the head of the navy during the war, given so publicly, was of far more value to me and mine than any number of banquets and swords.

I assure you that I feel deeply grateful for such favorable mention of the services of the *Gloucester*, under my command. I have felt

[4] Edwin Ginn (1838–1914), Boston publisher and founder of the World Peace Foundation.

[1] Speech at Chicago, October 9.

that my personal satisfaction, in being in the fight at Santiago, was sufficient reward for my part in the action, and now your speech has left me nothing to wish for in connection with the war, except that the country should appreciate more thoroughly the services of Admiral Sampson.

Very truly yours
RICHARD WAINWRIGHT [2]

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS TO SECRETARY LONG

Confidential

23 Court Street
BOSTON
October 13, 1899

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

You remember, some time ago, I wrote to you, enclosing an extract from a private letter I had just received from Frank Millet. You acknowledged it from Kittery, I believe.

Yesterday I got another letter from Millet, and enclose you a copy of a portion of it which, it seems to me, may be of interest to you and to the other members of the Cabinet, including, possibly, the President.

The Philippine question is so remote and at arm's length, that any information in regard to it from a private and reliable source can not be otherwise than of value. You probably know Frank Millet. I never met either the President, or Secretary Root, and have no idea that they know Millet. Accordingly, I prefer to communicate with you.

I want to suggest to you, would it not be possible for the government to avail itself of the services of Millet in this Philippine situation? He is quite a remarkable fellow, thoroughly reliable, with large experience among men, and a singular capacity for dealing with them. I should have great confidence in his judgment. Now, if, among you, you could arrange to send him to the Philippines in some confidential capacity, either as a special agent of the treasury, or war department, or otherwise, you would have, in my judgment, a much more reliable source of forming opinions as to the condition of affairs there and the wisest course to pursue, than ordinarily falls to the lot of those compelled to direct important affairs from such a great distance.

This is, of course, a confidential communication. The extract

[2] Commander Richard Wainwright (1849–1926).

I send you from Millet's letter you are welcome to use in any way which commends itself to your judgment, not implying publicity. As for the suggestion, it is wholly mine; but I should not make it if I did not know that Millet would be strongly inclined, if opportunity offered, to go back to the Philippines, and if I was not also well satisfied that, if there, he would prove a very valuable government agent.

Leaving the matter thus confidentially as a suggestion merely for your better consideration,

Believe me, *etc.*,
CHARLES F. ADAMS [1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

EXTRACT

"The Philippines still interest me. I hope they won't send Merritt [2] back. No greater disaster could be imagined. He is absolutely incapable of service there, good soldier as he is. The problem is not essentially a military one, it is largely a task which demands tact, experience with the world, and sound judgment in matters of the racial differences, the religious questions and the traditional rights of the people. In these respects Merritt is absolutely devoid of the necessary qualities and if he goes there again, it will be a decided setback. Otis [3] is a good man for organization, and, having a legal mind, is doing great work, I think, in establishing order out of the Spanish chaos. In his campaign he was not over successful for many reasons which are perfectly apparent to me, and which do not change my estimation of him for I know pretty well what he had to do. Merritt left him a ruinous legacy."

SECRETARY LONG TO REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
October 20, 1899

DEAR ADMIRAL:

Will you explain to me why you have done what, unexplained, seems to be a most injudicious and an unnecessary opening of a

[1] Charles Francis Adams (1835–1915).

[2] Major-General Merritt's administration provoked violent criticism in the United States.

[3] Major-General Elwell Stephen Otis (1838–1909).

contention with General Shafter and the army. I can not believe that you would deem it of much importance that Captain Chadwick should have done the literary work of writing a letter which became Shafter's the moment Shafter signed it. But I wish especially that you would advise me whether you have been correctly quoted in the interview, which was published in the Boston papers; whether you made the reflection there attributed to you upon the capacity of an army officer to write such a letter as the one referred to, *etc.*, *etc.* As the matter now stands in the public mind, it is most unfortunate.

Truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary

Rear-Admiral W. T. SAMPSON, U. S. N.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
October 22, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

At a late hour last night, I received your letter of the twentieth and make haste to send reply.

I do not understand your reference to the remarks which I made on the occasion of Captain Chadwick's sword presentation.[1] Probably I have not carefully read the papers to which you refer. There was no thought in my mind of any possible contention with General Shafter or the army, and no thought of implying that an army officer has not the capacity to write such a letter; except that General Shafter from an army officer's point of view could not understand the bearing which the late naval operations had upon the question involved, and therefore did not know – until Captain Chadwick told him – what was his great advantage over the enemy. He was discouraged and ready to fall back. Captain Chadwick's statement made him change his mind, and he put the fact so well in his letter, which he wrote, and which Shafter so promptly used without alteration, that I thought the story a complimentary one to tell to Chadwick's friends that day at Morgantown. This I was glad to do, among other remarks of a complimentary nature, quoting the despatch of July 6, 1898, as merely a specimen of Chadwick's good judgment and reliability when acting independently.

[1] At Morgantown, West Virginia, Captain Chadwick's birthplace.

Not for one instant did I imagine that Shafter would deny the authenticity of the despatch. It was unnecessary to do so. It has long been published as his despatch and with perfect propriety: and this I was careful to explain when I read the despatch.

Hoping this explanation will be clear and adequate, I am, Sir,

Very respectfully yours
W. T. Sampson

SECRETARY ROOT TO SECRETARY LONG

War Department
Washington
October 23, 1899

My dear Governor:

I return herewith, after reading with interest, the letter[1] of Mr. Charles Francis Adams, and the extract from Mr. Frank Millet's letter. I know Millet very well, and have a very high opinion of him. I should be glad to talk with you and the President at Tuesday's meeting on this suggestion.

Faithfully yours,
Elihu Root

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.
[Enclosures]

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Brookline, [Massachusetts]
October 29, 1899

Dear Long:

How few of us at our class dinners could have dreamed of John Ropes as the one whom we should next be called upon to follow to the grave. No better, nor purer, nor more patriotic man was in our class and we shall greatly miss him as long as any of us gather for class reunions, wherever they may be held. He is to be buried at noon to-morrow from Trinity church.

Carl Schurz's[1] anti-imperialist speech at Chicago has been carefully studied by me, at the request of John Candler[2] originally and

[1] Dated October 13, 1899.

[1] Carl Schurz (1829–1906). The speech was delivered at a national meeting of anti-imperialists at Chicago, October 17.

[2] John Wilson Candler.

subsequently of others including Senator Lodge; my criticism of it is said to be conclusive in exposing its fallacies – not to use a harsher term. It will be published verbatim over my name in the *Boston Journal* to-morrow or Tuesday, and I will send you advance proofs for such use as you may deem best. Perhaps republication in Ohio might prove timely.

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

P. S. Mr. Clement, editor of the *Transcript*, told me yesterday that Mr. Schurz considered this speech of his the crowning work of his life, his *magnum opus*.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMANDER MERRELL TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Montgomery*
PERNAMBUCO, BRAZIL
October 31, 1899

SIR:

In connection with my report of the twenty-eighth instant relating to the cruise of the *Montgomery* to the African coast, the following, which would be somewhat out of place in an official report, may be of interest and is therefore submitted in this informal way for what it may be worth.

The current opinion among the white people both in Monrovia and Sierra Leone seems to be that the Liberian republic can not last much longer unless it receives support from some other and stronger government. It is said that the country is hopelessly insolvent, that its customs revenues are mortgaged for years to come for one purpose or another, that the moral support of Great Britain and the United States is all that has kept the government from going to pieces long before this; and that corruption among the Liberian officials is the rule and not the exception.

The general opinion seems to be that both France and Germany have an eye on the territory of the republic; Germany for the reason that the greater part of the trade of the country is German, and France because she already has possession of all the country back of Liberia and desires to advance her holdings to the sea.

At Monrovia I heard rumors of the existence of a secret treaty between France and Liberia providing that, in case the present gov-

ernment of Liberia should cease to exist, the territory of the republic is to be ceded to France. This rumor probably grows out of the following which I was informed at Sierra Leone, by good authority, is undoubtedly true; viz., that in connection with the last boundary treaty between France and Liberia, France gave notice that in case Liberia ever should cede any part of her territory to a foreign government, France would claim Cape Mount and other points on the coast, basing this claim on alleged cessions from the aboriginal African tribes ante-dating those made to the American Colonization Society, under which, as I understand, Liberia holds title.

I enclose a clipping[1] from the *Mail* (London) of October 6, which bears on the matters presented above.

Very respectfully,
JOHN P. MERRELL

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

FITZHUGH LEE TO SECRETARY LONG

Westmoreland Club
RICHMOND, VIRGINIA
November 20, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am glad to hear you liked my book.[1] Of course it was written from a southern standpoint. I gave a copy to Mr. Root also and express the hope that he may find it is "written in a generous spirit" — as you did. I was very sorry to hear of your daughter's sickness and trust the change of climate may prove beneficial. I sent you a copy of Captain Stevens's report made to the Ward Company on the night of the disaster to the *Maine*. Secretary Root talks of running down to Cuba this winter. I wish you could do so too. You could then see for yourself the wreck and harbor.

It was Sir Walter Raleigh I think who said "no two men could

[1] Abstract of clipping: Berlin, October 5. The *Kolonial-Zeitung*, organ of the German Colonial Society, points out Germany's interest in the future disposal of Liberia, and no time should be lost in forestalling British and French schemes and in securing for Germany "a place in the sun" in West Africa, in other words annexing Liberia. The natives would be useful to Germany — the Kru, Wey, and other tribes furnishing stokers on steamers and laborers on plantations in the Cameroons; also fighting men and porters.

[1] His life of his uncle, General Robert Edward Lee.

see the same thing and give the same account of it." I leave here for "The Smile of the Sea" on the twenty-ninth.

Very sincerely yours,
FITZHUGH LEE [2]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER SOUTHERLAND TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Dolphin*
PORT OF SPAIN, TRINIDAD
November 23, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

So many little things have happened since we left Washington that I now feel like keeping my promise to write you occasionally. Mr. Snowden [1] had a touch of illness which kept him in his bed from the time we left Washington until our arrival here. He is on duty now and is again strong and well. Young Lieutenant Ryan [2] was taken sick the third day out and upon our arrival here his case was diagnosed as typhoid. I transferred him to the government hospital, where he commenced to improve very soon. He is under the direct care of the surgeon in charge, and Urie [3] and I have arranged that he shall have every attention and comfort. The governor [4] has become interested in him, and with our consul and some others, will see that he lacks for nothing.

My present intention is to return here about December 24, so as to get Pocahontas coal from our contractor before his contract expires on December 31, after which we would probably have to pay much more for it. If young Ryan is then able to do any work, I will take him on board for light duties, but if the doctors think that unadvisable, I will order him home. You can imagine that I was very anxious about these two sick officers, but Urie's unremitting care was almost an assurance that nothing serious could result. The passenger, Mr. Roeder,[5] was seasick all the way and spent most of

[2] Major-General commanding the Seventh Corps during the Spanish-American War.

[1] Lieutenant Thomas Snowden.
[2] Thomas William Ryan (1857–1930).
[3] Surgeon John Francis Urie, U. S. N. (b. 1862), Harvard Medical '88.
[4] Sir Hubert Edward Henry Jerningham (b. 1842).
[5] Not identified.

his time in bed. All the sick were berthed and cared for in the cabin, which for the time looked like a hospital.

Had a rough trip all the way — strong head winds and seas, but the little craft behaved quite well. Spent one day at La Guaira and got a fairly good idea of the Venezuelan situation from Commander Hemphill,[6] who is most earnest and energetic and has matters well in hand. Since arriving here every attention has been paid to the officers. The governor, Sir H. E. H. Jerningham, has been exceedingly attentive to me, and seems desirous of helping me in any possible manner.

Within two hours of arrival a Mr. Morgan Olcott called on board and told me that he was the cause of the *Dolphin's* orders to this neighborhood; in the course of conversation he told me that Wayne McVeagh was his active friend. And also gave me information as follows: That he was an American and the managing director of the Orinoco Shipping and Trading Company; that this was an English concern, with some American capital, having a most valuable concession from the Venezuelan Government; that it owned many river steamers trading along the Orinoco, all of which fly the Venezuelan flag in accordance with the provisions of the concession. His idea evidently was that the *Dolphin* was to go up to Ciudad Bolívar, two hundred and twenty-eight miles up the river, to protect these river steamers. I listened attentively and was, of course, very courteous. Told him that I could not discuss the matter with him officially as my orders did not contemplate such a trip as he had specified. We talked over the international law view of his steamers as under the Venezuelan flag in Venezuelan waters, on which subject he was evidently not well informed. I gained the impression that Mr. McVeagh who, it seems reasonable to suppose, represents Mr. Olcott's company in the United States, was possibly not aware of the fact that the steamers in question were legally flying the Venezuelan flag. This is about the gist of the matter. Mr. Olcott is a gentleman and makes a good impression. I did not allow the matter to weigh with me at the time as I knew the *Dolphin* drew too much water to get that far up the river without running extreme risks. Telegrams from the department have since convinced me that the status of this company is known there. Mr. Olcott as much as told me that his company could get no help from its own government.

[6] Joseph Newton Hemphill (1847–1931), commanding the *Detroit*.

Am waiting here to determine the chronometer rates in accordance with the department's orders. Snowden is doing this work and has had poor luck so far, due to cloudy weather. I think we will get away on the morning of the twenty-fourth, and return for coal after about thirty days.

The governor's courtesy has been so delicate and so continuous that I am convinced it is due to a desire to evidence the friendly feeling existing between the two countries. He has had me to dinner twice; has asked me to stay at Government House with him, has taken me for a day's excursion to the Pitch Lake (Barber Asphalt Company); has driven me through the interesting points near by; has arranged to later give the officers a railroad trip to the interesting points on the island; has made a long call on board in person, and is giving a dance to-morrow night which is practically for our officers, and which will enable them to meet the nicest people here, and thus give our young fellows homes to visit instead of passing their spare time at the clubs and hotel. Upon our return I shall entertain the governor properly, at which time his wife will have joined him from England.

We are splendidly equipped for the survey, and I hope for success. The matter which troubles me is the element of time and the danger of bad weather setting in for a full due. Young Ryan's sickness, by taking him from us, will probably increase the necessary time for the work by two weeks.

Our decks are filled fore and aft with lumber purchased here. Not one soul lives at the mouth of the Orinoco and I can not afford to leave here with anything lacking. While we have purchased a great deal of lumber and other things, I feel that no money has been wasted.

All hands are in good trim. Snowden seems strong and well again and Cole[7] never looked better. Mrs. Cole is here and heartily enjoying herself. I work pretty steadily and actually have no time to grumble at anything.

Please give my kindest regards to Mrs. Long and Mr. Allen;[8] and tell Mr. Allen that I wish he could spend the next month with me off the Orinoco and get some shooting and fishing.

With all good wishes, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

W. H. H. Southerland

[7] Lieutenant William Carey Cole (1868–1935).

[8] C. H. Allen, assistant secretary of the navy.

ARTHUR LORD TO SECRETARY LONG

53 State Street
Boston
5 December, 1899

My dear Governor:

I write to inquire if you can obtain for me an official copy of the President's civil service order,[1] issued last summer, and the report or statement of Secretary Gage[2] in relation to the same. They were published in the newspapers at the time, but I hesitate to rely in any public speech upon a newspaper report either of a modification of a law or an opinion of an official. I had the impression at the time the matter came out that the secretary's defence of the order was a very strong and convincing statement and especially in reference to certain of the departments affected by the order.

We are to have in Boston the latter part of the month a meeting of the American Historical Association. I notice that one of the subject[s] for discussion is a paper which will be read on the "Selection and Training of Colonial Officials in England, Holland and France." If an opportunity offers, I should be glad to take part in the debate, as I have had some ten years' experience, as you know, in the administration of the civil service law in Massachusetts as a member of the commission until July last, when I resigned, and because I made last summer in England a somewhat careful study of the application of the civil service in England especially in connection with the colonial and diplomatic service. I there had some favorable opportunities to go into the matter, more fully than is possible from a study merely of the printed reports, by personal interviews with the officials of the civil service commission, and the foreign office.

When I consider that it is the same Reform Club which is abusing the President so offensively for his action in Philippine matters, which seem to me eminently just and reasonable, I am the more convinced that their attack upon him for the civil service order may be equally unjustifiable.

Upon such examination as I have made of the civil service system as administered here and abroad, I am quite confident that some practical bill can be framed for its extension into our new possessions which will prove of substantial value and in which much of the present criticism against the civil service law can be avoided.

[1] Executive order, dated May 29, 1899, exempting 4000 officers from civil service rules.

[2] Lyman J. Gage, secretary of the treasury.

If you can kindly obtain for me the papers asked for I should esteem it a great favor. Would it be considered impertinent for me to address a formal communication to the President or the proper officer of the Cabinet in relation to the application and extension of the civil service to the government of our newly acquired possessions, with a draft of a proposed law or presidential order as may be necessary, with the reasons therefor?

I am, with regards,
Yours very truly,
ARTHUR LORD [3]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
NEW YORK
December 12, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I have received a letter from Chadwick, in which he mentions a letter addressed by him to the President, through the department, protesting against Schley's advancement until he shall have been cleared of heavy charges affecting his professional character, made as these are not by irresponsible persons, but by very responsible ones.

I have no difficulty in saying that, be these charges true or erroneous, there would be to me something monstrous, and to military experience unheard of, (as far as I know), in advancement under such conditions. In leaving the Dewey dinner, Sampson told me he had been consulted by Senator Chandler as to a bill making him and Schley vice-admirals, and asked my opinion. I replied that I thought he ought to be a vice-admiral, but to make Schley one, under known conditions, would be a disgrace to the navy; and I authorized him to say I so said, if necessary.

Personally, I have upon most of these charges no opinion to which I am committed. As to their truth I hold opinion in suspense; but as regards the impropriety of promoting an officer who lies under such charges, and seeks no inquiry, there is no room, in my judgment for differing opinions.

But, *personally*, I consider that Schley's utter unfitness for com-

[3] Arthur Lord (1850–1925), Harvard College '72.

mand is conclusively demonstrated, over his own signature, by two facts. One is the well-known telegram announcing his purpose to return to Key West; the other is the statement, in his letter of May 30, that the speed of the squadron was reduced, from seven and a half to eight and a half knots, to four or five, going from Cienfuegos to Santiago, to allow the *Eagle* to keep up. The man who, under all the circumstances, could do those two things, is demonstrably unfit for command; and I have always purposed, in case my opinion were asked, to rest it on these two statements. In my judgment as a student of military history, there is no escape from this conclusion.

With much respect,
Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

44 State Street
Boston
December 12, 1899

Dear Sir:

In reading over the *Life and Letters of Mr. John M. Forbes*,[1] which have been published by his daughter, I was again struck with what I had seen through many years, – the enormous energy, courage, and ingenuity and boldness of this man. He was never content until he had carried out his object, and his chief thought during the Civil War and during many years after seemed to be the good of his government and of his fellow men. He never asked anything nor ever wanted anything except to carry out these ends. It seems to be the way that our country moves, and it is well that it is so. I say this in regard to General Wood, whom you know all about.

General Wood and his wife passed the Fourth of July with us in Manchester, during which day he saw a great many people. I asked him what his chief immediate want at Santiago was, and he replied "A little money to buy school-books for the children." I asked him if ten thousand dollars would do, and he replied that it would. Therefore, I went to work and raised that sum, which is now in my hands subject to his order. He at that time had found that "the parents and children in his province of Santiago de Cuba

[1] John Murray Forbes (1813–1898).

were very anxious to go to school and to learn our ways and our language and have the advantage of our courts of justice. Granted these things, and they would be delighted to live under our government, without those they had no such wish." Soon after that there were three thousand children at school in Santiago alone, and although the schools were of the most primitive description, still the children were getting on. Presently, the schools were closed by the orders coming from the governor-general,[2] and many of General Wood's moves were rendered futile by orders which he received from Cuban headquarters.

If there is anything that is going to make Cuba of use to us, it is the education of the people, and of course we must begin with the children. We have got the island on our hands, as we have Porto Rico, and we must prove that we can take care of the inhabitants in a very different manner than [*sic*] that which the Spaniards practised. No matter how soon the people come to vote, we have got to prepare them for that trial and duty as quickly as possible.

All these facts you know as well as I, and much better. The only object of my letter is to beg that such orders shall go forth from the government as will enable these schools to be re-established at the expense of the inhabitants there, if necessary; and, then that they shall be pushed and supported by our United States officials.

General Wood was absolutely intent on these points as well as many others, and I have rarely seen a man more likely to succeed in that way than he. He is young enough and old enough; has had the New England training and the army training; does not fear responsibility the least in the world; is cool, and courageous, and level-headed. In short, he seemed to us all here born to be a governor of the province. It was not I alone that saw him, but plenty of other people, and they all had the same opinion.

Again I must apologize. I am not giving you any information about him, for no doubt you know him very well, but I very much hope that you will be able to so guide matters that his wishes in regard to the education and administration in that island will be carried out. I had hoped last summer that he[3] was to be made governor-general of the island and wish that it might be so. General Brooke is an old officer of the Civil War, whose reputation for

[2] Major General J. R. Brooke. See Edwin Ginn's letter of October 4.

[3] General Wood was appointed Governor-General about the time this letter was written.

gallantry and skill in handling his troops is a matter of history, but the present sort of work is not in his line.

At any rate, all these points aside, my ardent wish and that of most good citizens of the United States must be that the school system which has made our country should be introduced into Cuba and carried on as thoroughly as possible without any delay, and yet I repeat that in the province of Santiago there is not a child that is at school or a school-house that is open, and I fear very much that there is none at all in Cuba. Is not this wicked and ruinous to us? I think you may rely on my information absolutely, for it comes from the best of sources, and I hope you will pardon me for interfering in the matter.

I am, with great respect,

Yours truly,
H. L. Higginson

We've just won a good fight for good school-committee people here, and it is *the* fight everywhere. I am anxious for Wood's advancement on *our* account, not on his account.

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Albany
December 16, 1899

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Even your long suffering patience will give out some time if I keep on writing to you; but you need not answer my letters, and I only want you to take them at exactly their face value. I do not write you about any man with whom I was not brought into personal contact, and my letters are simply to be taken as testimonials such as I would give to any man who served with me — such as I have given about men in my own regiment and the other cavalry regiments to the secretary of war.

I learn that Captain Sigsbee has applied for Lieutenant-Commander Kimball for the intelligence department. During my year of service in the department, Kimball was one of the men with whom I was thrown into intimate contact. He did invaluable work, not merely with the torpedo-boat squadron, but in formulating and preparing plans of action for the war with Spain. He has a rather

rare combination of executive capacity in practice, and of knowledge of the theory of war. This makes him peculiarly fitted for such an office as the bureau of intelligence, for he neither disregards books and learning, nor on the other hand fails to understand the necessity of practical training. I would regard him as a peculiarly valuable officer for the place.

I enclose a letter from gallant Dick Wainwright on behalf of Paul Dashiell.[1] You note what he says of how invaluable Dashiell is to the Naval Academy. I have the utmost confidence in his word.

Always yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HENRY L. HIGGINSON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
December 17, 1899

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

If you knew from what source my information as to Cuban schools came, you would forgive my strong assertion that no schools were open. Let it go.

General Wood is in command of the island, and will do good work. It is a wise and timely appointment by the President – the best possible.

You will be glad to know that the Harvard Corporation have told Frank Bartlett and the class of '57 – the best class known to me – that they are glad to have a memorial to John Ropes put in Memorial Hall.

With best wishes,
I am yours truly,
H. L. HIGGINSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

ALBANY
December 19, 1899

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have just received your thoughtful and kind letters.

Unless you especially want it I won't send that letter to Kimball;

[1] Professor of physics.

because unless I said I did so at your suggestion, it would look as though I was trying to be unpleasant with him. I understand perfectly about Dashiell.

Now, I think I am going to adopt this rule about the navy department — the same rule as about the war department — that is, tell those people who write me (and you have no conception of how many do write me) that I will with pleasure testify to whatever I know at first hand about any man who served with me, but that I will make no request and do nothing of any kind further than speak about matters of which I have personal knowledge.

Meanwhile, my dear Sir, do let me assure you that I appreciate your patience and kindliness.

Faithfully your old friend,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER SOUTHERLAND TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Dolphin*
Personal — Mouth of the Orinoco River
VENEZUELA
December 23, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have just finished an official report to the department which I hope you will read, as it will give you an idea of the situation down here and show you why we are going to take many months to complete our work.

Until our arrival on the ground no one on board had any realization of what a stupendous undertaking the contemplated survey of this great expanse was; but we were not discouraged and have been working like beavers ever since.

Personally, I never had as anxious a time during the late war as I did when bringing the ship in. When we reached the bar, in coming in, there was not a mark in sight by which the position of the vessel could be verified. It was like working in the dark and trusting a great deal to luck. For several miles, although the little craft was drawing sixteen feet, eight inches, we forced her through a muddy bottom with a depth of water of only fifteen feet. During this time, while the leadsmen were calling out "a half two," even the men on deck were startled into silence; many of them looking at me in silent

amazement. I realized that it was too late to turn back and can assure you that I felt very sick at heart, although I tried not to show it and simply smoked a cigar and chatted with the pilot. The pilot was much more nervous than I, and with good reason; as it was only the third time a pilot has gone over the bar to bring a vessel in within the last eighteen years and, in addition, no vessel of such deep draft has ever before crossed the bar. I practically took the vessel in myself as he, having no landmarks to guide him until well across the bar, could only assist me by warning me when the vessel neared water with a hard bottom. He was a fine old fellow and realized the risk being taken. He has been of great assistance to me in the work of the survey since we got inside and, when the other pilots went on a strike and left here a few days ago because they had not received their pay, he remained behind to be of any possible assistance to me.

Had not Admiral Crowninshield told me of his experience here in 1892, I don't believe I would have taken the risk of crossing the bar with so deep draft a vessel. We have practically worked day and night since our arrival and each one has had about an equal share of the work. I am up every morning at 5:15 and am mighty glad to go to bed by 9:30.

Our progress has been slow, due principally to rough seas, and will probably be slower in the future as the windy season is about setting in. We are making every effort to finish up the really essential and practical features of the survey by January 20, about which date we will have to return to Trinidad for coal. The entire work as outlined in my instructions will I fear, with our one deep draft vessel and two small launches, take many months to complete. And if the information I have gained from the pilots and others in regard to the weather is correct we will be unable to even commence some of it before June. This is all explained fully in my report to the department, which was written in order to show that we on board are in no wise to blame for the slowness with which the work is progressing. We are doing our best, and only the elements at this season of the year are against us.

Our latest mail was November 22, and we know of no opportunity of receiving any other before we reach Trinidad next month. Our passenger, Mr. Roeder, did all that he could for us. The extra steam launch which he placed at our disposal would have proved of the greatest value had she not had a defective shaft which broke

and dropped her propeller overboard the first day we put her to any real use.

All the officers are in good trim and are doing fine work. We all work so steadily during the day time that we don't have time to grumble at anything, and we are too tired at night to do anything but sleep.

We have had several accidents but none serious excepting one — a deplorable case of drowning of one of our men. I fell down a ladder while trying to raise a swamped boat the other morning and broke my fall on one thumb. Urie pulled it into place in no time however, and says I will be using it in a few days. Am thankful it was not the wrist. Urie is a fine fellow to have around under these circumstances for, when discouragements come, which is rather often, he makes it his duty to convince me that it is probably all for the best and that it might be much worse. He keeps a close eye on every one and is of great assistance in many ways.

The yarns about the fine game and fish to be obtained here are fairy tales. Urie is caterer of the mess and as such tries to provide us with fish caught by his own hook. He has caught nothing but catfish and very few of them. They make a chowder, which tastes good because it is fresh.

The southern shore line is about thirty-five miles long and there is scarcely one place where a man can put his foot, it being one mass of tangled, matted mangrove growing out in the mud and water. Nothing but this mangrove growth is in sight anywhere, and although on a clear day, we could see a small mountain forty or fifty miles away, nothing of the sort is in sight. Two small settlements — about five houses in each — are on the banks of two small rivers near here, one English, containing a few native soldiers; the other, Venezuelan. Each house is situated in a small plot of muddy soil around all sides of which is a deep ditch to carry off the water and keep the house on comparatively dry ground. This is a great country for irrigation. Of course, no game would live in such mangrove swamps.

Mr. Roeder sent me two coon foxes and a parrot from up the river and they are elephants on my hands. The men have obtained two or three more parrots and a Venezuelan rabbit. If they live to get north, I will send them to the Washington Zoo.

We have heard a great deal of devil fish and manatee being in the neighborhood, but as yet have seen none. The base line party

have seen a few alligators. Of the less than two dozen inhabitants in this neighborhood, one is a Chinaman, and he is the most thriving one of the lot.

The weather is not specially trying, our only trouble being due to the constant dampness. Mould forms on clothing and leather articles within two or three days, and constant care has to be exercised by officers and men to keep clothing from being ruined. The general health is good, due principally to Urie's constant watchfulness over all on board.

We have felt Lieutenant Ryan's absence very much, one officer's aid, under these circumstances, meaning a great help. Urie does not think he will be able to do any heavy work when he returns to us. Am very sorry I told you this work could be finished in so short a time, but hope you realize that my information at the time regarding the conditions here was of such a character as to warrant my predictions.

The information, however, was of too uncertain a character, and we find obstacles, principally due to physical conditions and wind and weather, which result in the work of a deep draft vessel and two small launches going on quite slowly. However, we have met these obstacles, and knowing something about them, will work with increased vigor and to better effect, and will end up by successfully overcoming them.

I am quite certain that a good part of the outside work called for in my instructions is not only unnecessary but can scarcely be done by this vessel or any vessel of her draft. It is in water out of sight of land having depths of less than sixteen feet. Small launches could do it if the parent ship could keep near them in case of sudden bad weather or heavy seas. Our light draft yachts could do it, but I can not see that it is necessary as it would be of no practical use.

What is wanted here is a safe channel across the bar. When I have further investigated this matter and am absolutely certain in my own mind, I shall make it the subject of a recommendation to the hydrographic office, bureau of equipment, and am sure that Admiral Crowninshield, who has been here, will approve my ideas.

Please give my affectionate regards to Mrs. Long and don't fail to send nice messages to Miss Helen when you write. I do earnestly hope Miss Helen is doing well. Tell her I will make every effort to get north before August or September so as to give her at least a week or two on board.

And now, with all good wishes for yourself and fully believing that you realize that we are all doing our level best and that our slow progress and possible lengthy stay down here is not due to lack of ability, resourcefulness and effort, I am

Very sincerely yours,
W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department, WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON NAVY YARD
December 27, 1899

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have your letter of the twenty-second instant referring to the question of my recommendations in the case of Commander Delehanty.[1] While I thoroughly appreciate your views on the matter, I am still of the opinion that I was justified in employing one of the expressions "eminent and conspicuous conduct in battle," or "extraordinary heroism," for these are the only ones permitted by law in recommending a man for promotion. If an officer is considered worthy of promotion, for whatever reason, he must be recommended in the above terms, as you yourself have stated, or the recommendation fails. But suppose an officer has conducted his ship in action and has attained a victory complete and decisive, though under circumstances that admit of no eminent and conspicuous conduct on his part, his conduct can not be described in such terms; and yet is he not entitled to some reward? Is there no difference in degree of merit? The view that I hold is that when an officer has actually performed an act of extraordinary heroism, *etc.*, he should, generally, receive the maximum reward, namely, the promotion of thirty numbers; and for lesser exploits fewer numbers. I endeavored to distinguish the difference in degree of merit by the number of points for which I recommended each officer.

Very respectfully yours,
W. T. SAMPSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Daniel Delehanty (1845–1918).

1900

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

ALBANY
January 4, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I thank you for yours of the second instant with copy of testimony. I have not the vaguest remembrance of Mr. Creecey's name or of ever seeing him, of course; I saw so many hundreds of people that I could not keep any one in mind. I remember nothing about the telephonic or telegraphic messages. I do remember that I heard from various naval officers, even before the Rodgers Board [1] was organized, that the Luckenback ocean-going tugs were vessels which should be immediately secured for the auxiliary navy, and I know we tried to secure one or more of them. But the details have wholly slipped my mind, save that I have a dim remembrance that we had a quarrel over the price which deferred the purchase for some little time — but this may have been in reference to some entirely different vessels.

I suppose that it is unnecessary for me to say that it never occurred to me that Mr. Howell or any one else in the office had the least interest in any vessel, or any man trying to sell a vessel.

Faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

To Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON NAVY YARD
January 17, 1900

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have heard, with much pleasure, that the superintendent of the Naval Academy has recommended that Swordmaster Corbesier, at the Naval Academy, may be retired; and I beg to be allowed to express an earnest hope that the department may see fit to urge this action upon Congress.

During several tours of duty at the Naval Academy, including the superintendency of that institution for four years, I became

[1] A board of inspection and survey, of which Rear-Admiral Frederick Rodgers was president.

thoroughly acquainted with Mr. Corbesier's manner of performing his duties: a higher sense of duty, and a more thorough devotion thereto, it has never been my good fortune to witness. This was demonstrated by his work in the regular classes that he was required to conduct, no less than by his custom of organizing and drilling special classes purely on his own initiative, and with no possible compensation except the sense of good work performed in the interest of the academy. He has spent thirty-five years continuously at the academy, and I have been in a position to observe his work, at more or less regular periods, almost from the beginning. I know nothing of his antecedents, but he always impressed me as being a gentleman born and bred. His conduct toward the cadets has invariably been courteous, kindly, and dignified, even under aggravating circumstances. The efficiency of his department, the welfare of the cadets and of the school, seem to have been his principal care for this long term of years, for he was willing and eager to sacrifice his leisure hours in instructing a class or an individual in something new or in something in which the individual might be deficient. The last that I knew of him he was still as faithful and ambitious in his work. He must be at least sixty-five years old — too old to be much longer able to perform the arduous duties of his position. I know of no more deserving individual employed by the government in any capacity than Mr. Corbesier, and I hope that the department may see fit to urge such legislation as may be necessary for his retirement at an early date.

Very respectfully yours,
W. T. SAMPSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

RICHARD HENRY DANA TO SECRETARY LONG

53 State Street
BOSTON
January 17, 1900

DEAR MR. LONG:

I have yours of January 15 with two extracts from my speech at the annual meeting of the Boston Civil Service Reform Association.

The *Herald* had a full copy of the speech, but left out, as they

often do in condensing, some important matters. I went on to say regarding the evidence that has come to us of improper changes in the navy yard (which, by the way, is the navy yard at Kittery), that a report was about to be made to you, and that undoubtedly these matters would be rectified.

We learned of the state of affairs, of which we complain, some time ago from very reliable sources. Mr. McAneny [1] said something to you about them, as I recollect; but at all events, we sent down the assistant secretary of the national league, with a lawyer who is acquainted with people in the neighborhood, and, with the help of thoroughly non-partisan people who are fully acquainted with the affairs that had been going on in the navy yard, direct evidence was taken down from witnesses as to the details, fully substantiating all that I said, and a great deal more. The last witness only gave his testimony on January 6. This has all been sent on to New York to the national league's office, and it is proposed to submit this to you very soon.

You say: "I can not help thinking that if any instance of the sort had occurred, some intimation of it would have come to me, which is not the case." I am not at all sure of this. I went through some experience regarding this *same* navy yard during President Harrison's administration. Stories came to me, supported by evidence of eye-witnesses, of misdoings under Secretary Tracy in that same navy yard. I stated them in great detail, and Secretary Tracy officially denied them, making statements of reports regarding that navy yard which certainly officially contradicted the statements I had made. The *Boston Advertiser* came down on me, and required that I should retract all that I had stated. I felt confident from the character of the witnesses that I was right. I made further investigation, and found out in what methods the official reports had been treated before being sent to Washington, in order to cover up the actual facts, so that even the pay-rolls did not tell the true story. I then wrote that to General Tracy, and still he would not believe that I was right. He came to Boston later, and I had an interview with him, and he then went and made a personal investigation, and found out that I *was* right. I have never seen him since, but as it was almost immediately after this that he announced his intention of adopting rules for the employment of persons in the navy yard, and put them into operation, I am very much in-

[1] George McAneny, secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League.

clined to believe that the very fact of his being deceived by his own subordinates was one of the most convincing arguments to induce him to adopt such rules. I trust, therefore, that in any investigation that you will make it will be done in an absolutely thorough manner. We can furnish you with the names of a good many witnesses who are unwilling to testify to us, but who would testify if compelled to do so.

You ask me to tell you what places have been "taken out of the civil service rules and put under rules to be adopted by the navy." I reply: "All persons at navy yards, *etc.*" (see Executive Order May 29, 1899, amendment of rule III, section 8, clause m, 15th Report of Civil Service Commission, 50 and 52–54). For the war department, see clauses g, h, i, j, and k. In the war department the places are under "regulations to be issued by the secretary of war and approved by the President." The places in the navy department, taken out from the civil service commission's control, are under "paragraphs 74 to 83 of Navy Yard Order No. 23 revised." These paragraphs are of course subject to revision, and I understand and believe were actually revised, though I have not got the exact authority for that, as only a statement is made in the official report that they have been or may be revised.

It seems to me, and to us generally, that the civil service commission with its experience and machinery and freedom from political influence, is better adapted for regulating these appointments than, for example, the war department, where many of the appointing officers at the heads of large bureaus entrusted with the carrying out of the rules to prevent themselves from making political appointments, are themselves appointed for political reasons and subject to political pressure. Past experience in the United States has shown that rules in the nature of civil service rules, left to the departments to carry out, have *in the long run* failed of their object. It was only when a civil service commission was appointed and controlled the execution of its rules that any real good was effected. But of course you know all this. Your department, as we have frequently stated in our reports, under your personal guidance has been particularly free from any such influences; but the *system* now established may have to be dealt with by others who would not personally have the same qualities and the same regard for purer politics that you have, and it is the systems that I am interested in; the officials at the heads of the departments to-day

whether favorable or unfavorable to the general cause, are of less importance from the point of view of permanent reform.

One other instance of getting around the rules in effect, at the Kittery Yard, which might not come to your attention is, according to the evidence, about as follows: A recommendation is sent on to have certain offices abolished; and then to have new ones afterwards, or soon afterwards, established under different titles. As soon as the old offices are abolished, the holders of the positions are removed, and then, before the new ones are established, a few political followers are given a "tip," and they then apply for positions under the newly entitled offices which are about to be established. No one else knowing of the new titles, the names of these few favored applicants are the only ones registered when the new positions first become established. Appointments are then immediately made, and in this way they get rid of former employees, and get their particular friends into position. The actual work done under the new titles is exactly the same, certainly in some instances, as was done under the abolished positions. The exact dates, and names, *etc.*, will be sent you probably early in February. I return the slips, and I would be glad to give you, if you should desire it, the original of my remarks, as far as they cover these points.

Believe me,
Very truly yours,
R. H. DANA[2]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN DAVIS TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Observatory
WASHINGTON, D. C.
January 18, 1900

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Your note of the seventeenth received. I will be very glad to consider the matter of a naval monument in the national park at Vicksburg. Something could undoubtedly be done with old guns, but I suppose the character of the work would depend to some extent on the amount of the appropriation for it, and a tablet or column

[2] Richard Henry Dana (1851–1931), Harvard College '74. Other letters on this subject are dated January 25 (two letters), 29, February 2, 8, and April 21.

might be combined with guns and an anchor, or something of the kind. I will take the subject into serious consideration. I like the idea immensely because it has always seemed to me that the success of the navy in the Civil War on the western waters, far from its natural field of action, and with improvised ships and crews, has never been fully appreciated: and furthermore it is a good thing to keep the navy before the western people.

Very respectfully,
C. H. DAVIS

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Strictly confidential
W. T. S.

BOSTON NAVY YARD
January 19, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have just been told that you are considering a change in the command of the Naval Academy, and that Captain Chadwick has been mentioned for that duty. I feel embarrassed in this matter; for though I earnestly wish to see Chadwick receive this appointment and believe that no other officer is so well fitted for it, because of temperament, attainments, and high principle – I have already put myself six months ago on record as favoring Captain Goodrich for that place when it should become vacant.

If Captain Chadwick is chosen, I shall, believe me, feel that I have myself received a personal favor; and I know the academy would attain its best standard, under his command.

Another consideration which seems to me of no little importance in the question is the influence which Mrs. Chadwick would exert, in a place where it unquestionably makes the greatest difference what family a commanding officer takes with him. Indeed I have sometimes thought that had I the matter to decide, I would never order an officer to any duty at the Naval Academy without first learning that his wife was likely to carry with her an atmosphere of *peace* as well as of high principle. The commanding officer's wife is of course the leader in all social matters, and the cadets follow where they are led. In re-reading my letter I perceive that it is subject, perhaps, to misconstruction. I am certainly not *making any comparisons* between the wives of any officers who might be eligible for the command at the Naval Academy. Since Captain

Taylor does not wish to go, I feel that Captain Chadwick would fill the place better than any other man; and incidentally would carry with him an excellent influence to supplement, and never overthrow his own.

Yours sincerely,
W. T. SAMPSON [1]

COMMANDER KIMBALL TO SECRETARY LONG

Ordnance Office, Navy Yard
Personal NORFOLK, VIRGINIA
19 January, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Your most kind personal letter of yesterday has just been received. In regard to Sigsbee's request, the conversation was, in effect if not in exact words, as follows:

Sigsbee said he was to go to [the office of naval] intelligence and wished to have a commander as assistant. I said I supposed he meant me; that I had thought of intelligence only as a possible billet for me as chief; but that since it was to be raised to a captain's billet, and since he was to be chief, I would like to serve under him. He said that was what he wished and that he would ask Admiral Crowninshield for my services. I said I would make an official application – which I did.

I had no intention of giving you the impression that the original suggestion, as I understood it, did not come from Sigsbee. When you told me that it was not true that Sigsbee had asked for me, I was naturally embarrassed; could not dispute your direct statement, comprehended that you had been given a point of view very different from mine, and so was unable to make my position clear. The reply to my official request was that it could not be granted because my cruise was not finished; and there was no intimation that there was any other reason for not granting it. Accordingly I went ahead to try and get the *Vixen* ready for sea, with the expectation of leaving for the South early in December; and a few days later, I was detached from her and ordered to immediate duty at this yard.

Meantime, the captain of this yard had been in the bureau of ordnance and there learned that Mr. Hunker had asked Admiral O'Neil if he would have me here in his department, that the ad-

[1] Written by Mrs. Sampson and signed by the admiral.

miral had been good enough to say he would, and that accordingly I was to be sent here. The same day, the captain of the yard spoke of my detail to the chief of bureau of navigation, who told him I was *not* to leave the *Vixen*, because my cruise was not finished. These existing facts made it apparent to me, that either my case had not been considered by superior authority, or that there was some adverse influence at work to my detriment. In either case, I felt justified in bringing the matter to your attention, and in putting it as fairly as possible.

I am exceedingly sorry if anything I have done, under the indefinite but exceedingly difficult conditions in which I was placed, has caused you annoyance. It was as far as possible from any intention of mine. While I feel very confident that you have been given an incorrect impression in regard to my attitude toward intelligence duty, and more so in regard to the duty itself, the question is not one for me to discuss, since you find I am not needed for that duty. In relieving me here and sending me to the Washington yard, without quarters, you will add a large increase to the load of obligation I am carrying; for while the duty there will not allow the professional interest and improvement I had hoped for, it will relieve me of much personal expense, and give me many professional opportunities that do not exist in my present surroundings.

Very gratefully yours,
W. W. Kimball

LIEUTENANT KNAPP TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts
January 22, 1900

Sir:

1. In obedience to orders dated the twentieth instant, I called on Mr. R. H. Dana this morning in connection with alleged violations of the civil service rules at the Kittery Navy Yard. I explained "to him, as far as practicable, the workings of the rules of the board of labor employment," in particular such rules as referred to the addition of trades to the authorized schedule of any yard, and called his attention to the fact that no such change in the trade schedule could be made unless approved by the secretary of the navy, after recommendation by the head of the department, and the approval of the commandant.

2. Mr. Dana stated that objections had been made to the changes authorized by the President in his order of last May, in which certain offices in the navy yards were taken out of the classified list, and to reinstatements and transfers authorized by the said order. I informed him that I was not authorized to consider this matter, but was directed to look into the alleged violations of labor regulations referred to by him in that part of his speech which was quoted in your letter of the 20th instant. He said he had received his information from a stenographic report of an investigation made by a lawyer in Kittery and in Boston. This stenographic report, he informed me, had been forwarded to Mr. George McAneny, secretary of the National Civil Service Reform League, 54 William Street, New York.

3. I was informed that the above referred to investigation was made in consequence of personal statements of a professor at Harvard. From this investigation it appeared to Mr. Dana that changes had been made in the schedule of trades, and that those favored by a party faction said to be running the Kittery yard received the advantage of these changes in ratings in the manner referred to in his speech. I requested Mr. Dana to give me such definite information as would enable me to investigate the matter, but he declined to do so, stating that he preferred that the matter should reach you directly from the National Civil Service Reform League, and he did not think, pending its action, that it would be well for him to give me any further details. He dictated a letter in my presence to Mr. McAneny, requesting him to forward you at once, if practicable, the above referred to report.

4. I again urged Mr. Dana to inform me who the lawyer was that made the investigation, and to furnish me with further particulars, but he courteously declined, saying he preferred that you should have the whole matter presented to you through the civil service commission, as he deemed that you then, having all the evidence before you, could take such steps as might be necessary to ascertain the full facts in the matter.

5. I can proceed to the navy yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, at any time, but in order that further directions may be given me by you, if so desired, I will defer my departure until Thursday morning.

6. In the event of a formal investigation being ordered, I request that orders be given to Charles T. Ogle, clerk (on duty at this

yard under me), to accompany me to Portsmouth, in order that he may keep a stenographic record of the investigation; and further, that I be directed to administer to witnesses the oath authorized by section 183 of the revised statutes of the United States.

Very respectfully,
JOHN J. KNAPP [1]

The *Secretary of the Navy*
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THOMAS L. LIVERMORE TO SECRETARY LONG

12 Ashburton Place
BOSTON
January 23, 1900

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

Will you do the favor for Henry L. Higginson, Quincy A. Shaw, Jr.,[1] and myself to request a letter for us from the President or secretary of state, to introduce us to President Diaz [2] of Mexico. We are to leave for Mexico [on] February 10 to visit a mine in the state of Durango which Q. A. Shaw, Alexander Agassiz, H. L. Higginson, and I are opening, and we expect that it will be desirable for us to continue our journey to the city of Mexico to obtain the personal intercession of the President with the officials near our property to ensure the enforcement of the laws for our protection and for the peace of the region where we are operating.

We have been at work there over three years and the magnitude of our interests makes it desirable for us to be vouched for with the President of Mexico. Anything you may feel at liberty to do for us in this behalf will receive our sincere thanks.

Yours faithfully,
THOMAS L. LIVERMORE [3]

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON NAVY YARD
January 24, 1900

SIR:

I would be greatly pleased if you could make a short visit to this yard. You are probably more or less familiar with its present

[1] John Joseph Knapp (1857–1915).

[1] Quincy Adams Shaw, Jr. (b. 1869), Harvard College '91.
[2] José de la Cruz Porfirio Diaz (1830–1915).
[3] Colonel Thomas Leonard Livermore (1844–1918).

condition: I know, however, how important it is to a more complete understanding of the situation of affairs to have your knowledge renewed occasionally, and even to have its needs pointed out to you. May I be pardoned for mentioning that you are expected to take a special interest in the navy yard so near your home. This yard has been closed for all ordinary work for such a long time, that it has gone backward in a serious manner as a result. The whole establishment is suffering from the disuse, lack of care, and false economy which has so long prevailed. I feel confident that if you would come here quietly for a careful inspection, and see things as I see them, it would do us a world of good. As work is starting up again, I am anxious that the yard should be prepared for the change.

As your house at Hingham is probably closed, it would give me pleasure to entertain you here; and if Mrs. Long and your daughter would also come, Mrs. Sampson, as well as myself, would give them our most heartfelt welcome.

Sincerely yours,
W. T. Sampson

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

James Bradley Thayer to Secretary Long

Cambridge
January 24, 1900

Dear Governor Long:

No, I am too old a dog for new tricks. I wish heartily that I could go, for I feel much honored by the suggestion.[1] But there are quite insuperable difficulties in the way, with the nature of which I need not trouble you.

But let me suggest A. L. Lowell – Lawrence Lowell, as we call him. Perhaps you saw his article on this general subject; a very good one. He is a *very* able man, of forty or over, who has studied political questions carefully, whose work has attracted the favorable attention and comment of foreigners and who, I feel quite sure, is in sympathy with the administration in regard to these colonial problems. Perhaps you know all about him. He is Augustus Low-

[1] Professor Thayer had presumably been suggested as a member of the Philippine Commission.

ell's son, and a graduate of Harvard in 1877 and the law school in 1880, a brilliant man in both places. I talked with him lately on these questions with almost entire agreement.

I thank you heartily for suggesting my name for so honorable a place (for I presume that you did), and will beg you to communicate to the President my great regret that I can not be of service to him in his great and patriotic task.

Always with great respect,
J. B. THAYER

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.
January 26, [1900]

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

Mrs. Lodge has just given me your message. Lawrence Lowell [1] would be a most admirable man. He is a trained lawyer and a specialist on constitutions and systems of jurisprudence. He is deeply interested [in] the question of our new possessions and their government and has written a good deal on the subject and very well. I regard him as a very able man and just fitted for such work as this. If you think it worth while, I should be very glad to have you show this note to the President.

Sincerely yours,
H. C. LODGE

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

NEWPORT, [RHODE ISLAND]
30 January, 1900

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Your note of January 25 only reached me last night owing to some delay in transmission. I am sincerely grateful to you, Sir, for your kindness upon this as upon many other occasions during your administration, and I shall always remember that a chief of whom the navy is proud has thought well of me.

Feeling thus it appears even to myself to be stupid and ungrateful to decline an honor [1] offered me by one for whom I have such high

[1] See preceding letter, January 24, and below, February 9, note.

[1] Superintendency of the Naval Academy.

respect; but with my convictions, based as they are, not upon visionary fancies, but upon long study and practical experience, I would not be doing my best for you, Mr. Secretary, and for the service if I left the work which has for many years engaged my thoughts – and for which I can as yet find no colleague or successor, – and should engross myself entirely in the Naval Academy to the exclusion of all else, as I can not help doing if I undertake it.

On board the *Vermont* [2] where you have authorized my going in March, my duties will not be so engrossing and such leisure as I may have can be given to these questions of a general staff [3] or to any others which you might do me the honor to entrust to me. I send you this week the mem[orandum] of a general staff, which you spoke of my drafting for you when I was in Washington – and I beg you, Sir, to wait till you have read it before counting me either foolish or ungrateful in definitely and decidedly declining with most earnest thanks, your kind offer of the Naval Academy.

I am, Sir, with great respect,

Very sincerely yours,
H. C. Taylor

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
New York
January 31, 1900

My dear Mr. Long:

It is hard to keep my excellent intentions of withdrawing wholly from discussions of to-day's naval matters. The report I see, that the construction board [1] has decided upon battleships of fourteen

[2] Receiving ship at New York.

[3] The need of a general staff of the navy was urged after the Spanish War. "Its duties include the collection of information respecting foreign navies, their bases in time of war, and the theater of action in which they will move. . . . The department did not see its way clear to go further than to organize what is designated as the General Board, with the admiral of the navy as its president, and the whole thing under the direct supervision of the Secretary." Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 122–124 and II, 183–186.

[1] The board on construction, constituted by Secretary Tracy in 1889, consisted of the chiefs of the five bureaus of yards and docks, ordnance, equipment, construction and repair, and steam engineering, and had general supervision over the design, construction, and equipment of ships. See Long, *The New American Navy*, I, 121.

thousand tons, prompts me now to offer a suggestion which I had in fact drawn up while in Washington during the late war.

The various difficulties inherent in the problem of a battleship are peculiarly felt by each bureau, from which the construction board is drawn. A ready way to get what each, and all, want, is to increase size. It is, however, a strictly momentary expedient, analogous to meeting household difficulties, not by management but by increased expenditure. Logically, the process may lead to ships of twenty-five thousand tons, if harbors will admit them.

The difficulty is that, from its constitution, the construction board necessarily tends to view the question rather from the technological than from the military side. Unless the country — and Congress — is prepared for practically unlimited expenditure, bigger ships mean fewer ships. Now there are strong military reasons why numbers of ships are wanted; and in view of the steady increase in size, due to increasing demands of each technical factor in the battleship, the time has arrived when the military experts should be called in, and directed to consider what the limits of size should be. This would take two forms, viz.: what is the best normal tonnage for the bulk of the battle-fleet, — for the *mean* battleship? and, further, what *exceptional* battleships should be built, in number and in individual size, for the tactical purpose of strengthening certain parts of an order of battle? This is the old question of the two-decker and three-decker of Nelson and his times.

The military question by no means excludes consideration of technical details, but it should dominate them. If I were submitting it to a special board, I should pose the question before them somewhat thus:

" Having in view, on the one hand, the advisability of concentrating in the single battleship the highest offensive power, combined with adequate armor protection, and such coal endurance as our national strategic conditions require, together with a high and sustained, but not extreme, sea speed; and, considering on the other hand, the necessity of having numerous ships, in order to meet the various demands of a war, which require facility of combining and of distributing the aggregate tonnage of the fleet, as well as the maintenance of relief ships in reserve, in order that, through frequent exchanges, the efficiency of the vessels can be maintained, it is desirable to establish a standard size of battleships. The board is directed to consider and report within what limits of size, maximum

and minimum, the average medium battleship, the type of the fleet in general, should be kept. The board will also report if, for tactical reasons, occasional heavier battleships are desirable; and, if so, their size, and their numerical proportion to the fleet as a whole."

An excellent board, in my judgment, for this purpose, would be Dewey, Sampson, and Harry Taylor; the first two for obvious reasons, and Taylor as being one of the most maturely informed officers in the service, on military considerations as opposed to those which are chiefly technical.

I would like to add, for your personal information, that in my recent book, *Lessons of the War with Spain,* pages 30–42, and in the article, "Distinguishing Qualities of Ships of War," pages 257–273, I have expressed these views at a length not suited to this letter. I would like only to add that the serious defect of all navies, except possibly [of] Germany, is that all these decisions are made by the technologist rather than by the military expert. The military reasons for which navies exist are not given the primacy they should have.

Very sincerely yours,
A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[NEW YORK]
February 5, 1900

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I fear I must have expressed myself badly, for you have misapprehended my meaning in two particulars.

I did not intend to advocate a permanent board of three, although I think that the distinctly military element is inadequately represented by a board of bureau chiefs. What I hoped was that a decision might now be reached, through a board such as suggested, as to how the battleship tonnage of the navy was to be allotted: to very big ships, or to a determined medium size, which would allow a greater number.

Again, I certainly meant to criticize the decision to build ships of fourteen thousand tons, because, in my opinion, they are larger than needed, and likely to result in too few ships. I believe that I know that one bureau wants increased size, to attain a speed which I consider extravagant; and that another wants size, in order to [?] a

coal endurance which I believe unnecessary; and that both, for these ends, are willing to increase size without commensurate gain in offensive power. Both I consider distinctly contrary to sound military principle. The navy does not exist for ships, but ships for the navy; and correct conclusions can not be *secured* unless you call in those who think *first* what does the navy need for war, and next what kind of ships fulfil those needs. The technologist and bureau man necessarily thinks first of his own specialty.

If such a board as I suggested affirm in the main the decisions of the construction board – well; if not, a serious error may be timely averted, before the country be seized with a parsimonious fit, and we be left with a few monsters, instead of a number adequate to our varied requirements.

Very truly yours,
A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN HOBSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

HONG KONG
February 6, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

My eyes are giving me trouble and I have become supersensitive to the sun. The trouble has been progressive, being noticeable summer before last, after a touch of fever in Santiago, and continuing during last summer, being accentuated by a touch of fever toward the close of the heat, and a short time ago, after a touch of the sun received on what would be called a cloudy day, my eyes gave such trouble as to stop all reading or writing. This caused me to consult a doctor, and he says I should clear out of the tropics before the heat sets in.

I reported the matter to Admiral Watson this morning and he decided that action should be taken without delay looking to the carrying out of the doctor's recommendation. I asked him, however, not to make the matter official, for I feel sure that it can be made to come about all right, as I am otherwise in robust health – and I hate to start a medical record, having absolutely none thus far. Besides I feel that I must get some service at Manila and the two last gun-boats require a few weeks longer here. The admiral consented to my making the matter the subject of a personal letter to you, directing me to inform you of his approval and of his recommenda-

tion for my detachment by the middle of April, his judgment being the same as the doctor's that this should be the latest date.

I have had a feeling that it would be best for me to break away and rough it in Siberia, away from books and papers, and indoor and artificial lights, but I hardly see how this is practicable on account of the matter of expense unless my orders could help me out.

Could my orders of detachment direct me to proceed home, allowing me discretion in the way and time of getting there, placing a limit on the expenses allowed, say four hundred and fifty dollars (mileage and steamer coming out were about four hundred and seventy-five dollars), giving a normal time limit after which my pay would be as on waiting orders, that is, detachment, orders home, and to consider myself on waiting orders after five weeks, allowing a fixed sum for expenses.

I should be indebted if such could be arranged.

Yours sincerely,

RICHMOND PEARSON HOBSON

ROGER WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

53 State Street
BOSTON
February 9, 1900

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

As soon as possible after receiving your telegram I telegraphed you that I would go to Washington in compliance with your request, being then of course entirely ignorant of the purpose for which the President desired to see me.

Last evening I received your letter of February 7 disclosing this purpose, and as I felt sure that I could not accept the very honorable and responsible position [1] in connection with which you inform me the President has done me the honor to consider my name, I thought it better to abandon my proposed trip to Washington, fearing that my presence there might give rise to newspaper comment which would be undesirable.

Under other circumstances I confess this appointment might have a strong attraction for me. It would afford the opportunity at

[1] As member of the Philippine Commission. The commission as finally made up, March 20, 1900, consisted of: Jacob Gould Schurman (b. 1854), London University '77, president of Cornell University, chairman; Admiral George Dewey, U. S. N.; Major General Elwell S. Otis, U. S. A.; Charles Denby (1830–1904); Dean Conant Worcester (1866–1924), University of Michigan '89.

least of wisely determining a problem of grave difficulty and of far-reaching importance, and would bring the commissioners face to face with scenes and conditions of romantic novelty and interest.

But after a somewhat long period of unbroken public service, I feel the distinct need of a time of rest, and have formed plans for a trip to Europe the coming summer with Mrs. Wolcott and our children. My family, as you know, is a large one, and, were I to accept this appointment, I should be reluctant either to take them with me or to leave them behind for so long a period of absence.

I have felt at liberty to write to you thus fully, because I would not have you suppose that I feel otherwise than deeply sensible of the President's favorable opinion of me as shown in the suggestion you present.

I beg that you will convey to the President my very sincere thanks for his favorable consideration of my name in connection with this honorable and important service, and believe me, with much respect,

Very sincerely yours,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
14 February, 1900

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I forward with this note the memo[randum] of the general staff [1] methods of which I spoke to you, and concerning which you asked for some concrete suggestions. These are found at the end of the memo[randum] in the shape of proposed department orders. I hope, Sir, that you will find time among your busy hours to read the paper with some deliberation. I have refrained from elaboration and argument, knowing that if you found the general idea sensible and desirable, you would wish to discuss it further and would send for me to listen to verbal explanations – and if on the contrary the idea did not commend itself to you, that lengthy detailed description would be only a waste of time.

I have studied this question in practice as well as theory for many years, and I believe it now, in view of late events, to demand urgency. It can not be longer delayed now without grave injury to

[1] See Captain Taylor's letter of January 30, 1900.

the country's future. Such is my opinion at least which I submit to you, Sir, with all proper deference and respect. Should you care to have me go more into details I will be glad to come on to Washington when it suits your convenience. I congratulate you, Mr. Secretary, upon having secured so excellent a superintendent for the Naval Academy as Wainwright.

With much respect and many thanks for your kindness to me, I am, Sir,

Yours very truly,
H. C. TAYLOR

SECRETARY LONG TO GEORGE MCANENY

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 16, 1900

DEAR SIR:

I have your letter of the tenth instant, stating that special committee of the National Civil Service Reform League has made inquiry concerning certain alleged violations of the rules governing appointments and removals at the Portsmouth Navy Yard.

I shall be glad to make a thorough investigation, but it is necessary, as you will at once see, that specific charges should be stated. Those in your letter are very general; not a date is given. If you will make specifications, giving names, dates and circumstances, the department will at once send a competent officer to investigate the charges, and will, with pleasure, invite any representative of your league to attend the hearing.

As to paragraph one, similar charges were made more than a year ago, and were investigated in August, 1898, by Lieutenant-Commander B. H. Buckingham,[1] who devoted a month to the investigation, heard all complaints, and reported no charges were proven.

As to paragraph two, it is hardly within the province of the department to investigate the matter therein contained. It seems to involve a breach of the peace, outside of the navy yard, which called for the action of the civil authorities.

As to the charge in paragraph four, this was investigated as far back as 1891. Stevenson, the individual referred to, was complained of for having used government material for his own purposes. In

[1] Benjamin Horr Buckingham (d. 1906).

consequence of this charge, he was not appointed to a position in the yard for which, after a competitive examination, the examining board had recommended him as best qualified; but I am informed that when he was tried before a civil court, the case was dismissed. Thereafter, he was employed in the Boston and Portsmouth navy yards, and his superior officers reported his services in very favorable terms. Certainly a man punished for an alleged act of wrongdoing committed ten years ago, which the civil court dismissed, and since that time has done his duty in such a way as to be approved by his superior officers, is not subject to another investigation for the same matter.

His reappointment to his present position was made after the usual competitive examination before a naval board, as required by the regulations.

I am sure you will see at once that the charges made in your letter are either relative to matters so old that they have been disposed of, or of such a general character that the department can not be expected to incur the cost and disturbance of its navy yard work necessary for a thorough examination, without more specific information.

Very respectfully,
[John D. Long]
Secretary

Mr. George McAneny, *Secretary*
National Civil Service Reform League
54 William Street
New York, New York

CHARLES H. CRAMP TO SECRETARY LONG

Philadelphia
March 3, 1900

My dear Sir:

I have just read in the newspapers an account of the hearing before the house committee on naval affairs yesterday in which you are represented as taking strong ground against the policy of new construction in the navy yards for the reason that the cost is vastly more and it takes double the time to turn out the work as compared with the contract system.

Aside from any personal interest I might have in this question, and viewing the matter on public grounds alone, the same as any

man having my knowledge of the facts ought to view it whether he is a shipbuilder or not, I feel like congratulating you upon being the first secretary of the navy to boldly and unequivocally put these truths before the public. Some of your predecessors, notably Mr. Whitney and General Tracy, held the same views but they did not avow them so frankly as you have done and they also yielded to the navy yard clamor from time to time by causing ships to be built in them.

I do not know that this action on the part of Mr. Whitney and General Tracy was an unmixed evil because although the *Raleigh* and *Cincinnati* cost fifty per cent. more than we would have built them for, according to our bid; and the *Maine* and *Texas* vastly more than it would have cost to build them in any first-class shipyard, it is a question whether the experience that the government gained by these operations was not, in the long run, worth the extra cost. I think, however, that the remarks you are reported as having made in regard to new construction in navy yards may, with even greater force, be applied to the matter of reconstructing ships.

Take, for example, the *Chicago;* she was built by the late John Roach [1] for a contract price of $889,000. Going into commission in 1889, she saw about seven years service. The bureau of steam engineering then recommended that new engines and boilers be provided for her and asked for an appropriation, as well as I can remember, of $735,000 for that purpose and to cover the cost of such hull work as might be incidental to the installation of the new machinery. The *Chicago* was then sent to the New York Navy Yard to be re-engined and she remained there about three years before being ready for service again.

So far as time was concerned, I might remark that we built here, for example, the *Minneapolis,* a ship fifty per cent. larger than and more than twice as powerful as the *Chicago* is with her new engines in less than the time it has taken to re-engine the latter ship at the New York Navy Yard. I am informed that the total cost of the work done on the *Chicago* in the New York Navy Yard will reach $1,300,000 or very nearly and that it is divided about as follows:

Under the Bureau of Construction, say,					.....	$650,000
"	"	"	Steam Engineering	"	.....	570,000
"	"	"	Equipment	"	.....	75,000
"	"	"	Ordnance	"	.....	3,000

[1] John Roach (1815–1877).

Of course it is impossible for me to obtain the exact figures in cases of this kind, but I think you will find on examination of the actual accounts in the department that I am not far out of the way, certainly not more than a few thousand dollars. The footing of the above would be $1,298,000, but I think the actual figures would raise it above that rather than reduce it below. However, be this as it may, it is safe to assume that the re-engining and other work on the *Chicago* at the navy yard cost $1,300,000, which is $411,000 more than Mr. Roach's contract price, or nearly fifty per cent. more than the ship cost new.

To carry the comparison a little further I might say that we built the *Newark*, a new ship from truck to keel, for $1,248,000 contract price. She is a vessel of the same class as the *Chicago*, of nearly equal displacement and quite equal in power as the *Chicago* re-engined. I might also remark that we built the *Baltimore*, of the same class and of equal displacement as the *Chicago* and of greater engine power than the *Chicago* now is for $1,325,000 or only $25,000 more than the cost of re-engining the *Chicago* in the New York Navy Yard, and we built and delivered the *Baltimore* in less time than it took to re-engine the *Chicago*.

It should be borne in mind in surveying these comparisons that the *Newark* has in efficiency of ballistic resistance of her protective deck as compared with that of the *Chicago* more than twice as much protection to her vitals and the *Baltimore* about three times the protection that the *Chicago* now has after $1,300,000 has been expended in rejuvenating her. Of course you are in a position to know these facts better than I, so far as the financial part is concerned and I assume you know to a dollar what the rejuvenating of the *Chicago* cost. But it is known to many others and I presume would cut a considerable figure in debate should the advocates of navy yard work attempt to promote their cause in committee or in either house of Congress.

Again congratulating you on the eminent service you have done by the firm and logical stand you have taken in this affair, I am,

Very truly yours,
CHARLES H. CRAMP

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Department of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

ALBANY
March 5, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Recently in an obscure little paper published by Chapman [1] and one or two other alleged reformers who can be excused for dishonesty only on the ground that they are of unsound mind, there appeared, as I am informed, a statement practically accusing me of the gravest official misconduct in connection with the purchase of the *Merrimac*. It also, as I am informed, reflected upon you, but less directly.

Now, the paper in question is utterly unimportant, and unless the matter is taken up by more serious people, I shall do nothing with it, but I think it would be well to have a history of the case at hand. Would it be too much trouble for you to have such a history prepared? I remember the matter only in outline. But so far as it goes my memory is as follows:

We were at the time straining every nerve to purchase colliers. The *Merrimac* had been offered to us for that purpose, but at an exorbitant price, so that we did not take it. Just then word was wired showing that Cervera's fleet might be about to put to sea, so that in consequence it became necessary that the Flying Squadron should be in trim to leave at twenty-four hours' notice. Captain Bradford [2] reported that no other collier but the *Merrimac* could be obtained, and it was, of course, absolutely essential that some collier should go with the squadron. To refuse on account of the price to put the squadron in immediate shape would have been to incur the gravest risk for the nation. Under the circumstances I deemed, and so recommended to you, and you took the view that the collier be purchased at once, although we were entirely aware that advantage had been taken of the national needs to charge an excessive price.

Can any papers that were signed in the matter be looked up, and if possible some statement from Captain Bradford or from others who recollect the transaction be obtained? I do not believe there

[1] John Jay Chapman (1862–1933), Harvard College '84. The paper was *The Nursery* (later *The Political Nursery*), September, 1898. The article was not written by Mr. Chapman.

[2] R. B. Bradford, chief of the bureau of equipment.

will ever be any need of using the matter, but it is always possible that there may be such need.

Faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL CROWNINSHIELD
TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 7, 1900

Memorandum for the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

The bureau is compelled to call the department's attention to the urgent necessity of restricting the duty of naval officers to legitimate fields.

Of the officers afloat, those in the Philippine fleet, in the training service and in the vessels of the North Atlantic, South Atlantic, and Pacific stations, and a few others, are engaged in entirely legitimate naval duty. In addition to these, certain officers on shore duty are, by necessity, performing duties which could not well be performed except by naval officers. There are, however, a considerable number of officers afloat and some ashore who are either not doing legitimate naval duty or whose places could be taken by civilians. The bureau calls attention to the details of naval officers on board the *Albatross*, on board the *Scindia*,[1] the *Marcellus*,[1] the *Alexander*,[1] the *Yankton*, and the *Eagle*, the state school-ships — *St. Mary's*, *Saratoga* and *Enterprise* —, the *Caesar*,[1] the *Scorpion*, branch hydrographic offices. Not one of these is properly adding to his experience in the general duties of a naval officer. It is the duty of the bureau to call the department's attention to any failure to keep the fleet most efficient for use in war, and however restricted in its extent such failure may be, it is nevertheless proper that if there is a way of putting an end to it, it should be done. In the present instance, many of our officers are growing up without that experience to which they are entitled, and which the country has a right to expect they shall have. Twenty (20) torpedo boats already constructed and thirty (30) under construction, many of them nearing completion, are being allowed to lie idle, while for some consideration of expediency or prestige, our officers spend

[1] Colliers.

their time freighting coal or jotting down notes as the seaman heaves the lead. Not one of them is being trained in ordnance, nor in the handling of vessels and of men as he should be, and as he must be if the service is to be kept up to its proper standard.

With fifty-two (52) torpedo boats to lie idle, with this most excellent school of training absolutely neglected, we can not honestly continue to employ officers in towing and freighting coal, in surveying in Cuban harbors, and in collecting curiosities of marine *flora* and *fauna* in the Pacific (there are seven officers now employed on this latter duty aboard the *Albatross*). However valuable such duty as the *Albatross* has done may be both to the country and — failing better duty — to those engaged upon it as well, we should first detail our officers for naval officers' work, *i.e.*, going to sea in naval vessels. Every dollar that Congress spends for vessels, guns, or men should be put to the highest use that it can be put to. Torpedo boats should not lie idle and untried, unfamiliar things in the service while the *Scorpion* plies as a passenger vessel, the *Marcellus* as a coal freighter, the *Potomac* as a tow-boat, and so on.

The bureau would wish, for the good of the country and of the navy, that there were officers enough to man all the vessels of the fleet, and a surplus to get what training they might — in fault of better — in surveying vessels or other duty afloat. We would need them all in war time, and if they could not find places in our fleets as constituted for peace times, we should then do right to do the next best. To-day, however, each and every officer of the navy could find a place aboard battleships, training vessels, cruisers or torpedo boats, and it is there that they should go. Then, though our officers might be few, each and every one would have all the training that could be given him, our vessels themselves would reach a higher efficiency, and the thoroughly trained nucleus would approach in strength to that of a larger force which might lack the highest training in some of its parts.

In times when employment was lacking, service and individual ambitions have brought to us a round of outside duties which to-day should be lopped off. State school-ships, branch hydrographic offices, survey duty, some inspection duty under equipment and steam engineering, — and possibly even under ordnance — fish commission duty, isthmian canal duty, manning colliers and coal hulks, hurt a navy that can give all its officers command of ships, men, and guns afloat. They are excusable makeshifts in an idle navy.

The bureau urges the department to authorize the relief of every

officer whose duty is not contributing directly to the development of the navy as a fighting force, and to his own development as a fighting naval officer.

The foregoing is largely based upon general considerations of the department's duty to maintain the navy in the highest possible state of efficiency. The department's specific duty to be prepared at all times to make adequate naval defence is also involved. On July 1, 1897, ten months before the war with Spain, there were in commission on the North Atlantic station 12 vessels with about 220 officers on board, whereas now there are 5 with 82 officers on board.

The forces available for mobilization within thirty days on July 1, 1897, and on January 1, 1900, are compared below:

	North Atlantic		South Atlantic		European	
	Vessels	Officers	Vessels	Officers	Vessels	Officers
July 1, 1897	12	220	2	29	3	51
January 1, 1900	5	82	3	51	0	0

	Other Services (Estimated)		Total	
	Vessels	Officers	Vessels	Officers
July 1, 1897	9	180	26	480
January 1, 1900	6	96	14	229

Six months after July 1, 1897, we were straining every nerve to add to our available North Atlantic fleet to meet the most inferior of possible European foes: to-day, with less than half the force we had then we should concentrate all available officers on board war vessels afloat and in commission on the North Atlantic station.

A. S. Crowninshield
Chief of Bureau

REAR-ADMIRAL BELKNAP TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Nautical Training School
Boston
March 15, 1900

Personal

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I well know and appreciate how much the department dislikes to revoke or modify its orders, but the detachment of Commander Wise [1] from the *Enterprise*, just at this time when extensive repairs to the ship are going on under his supervision, works very much to the disadvantage of the school and to the embarrassment of the

[1] Frederick May Wise (d. 1901).

commissioners. No other officer can at this juncture do so much for the interest of the school as Commander Wise, and I beg to express the hope, therefore, that if you can see your way clear to modify his orders and extend his term so as to tide over the present conditions of the ship, that you will do so.

With great respect, I am,
Sincerely yours,
GEORGE E. BELKNAP[2]
Retired

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN McCALLA TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Newark*
Personal Off VIGAN, LUZON
16 March, 1900

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

Yesterday a cablegram from my wife gave me the glad news that your kindness to me, which began with your entry into the navy department, had culminated in restoring me to my original position on the active list. The brief cable message which I sent to Manila yesterday, for transmission to Washington, could have given you but a very faint impression of the gratitude which I feel for the action you have taken in removing what we consider to be a badge of disgrace in the service; and I therefore ask you to accept my very sincere and heartfelt thanks for giving my wife, my children and myself great joy.

I beg you to believe that I appreciate very highly the interest and confidence which you have so often shown that you have in me, by personal expression and official act; and I pray that I may yet have many opportunities to show you that your confidence is not undeserved, by conduct which may bring credit to your administration of the navy department, as well as personal satisfaction that in giving this happiness to us all, you have made no mistake.

I have the honor to be,

Very sincerely,
B. H. McCALLA

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[2] George Eugene Belknap (1832–1903).

W. MURRAY CRANE TO SECRETARY LONG

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Executive Department
BOSTON
March 22, 1900

SIR:

I am in receipt of the accompanying letter from Rear-Admiral George E. Belknap, chairman of the board of commissioners of the Massachusetts Nautical Training School, presenting reasons, which appear to be worthy of careful consideration, for the continuance of Commander Frederick M. Wise as commander of the training ship *Enterprise*. In the circumstances, I feel that it would be in the interest of the commonwealth if Commander Wise could continue his service on the *Enterprise* until the repairs on the ship are, at least, completed. If this request can be granted without detriment to the naval service, the commonwealth will appreciate the favor.

Very truly yours,
W. MURRAY CRANE[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

REAR-ADMIRAL BELKNAP TO GOVERNOR CRANE

Commonwealth of Massachusetts
Nautical Training School
BOSTON
March 22, 1900

SIR:

The commissioners of the Massachusetts Nautical Training School would respectfully present to your Excellency the following reasons for desiring the retention of Commander Frederick M. Wise, United States Navy, as commander of the training ship *Enterprise* and as superintendent of the school. The extensive repairs upon the ship, lately begun under the appropriation of $15,000 granted for that purpose by act of the legislature, approved by your excellency, require the constant oversight of a responsible person familiar with the ship and with the needed repairs. Commander Wise last spring conducted the repairs then made and con-

[1] Winthrop Murray Crane (1853–1920).

sequently knows exactly where that work stopped and how much more requires to be done.

The work now in progress is being carried on by a shipwright and requires the same intelligent supervision that would be given it by a naval constructor, if it were being done at a navy yard. Of the officers now attached to the ship, other than Captain Wise, none was present when the work last spring was carried on. Commander Wise having had several years' duty at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis has been enabled by that experience to materially raise the standard of instruction in the Massachusetts Nautical Training School, a fact of which the commissioners have had ample evidence.

If from the exigencies of the service Commander Wise can not be allowed to complete the full term hitherto allowed to officers detailed as superintendents of this school, the commissioners at least request that his term of duty may be extended until the beginning of the next fall term. An additional reason for making this request is that at the time Commanders John M. Hawley [1] and A. P. Nazro,[2] both natives of Massachusetts, and now at sea, will most probably be available for the superintendency, and either of these officers would be very acceptable to this board.

For the above reasons the commissioners urge that Commander Wise's superintendency may be extended, as above, as they believe his detachment at the present time would be detrimental to the better interests of the school.

Very respectfully,
GEORGE E. BELKNAP
Chairman Board of Commissioners

His Excellency W. MURRAY CRANE
Governor of Massachusetts
State House
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

REAR-ADMIRAL CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
April 13, 1900

Memorandum for the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

Referring to the great demand for officers for sea service and to the difficulty in supplying this demand, it is deemed necessary

[1] John Mitchell Hawley (1846–1925).
[2] Arthur Phillips Nazro (d. 1911).

to bring to the attention of the department the fact that the bureau of navigation is very frequently extremely embarrassed in the assignment of officers, on account of the numerous, and, at times, the unreasonable requests for retention of officers by the heads of the different departments or divisions under which they are serving, and the strenuous protests which are often filed when the bureau details an officer for certain duty required by the exigencies of the service. This hampering of the bureau in the performance of the duties devolving upon it, as required by regulations, is instanced by such interference as has recently been made in the cases of Lieutenant-Commander Sidney A. Staunton, U. S. N., whose detachment from his present duty with the Isthmian Canal Commission was strongly objected to by Rear-Admiral John G. Walker, U. S. N., retired, the president of the commission; Lieutenant-Commander John C. Frémont,[1] U. S. N., whose retention as the supervisor of the harbor of New York was requested by the honorable secretary of war; Lieutenant-Commander John T. Newton,[2] U. S. N., whose detachment was opposed by the chief of the bureau of equipment; Lieutenant-Commander Walter McLean,[3] U. S. N., whose assignment to duty as executive officer of the U. S. S. *Prairie* was objected to by the bureau of ordnance; Lieutenant-Commander Asher C. Baker,[4] U. S. N., whose retention on duty in connection with the Paris Exposition Commission has been urged by the commissioner-general; Lieutenant John J. Knapp, U. S. N., who has been retained on duty other than that to which he was assigned in the regular routine of naval details.

The employment of officers on board school-ships, vessels of the coast and geodetic survey and fish commission and as supervisor of the harbor of New York is authorized by law and custom; while the employment of Lieutenant-Commander Staunton in a civil clerical capacity and as the disbursing officer of the Isthmian Canal Commission, is not authorized or warranted under the law. In this connection, I beg leave to invite the department's attention to a communication from Rear-Admiral Watson, dated February 24, forwarding a roster of the line officers on the Asiatic station. Admiral Watson states as follows:

On January 1, 1900, (date of the last complete returns) the fleet was short 487 men of the regular complements, but with an excess of 377, chiefly of inferior ratings, leaving in actual numbers a net shortage

[1] John Charles Frémont, Jr., (1849–1911).
[2] John Thomas Newton (b. 1855).
[3] Walter McLean (1855–1930).
[4] Asher Carter Baker (1850–1926).

of 110. From these short complements the crews of twelve (12) gunboats have to be supplied. The times of many expire in the near future, the *Helena* alone losing forty (40) men between April 5 and June 30, which practically lays her up unless the men are retained overtime.

In view of these facts, I beg to recommend that at least fifty (50) line officers and four hundred (400) men, exclusive of apprentices, be sent to this station to arrive not later than July 1.

Thanks to the foresight of this bureau, the department is in a position to supply the four hundred men asked for by Admiral Watson, as there are that number of landsmen under training for seamen now on board of the *Dixie*. This ship is now in the Mediterranean, and as the men referred to have already received several months' training, she has been ordered to proceed to the Asiatic station direct, where she should arrive in about two months' time. In regard to furnishing the fifty officers called for, that is a much more difficult matter, in fact, it is quite impossible to send that number of officers to the Asiatic station unless the whole system that has been in force for many years, of having certain duties at our naval stations and in the navy department performed by line officers, is abolished. This, however, I do not recommend doing, as I believe that the best interests of the naval service require that our officers should be associated with the duty of inspecting, manufacturing, and installing of the ordnance, equipment, engineering outfit, *etc.*, of our ships of war.

In order, therefore, that we may get along with the number of officers at present allowed, I beg leave to make the following recommendations:

First, that all officers employed in state school-ships, and fish commission, be recalled to perform purely naval duties;

Second, that all colliers and such auxiliaries as can be spared from the Asiatic squadron be placed out of commission;

Third, That a reduction be made in the number of vessels in the Asiatic squadron;

Fourth, that no more vessels be commissioned for surveying.

It is desirable that the training of the personnel of the navy, both as regards enlisted men and officers, be carried on with the utmost vigor, and in this connection a squadron of torpedo boats should be kept in commission in order that the officers and men of the navy may be properly trained in their use. This, I regret to say,

with our present force of officers, is impossible to carry out, for, while the bureau recognizes how very desirable it is that this should be done, the small number of officers and men disposable will not permit it.

A. S. Crowninshield
Chief of Bureau

CHARLES H. ALLEN TO SECRETARY LONG

Executive Mansion
Porto Rico
June 4, 1900

Personal

My dear Governor:

I am awaiting the arrival now of Judge Hunt,[1] with a sort of feverish anxiety. It will be good to have somebody here to consult with. For while General Davis[2] has been very pleasant, he still has his own affairs, and naturally does not take the same keen interest in the civil government. But all things considered it is going well, and I have a hope I am gaining the confidence of the people. I can seem to see this in many little ways.

If it were not for the financial cloud all over us I should feel easier. Still I am full of confidence, and believe some way will be worked out. The military government spent between four and five millions this year, and left the civil government two hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars in the treasury and enough outstanding obligations to about swamp it.

To think of starting housekeeping on such a basis, and to contrast it with the free hand with which the army has scattered its money, is rather depressing. We shall try to "pay as we go," that is make the island self-supporting, and we shall be able to do so easily, after a while, for the country is rich enough, – but this year will be a hard struggle. Still we have the two million fund to fall back on, if necessary – for of course the President will not have permitted the army to *loot* that. It is not good business to use that money for current expenses. But the trouble is these people don't understand *taxes*. They simply won't levy or if they do, won't collect any taxes except what they call the "*consumo*" tax on beans, rice, and codfish, which the poor people have to pay. If instead of *squandering* money

[1] William Henry Hunt (b. 1857).
[2] George Whitefield Davis (1839–1918).

on rations (I don't mean this offensively) a little time had been taken to revise and modify the internal taxes, an available income could have been secured. Now that can only be done by the " harum-scarum " legislature when it comes together. And thinking of that body, I'm quite sure their first effort in legislating will be to authorize a ten million *loan.* They are all talking about that. The *San Juan News* this morning gives a list of men agreed upon in W[ashington] yesterday for the various offices here. It does not speak of either com[missioners] of interior or education, but as I shall of course be officially notified when the nominations are actually made, I can wait for that.

I'm sure it will be a great relief to you all in Washington when these offices are all filled, — but I can tell you it will be a comfort to me. Judge Hunt is due here to-morrow. I shall take him right in with me, here, and do my best to make him comfortable and contented. I hope he is a level-headed man of good judgment, and willing to work.

I've been quite ill: taken Friday night and was sick in bed until Monday and not quite right since. The regular thing here, bowel trouble with little fever. I think it more than likely from the heat and care. Didn't say anything about it to Mrs. Allen or she would have started right back.

Things are going better all the time, I hope. I do hope you are to be nominated for vice-president. I'm sure the people will be glad to have you there, and the position will be congenial to you, — of that I'm sure.

I intend to return, to go to Lowell and attend to my affairs, and hope to be able to leave here *about* the twentieth instant. I shall come directly to W[ashington] and remain there a few days. Logan [3] will come with me. I wish you would order him to the *Mayflower.* He speaks Spanish, and has been more useful to me than I can ever tell you. Next to the straw-hat you gave me, your loaning him to me, has been great. And it helps the civil government here, too.

My best love to Helen, Mrs. Long, — and indeed to you all.

Sincerely yours,

CHARLES H. ALLEN

P. S. Friday, June 9, 1900. Judge Hunt came this A.M. I was delighted to see him. Took him right in with me, and shall do my best to make him happy and contented. Have any other nominations

[3] Lieutenant George Wood Logan (1868–1915).

been made? I haven't heard of any since Judge Hunt (May 19). Has the state department forgotten me?

Yours truly,
C. H. A.

I hope before this can be answered I shall hear of your nomination for Vice-President.

EDWARD EVERETT HALE TO SECRETARY LONG

39 Highland Street
Roxbury, Massachusetts
June 15, 1900

My dear Governor Long:

Pray come to the Phi Beta dinner at Cambridge on the twenty-eighth of June. I preside, for my sins. But if you will come, all will be well. I have asked Senator Dawes [1] and our friend Hoar, and to you privately, I will say, that I rather like to show the Cambridge people that there are a few Republicans left who enjoy life in the deserts of Mugwumpry.

You know the merit of a Phi Beta dinner is that there are no reporters so that we can all say just what we like to; just what we blank choose.

My eccentric but amiable cousin, Will Everett,[2] has the oration, and is sure to give up some good texts.

Always truly yours,
Edward Everett Hale

EVERETT C. BUMPUS TO SECRETARY LONG

73 Tremont Street
Boston
June 26, 1900

My dear Governor:

Brooks Adams,[1] who has always been a personal friend of mine, called upon me Sunday and said that if Bryan was nominated upon the Chicago platform, he should certainly vote and do everything he could to elect the Republican ticket. He really wants to become a Republican and is more than three quarters. He also is very anxious that he should be asked to do some campaign speaking, and I am sure that while we sometimes think he is a bit cranky that he would

[1] Henry Laurens Dawes (1816–1903), Yale '39, U. S. senator from Massachusetts 1875–1892.

[2] William Everett (1839–1910), Harvard College '59.

[1] Brooks Adams (1848–1927), Harvard College '70.

be of great assistance, particularly in the West or in the Middle States. He would like to do it, and really wants to pull himself out of the life that he has been leading, writing a little literature here and there, and going forward and taking his part in the active things of this life. He was frank enough to say to me that he would be glad to have me, as a personal friend, say this to you or to any one else that I thought of, and I am sure such a recruit as this would be of decided advantage to our side of the question. Please consider and favor it if you think well of it as I hope you will.

Judging from what already appears in this locality, there isn't going to be a tremendous amount of enthusiasm evoked in this campaign. There are a lot of men here who ought to be ashamed of themselves, who think that we have got to stand in the same condition we were in fifty years ago. I was talking to even as good a man as Judge Knowlton[2] the other day and he said he looked upon this American movement with a great deal of foreboding. I said to him that no nation was immortal, and it was best for the world that the Americans should move forward; that I was glad of it and I believed the time would come when he would be. There is, however, a sort of a namby-pamby, idiotic condition with us in New England, particularly through this section. So few people here really know the West and South. However, I will not bother you with my chestnuts, but turn again to the Adams proposition with the hope that it may be of benefit.

The very kind letter that you wrote to me from Hingham I appreciate. We all wanted you to have that place,[3] but certainly your present position must be a great deal more satisfactory. I wonder if when you come this way in the fall we could not get up some sort of a stirabout that should not emanate from any club, but be the action of men, your Republican friends. On such an occasion as that, published abroad all over the country, a public man like yourself meets with a good deal more attention than in any other way. Meantime I will talk to you more about it, and believe me,

Very sincerely yours,
E. C. Bumpus[4]

Honorable John D. Long
Washington, D. C.

[2] Marcus Perrin Knowlton (1839–1918), Yale '60, chief-justice supreme judicial court of Massachusetts.

[3] The Republican nomination for Vice-President in 1900.

[4] Everett Cephas Bumpus (b. 1844).

SENATOR SPOONER TO SECRETARY LONG

Madison, Wisconsin
June 29, 1900

Dear Secretary Long:

I have your telegram of the twenty-eighth, relative to young Fairchild. Your letter not yet received, but, as I must go away in the morning, I do not wait for it to arrive before expressing my thanks to you for your kindness in this matter.

I was in Philadelphia during the convention, and I can see no reason to doubt that if Roosevelt had stayed away from the convention, or maintained after he arrived there the position which he had so long ago taken, with the firmness one would expect as a result of a "strenuous life," you would easily have been the nominee of the convention for vice-president. As it was, all things considered, it looked to me like an impossibility, and I thought you did the right thing to take yourself out of it.

Some odd things happened there, concerning which I want, when we meet, a ten minutes' chat.

In great haste,
Yours sincerely,
John C. Spooner [1]

The Honorable
John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN HOBSON TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Hospital
Yokohama, Japan
June 29, 1900

Personal

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I am making by this mail, an official request to return home by way of Siberia, when treatment is completed, having been forbidden to do further service in the tropics — taking this route accords with the views of the board of survey and with those of the surgeon in charge of the hospital, as it keeps me in northerly latitudes during the heat and reduces the exposure to the glare of water, and to ship lights, which coming through air ports and other small apertures are to be particularly avoided.

I am anxious to complete my visits to shipyards out here and to places that are most likely to influence the general situation in the

[1] John Coit Spooner (1843–1919), U. S. senator from Wisconsin.

Far East. These visits can be advantageously made *en route*. I have become deeply impressed with the industrial capacity of these populations, which gives to the Far East a vast importance all its own. The action to be taken by our country in the near future will have far-reaching consequences and additions to the meagre stock of information would have special value at this juncture. My application therefore requests additional authority and facility to make investigations on the general situation.

Particular interest attaches to the methods and results of the efforts of the Germans at Kiao-chau, of the British in organizing the Chinese regiment at Weihaiwei and of the Russians in their handling of the Chinese populations in Manchuria. It is difficult to estimate exactly how much time may be required for these investigations, and I hope you may see fit to send the requested orders and instructions by cable upon the receipt of the letter.

Very sincerely,

RICHMOND PEARSON HOBSON

P. S. Perhaps it may be well to let you know of the circumstances that lead me to cable you direct for permission to serve with the marines at Taku. When the *Solace* [1] arrived, the immediate situation looked gloomy and Major Waller [2] and I were convinced that serious importance might attach to getting as much artillery as possible for the small force of marines in presence of such large numbers of Chinese, and the major wished me to organize and take charge of all the artillery in reach and I was working up the question of mounting rapid-fire ship guns for use in the field. He made official application for me to Admiral Kempff,[3] and the admiral refused. Then I appealed to the admiral, and he would not listen to my representations, seeing only an incongruity and saying if I were a line officer he might consider the matter, but as it was I need not say a word, his mind was made up. The matter did not seem to me to be one to be treated lightly, and I asked for permission to remain at Taku while it was referred to the navy department. This was denied and I was directed to remain on the *Solace*, which was upon the point of leaving. I then requested that my application be cabled with a request for an answer to be sent

[1] Hospital ship.

[2] Littleton Waller Tazewell Waller (b. 1856), U. S. M. C., who was promoted for gallantry in the Boxer Rebellion.

[3] Louis Kempff (1841–1920).

to Nagasaki. The answer came from Admiral Remey and was such that I inferred that the matter had been referred to him only, and that he did not at all grasp the situation or the whole purport of the request. Then I applied to the commanding officer of the *Solace* as senior officer present to forward a cable request to the navy department. This he said he did not feel he could do under the circumstances. So I cabled you direct. I thought the cardinal points were the possibility for usefulness, Major Waller's request — and my willingness.

R. P. H.

The Honorable J. D. Long
Washington, D. C.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER SOUTHERLAND TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Dolphin*
Boston, Massachusetts
July 2, 1900

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Yours to hand this morning, and I will be ready for Mr. Hackett [1] on the eleventh instant, and will make all arrangements with him beforehand. The man "Stuart" never came back, and I am inclined to believe that he found the life too disagreeable. He was a good boy, had been in no trouble, and was liked by the officers. He got very seasick, however, and that alone may have decided him to give up the life. We lost two bright Indian boys, who had been educated at the Carlisle School, for the same reason.

In response to a pleasant letter from Mr. Foss [2] of the naval committee, I spent yesterday at Cohasset, where I was entertained by his brother,[3] a very wealthy man, president of the Sturtevant Blower Works, and husband of the daughter of the gentleman [4] who gave that building to the Hebron Academy,[5] which you were expected to help dedicate on the nineteenth of last month. They entertained me most charmingly, and the elder Mr. Foss spoke of

[1] Frank Warren Hackett (1841–1926), Harvard College '61, successor to Charles H. Allen as assistant secretary of the navy.

[2] George Edmund Foss (b. 1863), Harvard College '85, M. C. from Illinois.

[3] Eugene Noble Foss (b. 1858), M. C. 1910–1911, and governor of Massachusetts 1911–1913.

[4] Benjamin Franklin Sturtevant (1833–1890).

[5] Hebron Academy, Hebron, Maine, where Secretary Long was fitted for college.

you in a way which won my heart. He is evidently not only one of your friends, but also one of that set who do not believe any honor too great for you. I will repeat his conversation when I see you next.

The naval Mr. Foss expects to visit the Portsmouth Navy Yard with Mr. Hackett, and will visit this yard, unofficially and quietly, some day when he comes over to lunch with me; he is very much interested in the national naval reserve bill, and assures me that he hopes to pass it. Senator Hale has asked him to come to Maine, and make a speech for him, but he did not tell me whether he would do so or not.

Apropos of him, I enclose an official communication from Admiral Bradford, and a copy of my reply thereto. If I know exactly what Admiral Bradford wants done, we can make that survey at the least possible cost to the government. If my own surmise as to the place is correct, I believe it can be done well within the time assigned, and at a cost equal to only the wear and tear of the instruments placed on board for the purpose; if this is so, it would not be a bad idea for Mr. Foss to know it. If Admiral Bradford thinks the matter of enough importance, and you agree with him, and will order me on, I can spend the time between the ship's going out of dock to-morrow, and the tenth instant, in Washington, looking up the survey matter.

Mr. Cole is gone and I never saw any one so delighted to get away; unless you send Mr. Logan back,[6] I would be more than pleased to have Watts,[7] now at the torpedo station, with me again. Outside of Mr. Watts, I know only two young officers well enough to recommend. These are Ensign T. C. Hart,[8] now on the *Hartford* at this yard, and Ensign J. H. Roys [9] now on the *Kearsarge*.

I saw Mrs. Long Thursday afternoon; she was really looking very well, but complained of a little fatigue from household duties. Work on the ship is going along finely: it keeps me fully occupied. If I should be compelled to stay here long enough, I could easily qualify for a naval constructor.

With all hearty good wishes for yourself, believe me,

Very sincerely,

W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND

[6] Lieutenant G. W. Logan.
[7] Ensign William Carleton Watts (b. 1880).
[8] Thomas Charles Hart (b. 1877).
[9] John H. Roys (b. 1877).

SENATOR HALE TO SECRETARY LONG

Ellsworth, Maine
July 19, 1900

My dear Governor:

Before anything is done in filling the place of superintendent of the coast survey, I hope you will see that the President appreciates the importance of having some man in the place who is not hostile to the United States Navy. I have no man in mind for the place, but it would be much more comfortable for all of us, if there is a good man in, who will coöperate with us, and not be working against us.

I can not say too much in approval of the course which the administration is taking on the Chinese matter. If there ever was a time when things should be kept on an even keel, it is now, and if we are drawn into another war with the assumption that it is with British influence, we shall be very much hurt. I have no doubt your head is entirely level in the matter.

I wish you were here in Maine, where it is cool, instead of in Washington, where it is H——.

Very truly yours,
Eugene Hale

BRIGADIER-GENERAL HEYWOOD TO SECRETARY LONG

Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps
Washington, D. C.
July 23, 1900

Sir:

1. A battalion of marines, consisting of 14 officers and 501 enlisted men, left this city yesterday afternoon at 3.15 for San Francisco, over the Chesapeake & Ohio and Sante Fe routes, to sail in the army transport *Hancock* for China.

2. This battalion is under command of Major Randolph Dickins,[1] U. S. M. C., and one additional officer will join in San Francisco. The battalion is composed of healthy young men of excellent physique, is fully equipped for field service, and I feel confident that the

[1] Randolph Dickins (1853–1914).

officers and men will render a good account of themselves in case they are called into action in China.

Very respectfully,
CHARLES HEYWOOD
Commandant

The Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN MCCALLA TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *Newark*
Personal KURE, JAPAN
August 8, 1900

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I am taking the liberty of sending to you for your official information, my views of the probable seriousness of the situation which must soon be developed in northern China; whether a partition of the country be actually consummated or the nominal integrity of a Chinese government be maintained. I hope that you may have the time to read the official confidential letter, regarding our American concessions in China which should go forward by this same mail, as well as the official report at length of the effort of Admiral Seymour's[1] column to relieve the legations at Peking, in which the officers and men from the *Newark* gained great credit from the representatives of the other powers acting concurrently. This report should reach the department about the middle of August.

I hope very much that the rewards which I have recommended for certain officers and men, in accordance with law, may meet with your approval for they are, in my opinion, well deserved.

Trusting that you are quite well and enjoying a pleasant summer, with my kindest remembrances to Mrs. Long and your daughters,

Believe me,
Very sincerely,
B. H. MCCALLA

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

[1] Sir Edward Hobart Seymour (1840–1929), in command of international forces during the Boxer Rebellion.

SAMUEL L. GRACEY TO SECRETARY LONG

Consular Service, United States of America
Confidential Fuchau (Foochow), China
August 8, 1900

My dear Friend:

I have many times determined to write you, but remembering how overwhelmed you must be with care, responsibility, and work, I have desisted. I was disappointed that the late Rep[ublican] convention did not nominate you for Vice-President with Mr. McKinley. Sometimes geography plays the mischief with our hopes and plans. I suppose if Speaker Reed had lived in New York or Ohio, he would have been the nominee of our party for President before this – possibly?

We have fallen upon treacherous and evil times in China. Although the actual terrors are more manifest in the northern provinces, we feel here that we are living on the hot crust of a very active volcano, and know not what a day may bring forth. I am fortunate in being at a provincial capital, where I have frequent intercourse with their excellencies Hsü and Shan, the viceroy and Tartar general of two provinces, the "Minche," that is Fohkien and Chekiang, containing as is supposed fifty-six million people. We are favored by having two very excellent men over us. These with H. E. Chang Chitung, whom I regard as one of the very ablest men in China, and H. E. Lin, of Nanking, are standing like a wall of fire between the insurrection led by Prince Tuan in the north and all the central and southern provinces. Had they obeyed *his* edicts (Tuan's) we should all have been driven out from here before this. We are praying and longing for an advance and victory on the part of the allied forces speedily, or I fear even these determined men will be unable to hold the people in check. Li Hung Chang is a cunning crafty fox, or something worse and not to be trusted. He has many times succeeded in playing off the powers one against another and worked his own selfish ends. He [Tuan?] and Chang are great rivals. I do not know that we will get out of this alive. Nearly all my nationals have fled to Japan or America, but I am glad to be in a position where I can best serve my God and my country. I am content whatever may come. If needed for

service by my government in any other way than as consul here, you may nominate to Mr. McKinley for anything needed.

Very truly yours,
SAMUEL L. GRACEY[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary, etc.

CHARLES W. ELIOT TO SECRETARY LONG

ASTICOU, MAINE
August 21, 1900

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I heard when in Cambridge last week that the position of director of the coast and geodetic survey, vacated by Mr. Pritchett,[1] had not yet been filled. Will you allow me to mention a very good man for the place, which is, of course, an important one for the science of the country? We have at Cambridge an associate professor of astronomy, Solon Irving Bailey,[2] who is not only recognized as an able astronomer, but is also an experienced administrator, having been for some years at the head of our astronomical station at Arequipa, Peru. He is not only an astronomer but a meteorologist, having established and maintained meteorological stations crossing the Andes at great elevations. I should think him about forty-one or forty-two years of age. He is able-bodied, good-looking, and alert, and has pleasant manners. Mrs. Bailey is an agreeable woman, and he has some nice children. He gets work done by subordinates, but without making himself disagreeable to them. Altogether, Professor Bailey is a first-rate candidate for the place. We should be very sorry indeed to lose him from our observatory; but the superintendency of the coast survey would mean a considerable promotion for him as regards salary and influence, and I think he would like it. He is a graduate of Boston University in 1881; but in 1888 he took an A. M. at Harvard.

Very truly yours,
CHARLES W. ELIOT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

[1] Reverend Samuel Lewis Gracey (1835–1911), U. S. consul.

[1] Henry Smith Pritchett (b. 1857).
[2] Solon Irving Bailey (1854–1931).

ROGER WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

Hôtel zu den vier Jahreszeiten
Personal and confidential MÜNCHEN
August 22, 1900

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

With some hesitation I have finally determined to write to you regarding a matter which for nearly three weeks has been causing me a certain degree of embarrassment.

Before we left Paris on the fifth instant the papers announced that I had been appointed ambassador to Italy, and this report was shortly followed by the positive statement that I had accepted the offer, but would return to America for a brief period before taking up my official residence at Rome.

At first I supposed that this was a mere newspaper error: later I thought the appointee was probably Senator Wolcott of Colorado. Although I have not seen an American newspaper for some time owing to our rather rapid travelling, and have received letters from home only at rare intervals, so many references to the supposed appointment have been made in a large batch of letters received at this place this A.M. that I can not longer entirely ignore the report as I have done up to this time.

I have not received either directly or indirectly *a single word officially* regarding the matter from Washington or elsewhere, and as, if a misunderstanding exists, a longer continuance of it is likely only to increase the resulting embarrassment, I take the liberty of writing frankly to you regarding it.

If it be true that the President has done me the honor of thinking of me in connection with this most important and in many respects attractive appointment, I beg that you will express to him my grateful appreciation of his consideration. Under other circumstances I might gladly accept such an appointment if it were tendered me: but I have a large family of young sons and I should at present be equally unwilling to have them educated out of our own country and to be separated from them by the ocean. I should therefore now be unable to accept the appointment, and it is this feeling which has prompted me to write to you rather than to wait longer for further developments by mail.

If the whole matter is without foundation, you will, I am sure, understand the motive which has prompted me to write this letter and excuse my mistake. If otherwise, and you deem any public

statement necessary, I should be glad to have it said " that for family and other reasons I felt obliged," *etc., etc.*

Pray forgive my troubling you with so purely personal an affair, and believe me, with much respect,

Very sincerely yours,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

ROGER WOLCOTT TO SECRETARY LONG

LAUSANNE
September 6, 1900

DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

The enclosed letter was written by me at Munich fifteen days ago, but I finally decided not to send it at that time as I heard nothing further from any source regarding the matter referred to, and feared to place myself in a false position. I now regret that I did not forward it when written. Late last evening I received a letter from General Horace Porter[1] enclosing the following telegram undated.

PORTER, *Ambassador*, Paris.

Communicate following to Wolcott. Dean diplomatic corps Rome suggests to embassy there propriety your not arriving more than eight days before reception by King who is not expected to return before late October or first November.

ADEE,[2] Acting

This is absolutely the first official communication of any sort that I have received concerning the appointment, and this plainly regards it and my acceptance as *faits accomplis*. Except on the assumption that other communications have miscarried, I can not understand how the mistake can have arisen.

I regret extremely that the papers should have announced my acceptance, as it makes my position appear one of vacillation. For, however deeply I may feel the honor of the appointment, and however agreeable on many accounts a residence in Rome might prove, I nevertheless feel unable to accept the position for the reasons which I gave in the enclosed note.

[1] Horace Porter (1837–1921), ambassador to France.
[2] Alvey Augustus Adee (1842–1924), third assistant secretary of state.

I have to-day cabled the state department, and have also written to Secretary Hay to the above effect. If you can do anything to see that the papers state the matter aright: *i.e.*, that the appointment was never accepted by me, *etc.*, I should esteem it a great favor. I must beg once more that you will convey to the President my grateful sense of his confidence and my sincere regret that any embarrassment should have arisen from his generous purpose regarding me. I beg also that you will excuse me for troubling you with my personal affairs, and remain, with cordial regard,

Very truly yours,
ROGER WOLCOTT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN CLARK TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
LEAGUE ISLAND, PENNSYLVANIA
September 11, 1900

MY DEAR SIR:

When I met you at the Naval Academy last June, you were so kind as to say that if I ever wished for any duty I should apply to you, and this without any suggestion on my part. Now I do not care for anything at present for myself as I can retire on the twenty-ninth of this month on which date I shall have completed forty years' service and it is my present intention to retire as soon as you may be ready to dispense with my services as a member of the general board. Certainly my preference would be to retire, though I confess that there are officers who have aroused in me a little of the dog in the manger feeling. But I am going to ask what would be a great and highly appreciated favor, and that is the revocation of the orders of my son-in-law, Lieutenant S. S. Robison,[1] to the *Atlanta* and that orders for him to the *Alabama* be issued. I asked Admiral Crowninshield about August 29 that he be ordered to the *Alabama*, but he answered that it was probably too late, that the request should have been made before. On or about the eighth instant Lieutenant Robison made an official application, which was strongly endorsed by the Commandant, Admiral Casey,[2] asking that the request be granted because of his, Robison's, excellent record. Now if it will turn out an officer already ordered I could

[1] Samuel Shelburne Robison (b. 1867).
[2] Silas Casey (1841–1913).

not think of asking this but I can hardly think that is the case. Another and a good reason why Lieutenant Robison should not go to the *Atlanta* is that he has never had duty in a modern twin-screw ship and now he is again ordered to a single-screw vessel. If the *Alabama's* detail is complete, I hope you will see that he is ordered to one of the battleships on this station.

Mrs. Clark joins with me in kindest regards and best wishes for Mrs. Long and yourself, I am,

Very sincerely yours,
C. E. Clark

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

Worcester, Massachusetts
September 12, 1900

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Worcester people are to mark the spot where George Bancroft was born with a tablet on the one-hundredth anniversary of his birth, which will be October third. In addition to his great fame as an historian, he is entitled to honor as an eminent secretary of the navy, and especially as the founder and originator of the naval school at Annapolis.

The gentlemen who are promoting the enterprise will be very much gratified and honored if you can be present on the occasion. There will be a few informal speeches, not more than five minutes apiece, in general. You will, however, in the matter of speech-making be master of the occasion. If you wish to speak only five minutes that will be entirely sufficient for the absolute necessities of the occasion; and if you would speak ten times as long, the audience would like it so much the better.

I am, with high regard, faithfully yours,

George F. Hoar

The Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy, etc., etc., etc.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts
September 13, 1900

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have just received your letter of the 12th instant, with enclosure from General Bancroft.[1] I am of the opinion that the original plan to have the gate at Water Street is to be preferred. One objection would be that the traffic on Chelsea Street is heavy – I suppose that fully two hundred cars an hour pass the yard at that point, in addition to the great number of teams – and because of the fact that the street is very narrow, the large number of teams that would pass in and out of the yard at that point would be sure at times to cause congestion at the gate and interrupt traffic both by our own teams, other teams and the street cars. Beside this, the street is for nearly the whole distance along Chelsea Street several feet higher than the navy yard property, and such a gate would require considerable grading inside the yard, with consequent increase of expense and loss of ground which will probably be needed at no remote date for building purposes. As you doubtless know, the land is already well covered with buildings, and the locality is such as to make an extension of the yard difficult, if not impossible. It seems to me that the growth of the navy will demand an increase in the facilities of the navy yards, and economy in the expenditure of territory for a site for the new gate is a consideration of importance.

Having two gates, as General Bancroft suggests, would be a disadvantage to us, as it would require an appreciable increase in the number of sentries and gate-keepers. The gate on Chelsea Street would necessarily be somewhere on the brow of a rather steep hill, which all teams would have to ascend before entering the yard, and then they would have to ascend a considerable grade inside before leaving the yard. This is an item worthy of note when you consider the amount of heavy traffic that would pass through the gate. This is entirely obviated at the present site.

What General Bancroft says about the greater number of people that would view the gate on Chelsea Street, is perfectly true, and if more practical considerations were equal, his argument would have more weight. Erecting the gate on Chelsea Street would in-

[1] William Amos Bancroft (1855–1922), Harvard College '78.

volve the preparation of a complete set of new plans – another item of expense. Of course, you know that the contract has already been advertised, and that the bids are to be opened Saturday, the fifteenth instant; so that if any change is contemplated, I suppose that steps should be taken in the matter at once. You are the best judge of the difficulties that would arise at this stage in withdrawing proposals that have already been sent out to prospective bidders. I return General Bancroft's letter herewith.

With much respect, I am,

Very truly yours,
W. T. Sampson

Honorable John D. Long
Hingham, Massachusetts

A. BUSHNELL HART TO SECRETARY LONG

15 Appian Way
Cambridge
September 28, 1900

Dear Secretary Long:

After the death of Mr. John C. Ropes I was designated to act as his successor in providing speakers for the meetings of the Massachusetts Military Historical Society. Like all that Mr. Ropes did, nobody can equal or imitate him, but I venture to appeal to you as interested in the work of the society to suggest some military man who has taken part in the operations in the Philippines, and who could give an idea of the actual nature of the hostilities out there. General Otis is, of course, the man whom we should most wish to hear from, and perhaps, if you will use your powerful influence, we can secure him. Of course the society is unable to offer a fee, but will bear all travelling expenses. It has seemed to me desirable to approach General Otis thus through a third party, because of the state of his health, which may altogether prevent his accepting.

If General Otis be out of the question, can you help us with any other suggestion? I am told that Captain Sladen[1] (if I read my memorandum right) was chief-of-staff to General Otis, and may perhaps be secured.

The date of the next meeting is November 6, but there will be other meetings through the winter.

Sincerely yours,
Albert Bushnell Hart

Honorable John D. Long

[1] Fred Winchester Sladen (b. 1867).

CHARLES G. WASHBURN TO SECRETARY LONG

314 Main Street
Worcester, Massachusetts
October 16, 1900

Dear Mr. Secretary:

As you perhaps know, I am a candidate for Congress in this district which is now represented by a Democrat, and we are making great efforts to redeem the district, and it is generally regarded as rather important that we should do so in view of the very close division in Congress.

I write to inquire if it would be possible for you to make a speech here. I presume that you will come home to vote, and it occurred to me that you might be able to arrange it. I write directly to you in order that I may know as early as possible what can be done in this direction. There is to be a rally in Mechanic's Hall [on] October 25 at which Congressman Moody will speak, and we would like very much to have you here on that date. I should not think of basing this request on personal grounds but really feel that you would be doing a genuine service to the party by coming.

Yours sincerely,
C. G. Washburn [1]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

MAJOR-GENERAL MERRITT TO SECRETARY LONG

Union Club
[New York]
October 23, 1900

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I regret exceedingly to decline any request favored by you, but the conditions are such at this time that it is not possible for me to address the Historical Society of Massachusetts on the subject suggested. In the first place I have an engagement in Chicago about the time mentioned, but more to the point is the fact that I have had no experience as a lecturer and would hesitate very much to appear in that capacity before a Massachusetts audience.

[1] Charles Grenfill Washburn (1857–1928), Harvard College '80, M. C. from Massachusetts 1906–1911.

Will you kindly assure the society of my regret on being obliged to decline the honor so graciously offered.

With great respect,

Very truly yours,
WESLEY MERRITT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

If it is permissible I would suggest General Francis V. Greene of this city, my ablest lieutenant in the Philippines, as being the fittest man for the work intended.

W. M.

CURTIS GUILD, JR., TO SECRETARY LONG

Commercial Bulletin
BOSTON
November 13, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I sincerely trust that you will reconsider your determination, if the newspapers report you correctly, to leave the Cabinet. We are all proud of you and the President would have far to seek to find another New Englander who would so combine personal popularity with administrative success. I am sure that all New England hopes that her member of the Cabinet may be John D. Long indefinitely.

With high regard, I am as ever,

Cordially yours,
CURTIS GUILD, JR.[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CURTIS GUILD, JR., TO SECRETARY LONG

Commercial Bulletin
Private BOSTON
December 11, 1900

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Thanks for your letter of yesterday in regard to Clough. I imagined it would be difficult, but these applicants will not believe me; so I have to confront them with an official signature. The Boston

[1] Curtis Guild, Jr. (1860–1915), Harvard College '81, governor of Massachusetts 1906–1909, ambassador to Russia 1911–1913.

newspapers have added very largely to my trials by printing in the kindness of their hearts statements that I am to be "called to the army portfolio" and that the "administration can deny Guild nothing after his *etc.*, *etc.*"

You know at least that I have not advocated Republicanism for my own advancement or to control patronage. I may add that I still wear hats of the old size. It would be a national misfortune to have the Cabinet changed at this crisis even to make room for persons of very much greater importance and weight than your humble servant. You can guess however that I actually have to *hide* to escape the youth of Massachusetts, all eager for commissions and as eager to give their lives for the administration as our misguided friend McCall [1] is to give his vote against it.

Cordially and gratefully,
CURTIS GUILD, JR.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A. BUSHNELL HART TO SECRETARY LONG

15 Appian Way
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
December 17, 1900

DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

You may remember that I called on you a few weeks ago and that you kindly presented me to the President with reference to a plan for collecting, excerpting, and publishing the most cogent material on the Philippine question. As the President said, we were able to find nearly the whole material in print; we had gathered it together and were about to prepare a small volume. The members of the committee had been quietly increased throughout the country.

A few days ago there appeared the announcement of a society [1] in Boston for the same purpose, and at the same time one [2] of the people in Boston who had been most interested in this enterprise and had made large promises of financial aid, by a change of front,

[1] Samuel W. McCall, Republican representative from the Eighth Massachusetts District 1893–1913, was one of the six members of the House who voted against the resolution that led directly to the Spanish-American War.

[1] Philippine Information Society. See *Boston Daily Advertiser,* December 14, 1900.

[2] Not identified.

came out as a public anti-imperialist and anti-administrationist. Under those circumstances the committee thought itself bound to cut loose from that connection; we should have made a new financial arrangement and have proceeded in our work, but that it was evident that the public would inevitably confuse our work and its results with those of this other organization having its headquarters so near by. As that organization contains several people who have taken a very strong public stand against the retention of the Philippines on any terms, and includes Dr. Emerson,[3] the recent anti-imperialist candidate for elector, we feel convinced that we can not place our results before the public in such a way as to secure the desired effect of an impartial, colorless statement of the cogent facts as they are developed. We have therefore dissolved the committee, and if necessary shall say so in public.

I write to you because you showed so much kindness and so much interest in what really seemed a very hopeful plan; one of the reasons for giving up our enterprise is that it was published far and wide that the administration had offered facilities to the committee, and we feel sure that the attempt would be made to use that fact against the administration unless the first committee made it evident that the second society was an entirely different body. For two bodies to publish two reports which could hardly have had the same point of view, seemed likely to add to the public confusion.

Examination of the material so far as we have gone does not bear out the allegations freely and widely made that the administration has held back or concealed information necessary to form a judgment.

Perhaps you may find an opportunity to say to the President that the members of the committee thank him sincerely for his good will toward their enterprise, and that they have withdrawn from it only because they feel that under the circumstances it would be impossible to separate their work from that of persons who seem to approach the subject with a very distinct bias and animus.

With many thanks for your courtesy, I am,

Very truly yours,

ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

[3] Edward Waldo Emerson, M. D. (1844–1930), Harvard College '66, was nominated in 1900 by the National party of Massachusetts for presidential elector-at-large.

1901

CAPTAIN TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Relief Ship *Vermont*
Personal New York
January 6, 1901

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have followed your directions, and have written to no one else than Senator Elkins concerning the vice-admiral's place, and have also suggested to Chadwick and Evans that they do not move in the matter.

For two years past Sampson's friends have listened to me when I have urged them not to move until the presidential election was over. It has sometimes been difficult for them to overcome, at my suggestion, their earnest wish to be doing something, and I have always promised them and myself that during the winter following the presidential election I would encourage all active work, if they would agree that it should not be accompanied by a "brass band."

The first step in this activity was the letter to the President which you kindly approved, and letters to prominent senators and representatives were to constitute the second step. In this I am checked by your disapproval of the letter-writing, and I submit cheerfully to your wise judgment in the matter. I only wanted to say, Sir, that from all I have been able to gather, the bill creating a vice-admiral will not go through this session without some such quiet movement, although it may be promised in both houses. I do not say that this is a fact, for you, Sir, know much more about it than I do, but only that it appears so to me with my imperfect knowledge of the situation.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that if anything should occur to change your views in this matter and to cause you to doubt [the] final result, you will let me know in time, if you should think it advisable to grant permission for a few of us to proceed very quietly in this case.

Thanking you, Sir, for the many kindnesses you have shown me, I am, with much respect,

Yours very truly,
H. C. Taylor

The Secretary of the Navy

HENRY S. PRITCHETT TO SECRETARY LONG

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Personal BOSTON
January 7, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have since last Monday been in the throes of a most wicked attack of the "grippe," else had I written you sooner to thank you for your visit here, and for your address, and lastly for your kind words about myself. Your coming has helped us in more ways than one, and we heartily thank you for what you have done. Meantime your kind letter has been received, and my secretary has already written you with regard to the disposition of the manuscript we are anxious to use. The *Technology Review*, which will publish it, is a dignified production, and I will see that you have a proof to correct.

You doubtless are right in regard to your recollection of the matter of the superintendency of the coast survey. I only remember talking it over in a general way with the members of the committee of appointments, chiefly Mr. Cannon,[1] and his saying that during the last days of Mr. Hilgard's[2] administration, when the committee felt that all was not well with the survey, you, as a member of the committee, had taken an interest in the investigation, and my recollection was that some President, I thought it was Harrison, had asked you to take the place; doubtless it was Arthur. At all events I know that the committee expressed its wish that you should undertake the work.

The whole mode of government scientific work needs recasting, inasmuch as it has grown up in a desultory way; and the time will doubtless come when its growing developments may be brought together in one department, at a great saving, and to the betterment of science as well. I think it surprising that so much has been done as has been done, considering the almost complete lack of supervision which such departments have had. I have sometimes wondered whether the President and Cabinet ever found time to talk over together the administration of existing departments so as to deal with the difficulties of administration. I suppose the "piping times" of the past three years have been too full of other matters. I hope before your next four years are passed you may

[1] Joseph Gurney Cannon (1836–1926), M. C. from Illinois.

[2] Julius Erasmus Hilgard (1825–1891), superintendent of the U. S. coast survey 1881–1885.

see your way clear to a solution of the small problem of which we were speaking on Saturday night.

I thank you for reminding me that it was the *Æneid* and not the *Iliad* that you translated. This was a careless slip of the tongue on my part, as I have known the book almost from its publication, which occurred soon after I left college, although I did not know until a few months ago that the Mr. Long who translated the *Æneid* was the former governor and present secretary of the navy. You of course did not know that during my college life I devoted myself principally to the classics, and went into a scientific education later. At one time I was much interested in all translations of the better known classics, having attempted a metrical translation of the *Œdipus Tyrranus* myself, which however, fortunately never saw the light. In saying what I did the other night regarding your translation I was not attempting to give my own opinion, which is of no value in such matters, but was simply repeating the statement made to me by one of the best known literary men in New England, who said that he considered your translation the most helpful one of the *Æneid* in the language by reason of the fact that it gave the real sense of the author.

I was a little disposed to feel, when I first read your translation that the rendering of the first line, "I sing of war," was something of a departure from the meaning of the original; but it was, perhaps, because I had in my memory the first two lines of Dryden's well known verse.

Thanking you again most heartily for your coming, and with best wishes for your every success, I am,

Sincerely yours,
HENRY S. PRITCHETT
President

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN BOWLES TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
BROOKLYN
January 13, 1901

DEAR MR. LONG:

The "testimonial" under way for me is a set of resolutions a draft of which is enclosed. Unknown to me the *men* of the construction and repair department held a meeting last week outside

the yard and apart from the foremen who were not invited. They decided to present a set of resolutions and appointed a committee consisting of their own foremen to draft them. The method of presenting was considered and after the meeting I was asked if I would meet the men "with their coats on" outside the yard and I agreed to do so *after* I was detached but not otherwise. I did not know any contributions were being taken up and I will stop it at once, but if such a thing is going on it is only for the purpose indicated.

Yours very respectfully,
FRANCIS T. BOWLES

[Enclosure]

A TESTIMONIAL [1] TO FRANCIS T. BOWLES
NAVAL CONSTRUCTOR, UNITED STATES NAVY

We, the employees of the construction and repair department of the New York Navy Yard, in convention assembled and by a perfect unanimity of thought and action, have formulated a token of our regard in this declaration of our sentiments, expressive of approbation, to our chief, Francis T. Bowles, who having been called to a higher post of duty, will shortly leave us.

We believe that by his energy, resolution, determination and indomitable perseverance the department which he represents has become in point of discipline, effectiveness and general improvement a criterion for the United States Navy, and that the appreciation of his worth in the possession of the qualities that have raised this department to its present standard of excellence, has constrained his selection for promotion to chief of bureau of construction and repair of the United States Navy. We believe also that his characteristic steadfastness, together with his unswerving business methods, has permeated the entire naval department, thereby inspiring and developing a spirit of emulation which has done much toward making the United States Navy in its growth, power and influence, second to none in the world.

We commend him for the establishment of a superior construction plant embodying many improvements with the latest and best inventions in labor-saving machinery, that enables the department to excel in its working ability and efficiency, thereby necessitating

[1] Presented to Captain Bowles upon his detachment from the New York Navy Yard, where he had been on duty since 1895. He had been appointed chief constructor of the navy, with the rank of rear-admiral, and assumed that office March 4, 1901.

the sending of work requiring excellence and despatch to the New York Navy Yard. We commend him especially for his action in caring for his employees by installing an improved system of cleaning, lighting, heating and ventilating which with the arrangements made for the workmen, with all the facilities for their comfort and cleanliness, renders their labors less onerous and their general condition agreeable and pleasant. We admire his possession of a sterling and unimpeachable integrity exemplified by the exact justice exercised in his decisions in the performance of his duties in the department, by which he is preëminently fitted for the control of men and qualified in the highest degree to be the executive head of the exalted position to which he has been called in recognition of his worth and the appreciation of past services. We are pleased by the selection of Francis T. Bowles to the highest rank in the construction and repair department, as it affords, in the wider scope of his duties, a better opportunity for the development of his plans and designs in his aspiration to raise the construction and repair department and the navy generally to that highest plane of excellence and perfection which ever has been his aim and purpose. We are also pleased because it demonstrates the exalted opinion entertained by the authorities at Washington, in selecting the youngest man ever called to fill the office of chief of the bureau of the navy. While his management of the New York department has greatly benefited the employees and the station generally, we have no desire to have him retained and have no regrets to offer at his coming departure, feeling that it would be expressive of selfishness, but rather we are glad of the honor conferred upon him, believing that the change is but a removal of residence and that the same hand which has made the New York department a credit to the navy and to the whole country, will still, with greater power and influence, continue to exercise the same watchful care in keeping it up to its present condition of superiority.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
January 21, 1901

My dear Governor Long:

I have been in bed for a little more than a week, except for a few hours last Monday morning. Otherwise I should have come to ex-

press to you in person my deep and most grateful sense of the kind words you have lately spoken and of the great disinterestedness you have manifested on this as well as on previous occasions when Massachusetts was about to choose a senator. There is no doubt in my mind that, with the slightest encouragement from you, the desire of a very large number of the people that you should represent the commonwealth in the Senate would have found expression. And this would have been highly reasonable and natural under ordinary circumstances, and especially would have been highly reasonable and natural under the conditions that actually existed. While I have owed so much to the kindness of the people of the commonwealth at large, I owe an especial debt to the kindness of men my superiors in capacity for public service who would naturally have been my competitors, and among the men of whom this is true, I owe more to you than to any other. I hope your life may be for the future full of public honor, and that health and prosperity may dwell in your household.

I am, with high regard,

Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

The Honorable
JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO
February 17, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Just a line to say that I saw Miss Helen and Peirce [1] to-day. They have had the grippe, but are getting nicely over it. Tell your sporting colleague, the secretary of war,[2] that I got twelve mountain lions — eight with the rifle and four with the knife. I am now on my way home to get my top hat and frock coat and prepare to be a most decorous Vice-President.

Pray present my warmest respects to the President.

Faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Secretary Long's children.

[2] Elihu Root.

REAR-ADMIRAL FARQUHAR TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Flagship *Kearsarge*
Dictated PENSACOLA, FLORIDA
February 20, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I enclose a telegram which I beg you will send to the navy department with orders to give it to the press for publication on account of the publicity given to the recent coaling of the English battleship *Mars*, 204 tons an hour. This coaling record, 218 tons an hour, is one of the episodes of your visit to Pensacola and to the North Atlantic Squadron. This beats all known performances of any navy in the world – the only one that approaches it was that of the English battleship *Mars*, which was 204 tons an hour and was telegraphed all over the world. A personal interest on your part will create an excellent spirit of emulation throughout the service in this most important subject which, as you know, is under serious consideration and study by all naval administrations.

Sincerely yours,
N. H. FARQUHAR [1]

SECRETARY LONG TO SENATOR MCMILLAN

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
February 26, 1901

DEAR SENATOR:

In view of your suggestion this morning with regard to the *Texas*, I have asked Naval Constructor Taylor to give me the facts. He has done so, and has prepared a memorandum, which I send you by him. I wish you would not only look at it, but confer with Mr. Taylor, who is very familiar with the whole matter, and I am sure there is nothing in the matter of the *Texas* that should raise any doubt as to the admirable fitness of Naval Constructor Bowles for the place to which he has been nominated. I can frankly say that in my judgment there is no man in the corps better or so well fit for the position, and that is the opinion of every member of the corps whom I have seen in the matter.

Mr. Taylor will call your attention to the fact that Naval Constructor Capps,[1] now on duty in Washington, had charge of the

[1] Norman von Heldreich Farquhar (1840–1907).

[1] Washington Lee Capps (1864–1935).

docking of the *Oregon* at Puget Sound, and troubles similar to those which occurred on the *Texas* would have then occurred on the *Oregon* but for the most unusual precautions. The *Oregon* was immediately thereafter fitted with docking keels, thus showing that the alleged defect on the *Texas* was one which could only properly have been developed by experience, the *Oregon* having been designed several years after the *Texas's* plans were submitted but before the *Texas* herself had been built and docked. I should not write you in this matter, as I believe in sticking to my own department and leaving every independent body to its own judgment, if you had not yourself spoken of the matter this morning.

Very respectfully,
JOHN D. LONG

Honorable JAMES MCMILLAN [2]
UNITED STATES SENATE

ADMIRAL DEWEY TO SECRETARY LONG

1747 Rhode Island Avenue
WASHINGTON
February 26, 1901

SIR:

I have the honor to inform you that I have received appeals in the interest of a number of officers who served under me while I was in command of the Asiatic station, and who desire that their cases be brought before the board now considering the matter of rewards to officers. Some of those concerned are Lieutenant-Commander Fiske [1] and Lieutenants Ellicott,[2] Niblack, and Winship.[3] I understand that the scope of the board's duties is restricted to a more recent period than that in which the officers of whom I speak rendered conspicuous service; but if it is possible to authorize the board to inquire into special acts of gallantry performed between the date of the engagement in Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, and the time I left the station, it seems to me that a number of deserving cases which came to my notice, and concerning which reports were made to the department, may then be suitably recognized.

Very respectfully,
GEORGE DEWEY

The Secretary of the Navy

[2] James McMillan (1838–1902), U. S. senator from Michigan.

[1] Bradley Allen Fiske (b. 1854).
[2] John Morris Ellicott (b. 1859).
[3] Emory Winship (b. 1872).

ASSISTANT SECRETARY HACKETT
TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
March 22, 1901

Personal and confidential

My dear Mr. Secretary:

My attention has just been called to an article in the *Baltimore American* of February [*blank*], 1901, full of personal abuse of yourself and containing toward the end this serious charge: "The Navy Department has deliberately suppressed and falsified official documents in order to discredit Admiral Schley and advantage Admiral Sampson." As the head of this department you have done nothing to indicate a knowledge that this charge has been circulated by a newspaper of the respectable standing that the *American* enjoys. Perhaps you regard it as akin to "political abuse," and therefore think it wise not to take notice of it.

As an official of the department next in rank to yourself, I feel that I have the right to take notice of it and I write this letter of my own accord hoping that you will lay it before the President. I write it personally and confidentially, in my own hand so that nobody shall see it until I hand it to you in person. I want to speak plainly, and as I believe in the interests of the service. My long acquaintance with naval officers (from my boyhood) has given me a chance to understand something of the service — something of that *esprit de corps* which lies at the very foundation of success in naval affairs. The officers of the navy feel it as a stain on their good name that a charge such as this just recited should be allowed to go in silence. There is a profound feeling in the service that the unhappy condition of things, growing out of the attempt to promote Rear-Admiral Sampson and Rear-Admiral Schley at the same time — should be permitted to continue.

I recall a remark that you made to me just before the close of the session of Congress — after the names of these two officers had been sent to the Senate. It was to the effect that if the Senate did not act upon the nominations, you would consider that responsibility for failure was not upon the department and you should favor a court of inquiry to get at the truth and let it be known to the public. I desire to point to a fresh illustration of the trouble that is caused by this unsettled condition of things — a portion of the press maligning the department, and a large part of the officers restless and disturbed because the commanding officer at Santiago

is deprived most unjustly of his reward for faithful and invaluable services.

You have referred to the board of awards of which I am chairman the subject of bronze medals to be given to officers and men of the North Atlantic squadron who participated in engagements in West Indian waters, or on the shore of Cuba. Items like the following are appearing in the press: "Rear Admiral Sampson's profile will probably not be placed upon the medal to be awarded to the officers who served in the Santiago battle. The board of awards, of which Assistant Secretary Hackett is chairman, will consider the design to be adopted. As Admiral Dewey's head is placed in bas-relief upon the Manila medal, Admiral Sampson's friends have urged that he be similarly recognized. The board is not expected, however, to take such action."

It is true that the question of placing the head of Admiral Sampson on the medal is a very important one; and it is going to tax the wisdom of the board very severely. The Manila Bay medal, besides bearing the head of Dewey, has this inscription: "The gift of the people of the United States to the officers and men of the Asiatic Squadron, under the command of Commodore George Dewey." The question of the *head* of Sampson may be a question of artistic appropriateness, but nobody, you would conceive, would think of sending out a medal and making no mention of the name of the commanding officer at Santiago.[1]

Yet just this plan is advocated by some persons: others think that the medal should bear the inscription "under the command of Rear-Admiral Schley." Is it not plain that there should be an official settlement once for all of the question of not only who commanded, but to whom is the honor justly due for the victory? Permit me to say that your instinct and prevision were exactly right that led you to say that a court of inquiry ought to go to the bottom of this matter. I am creditably informed, so deep is the feeling, that fully one-half of the officers of the navy will not speak to Admiral Schley; and all who commanded at Santiago feel that Admiral Sampson is unjustly treated. I only hope that this latter officer will live to see the wrong righted under which he now suffers.

It is not for me to suggest a remedy any further than to express my hearty approval of what you yourself believe to be the right thing to do. I believe the President can not but agree that sooner

[1] The medal finally issued bears the head of Sampson.

or later a court must get at the facts, and let the people know just what the facts are — no matter how much it may provoke newspaper attack and crimination. I believe that three retired rear-admirals can sit as a court, giving publicity to each day's proceedings; and that their work will reach the people in a manner, dignified and orderly, that will carry a persuasive influence that they are developing the truth and nothing but the truth.

At least the duty is, I have the honor to say, with you as secretary to defend the department against the gross charge of falsifying its records; and it is the duty of the President to require an official examination into the acts and operations of the naval campaign on the coast of Cuba. The American people like fair play: they like an honest attempt to get at the truth; and the investigation, while unpopular at the start, would in the end purify the atmosphere that now envelopes the service, and strengthen the administration as the fearless defender of the right.

I remain your attached friend,

FRANK W. HACKETT

LEBARON R. BRIGGS TO SECRETARY LONG

Harvard College, CAMBRIDGE
March 25, 1901

MY DEAR SIR:

For the last few years the college has printed in the university catalogue in alphabetical order the names of its very highest undergraduate scholars, irrespective of class, and has called those scholars, "Scholars of the First Group." Some have scholarships in money; some have what we call "John Harvard Scholarships" — the titles without money: but the names of both kinds are printed together. We have been trying to show these fellows that the college appreciates their work. Every year some one in Boston has given a reception for them. Barrett Wendell [1] began; Mr. Henry L. Higginson followed; then Judge F. C. Lowell; [2] then Dr. Arthur Cabot; [3] and lastly Mr. Higginson again. Year before last, we had a meeting in honor of these highest scholars, and invited to the meeting the president and fellows, the overseers, all the living winners of Bowdoin prizes, the headmasters of the schools which had sent us the scholars

[1] Barrett Wendell (1855–1921), Harvard College '77.
[2] Francis Cabot Lowell (1855–1911), Harvard College '76.
[3] Arthur Tracy Cabot (1852–1912), Harvard College '72.

of our first group, and divers other persons. At the meeting we had a little speaking, presented the *deturs*, and announced the award of certain prizes. We also distributed a pamphlet, containing a list of winners of Bowdoin prizes since the foundation of these prizes, a list of winners of all sorts of prizes in the foregoing academic year, and a list of scholars of the first and second groups. Last year (that is, last December) we had a meeting in Sanders Theatre, opened it to the public, and had an address from Senator Hoar. This year we earnestly hope we may have an address from you. The meeting will be held preferably between Thanksgiving and the Christmas recess; but we can probably arrange it for almost any day between the middle of October and the twentieth of December. In general, Saturday is not a good day. The same may be said of the days of the two great football games, and the days immediately preceding them; but I know no other exceptions.

I recognize fully the fact that we are asking a great deal of you for which we have nothing to offer but the opportunity of helping the college. This is a meeting in honor of scholarly work done by the young men; and we wish to make it in every way as good as we can make it. We mean the occasion to be one of the most important events in the college year.

Believing that you will at least pardon us for asking you to come, I am,

Yours very truly,
LeBaron Russell Briggs[4]
Dean

Honorable John D. Long

REAR-ADMIRAL TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

Hotel St. George
Brooklyn
28 March, 1901

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to your kind wish to give me the orders I desired as second in command of the Home Squadron, I have written Crowninshield that I realized as you and he do, that for the moment, the squadron was scarcely large enough to justify a second in command, and that I had no wish to presume too much on your kind disposition in the matter, but would quite willingly wait the few months

[4] LeBaron Russell Briggs (1855–1934), Harvard College '75.

needed to get the *Illinois, Olympia, Cincinnati, Montgomery* and other vessels added to the squadron – continuing meantime my work for the general board,[1] whose importance at the present time can not be overestimated.

My hope has been that, if you were willing to restore this Home Squadron to the condition of a "Squadron of Evolution," which it has held for some years, until a year ago, I might in such case do much in my place as second in command to assist Admiral Higginson in creating and developing some foundation of a tactical system, such as I spoke of last week when I was calling upon you at the Portland. I think Higginson feels as I do about this, and knows he can count upon my loyal assistance.

Crowninshield, who has been very kind in this matter, fears that a lack of officers may prevent your commissioning many vessels, but I hope to convince him, as well as yourself, Sir, of the importance of keeping up this squadron for tactical training – and that the coming pacification of the Philippines must soon release many officers from that region. I have given much time both afloat and ashore to tactics and would be glad if now I could make it of some practical use to the service. Admiral Dewey expresses himself as anxious that I should go on with my general staff work for his board – but I could do a good part of it in connection with my squadron work afloat, and these tactical questions ought not to go longer untouched.

I wouldn't weary you, Sir, with these matters if they were only personal, but many larger things than self are concerned – and the "Squadron of Evolution" is at this moment most essential to efficiency.

With much respect,
Sincerely yours,
H. C. Taylor

ARTHUR LORD TO SECRETARY LONG

53 State Street
Boston
April 4, 1901

My dear Governor:

I notice by the papers that you have been somewhat burdened by letters of inquiry and application relating to the President's

[1] See Captain Taylor's letter of January 30, 1900.

visit, and fear that I am somewhat remiss in not having called to your attention the fact that Plymouth would be glad to receive a visit from the President.

I write merely to say now that I should be glad to arrange for the President's coming to Plymouth, in whatever way would be agreeable to him, or would commend itself to you. I suppose it is far too early to make any formal notifications or requests. I write merely to say that I will see that a committee of citizens be appointed, or, if the President would prefer to come more quietly with the purpose of seeing the town rather than the people, and the past rather than the present, I should be very glad, as president, or in behalf of the trustees, of the Pilgrim Society, to entertain him and to see that all the places and objects of interest are shown him.

At any time I should value very much a suggestion from you in this matter, and am,

Very truly yours,
ARTHUR LORD

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE TO SECRETARY LONG

Office of Naval Intelligence
WASHINGTON
April 20, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am considering the question of applying for orders to command the new battleship *Maine*.[1] When the matter comes before you, will you not take favorable action, if practicable? I admit that I have much sentiment in my wish, but no feeling of self-exploitation whatever. Through retirements for age alone I could not expect promotion to flag rank for two years and eight months. Orders to the *Maine* would mean on my part a good deal of sacrifice in one direction and another, both officially and privately, and would bring upon me, of course, the great responsibility of commanding an enormous battleship; but in respect to this I desire to say that I have never considered my private wishes as taking precedence of either my official duty or my official pride.

During the visit of the North Atlantic squadron to the waters of the state of Maine in 1899, when the *Texas* did much independ-

[1] Captain Sigsbee did not command the new *Maine*. Not long after she went into commission he was promoted to rear-admiral.

ent cruising in those waters, I was introduced to thousands of the people of that state. The wish among these people was very general and very outspoken that I should command the new *Maine;* I have no knowledge as to whether it will take form of action or be entirely disregarded.

This application is made entirely of my own volition, excepting that Admiral Higginson, who is to command the North Atlantic squadron, has expressed himself very warmly, even urgently, in favor of my making this request. I do not desire to ask you to do impracticable things for me. I shall be greatly gratified if my request can be granted.

About the time that I left the *Texas*, – and covering a period when I was on shore ill, – certain defects were reported on board the *Texas* for which I was held responsible. In this way a ship, which has been beautifully clean, well drilled, and which has done extraordinary and entirely successful cruising while under my command, was made to appear for a moment as varying from her well established reputation. This was one of those cases which sometimes happens in the service, in which circumstances conspire most unjustly to injure reputations. There was almost no ground whatever as against me for those reports, and I was able, about the time of the departure of Governor Allen, to actually disprove by documentary evidence nearly every allegation contained in the ground-work of those reports. Governor Allen left for Porto Rico; so I withheld my letters in the case. I do not now desire to submit them, but shall bring them forward when I come up for promotion for flag rank, in the event that any adverse statement is made against my command of the *Texas*. I shall only go so far as to say here that, when the *Texas* finished her repairs, she was almost immediately after inspected by the commander-in-chief, and that she passed a fine examination. Moreover, that the certain defects charged against me, which were supposed to be remedied thereafter during the course of repairs, were again reported as faulty, the difficulty being as in my case inherently faulty construction.

Officers feel these things very much, because an officer of high spirit and love for the service prizes his record above all things of a personal official character.

Very respectfully,
CHARLES D. SIGSBEE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[New York]
April 25, 1901

My dear Mr. Long:

You will perhaps remember my writing you eighteen months ago, towards the end of the summer of 1899, concerning the claim made by General Alger,[1] — as stated in the press, — to have been the originator of the proposition under which the Spaniards evacuated Santiago. I reminded you that it was I who had made the suggestion, and that I had taken the precaution to fix the fact in your memory, by asking you in your office, a week after the occurrence, whether you recalled *then* who broached the idea. Your reply then was that I had done it.[2]

In reply to my letter, you expressed your purpose to have the matter put straight on your return to Washington from Hingham. Nothing has been done, nor have I again troubled you; presuming some consideration of expediency intervened. My attention has been again called to the subject, by seeing in the *Army and Navy Register* of last Saturday, April 20, (page 304) allusion to General Alger as the author of the proposition, which in 1898 received a degree of applause that I confess surprised me.

The credit, such as it is, belongs to me, and yet more than to me, to the navy, which shares at large in whatever good thing its members do. To you, as head of the navy, I therefore recall the matter, without, however, pressing you for action. You can scarcely fail to remember the perplexity of that day's council, under the discouraging news from the generals at the front, and their recommendations as to the terms to be granted. The way out was found through this suggestion, and it appears to me monstrous that it should stand to the credit of a man who, as far as I could judge him, was a monument of incapacity.

As head of the navy, you may also be interested to know that it was to the intervention of a naval officer that was owing the drawing up of the declaration, attached to the signatures of the United States delegates at The Hague; which was the only part of the proceedings of the conference that the President quoted in his message of 1899. It was only on July 22 — a bare week before final

[1] Secretary of war.
[2] See Captain Mahan's letter of August 21, 1899.

adjournment – that I detected in a proposition, which had then passed the full committee to whom it belonged, – but of which I was not a member, – a stipulation which all our members agreed (when pointed out) contravened the Monroe Doctrine. The declaration was none of my begetting, it was not the way I would have chosen; but that the necessity was recognized and the declaration framed to meet it, was due wholly to my intervention.

In this case, as in the other instance, I said nothing – save to a very few intimates. I was content the matter should go in to the general results. But here again I find another claiming my work, though it is only just to say that he not only disclaims any such intention, but denies that his language implies such claim. I think, however, that any one who will read Mr. Holls's [3] – the secretary to our delegation – book on *The Peace Conference of The Hague*, pages 268–271, will agree with me that the natural and primary impression conveyed by his language is that the declaration was the consequence of a reservation previously made by him. He assures me that a number of persons, whose opinion he has asked, do not so construe his words; but I am satisfied that, whatever secondary sense may be wrung from them as equivocal, – like the old oracles, – the impression of the reader will be that Holls did it.

My easy acquiescence in silence for over a year after each event will I trust be assurance that I am not over-greedy of credit; but I own that on finding the credit, whatever it be, grasped by others, has stirred a moderate amount of feeling.

Sincerely yours,
A. T. Mahan

Honorable John D. Long

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

Worcester, Massachusetts
May 13, 1901

My dear Governor Long:

An invitation has gone, or will go very soon, to the President from the people of Quincy, asking him to visit Quincy when he is in that neighborhood.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams informs me that his family are quite anxious that the President should be their guest at the old house occupied by John Adams and John Quincy, and where John Adams died. I hope that may be accomplished. I think it would give the

[3] George F. W. Holls. See Captain Mahan's letter of June 7, 1899.

President great pleasure to see those interesting houses and their very interesting contents.

You would take pleasure, I am sure, in complying with Mr. Adams's request if you had heard his brief speech in the overseers' meeting on the question of the degree.[1] I think I never fully understood before the capacity of the race for fiery speech.

Adams said, whether he was a supporter of McKinley, he had not stopped to consider; he was an American gentleman first of all. I think our three Mugwump friends[2] were very much inclined to put their tails between their legs on that occasion.

I am, with high regard,

Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

REAR-ADMIRAL CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

Bureau of Navigation
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 16, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have not written to you because I did not want to bother you with bureau matters, though I shall have several things to bring to your attention when you return. I wish now to express my sympathy for you, in what the papers tell us is the harassed illness of your daughter; both Mrs. Crowninshield and I hope that these reports are exaggerated, and that her case is not as serious as has been stated.

Admiral Remey, who went with the *Brooklyn* to Melbourne to attend the opening of the Australian Parliament, has been ordered by the department to extend his visit to New Zealand. I did not agree with the assistant secretary in the orders for Admiral Remey to make this visit to New Zealand, as I believe there are good reasons why he should return from Melbourne direct to Manila. In such a large fleet as he has under his command there must certainly arise questions which can much better be decided by the com-

[1] President McKinley was contemplating a visit to Massachusetts and it was proposed that Harvard should give him an honorary degree. This was opposed by certain anti-imperialists.

[2] See Senator Hoar's letter of June 20, 1901.

mander-in-chief than by a subordinate. Admiral Kempff, who was left in charge at Cavite, has referred matters to the department, which he should, in my opinion, have settled himself; and besides this, Admiral Rodgers[1] is soon to reach Cavite, and as he ranks Admiral Kempff, it seems to me that Admiral Remey should be there to assign to Rodgers his future work.

Two days ago we ordered three vessels in the Asiatic squadron to return to the United States; which, with the *Bennington*, *Newark*, and *Oregon* already ordered home, will much relieve the situation in the matter of keeping up the personnel on that station. The lease on my house having expired on the first of May, I have stored my furniture and we have all moved out to Chevy Chase for the summer, where we find ourselves delightfully situated, having rooms in the house formerly occupied by Secretary Gage. The appointment of my son Caspar[2] as consular agent at Castellamare has all been completed, and he leaves for his post about the first of June.

With kind regards to yourself and daughters, in which Mrs. Crowninshield joins me, I remain,

Yours very sincerely,
A. S. Crowninshield

P. S.

In regard to the establishment of a squadron in the Mediterranean, I have the matter in hand, and upon your return to Washington, I shall lay a plan before you, which I hope will receive your approval.

The Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

SENATOR LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal
Private

United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
June 1, 1901

Dear Governor:

I was in hopes that I should see you before I left, as there were one or two matters I wanted to speak to you about, but as I hear that you are not to return until next week and as I leave tomorrow, I am obliged to trouble you with a letter.

I have been very much disturbed over the evident efforts of

[1] Frederick Rodgers. [2] Caspar Schuyler Crowninshield (1871–1910).

Germany to get possession of the Margarita Islands[1] and have had a long talk with Lieutenant-Commander Sargent[2] in regard to it. You have no doubt read his report. From what he tells me it appears that Germans have had a large cruiser there and were surveying the islands for three months; that they were acting under the immediate personal orders of the Emperor, and the universal belief is in Venezuela that when the Congress meets in September they will lease or sell the islands to Germany. This intention has been disavowed to our state department, but I do not think the secretary is at all satisfied with the nature of the disavowal. If Germany should step in there and get possession of these islands, it would put us in a very embarrassing position and might easily lead to war. If, on the other hand, she sees that we are on the alert, and have made it plain to Venezuela that if the islands are to be sold or leased to any one it must be to us, she will not make a move, and all danger of trouble will be avoided. For these reasons it seems to me of the utmost importance that we should have a powerful cruiser, accompanied also by a gunboat, at La Guaira.[3] In my opinion there is no place in the world at this moment where it is so important that we should have a war vessel as La Guaira and the coast of Venezuela. The mere presence of one of our ships there would, I think, be sufficient to prevent trouble. It seems to me that it is infinitely more important to send one of our ships there than to have it on a cruise with the North Atlantic squadron this summer.

I write you thus fully and urgently because I have been following the matter for some time, and have been made extremely anxious by the developments which I think are going on there. I sincerely hope you will take the matter up and arrange to have a ship sent there.

Just before you left I sent a memorandum to you through your secretary in regard to my brother-in-law, Captain Davis.[4] He is very anxious to have an opportunity to show what he can do at the observatory under the present arrangement and to remain there until the board of visitors has reported. I am very anxious myself that he should have a year more, and I hope that then he can be assigned to command of the *Maine*,[5] for which he has applied. This,

[1] Off the northern coast of Venezuela.
[2] Nathan Sargent (d. 1907), commanding the gunboat *Scorpion*.
[3] The port of Carácas, capital of Venezuela.
[4] Charles Henry Davis (1845–1921).
[5] The new battleship *Maine*. Captain Davis was not assigned to her.

as you will readily understand, is a personal matter and one which is very near to me. I should regard it as a great personal favor if you could oblige me in this respect.

I hope, too, that you will bear young Wynne [6] in mind. His claim for recognition seems to me complete on the report of Colonel Meade.[7] A brevet means a great deal to him and I think he has earned it and I hope you will bear him in mind. I do not know whether there is any hesitation about it in the board; there certainly ought not to be, and if you say a word to them I am sure there will not be.

It has been to Mrs. Lodge and myself a very real sorrow to hear that you had such unfavorable news from your daughter while you were in the West. I trust that when you got to Denver you found her better, and in this anxiety and trouble you will believe that you have our deepest sympathy.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely yours,
H. C. LODGE

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

REAR-ADMIRAL TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

WILTON, NEW YORK
June 8, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I hear that Sampson's bombardment of San Juan de Porto Rico [1] is not to have a "clasp," as being a regular battle. I know the "medal board" [2] is most able and impartial, and I only write as having been present and eye witness. It was not a casual encounter, incident to blockade duty, as some of those were which we had at Santiago, but an "action" deliberately undertaken by our great commander-in-chief, in order that his reconnaissance in force should leave no doubt and that we should *know* when he finished whether Cervera was or was not in San Juan. I hope, Sir, if this matter has not been finally decided, that it may have further consideration.

I was very glad to learn from Crowninshield that you were in-

[6] Captain Robert Francis Wynne, U. S. M. C., in China during the Boxer Rebellion.

[7] Colonel Robert Leamy Meade (1841–1910), U. S. M. C.

[1] May 12, 1898. See Admiral Sampson's letter of July 19, 1901.

[2] The board of awards. See letter of Assistant Secretary Hackett, March 22, 1901.

terested in the letter about the Monroe Doctrine, and approved it. The limitations of naval possibilities bear so close a relation to national policy in this instance, that the need seemed urgent that those limitations should be clearly shown to those above us. I hope this and other work we do may dispose you, Sir, to obtain the sanction of Congress to the permanence of the board. It has had a good testing in the last eighteen months. I think, too, that it would be desirable if the President made some brief mention of the general board [3] in his annual message to Congress — and I believe, subject to your better knowledge of this, that he would be pleased to make such mention, if you favored it. I hope the idea will commend itself to you, and if it should happen that you cared for some written argument I would be glad to submit briefly the reasons for such action. I am confident, Sir, that you need have no fear of controversies between the general board and any of the bureaus. When, as at present in the case of [the] equipment bureau and the Dry Tortugas, some friction threatens, a timely conference will arrange matters — and for the rest, the field hitherto untouched, of war plans and general staff work, shows busy occupation for a generation to come without encroaching on any one's domain.

Admiral Dewey and others think I should remain on the general board, and not go to sea for some time yet, but when the North Atlantic Squadron is increased sufficiently to justify a flag officer as second in command, I believe I can do good service in that position and hope that you will continue to favor me for this assignment. The squadron will not have grown large enough before midwinter or spring and by that time I see no reason why I should not take my turn at sea — if in this Home Squadron. I will be available much of the time, if the general board wants my counsel — but it will not. Some day when you have time, I would like to describe to you the principles underlying our war plans, and the reasoning by which we reach the conclusions indicated in the Monroe Doctrine letter.

With much respect, Sir,

Sincerely yours,
H. C. Taylor

[3] See Admiral Taylor's letter of January 30, 1900.

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

Quogue, New York
June 17, 1901

Dear Mr. Long:

Circumstances that have occurred since the close of the war with Spain lead me to ask you whether the following statement of certain facts, connected with an incident of the war, agrees with your own recollection.[1] At the opening of negotiations before Santiago, between the commanders of the contending armies, for the surrender of the place, the Spaniards demanded as their conditions that the garrison should be allowed to march out, not as prisoners of war, and to rejoin their forces elsewhere. Our own generals, both General Shafter and General Miles, in telegraphing these terms, recommended the acceptance of them, on account of the existing conditions. These telegrams are doubtless on record, and the fact therefore not dependent on memory. In consequence, the naval war board was summoned to the White House, where were met the President and Cabinet, with representatives of the army; and in this assemblage the Spanish propositions were discussed. I can not speak positively to the opinion of any one person there, except that of the President and my own; but my impression is that the general sense of those present favored acceptance. I personally did, and said so clearly, on the ground that officers of the position of our generals, on the spot, could judge better of the exigencies of the situation, as regarding the defences of the place and the actual effects of the climate on the health of our troops, than we could. The kernel of the matter — especially from a naval point of view — was to get the harbor and release our ships to other duties; Cervera's squadron having been already destroyed.

The President, on the other hand, took very strong ground against acceptance; expressing himself not only vigorously, but with a certain vehemence very foreign to his usual manner. He argued that the impression at home, and to an extreme degree abroad, would be most unfavorable to us, would tend to foreign complications and to prolong the war; for it would be assumed that such terms were extorted only from our sense of weakness. As decision rested absolutely with him, the rest of us being purely advisory, the matter hung thus in suspense for a time, during which

[1] See letters of Captain Mahan dated August 21, 1899, and April 25, 1901.

there was desultory discussion; and in the course of this the thought occurred to me, and was by me submitted, that our government should present as its terms the capitulation of the place and of the garrison, and the stipulation that the latter should be carried to Spain, with their arms, at our expense.

That these were, in substance, the terms of the surrender is sufficiently known. I was somewhat surprised to find them so warmly applauded as they were by a portion of our people, as a happy solution of a painful and embarrassing situation; but this fact led me to go to your office about a week after the occurrence, and ask if you remembered from whom the suggestion came. You reflected for a moment, and then replied, "Yes I do; it was from you." I had then no idea of publicity; but a year later, while I was a delegate at the Hague Conference, a paragraph went the round of the press that another member of the assemblage at the White House had claimed the credit of originating the proposal. Within the last three months I have seen the claim again asserted for that person. I will ask, therefore, whether you will favor me with your own recollection of the matter, and whether you will permit me to publish the correspondence, if, in my judgment, due occasion arises.

I have the honor to be, with much respect,

Your obedient servant,
A. T. MAHAN

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

BLISS PERRY TO SECRETARY LONG

4 Park Street
BOSTON
June 18, 1901

MY DEAR SIR:

I have just received your courteous note of June 15. I trust you will not think the *Atlantic* too persistent if I say that some general comments by you upon "The *Mayflower* and Her Log," in case you can persuade yourself by and by to do the *Atlantic* this service, would be far more acceptable to us than any review by a special student of pilgrim history. The *Atlantic* reviews very few books nowadays, and whenever it does contain a paper suggested by a new book we ask the author of the article to emphasize the more

general human interest of the book rather than its importance to the expert. What we hoped, and still hope, that you may feel inclined to write for the *Atlantic*, is simply any generalizations or suggestions that may occur to you after reading the book, and not in any sense a formal or exhaustive review of Dr. Ames's[1] work. Will you not give us at least the benefit of the doubt for a few weeks longer? We should be glad to wait for several months if necessary in case you can give us a "lively hope."

Very truly yours,
BLISS PERRY

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
June 20, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I received a letter from the secretary of state[1] a fortnight ago to the same effect with that I have just received from you. I communicated it to President Eliot in confidence, without intimating any opinion of my own.

President Eliot answered that a degree *in absentia* was a matter in which very little interest was taken anywhere. It had become contrary to the custom of the college to give it, and that he should not think it would be regarded as much of an honor, and thought it should be a matter which should stand until next year, when they hoped they should have the great honor and pleasure of a visit from the President.

After President Eliot had expressed his opinion, I told him that I entirely agreed with him. I had already replied to the secretary of state something to the same effect. In addition to these reasons, the vote to confer a degree now always is, "provided the person be at commencement." Now, to waive this would require a new vote of the corporation, which could easily be had. But it would also require a new vote of the overseers. The only meeting that the overseers could have is a very brief one, usually lasting only a few minutes, on commencement morning at Cambridge. This meeting is generally called at 9 o'clock, and they usually make up the pro-

[1] Azel Ames (1845–1908).

[1] John Hay.

cession at 9:45. So it would be in the power of any Mugwump, by talking, or perhaps by raising the question of a quorum, to defeat the whole matter. That would be an exceedingly bad thing to have happen, if it were known, as it probably would be. I suppose that Moorfield Story [Storey] would be entirely capable of such a performance. I do not think that Professor Norton [2] or William Everett would be. I do not know about Mr. Bonaparte.[3] Mr. Everett approved giving the degree when he was consulted in the first place, but declined to vote when it came up, on the ground that he thought the alumni ought to be heard before conferring it. So there were but three objectors. One was Norton, who put his objection solely on the ground that it should be conferred on scholars only, and should not be had merely by reason of distinction in public life. Mr. Bonaparte thought there should be no objection on that ground, but thought the President an unworthy person. Mr. Storey put his objection on both grounds.

This matter is, of course, to be treated as highly confidential. But whether any particular reason is good or bad, it is impracticable now to do anything but wait until next year. I hope that the President will understand that the college and everybody here sympathises with him profoundly in his reason for his absence, and hopes to see him here later.[4]

There never has been a President of the United States since Washington, even if it were true of him, while he was in office, who has had the earnest affection of the people of the United States to the extent that President McKinley has it. This is as true of the people who differ with him politically as it is of those who agree with him. An old, hide-bound, dyed-in-the-wool Democrat, here in Worcester, a lawyer, and a man formerly of large influence in his party, spoke to me about him the other day most enthusiastically. He never spoke to me in that way of Grant, or of any other Republican President since.

There is very little sympathy in Massachusetts for the administration, even among Republicans, in regard to the Philippine Islands matter, except among the active and noisy men, who in many parts of the commonwealth manage political meetings and caucuses. I do not undervalue that class of men, who are intelligent, honest, and

[2] Charles Eliot Norton (1827–1908), Harvard College '46.

[3] Charles Joseph Bonaparte (1851–1921), Harvard College '71, secretary of the navy a few years later.

[4] Mrs. McKinley's illness prevented the proposed visit to Massachusetts.

sensible and bear the burden and the heat of the day. But in general I believe that our people think the whole thing a great mistake, and that we should have done with the Philippines just what we did with Cuba. They believe it will come to the same thing in the end, and that we could have done it without the loss of life and the overthrow of our old doctrines of republican liberty.

Every member of the corporation voted heartily for the degree. Every one of them, I believe, agrees with me as to the Philippine Islands matter. Every member of the board of overseers, so far as I know, with one exception, is opposed to the Philippine Islands policy. Yet every one favored giving the President his degree, except the men whom I have named. All of which, as we say in petitions, is respectfully submitted.

I am, with high regard, faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

P. S. It is quite possible that conditions may exist next year which would make it peculiarly agreeable to you to have the President at commencement then.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Naval Academy
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
June 25, 1901

SIR:

In reply to the department's letter in regard to the cost of the new chapel of the Naval Academy, I have the honor to state that I do not believe $400,000 to be extravagant when the circumstances surrounding the case are taken into consideration.

2. The chapel is designed to be the dominating architectural feature of the whole group of new buildings, and is intended to bear the same relation to this group that the dome of the capitol bears to that building.

3. A short time ago, the park commission at Washington, consisting of Messrs. Burnham,[1] McKim,[2] and Olmsted,[3] visited the Naval Academy and I showed them various views and plans of the intended building. They expressed a strong approval of the plan

[1] Daniel Hudson Burnham (1846–1912).
[2] Charles Follen McKim (1847–1909).
[3] Frederick Law Olmsted (b. 1870), Harvard College '94.

as a whole, and particularly impressed upon me the importance of the chapel as an architectural feature, stating that Mr. Flagg[4] should be allowed to make that as prominent as possible.

4. The seating capacity of the old chapel is far less than our present needs, and in designing the new buildings the architect was directed to provide for an increased number of naval cadets. At present the seating capacity is about 450. The new chapel will have a seating capacity of 1000.

5. The chapel is necessarily used not only for religious services, but also as a lecture hall. During the graduating ceremonies of this year a large number of those desiring to be present in the chapel, among them being relatives and friends of the cadets, were necessarily excluded owing to the limited space.

6. There are officers resident in Annapolis, not attached to the academy, to whom it is impossible to assign seats for these services, and the new chapel will be none too large for the probable needs of the academy.

7. The present chapel contains many memorials of the dead, either of graduates of the academy or of those who have seen long service here as instructors. The space that can be properly devoted to such memorials is now greatly overcrowded.

8. The cost of the various buildings, as designed, was somewhat increased by the requirements of Congress directing that the armory and boat house should be constructed of granite. The remaining buildings, while not built entirely of granite, must have a large amount of granite trimmings to keep them in harmony with those now in the process of erection. This adds somewhat to the cost, but would seem to show the desire of Congress that beauty and elegance should be considered in the design of the buildings.

9. I believe that when the department considers the uses of this building as an auditorium and memorial hall, and its position, carrying the dome in the central portion of the plan, the sum as approved, for the cost of this building, will not appear too large.

Very respectfully,

RICHARD WAINWRIGHT
Superintendent

Honorable Secretary of the Navy
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[4] Ernest Flagg (b. 1857).

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts
June 28, 1901

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to your letter of June 25, with enclosure from Commander Clover: I received several months ago a letter from Mr. Kane [1] as follows:

Gainsborough House
Aldine Street, Uxbridge Road
London, W.
Easter Eve, 1901

Dear Sir and Companion:

While traveling on the Continent a few weeks ago, I read the cabled items respecting your letter about Gunner Morgan,[2] in the Paris edition of the *New York Herald;* and, having a little curiosity, I wrote to a friend of mine asking him whether in his opinion a certain officer of the navy was not in some way or other responsible, either directly or indirectly, for its publication. I have just received his answer, and it is to the effect that the officer referred to was undoubtedly mixed up in the matter.

My informant, a naval veteran, holds a quasi-civil appointment under the navy department, the salary of which, I believe, does not exceed $1400 a year. He would not care to divulge his name and authority unless some protection and assurance were given him, as otherwise he might incur the enmity of the officer in question, who is very vindictive, malicious, and unscrupulous, and exercising some political influence. My friend might feel the effect of this man's enmity and possibly lose his place. He has no private means other than his salary; he has a wife and daughter dependent upon him for support; and being a man endowed with a liberal education, he must exercise caution in a contingency of this kind.

About ten years ago, I held a responsible position (quasi-naval) under the control of the navy department, which I voluntarily relin-

[1] Aloysius José Gordon Kane.

[2] Charles Morgan (b. 1865) wished to take the examination for promotion to ensign. Admiral Sampson forwarded his letter to the navy department with an endorsement, which should not have been published, expressing disapproval of the promotion of enlisted men to commissioned rank. Morgan was subsequently given a commission and was promoted to lieutenant on the retired list in 1930.

quished by resignation in 1891, and it was by reason of this service that I came into possession of certain facts respecting the officer referred to, and I was amazed at the abnormal capacity for mischief-making which this officer exhibited on several occasions. I have no doubt but what it will come as a very great surprise to you, as you will doubtless fail to see a motive for the mischief this man has created. Should you care to investigate the matter further, I will arrange it for you upon your assurance, either by yourself or some responsible officer acting on your behalf, to place you in communication with my friend, who will place all the facts before you provided that you will protect him. I desire absolutely nothing in return for this service — office or employment, or anything that you can offer. My brother, Chaplain Kane,[3] of the navy, has often told me that he owed his original entry in the navy as a master's mate, in 1861, to Admiral Powell,[4] and his further advancement in the service to Admirals Farragut and Porter,[5] but that to you, for instruction, drill, discipline, and advice he owed more, while personally serving under you, without which he never could have achieved the success that he did. You doubtless can remember whether these are facts or not. I served in the navy as master's mate (by transfer from the coast survey) from March 14, 1861; acting ensign September 20, 1864, to March 21, 1871; lieutenant-colonel three months in volunteer army, January, 1865; rank, pay, pension, and service confirmed by the act of congress approved February 24, 1897; and lieutenant-colonel, national guard, state of Washington, retired list. I was wounded twice in action during the war; am a graduate (with LL. B.) from Harvard, 1871; and am a companion Military Order Loyal Legion, first class, by service. I merely mention these facts as a prelude to my introduction in this note, and you can rely upon my honor as a companion that I am only prompted to this to assist you to find the guilty party. I have no other motive but friendly feelings to a comrade and companion.

Very sincerely and fraternally yours,
A. J. G. Kane
Lieutenant-Colonel

Rear-Admiral Sampson

To this, I replied as follows:

[3] James Johnson Kane (1837–1921).
[4] Levin M. Powell (d. 1885).
[5] David Dixon Porter (1813–1891).

Navy Yard
Boston, Massachusetts
April 22, 1901

My dear Sir:

I have your courteous letter of recent date, and beg to thank you for the interest you have taken in the matter. Unfortunately, I am not in position where I could guarantee the protection of your friend, even if he were of the greatest service in the matter. This could be done only through the good offices of the secretary of the navy. Consequently, I am not in a position to make use of the information that you have offered, unless you will permit me to send your letter to the secretary and ask him what he thinks best to be done in the matter, and intimating that this clerk's interests must be protected if he is of service in bringing the offender to light. I do not feel at liberty to do this without your permission.

Again thanking you, I am,

Yours sincerely,
W. T. Sampson

I received his answer in return as follows:

The Cliftonville Hotel
Margate
28 May, 1901

Dear Sir and Companion:

I had delayed answering your note until I had a reply from my friend in America. To be brief, he dreads the apparent notoriety that he may achieve by the fact of his name being coupled with court-martial proceedings, and points out other difficulties which may present themselves if the honorable secretary of the navy should cause an investigation to be instituted. However, I propose, upon my return to London in a day or two, to see our naval attaché, Commander Clover, U. S. N., upon the subject, and ascertain, if possible, a way out of the difficulty, and will then communicate direct with you.

My address in London for communications is my brother's chambers (as before) Gainsborough House, Aldine Street, Shepherd's Bush, London, W.

Very truly yours,
A. J. G. Kane

Rear-Admiral W. T. Sampson
United States Navy

As these letters were personal, I preferred to have his consent before laying the matter before you for such action as you deemed proper; but as no names are mentioned, I suppose that there is no harm in doing so. There are two points which I will mention: First, that, as will be seen from Mr. Kane's second letter, his conference with Commander Clover was his own suggestion, and not mine, as he appears to have told Commander Clover. Second, that Commander Clover seems to have gathered from what Mr. Kane told him that the clerk who is possessed of this information is at the Boston yard; whereas, you will see from Mr. Kane's first letter he states that the clerk is at the navy department. I return Commander Clover's letter herewith.

With great respect, I am,

Yours most truly,
W. T. SAMPSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
June 28, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I congratulate you upon your election to the highly honorable office of president of the alumni of Harvard.

Will you be kind enough to say to the President from me that this unanimous choice, by the alumni who were present at the meeting, of a person whom they believe to be one of his closest and most trusted counsellors, while, it is unnecessary to state, it was a mark of high regard for you which would have been manifested in this way at some time, was inspired at this time by a desire to testify to their respect for him, and in the hope that this selection would make it especially agreeable to him to visit the university next year.

I enclose two copies of the report in the *Boston Globe* of what I said at the dinner. Perhaps you will be kind enough to see that the President receives one of them, and at some time, when it shall seem to be proper, will communicate the other to Mr. Secretary Hay.

I am, with high regard,

Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN BROWNSON TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. Battleship *Alabama*
Off Newport, Rhode Island
June 29, 1901

Personal

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Referring to the articles in the New York and Newport papers some days ago, stating that the *Alabama* had remained at sea to prevent being in company with the *Kearsarge* on the nineteenth of June,[1] I wish to tell you, with some little mortification that my memory and knowledge of history did not connect, either on that day, or on any day prior to our leaving New York. I write you this that you may know that no one on board of this ship was thinking of the subject, one way or the other.

It occurs to me that, in order to convince those abroad, as well as at home, that the day has passed when the events of 1861 to 1865 cause any uneasiness in their official action to officers of the government, that it might be well, in case it was contemplated to send any vessels abroad on such an occasion, for instance, as the coronation of Edward VII to select the *Alabama* and *Kearsarge* to serve as an object lesson in this respect.

Trusting that I may have the pleasure of seeing you on board of the *Alabama* some time during the summer, I am,

Very truly yours,
Willard H. Brownson

The Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CAPTAIN CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

"Oakhill"
Peabody, Massachusetts
July 3, 1901

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The enclosed statement as to how the despatch to Dewey was written by me has been hastily written as I am anxious you should be put in possession of the facts about it at as early a moment as possible. It is curious that we have never talked it over!

In haste, believe me,

Yours very truly,
A. S. Crowninshield

To the Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Hingham, Massachusetts
[Enclosure]

[1] The anniversary of the battle of the *Kearsarge* and *Alabama* in 1864.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have experienced so much surprise at the published statement made by you yesterday at the meeting of the Massachusetts Club [1] regarding the authorship of the despatch [2] to Dewey that I hasten to write you that the despatch in question was composed and written by myself at the White House under the following circumstances. It was on a Sunday. I went over to Arlington in the forenoon with my son and his cousin to see them play a round of golf. While there you and Mrs. Long drove by on your way out to the country.

I recall your stopping and my speaking to you. I returned to Washington between twelve and one o'clock. Soon after my return home Whittlesey [3] brought me the despatch from Dewey from Hong Kong informing the department that the Governor of Hong Kong had notified him that he must leave that port within forty-eight hours and requesting instructions. I at once took it to [the] White House and laid it before the President telling him how very important it was that Dewey should have a reply. The President directed me to go and find you and Judge Day [4] and bring you both to the White House. I stopped at the Portland, but you had not returned: I then drove to the residence of Secretary Day and returned with him to the White House, I going to the department, Secretary Day telling me to remain near the telephone as he should probably send for me in a short time. In fifteen or twenty minutes he telephoned for me to come over, which I at once did. I joined the party with the President in the western end of the upper hall. There were present, besides the President, Secretary Day, Attorney-General Griggs,[5] Senator Hale, and, I believe, one other person: Senator Davis [6] came in later.

The question of what reply should be sent to Dewey was discussed. In a short time the President directed Attorney-General Griggs to write a despatch for Dewey to proceed to Manila and attack the Spanish fleet. General Griggs turned to me and said,

[1] Governor Long addressed the Massachusetts Club at Nantasket, July 2, 1901.

[2] On April 24, 1898, the following cable despatch was sent to Commodore Dewey: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to Philippine Islands. Begin operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors. Long."

[3] Lieutenant Humes Houston Whittlesey (b. 1861).

[4] Secretary of state.

[5] John William Griggs (1849–1927).

[6] Cushman Kellogg Davis (1838–1900), U. S. senator from Minnesota.

"Captain you know better than I do how to word such a despatch – you go and write it." I left the party, went into the Cabinet room where young Hayes (who was staying with the President), gave me a large yellow telegraph blank. I sat down, alone, and wrote the whole despatch and took it back to General Griggs, who first read it and said it was all right; then he passed it to the President. Only one word was added – either the word "capture" or the word "destroy." No other change was made in the despatch. The President then directed that it should not be sent until your return to the city as he said he wished you to see it before it went. I told him I would hold it, but pending your return I would have the despatch put into cipher. This plan was approved by the President. I then took the despatch over to my office and directed Lieutenant Whittlesey to put it in cipher and to take it to the Portland, which he did about six o'clock, or possibly a little later, that evening.

General Griggs and myself have often had our joke over this despatch to Dewey – for we have seldom met during the past three years but one or the other would call out, "capture or destroy"!! So many events rapidly followed the sending of this despatch that you and I never seem to have talked the matter over. It has been a great source of regret to me that Lieutenant Whittlesey after copying the despatch and putting it into cipher, should have destroyed the original.

Sincerely yours,
A. S. Crowninshield

To the Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Hingham, Massachusetts

JOSEPH E. CHAMBERLIN TO SECRETARY LONG

203 Broadway
New York
July 5, 1901

Dear Governor Long:

In a private conversation which I recently had with Ex-Attorney-General Griggs, he told me that he wrote the celebrated order to Admiral Dewey to proceed to Manila and "capture or destroy the Spanish fleet." "I was the only Cabinet officer present at the time," Mr. Griggs said to me, "and I was asked to write out an order to Dewey. I wrote the dispatch exactly as it was sent, and it went in

Secretary Long's name." Mr. Griggs told me this some six weeks ago. He pledged me to secrecy about it only so far as newspaper publication was concerned. Now that the matter is under discussion again, apropos of your declaration which I find this morning in the New York *Sun*, I had hoped that Mr. Griggs would authorize the publication of the story, but he says that "if it comes out it will have to come out through some one else; I shall not make the statement." I don't fancy that he would be at all displeased if you said publicly, or authorized the statement, that you had heard that Mr. Griggs wrote the dispatch. Would you be willing to say so? I will assure you that I shall not make public any note you write me on the subject unless you authorize it.

Doubtless you will remember me as the old *Transcript* "Listener"; I left that paper in February, and for most of the time since have been editorially connected with this good administration paper.[1]

Very sincerely yours,
J. E. CHAMBERLIN [2]

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Yard
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
July 19, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have been informed that no medal nor bar is to be given in recognition of the bombardment of San Juan.[1] If this information is correct, I would like to ask your earnest reconsideration of the matter. The engagement was, with the exception of the naval battle of Santiago, the most spirited of any of the engagements in the Atlantic, and the conduct of all the vessels engaged was beyond criticism. The action of the *Detroit* [2] in this engagement was especially meritorious, and it would seem most unfortunate if her complement should be deprived of recognition — and unfortunately the *Detroit* will not share in the distribution of medals for any other engagement. In my opinion, the action of the *Detroit* in maintaining her position close up to a much superior battery, and driving the enemy from his guns and keeping him driven away until the *Detroit* was ordered out of her position, was one of the most gallant

[1] The New York *Mail and Express*.
[2] Joseph Edgar Chamberlin (b. 1851).

[1] See Admiral Taylor's letter of June 8, 1901. For Admiral Sampson's report, see Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 225.
[2] The unprotected cruiser *Detroit*, Commander James Henry Dayton (b. 1846).

and effective acts performed by any vessel during the war. Even if in your opinion the participants as a whole are not worthy of recognition, I would suggest that it would be better that all should be recognized in order that the *Detroit* might be included. I consider the conduct of that vessel on this occasion comparable with and equally meritorious to that of the *Gloucester* on the third of July; and if you choose to ask the opinion of the conservative officers (taking, perhaps, those who will receive medals for other engagements, thus feeling confident that their opinions will be without personal bias) I am confident that you will find that they quite agree in the opinion that I have expressed.

Very respectfully yours,
W. T. Sampson

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

[Memorandum] Show Hackett and be sure to refer to board on awards. Considered by Board. No recommendation.

JOSEPH E. CHAMBERLIN TO SECRETARY LONG

203 Broadway
New York
July 20, 1901

Dear Governor Long:

I thank you most heartily for your kind and full letter to me of the eighth, on the subject of the famous despatch to Dewey. I enclose to you a portion of the *Mail and Express* of yesterday, containing a paragraph which I wrote. You will see that it presents the view that the credit for the despatch belongs wholly to the President and yourself. Mr. Griggs has written to me that Admiral Crowninshield's statement " is correct in the main, but in error as to some minor details." He certainly told me some little time since, before this controversy began, that he wrote the despatch himself, but he has declined to make any public statement about it.

Very sincerely yours,
J. E. Chamberlin

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
July 21, 1901

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I was in Boston yesterday and was with Admiral and Mrs. Sampson several hours.

My conversation, however, as to the admiral's health, plans, suggestions, *etc.*, was, apart from incidental talk with the admiral, only with Mrs. Sampson.

She thinks, and I believe that she is right, that the thing which has done most for the admiral in the last two years has been the fact that he has had responsible duty; that if they had carried out the idea which she herself had had of quiet retirement to Glenridge that he would not have lived, and that any thing looking to his detachment before the time they have fixed upon for leaving the yard, would have a very injurious effect upon him. The time so set is about November 1.

Until the Fourth of July, the admiral had had no illness for nine weeks. He then underwent a trying day in attending an affair at Jamaica Plain, of which Hobson was the center. He thought it his duty to go and went. Given this idea, he is inflexible.

His physical condition is evidently improving; he is very considerably heavier than for some years. When he came north in 1898 he weighed 131 pounds; he now weighs about 150; a fair normal weight for his type. He has an excellent appetite and digestion and sleeps perfectly. He has perfect heart action. He was examined but a short time since by an eminent Boston physician who stated to Mrs. Sampson that he is organically in perfect condition. His eye is bright and clear. His one difficulty, apparently, is the obscure nervous trouble which suddenly under any strain of fatigue produces a nervous collapse, deprives him of memory for names and causes extreme slowness of cerebration and of speech. I do not think his judgment in any material degree whatever is impaired. This opinion was corroborated by Commander Pillsbury[1] in company with whom I returned to Newport, and whom I questioned fully. I have great repose in his judgment. He agrees with Mrs. Sampson that (using his own words) "the best thing possible for the admiral is to remain right where he is." I, also, think this is beyond question.

Mrs. Sampson spoke of the possibility of their going on leave for a time which I strongly advocated; but it would be difficult to find a place where the admiral would be so comfortable as in his own quarters. He has never suffered anywhere in hot weather. This is due, I think, to his equable and unfretting temperament.

That he has been weakened as he has been, and particularly so much through the mental pain to which he has been so unright-

[1] John E. Pillsbury.

eously subjected, is an inexpressible sadness to so many who love him. We are all of us eager that he should be spared as long as possible, and all are agreed with yourself that he should be saved every pain; and any hint of a change, for any reason, before the time he has set, would I think be painful to him.

Very truly yours,
F. E. CHADWICK

To the Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN CHADWICK TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
NEWPORT
4 August, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

It must be acknowledged, of course, that if Admiral Sampson goes on the sick list, there will be a good deal of comment to face. But if he does not do so, there is the chance of a fatal outcome of an effort to appear before the court. Every thing the admiral does is so cruelly misunderstood and so cruelly criticized, that one is in a painful dilemma in attempting to advise.

In suggesting that he go on the list, I am taking for granted that his appearance before the court is a necessity. Mr. Bennett,[1] his former flag lieutenant, and now with him, and who knows the situation best, is most earnest in the opinion that he can not undergo this: that it is impossible for him to undergo an extended examination with any justice to himself, apart from the danger of complete breakdown.

Might it be possible to await the time of his being called, and if he shall then be as he is now, have the surgeon report his condition to the court? One thing at least seems to be certain: that his appearance there is not to be thought of.

Very truly yours,
F. E. CHADWICK

SURGEON BEYER TO SECRETARY LONG

384 Cumberland Street
PORTLAND, MAINE
August 9, 1901

DEAR MR. LONG:

I am impelled to write to you from a sense of duty which I feel towards Admiral Sampson in my capacity of medical adviser. The

[1] Ernest Linwood Bennett (b. 1871).

question is one of professional privacy and, outside of Mrs. Sampson, with whose permission I write, no one knows the real character of the admiral's troubles. But, in view of the coming court of inquiry in which the admiral would appear as a most important witness, I can not spare you the information of what must influence the results of the findings of the court seriously and, perhaps, adversely to the interests of both the service and the admiral personally.

Of course, every one knows by this time that he is an invalid; that his race is run; that, in coming out ahead, he has gone beyond the normal range of his physical endurance and, consequently, never again will be the man he was before. It has been only with the greatest precautions and never flagging care that his life has so far been spared but even in spite of all these, any unusual exertion over and above the mere routine duties, is almost invariably followed by a mental depression, the most constant symptom of which is a certain form of aphasia, characterized by his mixing up words.

To give you but one of a number of examples which might be cited: We will suppose it to be dinner time, and the family is sitting in the library. Dinner being announced ready, the admiral will tell his wife that he wants to go to bed; she, thereupon, takes him by the arm, wishing to help him upstairs and conducting him in that direction; but this he strongly resists, making for his place at the dinner-table, sitting down and proceeding with his dinner as usual. Now, he did what he intended to say he would do, but said quite another thing, much to the alarm of his wife. To a physician, this is a not infrequent form of aphasia but has nothing at all to do with mental aberration.

Imagine, if you please, the admiral before the court of inquiry, in a similar condition and you will at once realize what the consequences might be. The peculiar circumstances surrounding such a court, the necessary preliminary work to be done before his arrival on the spot, are bound to be attended by a certain amount of fatigue and exertion which, so far as my observations with him go, have always been followed by that condition.

If, therefore, he would be ordered before that court, the chances are that he would arrive either altogether unable to speak, or in such a state as to cause him to say one thing while meaning quite another. You will see at once what consequences that might have.

I would, therefore, very strongly suggest, if in any way possible, that the admiral be spared that trial.

Very respectfully,
H. G. BEYER[1]

REAR-ADMIRAL TAYLOR TO SECRETARY LONG

Naval War College
NEWPORT
August 12, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Permit me to suggest that some steps be taken to ensure that the evidence in the coming court of enquiry be transmitted fully and impartially throughout the country. I am sure that the people generally will arrive at a just decision if only the case is presented to them without suppression or distortion. It appears to me that nothing more is needed than that to ensure the court and the country coming to the same conclusion.

For this reason it would seem to be of the highest importance to ensure the transmission of the evidence fully and without reserve; and I venture therefore to submit this view to you.

I was very sorry, Sir, that you should not think well of establishing the general board[1] by congressional action — and that no opportunity has arisen during the summer to submit my views further to you on the subject. Some further evolution is necessary if this board is to be, as originally contemplated, the nucleus of a great general staff; and something more than an advisory council. It need not be action by Congress but the department could itself proceed with the evolution. Something, however, must be done, or the good that has been begun will fade before fruition.

With much respect, Sir,

Sincerely yours,
H. C. TAYLOR

CAPTAIN LEMLY TO SECRETARY LONG

Hotel Carleton
Personal CAPE VINCENT, NEW YORK
August 21, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Developments at Washington in the preparation for the Schley inquiry have determined me to cut short my vacation by a few days

[1] Henry Gustav Beyer (1850–1918).

[1] See letter of January 30, 1900.

and return to my work on Friday, the twenty-third, instead of Monday, twenty-sixth instant. I have concurred with the acting secretary in the propriety of having some one to assist me in the case provided that it be a man of such attainments as will enable him to cope with Judge Wilson [1] on the points of law which may arise during the investigation. He, you know, is a very able lawyer, — exceptionally so, as also I suppose is Mr. Rayner [2] of Baltimore. Captain Parker,[3] I do not fear, but from actual experience in two cases which I prosecuted, he defending, I know that *he is a man to be watched.*

I learn that Mr. Hackett has conferred with the attorney-general concerning counsel to assist the judge-advocate, suggesting Assistant Attorney-General Hoyt,[4] who would be eminently satisfactory to me, but Mr. Knox [5] fears the further cry of persecution if an officer of his department is detailed for the duty, and prefers the employment of some one not in the service of the government. If this be done, it must be through the department of justice, as the navy department has no fund out of which services of this character can be compensated. I desire to get back for this and other reasons which appear from the information I have received to make my presence necessary, — or at least important. The meeting of the court at the navy yard instead of at the department, is, I think, for many reasons a very good move, but I think it would be well to obtain Admiral Dewey's views on this matter before reaching a final conclusion. The principal advantage of the change would be in the removal of the court from what is supposed to be the departmental influence against Schley.

And now, Mr. Secretary, availing myself of the encouragement which you have always given me to speak frankly to you, I beg that you will take the necessary steps, — a word from you to Mr. Hackett will suffice — to have the entire matter of the Schley inquiry turned over to the court, with such assistance only from the department as it may be requested to render. This, Mr. Secretary, is not only proper and usual but necessary as well from my observation and knowledge in the premises, and can not be done too soon. Mr. Hackett appears to lack confidence in me, which I trust

[1] Jeremiah M. Wilson (1828–1901).
[2] Isidor Rayner (1850–1912), U. S. senator from Maryland, 1905–1912.
[3] William Harwar Parker (b. 1879), U. S. M. C.
[4] Henry Martyn Hoyt (1856–1910).
[5] Philander Chase Knox (1853–1921), attorney-general.

you do not share. I am confident of my ability, with or without assistance, of bringing this vexed matter to a proper conclusion and securing a finding in accordance with the *facts* in the case, which is, I know, all that you desire. The step, – the word I suggest – can not come too soon.

Do you mind telling me in confidence when you expect to return to Washington? There are several matters upon which I would like to communicate with you in person.

Mrs. Lemly joins me in wishing that Mrs. Long and yourself will have a pleasant vacation.

I have the honor to be,

Very sincerely,
SAM C. LEMLY [6]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
BUCKFIELD, MAINE

CAPTAIN LEMLY TO SECRETARY LONG

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
August 25, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I thank you for your respective timely and kindly letters to Mr. Hackett and myself. The attorney-general is in Pittsburgh, and indeed none of his assistants was here yesterday. Mr. Hackett, however, has written him a communication asking that Mr. Assistant Attorney-General Hoyt be detailed to aid me in the prosecution of the case before the Schley inquiry. Frankly, I had about made up my mind to go it alone, and feel rather indifferent as to whether I have an assistant or not. It was suggested in the letter to [the] attorney-general that if Mr. Hoyt is not available, an outside party be employed.

I do not propose to bother you with details, but would like your advice with regard to the propriety of my running on about next Sunday and Labor Day following to interview Admiral Sampson. It is eminently proper that I should interview my witnesses before putting them on the stand, and in the particular case of Sampson it seems necessary to determine whether he is in condition to testify. He is not an essential witness, but it is my intention to call him if

[6] Lieutenant-Commander Samuel Conrad Lemly (1853–1909), judge-advocate-general of the navy.

practicable. I do not, however, as the newspapers evidently desire, propose to call any witnesses for the purpose of having them baited by Schley's counsel for the edification of the public. A word from you in this matter will suffice.

I am, Sir,

Very sincerely,
SAM C. LEMLY

P. S. Mr. Hackett has just shown me your telegram containing suggestion as to assistant. There can, of course, be no better man than the one you name, if obtainable, which would necessarily be through the attorney-general. The matter is to be taken up to-morrow.

S. C. L.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

REAR-ADMIRAL CROWNINSHIELD TO SECRETARY LONG

"Oakhill"
PEABODY, MASSACHUSETTS
September 3, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

From what I hear from Washington the interest in the coming court of inquiry is very intense; in fact, before I came away the action of the newspaper men reminded me of the days of the Spanish War. The Schley press is doing everything to discredit the court and is making severe attacks upon Howison,[1] also upon Mr. Hackett. Schley is well fortified by the support of so many newspapers and he will go into court with a strong array of counsel. While I feel that Lemly is perfectly able to meet them on all technical points, he should have the assistance and the support of some man of note, and it has been proposed by Colonel Robert Thompson[2] (whom you may recall as the great friend of the Naval Academy), to furnish at his own expense as assistant counsel, either Tom Reed[3] or Wayne McVeagh.[4] The Schley people are going to fight every inch of ground and their tactics should be met by the best talent we can produce. I am not at all worried, Mr. Secretary,

[1] Rear-Admiral H. L. Howison.
[2] Robert Means Thompson (1849–1930).
[3] Thomas Brackett Reed.
[4] Wayne McVeagh (1833–1917), Yale '53.

about myself or about my bureau, but I am anxious about the outcome of the inquiry as it affects the American people – it is the people we want to put straight in this matter and one of the greatest helps towards our accomplishing this end is the employment [of] high class counsel – men of such reputation that their mere presence in the court will affect the public mind. I sincerely hope that you will agree to this arrangement.

There are two or three other points I desire to talk over with you, and so I am in hopes that I may see you in Hingham before my return to Washington. I shall remain here probably through this week – and even longer if I thought I would be able to see you. It seems to me that one point of importance, in connection with this Schley court, and which should not be lost sight of is the political aspect it has been taking on. While there are two or three Republican papers giving his case their support, the entire Democratic press stand by him – throughout the South universally so – one or two of the Southern papers having already stated that no matter what the findings of the court may be, except they were favorable to Schley, they would not be accepted. The first move of Schley after the court opens will be to challenge Howison – and if such objection is supported by the other members, then the department will at once have to select a new member. This should of course all be considered before the court meets, and the name of the new man decided upon – a matter of much importance.

I sincerely hope that you will give your approval, if you have not already done so, to the plan of having Mr. Reed, or some other man of great reputation, employed as assistant counsel. I also hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will be back in Washington at the time of the meeting of the court. Believe me, with kind regards to yourself and Mrs. Long, in which Mrs. Crowninshield joins,

Yours very sincerely,
A. S. Crowninshield

P. S. I enclose a note just received from Cowles,[5] thinking it may interest you. Do not trouble yourself to return it.

To the Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Buckfield, Maine

[5] Commander William Sheffield Cowles (1846–1923), assistant to the bureau of navigation.

REAR-ADMIRAL SAMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

Burkehaven
Lake Sunapee, New Hampshire
September 12, 1901

My dear Mr. Long:

I made on Monday a request to the navy department for a second extension of "leave." This was done on the urgent insistence of my physician, Dr. Beyer, who begs that I will not return to duty. My stay here in New Hampshire has probably done me good which I may feel later. At least he thinks it should be prolonged. According to precedent in such matters, Mr. Secretary, I fear it will be embarrassing to the department unless I ask for my detachment. I think I ought to ask for it; and if this seems best to you, I herewith ask to be detached from the Boston Navy Yard October 1 and ordered to Washington or "to my home," which amounts now to the same thing. Our convenience should, I fear, not longer be considered in this matter.

Yours respectfully,
W. T. Sampson[1]

To the Honorable Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

CAPTAIN MCCALLA TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Kearsarge*
Personal Fort Monroe
18 September, 1901

Dear Governor Long:

I can not find words to express to you how deeply we feel the terrible catastrophe at Buffalo.[1] I should have believed, with Mr. McKinley, that our Presidents would have been safe from the bullet or knife of the anarchists who find liberty and homes in the United States.

Knowing how great the loss must be to you, both as a member of Mr. McKinley's Cabinet and as his friend, I beg that you will accept the assurance of my most sincere sympathy, rendered even more deep, if possible, by my sense of obligation to the late Presi-

[1] Written by Mrs. Sampson and signed by the admiral.

[1] The President was shot on September 6, 1901, and died on the fourteenth.

dent for his kindness to my wife, and his clemency in restoring me, at your request, to my position on the active list of the navy.

Believe me, my dear Governor,

Very sincerely,
B. H. McCALLA

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER SOUTHERLAND TO SECRETARY LONG

U. S. S. *Dolphin*
GLOUCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS
September 19, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

In accordance with a request from the Gloucester city authorities, I, in company with five officers and fourteen petty officers and enlisted men, attended the memorial services to our late lamented President in the city hall at this place to-day. We went in uniform and made every effort to add to the importance and impressiveness of the solemn occasion. We were treated with the greatest courtesy and one and all are glad that we had this opportunity to pay homage to the memory of as fine a man as our country has ever produced. The services were impressive and becoming. The city hall was so crowded that overflow meetings had to be held in some of the churches. An aged Catholic priest pronounced the benediction and three buglers sounded taps, as a fitting end to the occasion. You can easily imagine the general tenor of the short addresses, which were given by each of the clergymen of the city. One, however, went beyond the others and compared our late President with Alfred the Great, trying to prove that, in accordance with the principles of wireless telegraphy, the aims and principles, – civic, political, and religious – of the ruler of a thousand years ago, had been transmitted to our late commander-in-chief. I only mention this because, while I can not trace the parallel myself, it may interest you to look up the subject. Every officer on board eagerly volunteered to attend this memorial service and the crew were not at all behind their officers. We are all glad of the opportunity which this ceremony afforded us of showing our love and esteem for our late President.

I had a charming note from Mrs. Long yesterday and, feeling

that she must be lonely with you and Peirce away from her, have written and asked her to spend a few days on board ship with us. I earnestly hope she will accept and will remain on board till your return. Although I have no positive knowledge of your movements, I am inclined to believe that you will come home about the middle of next week, so have arranged to have the *Dolphin* reach the navy yard at Boston, about Wednesday the twenty-fifth instant. This will place me where you can reach me by telephone in case I can be of any service in any way to you or yours.

With all good wishes, believe me,

Very sincerely yours,
W. H. H. SOUTHERLAND

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
The Portland
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN LEMLY TO SECRETARY LONG

Court of Inquiry, Navy Yard
WASHINGTON
September 25, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

You have doubtless been advised of the death of Judge Wilson, Schley's senior counsel, on account of which the court adjourned yesterday until this morning, when we re-assemble. I regard this in some respects as a serious loss to the court, since the Judge's efforts, while always helpful to his client, in the one sense tended towards pacification. It is understood, though I am not at all sure of this, that no one will be employed to succeed him, but that Messrs. Rayner and Parker will go ahead with the case.

Referring to the question which we discussed on the morning before you left Washington of further assistance to the judge-advocate, I wish to say that Mr. Hanna,[1] who is by me as I write, agrees with me that none such is necessary, and we are convinced, Mr. Secretary, that it would be impolitic, to say the least, to resort at this late day to such a course. Any one coming into the case now would be more of a handicap than assistance; and, despite the tone of many of the papers, which I was prepared to discount before we entered upon the inquiry, we are entirely satisfied with the progress that we have so far made and with the present aspect

[1] Edwin P. Hanna, solicitor, judge-advocate-general's office, navy department.

of the matter. Mr. Hanna supplements this by saying that he is more than satisfied.

I have the honor to be,

Very sincerely,
SAM C. LEMLY
Judge-Advocate

P. S. I am very sorry to trouble you with these matters, but in your absence I miss the level headed counsel which you give me when here. My sincere personal regards for yourself and family.

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

ROBERT M. THOMPSON TO SECRETARY LONG

NEW YORK
September 27, 1901

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

A number of the newspapers have attacked Admiral Sampson because of the interview in which it was stated that he had examined the proofs of Maclay's[1] *History* and it was assumed that he had examined and approved of the charges of cowardice, *etc.*, made against Schley. It has come to my knowledge that the admiral examined the proofs of the first half of the book, but when the second half was put before him and he found these charges, that he threw the proofs into the waste basket and refused to have anything to do with it.

The newspaper reporter who obtained the interview, got into the admiral's sick room (for the admiral was sick in bed), and asked the admiral if he had seen and examined the proofs of Maclay's *History* without calling his attention as to what point was in issue. The admiral then being quite ill, replied only generally, that he had seen the proofs, and this is the basis of fact contained in the interview.

Many friends of the admiral think it very desirable and that the present time is opportune, for making a true statement of the facts. Are you willing to permit the admiral's secretary, Lieutenant Bennett,[2] the only person who could give an authoritative statement of facts, to inform me of exactly what took place, and I will then give out an interview under my own name, not connect-

[1] Edgar Stanton Maclay (1863–1919).

[2] Ernest Linwood Bennett.

ing any naval officer in any way with it, and being responsible for the interview myself? I now know the facts only generally, and would like to be accurate. Bennett does not feel at liberty to make any statement in regard to it without your permission.

I am,

With great respect,
ROBERT M. THOMPSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON
October 1, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am in receipt of your communication of this date. I shall appoint Admiral Sampson's son, and if the appointment for his alternate has been regularly made out, I shall appoint the alternate also. Otherwise, I shall appoint Admiral Philip's son to the position of alternate.[1] I can not be bound by any nominations made after the year 1902. I have the very highest regard for Dr. Mitchell, but I do not think it fair to naval men that their sons should be passed over even for the grandnephew of so distinguished a man as Dr. Weir Mitchell.[2]

Both to Annapolis and West Point I want to see during my term of office one or two southerners appointed, and it may be, from the nature of the case, these will have to be the sons of men not in the United States military or naval service; but these will be the only exceptions.

Sincerely yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

T. A. TOMPKINS TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
October 26, 1901

MY DEAR SIR:

The American people have made up a verdict in the Schley case, finding that he has been most shamefully treated by the naval de-

[1] Ralph Earle Sampson and John Woodward Philip entered the Naval Academy in 1903.
[2] Silas Weir Mitchell (1830–1914).

partment. The general opinion is that Crowninshield is responsible. If you do not dismiss him from the service, you will fall under severe criticism, which can not be averted by giving him command of the European squadron. The article in this morning's *Post* voices the sentiment of the American people, and you do well to heed. You can not afford to shield this man any longer. I sincerely hope you will be able to escape the storm of indignation which will demand a congressional investigation. These words are written in your interest by a gentleman from Illinois who has rare opportunities to feel the public pulse on all great questions.

Sincerely yours,
T. A. TOMPKINS[1]

SECRETARY LONG TO T. A. TOMPKINS

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
October 28, 1901

SIR:

I have your letter, and appreciate the kindly spirit in which you write. I am sure you will let me suggest that the verdict should not be made up until the finding of the court is announced. The court, which is everywhere recognized as an entirely fair one, will have the best opportunity for arriving at the right result.

With regard to Admiral Crowninshield, – you know that the American in the long run wants everybody to have a fair hearing, and if you will specify any particular in which he has done wrong, the department will gladly investigate it. As to a congressional investigation, – nothing would be more gratifying to this department than that one should be had. If there is any respect in which this department has been at fault, it ought to be called to account; and if, on the other hand, it is unjustly accused, there could be nothing better for it than to have that fact appear.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG[1]
Secretary

MR. T. A. TOMPKINS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Not identified.

[1] This letter was returned from the post office, unclaimed.

MALBON G. RICHARDSON TO SECRETARY LONG

70 State Street
Boston, Massachusetts
October 31, 1901

Dear Mr. Long:

As you know, I am very much interested in boys' and men's clubs, and on last Monday night I went over to the Sailors' Haven, which is situated at number 46 Water Street, Charlestown, in close proximity to the navy yard. I inspected the whole building and find it an institution that is worthy of your attention. In this building there is a club room for the men of the merchant service, club room for the blue-jackets of the navy and the marines. In these rooms they can read, write, smoke, play billiards and other games. They have a concert every Monday night, and I was surprised to see the club room filled with marines and blue-jackets from the navy yard and warships. The superintendent, Mr. Stanton H. King,[1] whom I have known for some time, and in whom I have every confidence was once an enlisted man in our navy and served two enlistments.

He knows what is needed for these men and is doing wonderfully effective work among them, and it occurred to me that it would help the work very much if you could send some word to the admiral at the navy yard, endorsing the work of the Sailors' Haven, number 46 Water Street, Charlestown, saying that it is your wish that this institution be brought to the notice of the enlisted men.

The work of the Sailors' Haven is similar to the work done by the Y. M. C. A., and as they have no work in Charlestown, I most strongly feel that you can safely endorse the work of the haven.

It is very interesting to see what a man like King has come up from and helped himself, and he has written an account of his experiences at sea and it is published in book form by Houghton Mifflin Company, and I think that if this book was put in the ships' libraries, it would do a great amount of good, and the title is *Dog Watches at Sea.* I was very much impressed at the clean, straightforward way that this work is being done. The night that I was there some 275 men were present, made up of marines, blue-jackets, and sailors. I write this thinking that you may be interested and knowing that your endorsement would greatly help the work and bring many a man to the haven to be helped and amused who

[1] Stanton Henry King.

would otherwise never go there. One thing that I like very much about the situation is that it is right down among the bar-rooms and it can fight them right there on their own ground. I enclose a heading which speaks for itself.

With kindest regards, I am,

Very truly yours,
MALBON GORE RICHARDSON

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.
[Enclosure]

SAILORS' HAVEN, CHARLESTOWN

46 Water Street

(Episcopal City Mission, Boston)

Our two sailor missions in East Boston and Charlestown are the constant resort of seamen in port.

St. Mary's House for Sailors, 120 Marginal Street, East Boston, is near the Cunard and Leyland wharves, while the Sailors' Haven is near the Warren, Furness, and Dominion Lines, and the navy yard. Both houses provide reading and game rooms, bath and toilet rooms, quarters for officers, for seamen and firemen, for stewards and naval men.

Religious service every Sunday evening.
Evening prayer and temperance meeting every Friday evening.
Sailors' concerts every Monday night (from October to May).

Missionaries: Stanton H. King, *Superintendent*
Josephine R. Upham

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

White House
WASHINGTON
November 5, 1901

Personal

The Secretary of the Navy:

Before making any recommendation about the naval observatory[1] and the question of its removal from the control of the navy,

[1] Secretary Long believed that the superintendent of the naval observatory "should have continuity of tenure" and in his annual report for 1901 he recommended that the office should not be restricted to line officers of the navy but that the best astronomer attainable should be appointed and given a long term of service.

or having anything made public about it, will you please consult me? We have enough of a fight about naval upbuilding on hand this year to make it very unwise, in my opinion, to complicate the matter with any side issue of any kind or sort.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

CAPTAIN SIGSBEE TO SECRETARY LONG

Office of Naval Intelligence
WASHINGTON, D. C.
November 6, 1901

DEAR SIR:

On January 21, 1900, Miss Edith Wallace Benham,[1] secretary, on behalf of the committee of the Battleship *Maine* Relief Association, tendered me the transfer of the committee's documents and the unexpended balance of the funds of the association on the occasion of my relief from sea duty and establishment as chief of the office of naval intelligence, navy department. The members of the association were: Mrs. John D. Long, Mrs. Edmund O. Matthews, Mrs. Arent S. Crowninshield, Mrs. Charles O'Neil, Mrs. Royal B. Bradford, Mrs. Edwin Stewart, Mrs. Philip Hichborn, Mrs. Charles Heywood, Mrs. Samuel C. Lemly, Mrs. Richardson Clover, and Miss Edith W. Benham.

After conference with the honorable secretary of the navy I accepted the transfer on February 9, 1900. On March 5, 1900, I received the files of the relief committee of the association from Mrs. Richardson Clover. On March 7, 1900, I received from Mrs. Edwin Stewart,[2] treasurer of the association, the unexpended balance amounting to $1595.19; also the accounts and files of the treasurer. The aggregate amount which had been subscribed was $31,378.28. On March 8, 1900, I opened an account with the Riggs National Bank, of Washington, D. C., on behalf of the fund, in the name of Charles D. Sigsbee, Trustee. I deposited therein the whole amount of the balance, and began a new series of numbers for the checks.

The fund was exhausted on October 24, 1901, by a payment of $25.00 to the mother of a member of the crew who lost his life in the *Maine*. When considering the propriety of making the several payments from the fund from time to time I have habitually conferred with the secretary of the navy. I enclose a transcript of

[1] Presumably the daughter of Admiral Benham.
[2] Wife of the paymaster-general of the navy.

my accounts, with the request that the department have them audited and give instructions as to the disposition of the files now in my possession. These files occupy considerable space.

It gives me pleasure to acknowledge the great help that I have received from the admirably kept files and accounts transferred to me by the ladies' association. The amount of work done by the association was immense and beyond comparison with the small amount of work required of me; in which, moreover, I had the labors of the ladies' association for reference and guidance. In nearly every payment made by me it was necessary only to refer to the files of the association in order to identify individuals.

Greatly needed relief has been afforded to distressed relatives of the *Maine's* dead by this fund contributed by the generosity of the patriotic and sympathetic people of the country. It is pleasant to be able to report that whereas the applications for assistance for a long time after the loss of the *Maine* were both frequent and pressing they so fell off during my administration of the fund that it became necessary to publish from time to time, through the courtesy of the Associated Press, notification of the fact that there was still a balance of the fund. These conditions show apparently that where there was much destitution about the time the fund was contributed it was relieved so largely and opportunely by the fund as to enable beneficiaries to manage their own affairs without further assistance.

I beg to thank the honorable secretary of the navy for his patient and kindly interest in the disbursement of the fund as well as for his suggestions and decisions in cases involving nice distinctions of responsibility.

Very respectfully,
CHARLES D. SIGSBEE
Trustee, Battleship Maine *Relief Fund*

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

SECRETARY LONG TO CAPTAIN SIGSBEE

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
November 6, 1901

MY DEAR CAPTAIN SIGSBEE:

I write to acknowledge the receipt of yours of this date, making full and specific statement of the distribution of the unexpended

balance transmitted to you January 21, 1900, by the committee of the Battleship *Maine* Relief Association and then amounting to the sum of $1,595.19. Permit me to express my appreciation of the valuable service which you have rendered in the work of distributing this amount to the distressed relatives of the dead of the U. S. S. *Maine*. Your name will always be associated with this famous ship, and I can well understand the pleasure you have found in this renewed association with the brave crew whose captain you were.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG

Captain CHARLES D. SIGSBEE, U. S. N.
Office of Naval Intelligence
Navy Department

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
November 8, 1901

MY DEAR LONG:

It is gratifying to learn by your letter of November 6 that my paper on "Rule by Parliament" in the *Transcript* of November 2 interested you and "raised new questions" in your mind, although when governor you had favored giving seats on the floor of the legislature to heads of department.

Although the heads of department in Massachusetts, at present, have administrative rather than political functions, the plan of consolidating the fifty-odd commissions and bureaus into a few great departments as in the United States government, would make such grand officials class with the so-called Cabinet officers at Washington. I recognize that our Cabinet officers are not, strictly speaking, Cabinet ministers mainly because they are not responsible to Congress; that they properly are secretaries of executive departments, responsible to the President, through whom alone they become indirectly responsible to Congress.

There is, however, one possible exception – the secretary of the treasury, whose reports are addressed to the Speaker of the House. I do not know how long this custom has existed, possibly since the time of Hamilton, who, starting from the British parliamentary system, may have reported to the House as *then* the branch of Congress in which alone appropriation bills could be introduced. But the secretary of treasury has no official right to a seat on the

floor of the House, any more than any other of the secretaries, nor can he be called upon to appear on the floor and be obliged to answer questions.

Hence, to give Cabinet officers seats on the floor of the House would make them ministers, responsible to Congress, instead of secretaries responsible to the President. This, in my opinion, would openly nullify the exclusive responsibility of the President as the sole executive created by the constitution. The Massachusetts constitution makes the governor the sole executive, and the thirtieth article of the Massachusetts bill of rights specifically declares that the executive power shall never be wielded by the legislature, nor the legislative power by the executive. With this in mind I stated in my paper that "As the State and Federal governments are organized on the same principles, the following criticism of parliamentary government is as applicable to the one as to the other."

As to Mr. Quincy's [1] argument that the consolidation of the fifty-odd commissions and bureaus into a few great departments [*sic*], I am decidedly in favor of the idea. If judiciously so done, the result would be greater harmony and energy. Official responsibility well-defined and strictly enforced is the basis of every really effective organized force, — be it army or navy, administrative department of state, political machine, church, or industrial corporation. Tammany Hall, the Jesuit order, the Roman Catholic church are strong because they are marvels of perfect organization; they are autocracies with every part in direct touch with one will, to which all others must yield unhesitating obedience. The first element of a perfect organization is a clearly defined responsibility of its members. For these reasons I favor the consolidation of bureaus into a few departments, but question the policy of giving their heads seats in the legislature.

I enclose copy of my letter of November 4 to Senator Lodge, which is a supplement to my paper on parliamentary government.

Yours truly,

HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Josiah Quincy (1859–1919), Harvard College '80, Democratic candidate for governor of Massachusetts, was advocating a parliamentary system of government for the state.

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston
November 18, 1901

My dear Long:

The necessity of reciprocity treaties for the preservation of our system of a protective tariff has long been recognized by me. The present tariff is excessive, as shown by an average balance of trade in our favor of $585,000,000 a year for the four full years (ending October, 1901) since the Dingley Tariff [1] went into operation. Of course, this has involved a drain of that amount upon the quick capital of countries trading with us, and to it has been attributed, in a measure, the industrial depression on the continent of Europe and a tendency to retaliate – to a tariff war. In fact, the consensus in governmental circles seems to be that the twentieth century will be a period of a struggle for the existence, in Europe, of their commerce and industries; and it behooves us to remove obstacles to the extension of our commerce and industries by keeping and extending our foreign markets.

As the question has heretofore been raised, and is likely to be again, about the compatibility of reciprocity treaties with our existing treaties – especially those containing the "most favored nation" clause, – I have practically embodied in the enclosed paper on "Reciprocity Treaties" my argument before the Chilean minister [2] of foreign relations in 1880, – at which the entire Cabinet and professor (of international law) Huneus of [the] University of Chile were present and seemed entirely convinced.

So far as I know, no treatise on international law has clearly explained the inherent principles which distinguish reciprocal, most favored nation and national treatment, and treaties respectively based on them, from reciprocity treaties. This I have endeavored to present, accurately and clearly, in the enclosed paper; as the result of much study of different treaties, and decisions and opinions of jurists on the different phases of this question.

The appended memorandum of "points discussed" in the enclosed paper, presents in condensed form the distinction alluded to and the principles upon which the several classes of treaties rest.

I enclose a number of copies of this "Reciprocity Treaties"

[1] See letter of W. H. Moody, M. C., dated September 10, 1898.
[2] Señor Santa María or Señor Valdarana. The office changed hands in 1880.

paper and should be pleased to have you present, with my compliments, a copy to Secretary Hay with whom my acquaintance is too brief to warrant my doing so directly, and others to the President and such members of his Cabinet as may be interested to read it. If you think it desirable to have more copies, I will send them to you.

This question of reciprocity treaties seems likely to occupy much of the attention of Congress when it convenes next month; and it may be desirable to clear away uncertainties and obstacles to its prompt and intelligent solution.

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.
[Enclosure]

POINTS DISCUSSED IN COLONEL FISHER'S PAPER ON RECIPROCITY TREATIES

(Published in the *Boston Transcript* of Saturday, November 16, 1901)

As *text*, the following extracts from President McKinley's speech of September 5, 1901: "We can not for ever sell everything and buy little or nothing. . . . It would not be best for us or for those with whom we deal. . . . Mutual exchange of commodities is manifestly essential to the continued and healthful growth of our export trade." These three propositions considered.

I. What is the balance of trade and its effect on national wealth? An excessive balance of trade in our favor would drain the quick capital of other countries and reduce their purchasing power and thus react on our export trade, if long continued.

II. Since the Dingley Tariff of 1897, the balance of trade in our favor has averaged $585,000,000 a year for four years: to it is attributed, in a measure, the present industrial depression on the continent of Europe, now attracting the serious attention of their statesmen and creating apprehension for their industrial future. This tends to a tariff war, which would diminish our foreign markets. The consensus of the leading statesmen is that the twentieth century will, for

Europe, be a struggle for existence in commerce and industry.

III. Tariffs for revenue and tariffs for revenue and protection. The Dingley Tariff makes special provision for reciprocity treaties and allows special discounts on imports in exchange for *equivalent* concessions on our exports, to be agreed upon in reciprocity treaties.

IV. "*Treatment*" is the technical name of the mass of favors, rights, and privileges, granted voluntarily and without compensation to commerce and navigation, to foreign ships, merchants, citizens and public officers. Treaties are classified according to the kind of treatment – 3 classes.

(1) Treatment of "exact and perfect reciprocity" – reciprocal treaties;

(2) "Treatment of the most favored nation";

(3) "National treatment."

V. *Reciprocal Treaties* provide that whatever favors, *etc.*, one nation may grant to the other shall be reciprocated by a grant by the other nation of exactly the same identical favors. But such favors are prospective and therefore conditional; and, being voluntary and without compensation in the first place, can be withdrawn or modified at the pleasure of the grantor. Hence reciprocal treaties create no rights of themselves and refer only to rights which may hereafter be granted – that is, to provisional rights *in futuro*. Such rights must be *exactly* the same in every respect, identical for both parties. They refer only to "navigation" rights and to the civil status of alien residents, never directly to commerce – the commodities imported. *Exact equality* is the test of the three classes above-named.

VI. Under the "*Most Favored Nation*" *Treatment*, all favors, *etc.* granted to any nation, in regard to such navigation rights and civil status, by one of the parties to the treaty immediately inure to the other party: being voluntary and without compensation, they are not permanent rights created by the treaty; nor have they any direct relation to commodities imported.

VII. "*National Treatment*" applies only to the same class of rights as to two previous classes – to navigation and civil rights of aliens, not directly to commodities imported. Under this class the flags of the two countries are assimilated,

so far as relates to foreign trade (rarely to coastwise trade): goods imported in foreign ships pay the same duty as in native ships, port-charges, *etc.*, are exactly the same for both. Differential duties are thus abolished.

VIII. "*Reciprocity Treaties*," on the contrary, refer exclusively to certain specified commodities imported which are to pay customs duties less than in the regular tariff; in consideration of which certain other specified commodities exported to the other country shall pay a certain less rate than generally levied. The concessions of duties thus mutually agreed upon are not necessarily the same rate of discount; but are deemed equivalent concessions. This is the fundamental distinction between reciprocity treaties and the three classes already described: *equivalency instead of exact equality of concessions:* direct and absolute concessions to certain specified imported commodities, and none other, instead of conditional and revocable favors to navigation and aliens. Hence reciprocity treaties are independent of all preëxisting treaties.

IX. The danger to our own industrial prosperity, resulting from a long-continued excessively favorable balance of trade, tends to commercial war on the part of other countries to prevent us from absorbing their quick capital used in payment of our excessive exports to them; in addition to their loss of ability to buy of us because of their impoverishment. This would diminish our foreign market and throw upon our home market a mass of commodities beyond its capacity to absorb. The result would be the crippling of our industries, — representing, in 1890, an investment of over six thousand millions of capital, over nine thousand millions of annual production; over four millions of operatives receiving over two thousand millions as wages. The increase of industrial capital between 1870 and 1890 was 285%, of industrial production 177%, of industrial operatives 132%, — while our increase in population was only 62%. Hence the necessity of keeping and extending our foreign markets grows greater year by year. Heretofore we have had need [of] protective tariffs to promote industries; now we need reciprocity treaties to protect them and to preserve our domestic peace and political stability.

HORACE N. FISHER

REAR-ADMIRAL BOWLES TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

Bureau of Construction and Repair
WASHINGTON, D. C.
December 6, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Replying to your note of the fourth instant, I am in entire agreement with you that the title of rear-admiral is one that should only be applied to an officer who exercises military command, and it is much more fitting the head of the construction corps should have a title distinctly designating his office. It appears to me that this view of the matter of title applies with equal force, both in law and logic, to all bureaus of the navy department, no matter from what corps their chiefs are assigned or originate, because no chief of bureau exercises military command, and the duties of all bureaus are essentially and actually staff functions. Therefore, I consider that the chief of the bureau of construction and repair is to-day as fully entitled to the rank and title of rear-admiral as the chief of the bureau of equipment or as the chief of the bureau of navigation. The last *Navy Register* in failing to give my position that title, and in giving it to the chiefs above mentioned, made an unjustifiable discrimination.

This instance is cited to illustrate a tendency which has always existed and now exists to grudgingly award any sort of honor or distinction in the way of rank or position to those of the staff, who, while shorn of opportunities of distinction and agreeable duty following from military command, are at the same time inadequately recompensed for their necessary and arduous labor involving a high order of technical training. There is no doubt that in the public mind, and also in social life, the title of rear-admiral, however ill applied, does in reality add honor and dignity to the office I occupy and serves to class it in relation to other positions in the naval service. No matter what his title, my experience from the Naval Academy through the various grades of the construction corps teaches me that the chief of the bureau of construction must have *rank* with other officers; so the present question is merely one of whether or not it is best to use the title of rear-admiral, and does not admit of any doubt as to the matter of rank.

You have cited the case of Sir William White,[1] who, having no

[1] Sir William Henry White (1845–1913), naval architect.

military rank, is a civilian official at a salary of $15,000 a year and whose title is assistant controller of the admiralty and director of naval construction. It is not a parallel case on several important issues. The royal corps of constructors in England are employees of the civil service and entitled to pensions and retired pay under the rules of that service. The constructor in each dockyard has the title of chief constructor, and constructors and chief constructors also serve as assistants to the admiral superintendent at the several dockyards and are listed in the English navy list next after that official at each dockyard. The administration of English dockyards is on a civil basis and not on a military one such as ours or the French, and therefore rank is not essential.

Having cleared the ground by these remarks, I am personally not desirous of retaining the title of rear-admiral, but I consider it my duty to see that the head of my corps, the responsible designer of naval vessels, shall lose nothing in way of honor and distinction by relinquishing that title and that no loss of naval rank is thereby involved. Therefore, I should wish to carefully consider any substitute for the title and to secure at least as much pay as the rank of rear-admiral carried with it.

Very respectfully,
F. T. Bowles
Chief Constructor, United States Navy

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CYRUS T. BRADY TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
December 17, 1901

My dear Sir:

Pray do not think that I intend to inaugurate a daily correspondence with you but the more I consider this subject the more indignant I become. When I read the utterly unmerited abuse which is being heaped upon the heads of Admirals Benham [1] and Ramsay,[2] and the equally unmerited laudation which accompanies the persistent misunderstanding of Admiral Dewey's position, I am filled

[1] Andrew Ellicott Kennedy Benham (1832–1905).

[2] F. M. Ramsay. The court of inquiry in the Schley case was composed of Admiral Dewey, president, and Rear-Admirals Benham and Ramsay.

with scorn and contempt. If Admiral Dewey agrees with his colleagues in the major portion of their verdict, in the name of manhood and decency let him stand up and say so! It is a shame that the persistent misunderstanding places the two admirals in one position and the third admiral in another. It seems to me that any man with a spark of manhood would rise up in indignation and say plainly that he concurs with the opinions which are animadverted upon so severely, except in so far as his published statement disagrees therefrom, and that if there is room or reason for censure, he will take his share with the others.

Do, Mr. Secretary, in behalf of justice and fair play, give Admiral Dewey permission to do this and perhaps you might furnish him with a little inspiration also. Plainly the honor of the admiral, which is in a certain sense the honor of the navy, demands that he should take this action. Let him show some of the backbone that he exhibited at Manila and set himself right as an officer and a gentleman with his colleagues, with the navy, and with the country. It is a burning shame, I repeat, that he should shelter himself behind an ambiguity. If he agrees, or disagrees, let him speak!

Very sincerely yours,
CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY[3]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS TO SECRETARY LONG

BOSTON
December 18, 1901

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

Thanks for your letter of the sixteenth, and the criticism contained in it. Every historical analogy can easily be pushed too far; and, still more easily, admits of differentiation in minor points. The discussion of " what might have been " is unprofitable.

My object in preparing the paper you so kindly discuss was twofold: first, I wanted to give credit to Lee;[1] second, I wanted to suggest to the gentlemen in South Africa who have pursued a differ-

[3] Reverend Cyrus Townsend Brady (1861–1920), graduate of the Naval Academy.

[1] General Robert Edward Lee (1807–1870). The paper was read before the American Antiquarian Society, October 30, 1901.

ent policy that there are two sides to these questions; and the fact that, now, after thirty-six years, there can not be found *one single man in the whole United States*, North or South, who will say that Lee made a mistake,[2] is a pretty strong piece of evidence. Absolute unanimity as the result of thirty-six years is significant.

From either a literary or legal point of view, you will agree with me that, when you have an object in view, the thing is to strike at it as forcibly as you can, without dissipating your strength by going into side issues. This I proposed to do; and the response my paper has received shows that I was not mistaken in my judgment.

Meanwhile, I will suggest to you one little historical point. It has been repeatedly said, – as you say, in reply to my argument, – that for this, that, or the other reason, the Confederates could not have done, or would not have been likely to do, what is now being done in South Africa. On the other hand, let me suggest to you that Mosby [3] carried on exactly the warfare De Wet [4] is now carrying on in South Africa, for four years, within fifty miles of Washington, and we never once succeeded in putting our hands upon him. Anything and everything that Botha,[5] De Wet and the Boer leaders have done, simply is not "in it" in comparison with what Mosby and Forrest [6] did. Mosby's men, *within fifty miles of Washington*, pursued exactly the course which the Boers are pursuing; that is, they were farmers one day and soldiers the next; and we pursued, only to far greater extremity, the course the English are pursuing. We devastated the country, shot our prisoners, burnt houses, and did what is always done in irregular warfare, – and which no one has a right to complain of when recourse is had to irregular warfare! It is a logical sequence.

In the above, please remember that I am speaking of that which I know from individual and personal observation. The difficulty in the whole case is, that thirty years throw a light over what actually has been, which entirely obliterates from the average memory what easily might have been. After all, however, we will agree on one

[2] See the short paper on Lee's mistakes by John D. Long, *Proceedings*, Massachusetts Historical Society, XLIV, 592.

[3] John Singleton Mosby (1833–1916).

[4] Christian Rudolf De Wet (1854–1922).

[5] Louis Botha (1862–1919), South African general and statesman and first premier of the Union of South Africa, 1910–1919.

[6] Nathan Bedford Forrest (1821–1877).

point, *i.e.*, that the stenographer is a blessing. But for the stenographer and typewriter I should not have received your letter, — nor would you have got this reply!

I have to be in Washington, to attend the meeting of the American Historical Association, of which I chance to be president, the last of next week, and not impossibly I may take the opportunity to drop in upon you at the naval department. Meanwhile, permit me to offer my felicitations upon the happy state in which our admiral has left the result of the Schley court of enquiry. I never yet knew a court of enquiry, or a council, which was of any service whatever. The result of this last one merely further establishes a principle already proven. What was already bad enough is made, if possible, a little worse than it was. Dewey may be great as an admiral, — of that I have nothing to say, — but in the ordinary affairs of life he is not a success.

Believe me, *etc.*,
CHARLES F. ADAMS

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CAPTAIN HOBSON TO SECRETARY LONG

St. Nicholas Hotel
Personal CINCINNATI
December 18, 1901

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

A sensational newspaper this morning misquoted a part of an address I made here last night on the navy, in which there was not a word touching the controversy. Some one in the audience asked, referring to the battle of Santiago, "Who did it?" I replied, "The man behind the gun, or perhaps, I might better say, with Admiral Schley, the girl behind the man behind the gun." The paper in question, from this, makes up a sensational paragraph saying, I said, "Schley did it."

I thought it best to let you know the facts whether or not the matter comes to your notice.

Yours very truly,
R. P. HOBSON

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Navy Department
WASHINGTON, D. C.

WINSLOW WARREN TO SECRETARY LONG

39 Court Street
Boston, Massachusetts
December 23, 1901

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Although you and I do not agree on all political matters and perhaps because of that fact, I am impelled to write you a hearty note of congratulation for your dignified and manly action anent the Schley controversy and I extend the same feeling as regards the President's action as to General Miles. I have no interest in the matter except as a private citizen and have no wish to derogate from the proper glory to which Admiral Schley is entitled for what he did well, but when a man appeals to a court for justice and fully assents to its composition it is folly to rail at its judgment. We lawyers think it useless enough when we are compelled to go to a court that we have not asked for nor assented to.

Whatever gust of feeling may temporarily sweep over the country, fanned as it will be by partisan[s] who think they see something in it for them — the thinking people are with the administration and feel confident that history will be. I sincerely trust that this unfortunate controversy may now be buried, but if not, that the administration will stand firm and rely upon the people.

I am,

Sincerely yours,
Winslow Warren [1]

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy

CHARLES P. GREENOUGH TO SECRETARY LONG

39 Court Street
Boston
December 23, 1901

Dear Secretary:

Allow me very respectfully to express my admiration of your Schley message.[1] Not a word wasted, not a word omitted — it was

[1] Winslow Warren (1838–1930), Harvard College '58.

[1] The letter of Secretary Long, in which "the findings of fact and the opinion of the full court [of inquiry] are approved," was published December 21, 1901; also the statement that Secretary of War Root had called upon General Miles for

a lesson in English. Your whole management of the matter was most delightful and unless Dewey has a hide like a rhinoceros, your pungent words must have made some impression. That with Secretary Root's deserved rebuke to Miles has had the best effect here and everybody I have seen entirely approves of both. Let me congratulate you most warmly. We feel here that Schley has had justice tempered with quite enough mercy.

Yours very truly,
CHARLES P. GREENOUGH [2]

SECRETARY LONG TO BENJAMIN H. TICKNOR

Navy Department
WASHINGTON
December 26, 1901

MY DEAR MR. TICKNOR:

I thank you very much for your kind letter, and I am glad that a re-reading of my action on the Schley case leads you, though you at first desired something more sweeping, to think that what I said was best. I never have had the slightest personal feeling in this case. I have acted with entire disinterestedness and as judicially as I am capable of doing. Of course all the talk about a conspiracy, *etc.*, *etc.*, is utterly unfounded. I certainly appreciate the approval of an old soldier like yourself – and an old friend.

Very truly yours,
[JOHN D. LONG]
Secretary

MR. BENJAMIN H. TICKNOR [1]
4 Park Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

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an explanation of his newspaper interview commenting on the trial. For opinions of Secretary Long and President Roosevelt on the court of inquiry, see Long's *The New American Navy*, I, 283–287, and II, 195.

[2] Charles Pelham Greenough (1844–1924), Harvard College '64.

[1] Benjamin Holt Ticknor (1842–1914), Harvard College '62.

1902

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

White House
WASHINGTON
January 4, 1902

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

Referring to the attached memoranda, I must say that this showing makes me feel that the unfortunate Captain Clark has had a pretty hard deal.[1] Why was Captain Higginson given five numbers? Ought not Captain Clark, as a simple matter of justice, really to receive six numbers, instead of a make-believe six numbers? Can not this be done now without prejudice to others?

Faithfully yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO SECRETARY LONG

Personal

White House
WASHINGTON
January 9, 1902

The Secretary of the Navy:

I would like a report on this from you. It certainly seems to me that every effort should be made to keep our officers at sea, and that wherever possible coast fortifications should be in the hands of the engineer department of the army. There are special reasons why this should not be done at Culebra but elsewhere the great object should be to release the navy officers for sea service. Am I not right in my remembrance that the officers of the army and navy have repeatedly complained to me as to their insufficiency in number? If such is the fact, it seems unwise to try to do work which could be as well done by the engineer body of the army.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

WILLIAM LAWRENCE TO SECRETARY LONG

1 Joy Street
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
January 27, 1902

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I have read with interest your letter of January nineteenth, which appeared in the *Boston Herald* the other day, in regard to the pay

[1] See Captain Clark's letter of May 2, 1902, note.

of chaplains and its proposed increase. Knowing your own personal desire to improve the staff of chaplains and to get men worthy of the work, I am moved to write you a few considerations which have weighed more and more with me during the past few years. My justification in writing you is a deep interest of several years' standing in this subject, an acquaintance with a number of navy officers and chaplains, with whom I have talked upon the subject, and an intimate knowledge of the conditions and salaries of the clergymen of at least one religious body in your own state of Massachusetts.

Let me say first that of course any clergyman who, on entering the navy, holds salary as a prime consideration is not worthy of his calling. Let me add that there are, as you well know, other considerations more serious and difficult to adjust than that of pay which hold many clergymen of ability from the navy. Of these I shall speak later.

I am confident that your statement that the character of the chaplains has steadily improved in the last years is well within the mark. The immediate question is, is the standard now satisfactory, and, if not, how can it be further improved?

I appeal to you if, in your conversation with officers and men, you have found their regard for the chaplains and their work what it should be. I take it that your wide experience is the same as my limited one, — that, while the officers agree that the chaplains are of irreproachable character and gladly point to this or that one whom they call exceptional in his successful work, they do not recognize that the body of chaplains are of such force of character, devotion, and ability as the navy should have. Officers of religious spirit, deeply concerned for the welfare of their men, have told me within three or four years that they would rather have no chaplain than the average chaplain of the navy. Granted that there may have been some prejudices mixed up in this statement, still these, I believe, are facts, and this is the general temper of the officers. Is this satisfactory? Certainly not.

The vital question is, what can be done to get better chaplains? I feel that, with all respect to yourself, the first obstacle to reform is the note which you strike so strongly in your letter. When our navy is raising the standard of education, skill, and character in its officers; when it is taking all pains to get men of more than average ability; and when its record under your administration has so evidently shown good results of this effort; — I protest, with all re-

spect, against "the average clergyman," "the salary of the average clergyman," or the work of "the average clergyman," being made the standard for the chaplaincy of the navy of this country. I believe that the people of this country want chaplains in the navy who are not, taking the country over and the rank and file of the ministry, average clergymen. I believe that the people want and the navy should have as chaplains men of far more than average force of character, devotion, and tact, backed by such excellent education as will give them the intellectual respect of the best trained officers of the navy.

I am not surprised that "the department is overwhelmed with applications for the position of chaplain." I could provide you with another long list of applicants, all of them men of stainless character, and not one of them fitted for the delicate post of navy chaplain. My point is, is the navy under its present conditions in as good a position to get men of such force, education, ability, and devotion as it would be if the chaplains were in the matter of pay on an equal footing with men of equal rank?

Allow me to give you a few facts in relation to the clergymen of the Episcopal church in Massachusetts – for it is of them only that I can speak with full knowledge – and the position of navy chaplain.

About a year ago, my interest in getting before the department men whom I believed of force and character led me to make an effort to present to you the names of one or two men who I was confident were fitted for the position of chaplain. After a careful study of the two hundred and sixty Episcopal clergymen of Massachusetts, I selected six, and wrote them asking whether they would allow me to take steps towards getting their names presented to the department for the position of chaplain. Of those six, four declined; one expressed his readiness to allow his name to be sent (I might add that since then his work, usefulness, and salary have so increased that, if approached now, he would decline); the other declined to allow his name to be presented, but said that he would yield if I insisted. In other words, out of two hundred and sixty Episcopal clergymen in Massachusetts, most of whom have a full college and theological education, I could find only one – and to-day I could not find one – whom I could commend to you as a man of such force and ability as ought to be a navy chaplain, who would be ready to take the post, if appointed. Of course, most of

the causes of this situation are not financial. Strong men are doing larger work than that which they think a chaplaincy in the navy offers. Good men who have been five years in the ministry in Massachusetts are getting salaries which enable them to live as well as the salary of a navy chaplain provides. "The average clergyman" may not, as you suggest, get a rise in income as he grows older; but the strong clergyman does get an increase of salary, and it is with him and him only that I think we are concerned. The clergyman of whom I am speaking (and as a class such men are the most efficient to-day) has put four years into college and three into the theological school: in other words, he has had seven years of education beyond the high school. A large part of this education has often been gained by his own efforts. He can not be justly compared with skilful master-mechanics or even pay officers. Am I not right in saying that he has put more time and money of his own into his education than any of the officers of a battleship, whose education has been obtained largely at the expense of the government?

There are, as I have already said, difficult conditions. Men of force who have been in the ministry a few years and are reaching a thousand men, women, and children, and are becoming a source of power in the community in which they live, hesitate about throwing their work aside in order to come into touch with perhaps six hundred officers and men, whose characters are largely set, in the walls of a ship. A strong man questions his ability to live happily in the necessary discipline of the ship and in the required relations between officers and men. There are other obstacles more familiar to you than to myself. This, however, I want to emphasize: I believe that there is a work in the navy for clergymen of force. I am confident that the officers will welcome them and that the men will respond to their work. Their influence will, as you well know, extend far beyond the ship; their names and work will be known throughout the navy, and their profession regarded. I am deeply concerned that the strong men in the ministry should realize this and the opportunity which, with all its limitations, a chaplaincy offers. I believe that there is a man here and there who has discovered his power over men and who might be turned toward the navy, but it would be difficult to pull him out of his present work. Money and increased pay are not going to do it. The prime consideration is as to whether he can be persuaded that his life will be devoted to a larger and more permanent service for Christ and his fellow men than in his present position. That being his prime

consideration, there is a secondary consideration which weighs with men, especially such men as the navy wants as chaplains, — men who are married and have children, and who have the American enthusiasm for education and for the education of their children. If such a man can be persuaded not only that there is work in the navy for him, but also that his wife can live with reasonable comfort and his children gain a first-rate education, he will be more liable to respond to the call for the work of the navy.

Eighteen months ago I lunched with a mess of officers. One and another happened to mention that his wife and family were passing the summer at Jamestown or some northern resort. I noticed that the chaplain said nothing. After lunch I asked him where his wife and children were. He said that he was anxious at the time, for he had learned that both his children were sick; that they with his wife were at Norfolk, and that the heat was bearing hard upon them. I asked him why he did not bring them to Jamestown, and he said that his pay, being smaller than that of his brother officers, did not allow that expenditure. Now that chaplain was doing his work with less buoyancy and success because of his anxiety, due to a smaller pay than that of his fellow officers. I think, though he did not mention it, that there was a slight sense, I will not say of injustice, but of misfortune in the discrimination; and I am not sure that I should agree with you in saying that the relation of his pay to that of his fellow officers had nothing to do with their estimate of the importance of his work. Taking men as they go, is it not the fact that men who are living in close contact with each other are affected in their estimate of each other's work by the value which the government seems to put upon their office?

Pardon the length of this letter. As my last word, may I respectfully urge you to set for the department and the nation a higher standard for the chaplaincy of the navy than that of " the average clergyman "? May I not hope that you will aim for nothing less than gaining for the chaplaincies of the navy (as you are gaining them for the other positions) men of distinct force of character, of education, of tact, and of devotion?

I remain, with kind regards,
Yours respectfully,
WILLIAM LAWRENCE [1]

The Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Right Reverend William Lawrence (b. 1850), Harvard College '71, Protestant Episcopal bishop of Massachusetts, 1893–1926.

CAPTAIN LYON TO SECRETARY LONG

Olympia
Personal BOSTON
January 29, 1902

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

I am very much obliged to you for the photograph which is just the best size, framed, to suit the height of the cabin and the size of the panels. We went into commission last Saturday at ten o'clock, the men marching back to their dinner on board the receiving ship and then returning with bags and hammocks to begin their life on board. Mrs. Lyon took luncheon with me on Sunday, and the ship was wonderfully well shaken down even by that time. The galley, heating system, electric lights and "all the comforts of a home" were in working order and the men's Sunday afternoon pipes seemed to send out a comfortable, glad-we-are-at-home sort of smoke.

Since then we have made excellent progress in getting stores on board, and have our six hundred tons of coal for first operations safely in the bunkers. I have reported to the commandant that but for the assurance that we shall have our fire hose and 8-inch ammunition hoist controllers, I could easily promise to get away on the tenth proximo, or even sooner. Admiral Johnson[1] has made such efforts to give us a good shove off and his heads of department have worked so well with him, I am anxious to give the navy department the surprise of finding us ready by the date set, and with no questions as to outfit.

I am rather short of officers, but all on board are working well and cheerfully to make a good ship. I am also short of leading petty officers, but the crew is going to be a fine one, is now willing and well behaved, and only wants some leading to be most efficient. In speaking of these shortages, I am not reflecting at all on the bureau of navigation which has done its very best for us, and has never shown any discrimination such as was suggested by a Boston newspaper when it undertook to discuss what was nobody's business and had a scare head line reading "Crowninshield and Lyon don't speak." I shall see Mr. Glover shortly and ask him to come on board. Before long, I hope that you will be able to visit us, and if

[1] Mortimer Lawrence Johnson (1842–1913), commandant of the Boston Navy Yard.

you will give me sufficient notice I will have some doughnuts that you can "chew on."

Mrs. Lyon has gone to Annapolis to be near our boy who is doing very well in his studies to meet the competition of those bright Yankee boys at the examination in Rockland or Lewiston next May.

With highest regards to Mrs. Long,

Sincerely yours,
H. W. Lyon

HORACE N. FISHER TO SECRETARY LONG

60 Congress Street
Boston
January 29, 1902

Dear Long:

In to-day's (Wednesday, 29 January) *Boston Transcript* will be published a paper of mine on "The Danish West Indies," in which are discussed these two propositions: (1) Their acquisition, politically considered, the logical application of our Monroe Doctrine; (2) Strategically considered, an incident and consequence of our isthmian canal policy. Proofs in pamphlet form are to be made, as in former cases, and I will send you some for use of yourself and colleagues (if they wish them).

The Monroe Doctrine message defines three principles: (1) No *political* domination of Europe over American nations; (2) No European colonization hereafter on American continent and islands; (3) No transfer of existing European colonies from one European power to another. This third principle appears in the Monroe message in these words: "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." The uniform interpretation of which, by every President and secretary of state in messages and reports to Congress on the subject whenever it has arisen, has been that we shall not interfere with existing European colonies in America or West Indies so long as their then owners (of 1823) shall continue in possession, but no longer; that their transfer from one European power to another will be a matter of moment to us as affecting (possibly) our safety, and therefore not allowable.

It has been thus officially stated by President Grant in his annual message in 1869: "The existing [European] dependencies

are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another"; and by Secretary Fish, in his report to the President appended to the message of July 14, 1870, – "This policy is not a policy of aggression but it opposes the creation of European dominion on American soil, or its transfer to other European powers; and it looks hopefully to the time when, by the voluntary departure of European governments from this continent and the adjacent islands, America shall be wholly American."

In the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, the West Indies held the practical monopoly of the sugar production of the world – they were the "spice islands" of the western hemisphere, only infinitely more valuable to their European owners: for which reason the great naval battles of the eighteenth century between England, France, and Spain were fought in the West Indies for the control of the Caribbean and its sugar islands. Even as late as the year our class graduated at Harvard [1857], the beet sugar production of the world was only 200,000 tons (15%) against 1,200,000 tons of cane sugar, of which the West Indies produced 57% and thus had the control of one of the great staples of commerce. Sugar was king then, even more emphatically than cotton has ever been a political dictator of national policy. To-day, all this is changed: in 1900, beet sugar production was 5,607,000 tons as against 2,839,000 tons of cane sugar and the West Indian islands (though producing, as in 1857, 670,000 tons) produced only 8% of the world's sugar: their commercial importance had dwindled, their market on the continent had not only gone for good but the surplus of the continental sugar production was driving them out of the British and American markets. The cheap labor of oriental countries and Hawaii enabled those countries to undersell the West Indies in cane sugar production, so that the main West Indian industry is unprofitable and being abandoned in despair: the consequence is that those islands are no longer valuable *commercially* to their European owners, but because of their wrecked sole industry they are unable to make their revenue cover their expenditures and the home government of every European West Indian colony has to make up the annual deficit from the public treasury. For example, in 1899, Parliament granted £40,000 to Barbados, £30,000 to Grenada, besides loaning to Jamaica £150,000 "in aid of revenue" and £303,000 for public works and railways, to Trinidad £110,000 for public works and

railways, to Barbados £50,000 as "hurricane loan," and to Saint Vincent £50,000. Thus three and one-half millions of dollars were drawn from the British taxpayers, already groaning under their costly war in South Africa. In like manner the French budget of 1901 appropriated 3,857,971 francs for her two West Indian islands, besides loaning, in 1899, 1,400,000 francs to Martinique for twenty years. The Dutch West India Colony of Curaçao in 1900 showed a deficit of $31,400 in its revenue, which was paid from the Dutch treasury. As to the Danish West Indies, they have long had an annual deficit, which has had to be paid from the Danish treasury already so overburdened that her gold reserve fund for "sudden occurrences" — $31,386,000 in 1867 — had been drawn down to $4,830,000 in 1900.

Now these facts present a momentous question to us: what is to be the political destiny of the remaining European colonies in the West Indies? We have settled the West Indian interests of Denmark by purchase,[1] at about one-third her asking price in 1867. How about the others?

If we insist that their present owners shall not sell or transfer those unprofitable colonies to other European powers (the only powers which could buy, except ourselves), and the time should come — and it seems not far away — when the European owners find them too heavy a burden without commercial compensation to keep, and the colonies see sure ruin before them if they remain under European dominion, what will the United States do in such event? The European owner may be glad to "voluntarily depart," but scarcely one of those colonies is able to govern itself, financially or politically. Their only chance of recuperation seems to be to join the procession with Porto Rico and the Danish islands as dependencies of the United States; and thus, with favorable tariff reductions in their favor, they will recover their pristine prosperity and even more.

To my mind, the acquisition of the Danish West Indies is the initiation of an American West Indian policy of immeasurable importance to us and to the world.

Yours truly,
HORACE N. FISHER

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

[1] Negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West Indies failed until 1917.

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
January 30, 1902

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

I can not tell whether I have paid the pew rent for this year or no. I paid the quarter's bills which came about the first of January at home and the receipts are there as are the checks. I do not at this moment remember the address of the treasurer of the church, but I suppose if you know it, you can ask him by telephone.

I doubt whether you ought to pay one-half of this pew rent. Your soul and that of Mrs. Long are both so sure of salvation without preaching that a sinner like me ought at least to pay three-fourths of the cost of the doctrine that comes to that pew.

I am,
Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

CAPTAIN MAHAN TO SECRETARY LONG

160 West Eighty-Sixth Street
[NEW YORK]
February 9, 1902

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

This letter will introduce to you the Right Reverend Charles Henry Brent,[1] who I hope will have the opportunity of presenting it in an approaching visit to Washington. Bishop Brent has been recently consecrated to the charge of the Missionary jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands, and I need not say how advantageous to him and his work will be the countenance of the navy department, so far as it can be properly extended in its various offices in the Philippines. As a Bostonian, you have the means of knowing from personal observers the high character of the work done by Bishop Brent in his recent charge of St. Stephen's Church in Florence Street, while to the estimation of his clerical qualities by the church at large, the selection of him for his present office is sufficient testimonial. In view of these, it is scarcely important to add that for both Bishop Brent and his future work I personally have the utmost value.

With much respect, Sincerely yours,
A. T. MAHAN

[1] Charles Henry Brent (1862–1929).

WILLIAM H. LINCOLN TO SECRETARY LONG

Boston Chamber of Commerce
February 24, 1902

DEAR SECRETARY LONG:

I want to congratulate you upon the decision of the President on the Schley controversy.[1]

When I read your letter upon the subject published a long time ago, I said that was enough for me and for any intelligent and sincere man – and I have not taken the time to read anything since till I read the verdict of the President. I knew very well that your sense of justice and fairness would not allow you to arrive at any other than a sound conclusion. I am delighted that your course in this unfortunate affair has received such unqualified endorsement. You must know that the people of this state are proud of your record. I notice your intention soon to relinquish your cares and responsibilities as secretary of the navy – and I am not surprised. You have had a long and honorable service and during one of the most momentous periods in our history.

A warm and hearty welcome awaits you.

I expect to leave the last of the week for Cuba, and shall do a little exploring on my own account. It is a shame that Congress does not rise to the height of the occasion and recognize its responsibilities to the people of Cuba.

Believe me, dear Mr. Long, your devoted friend and admirer,

WILLIAM H. LINCOLN[2]

HENRY CABOT LODGE TO SECRETARY LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
March 11, 1902

DEAR GOVERNOR:

In what I said to our home newspapers last night in regard to the change in the navy department, I tried to express my sincere regret at your withdrawal and my sense of your great public service in the Cabinet. Published interviews are however so apt to sound cold and perfunctory that I can not refrain from saying to you personally how much I regret your determination to retire. As a friend

[1] President's memorandum, dated February 18, 1902. See Long, *The New American Navy*, II, 195.

[2] William H. Lincoln, president of the Boston chamber of commerce.

and a Massachusetts man I have taken the greatest possible pride in your most distinguished service in the Cabinet, in your brilliant success in the trying days of war, and in the purity, the lofty purpose, and the high-mindedness which have characterized your whole administration. In this pride Massachusetts shares, and I am but expressing the opinion of the state and of all reflecting men. That this should be the case is an especial pleasure to your friends, among whom I trust you will always allow me to number myself and who feel not only pride in you but affection for you.

Sincerely yours,
HENRY CABOT LODGE

CYRUS T. BRADY TO SECRETARY LONG

Thirty-Sixth and Chestnut Streets
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
March 12, 1902

DEAR SIR:

I have read with great regret the published statement that you have resigned as secretary of the navy.

As a citizen of the country and a graduate of the United States Naval Academy, I take the greatest interest in the welfare of the navy, and I wish to express my profound sense of appreciation of your brilliant administration. While it did not have so great a problem as that brought forth by the Civil War to grapple with, yet in the lesser emergency the department under your leadership exhibited such a degree of efficiency, and the efforts of the navy were attended by such signal success that I think it no more than due, Sir, to say that your administration stands among the very highest and best that the navy department has ever experienced.

You will, I am sure, Mr. Secretary, carry with you in your retirement, the gratitude and admiration of the best part of your countrymen; and what is better than that, the consciousness that you have deserved it. There is nothing back of this statement of mine; no reason that I should make it, except that it conveys my sincere and carefully considered opinion. I have expressed it publicly as well as privately, and I wish you to know it. Even the approbation of the humble is pleasant to the great.

Very sincerely yours,
CYRUS TOWNSEND BRADY

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
Secretary of the Navy
WASHINGTON, D. C.

HENRY S. PRITCHETT TO SECRETARY LONG

Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Boston, Massachusetts
March 14, 1902

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I think the man who takes off his armor is to be congratulated, rather than he who puts it on, and I am taking the liberty of sending a line of friendly congratulation after seeing your letter of resignation. You have done a good work in Washington, and you have every reason to feel satisfied and contented with it. I am sure you would be more than pleased if you could hear the many expressions of good will from the citizens of Massachusetts at the thought of your return home. You will have here a welcome such as perhaps no other son of Massachusetts would get, and which is perhaps the best possible expression, not only of good will, but of appreciation of your service.

Please do not take the trouble to answer this. I shall hope to see you often when you have once more become a citizen of the old Bay State.

Sincerely yours,
Henry S. Pritchett
President

Honorable John D. Long
Secretary of the Navy
Washington, D. C.

A. BUSHNELL HART TO SECRETARY LONG

15 Appian Way
Cambridge, Massachusetts
March 18, 1902

Dear Secretary Long:

As one of your Massachusetts constituents, may I express a personal word with regard to your service as secretary of the navy? We of Harvard are very proud of the position of Secretary Long in public life as in private life. It is a splendid thing for the country to have the opportunity of applying high standards and direct methods to the administration of such a great public service as the navy; and I can not let the opportunity pass to express a personal gratitude for that spirit, for the splendid service of the navy during the war, for the high standard of the navy in peace, and for the good temper and wisdom with which you have borne the assaults

of those who would like to force upon the department naval reputations which have not the endorsement of professional soldiers either in this or in other countries. I think that calmness, quiet, and dignity in the midst of trying controversy is as good an example as an American or a Harvard man can set his fellows.

I feel personally indebted to you for some courtesy eighteen months ago in bringing about an interview with President McKinley, but that is the smallest reason for writing this letter. I suppose even the faithful public servant sometimes likes to know that his millions of masters appreciate loyalty, unselfish and right public service. Please do not take the pains to answer this letter, which is not intended to add to the weariness of a very busy man.

Sincerely yours,
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART

Honorable JOHN D. LONG

CAPTAIN CLARK TO JOHN D. LONG

Naval Home
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA
May 2, 1902

MY DEAR SIR:

I have written you so much lately you may well feel you are entitled to a respite but your very kind letter which came yesterday shows that the misunderstanding which you say does not, in my opinion does exist. While you have felt so kindly towards me and have been so much interested in what concerned my reputation as an officer, you have in my opinion, and I say this in all kindness, been persuaded and have persuaded others to entertain such an estimate of my services that their value in the eyes of my country men has been lowered or obscured. This I have felt keenly because I have not sought but rather have discouraged others who would seek for me rank and official distinction. I do not understand how the only captain who always had his ship off Santiago, ready to go full speed, and who, when the enemy came out and broke through our line, and had apparently succeeded in escaping, was able to overtake and play the leading part in forcing on shore, in succession, all four Spanish ships, could have been said to have done only one-sixth better than the other battleship captains. After the first twenty minutes they had only to follow and deal with the enemy's ships already beaten and headed for the shore. If the

speed of the *Oregon* did this, or enabled her to do it, what gave her this speed? She had to pass the *Iowa* and *Texas*, both rated faster ships, and she did it, as an officer testified before the court of inquiry, as if they were standing still. When the chief engineer represented to me the advantage of never using the main boilers for condensing, I kept the officers and men on tepid – almost nauseating drinking water, but they were loyal and devoted knowing why I required it, but when he insisted that the ship could not remain in service longer without going to a navy yard after he knew of your despatch, telling me to go to Key West if ready for service, otherwise to come north, I made him understand on the quarter-deck that the ship had come to take her chances in war and would take them. I speak of this because of the attempts lately made by an engineer to show that he was the man of action. The responsibility was always upon me as it was when I came six hundred miles after leaving the *Marietta* and *Nictheroy* off Cape Frio at the risk any hour of an encounter with the Spanish fleet and then cabled you from Rio that the *Oregon* could make a running fight with it: this too after you had, justly and considerately, suggested that I could in an emergency remain in a Brazilian port, under plea of repairs. You saw the merit of Dewey's action for whom you assumed the responsibility of ordering the attack upon the Spanish fleet in the Philippines and recommended him for an advance of more than two full grades, and of Wainwright's attack upon the torpedo boats, which he says he thought the *Indiana* signalled him to make and recommended him for ten numbers.

You know that Admiral Evans, for instance, was promoted over five of his lifelong seniors gaining, perhaps, years; while I only went over Chester and Harrington, – the remainder of my six numbers being absorbed in getting back again over two Manila captains and two engineers wedged in just above me by the personnel bill.[1]

I could never understand how you could think six numbers a proportionate reward for my services or how you could say I had received even that reward in full. Suppose that instead of two, that four engineers had been put in just above me and that they

[1] For the passage of the personnel bill, see the letter of Professor Hollis, January 19, 1899, note. Captain Clark received seven additional numbers June 18, 1902, just after his promotion to rear-admiral.

retired the day after I was advanced, leaving me just where I was at the start, next below Chester, would that be what you would have the American people understand was a full reward for my services?

But I am not complaining about the result for as I told Senator Proctor [2] when he wanted to take up the matter that I did not care to wrangle about any of the six pieces when I thought so poorly of the whole pie. Now, my dear Sir, I am not trying to make you see things as I do. Your last kind letter shows that we differ so widely in opinion that a concurrence is impossible. It is enough that you did what you thought was just and right. My regard for my fellow men whose actions affect me is measured by their feelings and intentions. However you may feel towards me after this I shall always hope that good fortune and happiness will be yours and that some time you will think leniently of my views.

Very sincerely yours,
C. E. CLARK

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
WASHINGTON

GEORGE FRISBIE HOAR TO SECRETARY LONG

United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D. C.
May 20, 1902

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

The members of the Massachusetts delegation had hoped to mark your retirement from the office which you had held so much to the credit of the state, and the satisfaction as well as the advantage of the country, by some emphatic expression of their sense of your distinguished service, and their pride that it had been rendered by a citizen of our commonwealth. It had been intended to address to you a communication which you would have liked to preserve and which would have been made public. That was desired by both senators and by the representatives including the two from the city of Boston,[1] with one exception. That gentleman [2] while having the kindliest regard for you was afraid it might be interpreted into an

[2] U. S. senator from Vermont, Captain Clark's native state.

[1] The two representatives from Boston were Joseph Aloysius Conry (b. 1868) and Henry Francis Naphen (1852–1905), Harvard College '78.

[2] Not identified.

approval of the administration in regard to Admiral Schley. So the matter was dropped as any division on political grounds on such a matter would have been annoying to us all. But we had all hoped to see you at the dinner to be given to Mr. Moody and to have assured Mr. Moody and you that a very large share of the honor he had gained came from the fact that he was your successor.[3] But for the unhappy reason [4] which you know the dinner had to be postponed. It will come off on the seventh of June.[5] I hope very much you will be able to come to Washington and take part in it. The occasion will be as much in your honor as in his, although the delegation have the kindest feeling and greatest respect for him. This is the desire, I am sure, of all of us. I believe Mr. Lovering [6] will write to you also.

I am with high regard,

Faithfully yours,
GEORGE F. HOAR

[3] W. H. Moody was secretary of the navy from May 1, 1902, to July 1, 1904.
[4] The death of Admiral Sampson on May 6.
[5] The dinner was again postponed.
[6] William C. Lovering, M. C. from Massachusetts.

1903

FRANK W. HACKETT TO JOHN D. LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
June 19, 1903

DEAR JOHN:

I have just read your article in the *Outlook* upon the subject of Schley's conduct before reaching Santiago. It is a perilous task for you to treat of this topic, and I want to extend my congratulations, because in my judgment, you have done the work admirably. One can hardly review the behavior of that officer without indignation. You exhibit self-control, good temper, and perfect fairness. To do so under the strong temptation to comment with severity is indeed a triumph. It is highly important historically that your final word should be spoken. It will, as it deserves, carry great weight. I, for one, am greatly pleased to see that this is done with so temperate a spirit.

A like commendation is due you, I think, for your handling of the very aggravating behavior of Admiral Dewey. You say just enough and say it with the right tone. If anything, you might have made it a little stronger, but after all the comparative mildness with which you speak adds to the gravity of the rebuke. I am glad to say this, not so much out of personal friendship, but because in common with all who know the facts, I recognize the great importance of having the record "kept straight."

Yours truly,
FRANK W. HACKETT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

JACOB W. MILLER TO JOHN D. LONG

NEW YORK
October 2, 1903

MY DEAR MR. LONG:

I do not wonder that you could not read my singular signature; perhaps you may call to mind, however, J. W. Miller, who was formerly a naval officer, and is now captain of the naval militia, state of New York.

General Tracy, who is our president, as well as the rest of us who are interested in the service, are very anxious that the ex-secretaries of the navy shall all be honorary vice-presidents, and

I sincerely trust that you will alter your decision and join the Navy League. We have worked very hard over its formation, and intend if possible, to make it equal to the similar bodies in Germany and England. The President, Secretary Moody, and Admiral Dewey are helping us. The position is purely honorary, and we are getting prominent men all over the country to lend us the use of their names. Our ambition is to have at least twenty thousand members for the first year. We now have nineteen sections formed and are publishing a journal monthly, and will meet with great success if we can get all patriotic citizens interested in the navy to help us. We of the central board here do not expect any active service from you except that whenever you can legitimately do so you will ask your friends to join the Massachusetts section, of which Captain J. W. Weeks is a member in Boston. I have again asked the secretary to send you all data on the subject.

Trusting that you will pardon me for writing again, from the fact that my only ambition is one of patriotism, believe me,

Yours respectfully,
J. W. MILLER[1]

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO JOHN D. LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
October 12, 1903

MY DEAR GOVERNOR LONG:

In the *Outlook* in an article written by you there has appeared this statement about me when I was assistant secretary to you: "Just before the war he, as well as some naval officers, was anxious to send a squadron across the ocean to sink the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers of the Spanish fleet while we were yet at peace with Spain." I am sure that you did not intend to state the proposition just as it is here expressed. My memory is that I wished to treat the sending over by Spain of her battleships and destroyers as a cause of war. My memory is also that when two or more of the armor-clads of Spain were in Havana – not on the coast of Spain – just before the outbreak of hostilities, I desired some of our ships sent down to watch them. Do you not refer to these two facts?

I would not bother you about this, my dear Governor, but it

[1] Jacob William Miller (1847–1918), general manager of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad.

seems to me to be a very serious accusation when brought against me by a gentleman of your high standing, my former chief; and it has seemingly been so accepted by the public at large, if I am to judge by the activity of the gentlemen of the press in seeking interviews with me this morning.

With regards to Mrs. Long, believe me,

Sincerely yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

JOHN D. LONG TO THEODORE ROOSEVELT[1]

HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS
October 14, 1903

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have your letter and nobody can regret more than I that I have, however unintentionally, caused you annoyance, especially if I have subjected you to any misapprehension on the part of the public. In writing for the *Outlook* some personal reminiscences of my naval association I referred by name to many of the navy men I had met, intending to speak always [a] good word and never an unkind one. When I came to you, I ought to have had in mind that you are now President and that any word about you should not be in such an unconventional style and might be misconstrued. But as I took notes from my diary I was thinking of you only as assistant secretary – of your ardor and enthusiasm and push in that capacity. I still think that I did justice to your energy and helpfulness, for I certainly intended to do so. When I wrote that your ardor sometimes went faster than that of the President and the department I certainly was saying what was common knowledge and what with many – I notice with most – people has redounded to your credit. As an instance of this quality I wrote the [words *cancelled*] sentence that you now quote and wrote them [it] without any thought of an attack upon you. Nor do I think they conveyed any such impression on the *Outlook* people, who, you know, are devoted friends of yours, as otherwise they would have so notified me. Because of the stir that sentence has made I should be glad if I had phrased

[1] This is a rough draft of Mr. Long's letter, and is illegible in many places.

them [it] differently or indeed if I had not written them [it] differently or indeed if I had not written them [it] at all. But the statement they contain I always regarded as almost common knowledge at the time and it was clearly my memory that you took the view there quoted that as you suggest in your letter now to me you regarded the approach of the Spanish fleet as a forerunner of war and thought it our duty to meet it on its way and sink it. The impression on my mind is that your word was "smash it." I know that this view was taken by several leading naval officers. The President and the department, on the other hand, held that the formal declaration of war must be waited for. It is justice to you to say that time was pressing: that the war was just on us and that, as I can not help thinking, you were more inclined to your view than you would have been if the ultimate resolution in such a case had been on you, as it now is and as it then was on the then President, for ultimate responsibility always makes a man more conservative and it has not infrequently happened that the hand whose caution is doubted becomes when on the helm the safest and steadiest.

Your second suggestion that when some of the Spanish armorclads were in Havana just before the war you desired some of our ships sent to Havana to watch them I do not recall, but it is, no doubt, correct.

I, too, have been beset by reporters. I have refused except in two instances to say anything: in those I spoke as above of the incidents [*illegible*] of the war at the moment and of the views of leading naval officers as to hitting the Spanish fleet on its way. I carefully refrained from saying more than I put in a written paragraph to that effect, but one reporter, when I declined to answer his questions further than by referring him to that paragraph, took the liberty after leaving me of framing one or two questions and answers of his own phraseology.

I have written [*Outlook* Company?] to send [me?] the bookplates that I may revise the phrasing of the sentence in question.

Very truly,

J[OHN] D. L[ONG]

To the PRESIDENT

JOHN D. LONG TO MRS. THOMAS B. REED

HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS
October 14, 1903

DEAR MRS. REED:

In spite of your injunction to the contrary, I must write you in reply to your letter just received. I am sure you are under a misapprehension. I entertained the greatest respect and personal regard for Mr. Reed and have often privately and publicly expressed my appreciation of his great ability and services. So far from any disparagement of him in my McKinley address at Adams, I intended to pay him, and I think I did pay him, the highest compliment when I said he was the most powerful five-minute debater that ever stood on the floor of Congress and then went on to describe the effect — the over-powering effect — of his assaults on his political opponents. He never seemed to me to have the effect — that is of driving everybody before him — in his longer speeches, and in the frank talks I have often had with him I think I have said the same thing to him. That certainly is not disparagement, to say that he was more irresistible in one line than in another. It is simply one of the entirely kindly distinctions which may always be drawn in estimating the abilities of public men.

I was referring to the time only, when he was on its floor with other great debaters like Carlisle [1] and Randall [2] and McKinley. McKinley later was on ways and means as chairman and was especially charged with its tariff bills and as you know in that capacity had the opportunity to make special impression on the country as to its revenue measures — more I think than any other. This is undoubtedly what gave him the presidency, because he was recognized, having been chairman of ways and means, as the special representative of protection. This, too, is simply one of the cases of estimate of the opportunities of public men and is entirely a matter of most proper statement.

I utterly fail to understand your suggestion of any disparagement of Mr. Reed's "character and honor." There is not a word in my speech suggesting such a thing. I could not say or conceive such a thing. A man of higher character, honor, truth and honesty, I have not known. My admiration for him in all these respects was

[1] John Griffin Carlisle (1835–1910), M. C. from Kentucky, Speaker.
[2] Samuel Jackson Randall (1828–1890), M. C. from Pennsylvania, Speaker.

unbounded. Have you not drawn an altogether unwarranted inference? and done me injustice? I can not tell you how pained I am at the thought that I have caused you pain, however unfounded it may be. You and Mr. Reed have been to me and to my family the objects of our warm personal regard, and your letter is a great grief to me, for I would not for the world cause you a regret.

Very sincerely yours,
JOHN D. LONG

THEODORE ROOSEVELT TO JOHN D. LONG

WASHINGTON, D. C.
Personal October 15, 1903

MY DEAR GOVERNOR:

I thank you for your letter. I am sure I need not tell you how well I know your kindly feelings towards me, which feelings found full expression in the general tenor of your article. I think, however, that it was a pity that in such an important matter as this I was not given a chance to try to refresh your memory on any point where we differed. It is perfectly true that I wished a declaration of war long before we did declare it; and I also desired notice to be sent to the Spanish government that we should treat the sailing of the fleet as an act of war, and then meet the fleet on the seas and smash it before it could act on the defensive. It was to my mind obvious that arm[or]ed cruisers and torpedo boats could not be used against the insurgents, and could only be intended for use against us. But this last is aside from the point. Don't you think the two statements you have made as to my attitude are in themselves a little inconsistent? You speak in one case as if I wished to send a fleet over to Spain and sink the Spanish boats while we were still at peace. In the other case you speak of the Spanish vessels as *having* sailed, and my being anxious to meet them on the sea and smash them. I am sure that you will recall that I had been urging a declaration of war for some time – that is, urging a declaration that we should take certain acts, or failures to act, as warranting such declaration after notice had been given. In the case of the sailing of the torpedo boats, I did wish us to notify the Spanish government that we should treat their being sent as an act of war. In the form in which the statement is made in the *Outlook*, I can not admit that either I or any naval officer whom I was associated with made it – indeed I do not recall such a suggestion made by any one, and certainly I

never made any such suggestion myself, as that we should send a squadron across the ocean to sink the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers while we were yet at peace with Spain. As I recall it, all that I remember any naval officer urging was that we should notify the Spanish government that we should treat the sailing of the vessels as an act of war, and that we would then conduct ourselves accordingly.

With regards to Mrs. Long, believe me,

Sincerely yours,
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Honorable JOHN D. LONG
HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS

JOHN D. LONG TO THEODORE ROOSEVELT

[ROUGH DRAFT]

HINGHAM, MASSACHUSETTS
October 17, 1903

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have your letter and am sure I can phrase the sentence so as to be satisfactory. I take it to be your view that you and some naval officers regarded the approach at that crucial time of a Spanish battle fleet as in itself a cause of war and that we ought to meet it without waiting for the more formal declaration of war, which, of course, only Congress could make. The words " while we were yet at peace with Spain " while technically correct, were therefore, I agree with you, calculated to convey a different meaning and one that I did not intend and I shall omit them as well as rev[ise] the rest.

I repeat that I regret any annoyance to which I have put you.

Mrs. Long appreciates your kind message to her and joins me in cordial regards to you and Mrs. Roosevelt.

Very truly yours,
JOHN D. LONG

To the PRESIDENT

1904

HENRY CABOT LODGE TO JOHN D. LONG

60 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts
March 18, 1904

Dear Governor Long:

I pay but little attention to the announcements in a hostile newspaper of candidacies in opposition to my return to the Senate.

Although I did not for a moment suppose that an old and very valued friend like yourself was to be a candidate against me, none the less the kind words reported from you in the Washington despatches this evening have touched and pleased me very greatly. I thank you for them most sincerely and I am especially gratified that you should say, "He will be returned without opposition," for I know how much weight your words will have and that they show that in your opinion I have earned by my service the approbation of Massachusetts as well as your own.

With my best thanks and kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,
Henry Cabot Lodge

Appendix

Vessels of the United States Navy in commission during the Spanish American War [1]

BATTLESHIPS

Indiana, 10,288 tons
Iowa, 11,340 tons
Massachusetts, 10,288 tons
Oregon, 10,288 tons
Texas, 6,315 tons

ARMORED CRUISERS

Brooklyn, 9,215 tons
New York, 8,200 tons

MONITORS

Amphitrite, 3,990 tons
Catskill, 1,875 tons [2]
Jason, 1,875 tons [2]
Lehigh, 1,875 tons [2]
Miantonomoh, 3,990 tons
Monadnock, 3,990 tons
Montawk, 1,875 tons [2]
Monterey, 4,084 tons
Nahant, 1,875 tons [2]
Nantucket, 1,875 tons [2]
Passaic, 1,875 tons [2]
Puritan, 6,060 tons
Terror, 3,990 tons
Wyandotte, 2,100 tons [2]

PROTECTED CRUISERS

Baltimore, 4,413 tons
Boston, 3,000 tons
Charleston, 3,730 tons
Chicago, 4,500 tons [3]
Cincinnati, 3,213 tons
Columbia, 7,375 tons
Minneapolis, 7,375 tons
Newark, 4,098 tons
New Orleans (*Amazonas*), 3,437 tons [4]
Olympia, 5,870 tons
Philadelphia, 4,324 tons
Raleigh, 3,213 tons
San Francisco, 4,098 tons

[1] The U. S. S. *Maine*, 6,682 tons, was blown up in the harbor of Havana on the night of February 15, 1898 by a mysterious explosion, with the loss of 266 men, including several officers. Names in parentheses are those borne by vessels before their purchase by the United States. Other ships of the United States Navy mentioned in the letters are: the *Kearsarge*, 11,525 tons; the *Alabama*, 11,525 tons, both commissioned in 1901, and the second battleship *Maine*, 12,500 tons, commissioned in 1902. Many vessels of minor importance are not included in this list.

[2] This vessel was a Civil War monitor used for harbor defense.

[3] Out of commission for repairs.

[4] Purchased in England while under construction for Brazil.

UNPROTECTED CRUISERS

Detroit, 2,089 tons
Lancaster, 3,250 tons
Marblehead, 2,089 tons
Mohican, 1,900 tons
Montgomery, 2,089 tons

GUNBOATS

Alvarado, 100 tons [5]
Annapolis, 1,000 tons
Bancroft, 839 tons
Bennington, 1,710 tons
Castine, 1,177 tons
Concord, 1,710 tons
Helena, 1,392 tons
Machias, 1,177 tons
Marietta, 1,000 tons
Monocacy, 1,370 tons
Nashville, 1,371 tons
Newport, 1,000 tons
Peoria (*Philadelphia*), 488 tons [6]
Petrel, 892 tons
Princeton, 1,000 tons
Topeka (*Diogenes*), 1,700 tons [7]
Vicksburg, 1,000 tons
Wheeling, 1,000 tons
Wilmington, 1,392 tons
Yorktown, 1,710 tons

TORPEDO BOATS

Cushing, 105 tons
Dupont, 165 tons
Ericsson, 120 tons
Foote, 142 tons
Gwin, 46½ tons
McKee, 65 tons
Morris, 105 tons
Porter, 165 tons
Rodgers, 142 tons
Talbot, 46½ tons
Winslow, 142 tons

CONVERTED CRUISERS

Badger (*Yumuri*), 4,784 tons
Buffalo (*El Cid*, *Nictheroy*), 6,888 tons [8]
Dixie (*El Rio*), 6,114 tons
Harvard (*New York*), 11,550 tons
Panther (*Venezuela*), 4,260 tons
Prairie (*El Sol*), 6,872 tons
St. Louis, 16,000 tons
St. Paul, 16,000 tons
Yale (*Paris*), 11,550 tons
Yankee (*El Norte*), 6,888 tons
Yosemite (*El Sud*), 6,179 tons

YACHTS [9]

Buccaneer, —— tons
Eagle (*Almy*), 434 tons
Gloucester (*Corsair*), 786 tons
Hist (*Thespia*), 472 tons
Mayflower, 2,690 tons
Scorpion (*Sovereign*), 850 tons
Vixen (*Josephine*), 806 tons
Wasp (*Columbia*), 630 tons
Yankton (*Penelope*), 975 tons

[5] Spanish prize.
[6] Converted gunboat.
[7] Purchased in England.
[8] Purchased in Brazil.
[9] There were twenty-seven yachts in all.

MISCELLANEOUS [10]

Albatross, Fish-commission vessel.
Armeria, 1,600 tons. Light-house tender.
Dolphin, 1,486 tons. Dispatch boat.
Fern, 840 tons. Transport.
Katahdin, 2,155 tons. Harbor-defense ram.
McCulloch, 1,280 tons. Revenue cutter.
Merrimac, 7,500 tons. Collier.
Osceola (*Winthrop*), 571 tons. Tug.
Potomac (*Wilmot*), 677 tons. Tug.
Resolute (*Yorktown*), 4,175 tons. Transport.
Solace (*Creole*), 4,700 tons. Hospital ship.
Supply (*Illinois*), 4,460 tons. Supply ship.
Suwanee, 2,185 tons. Light-house tender.
Uncas (*Walter A. Luckenback*), 441 tons. Tug.
Vesuvius, 929 tons. Dynamite-gun vessel.
Wompatuck (*Atlas*), 462 tons. Tug.

[10] There were thirty-nine tugs, sixteen colliers, fifteen revenue cutters, and about twenty-four other vessels of various types.

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